 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
10/8/08 |
 |
||||||||
|
 |
Home / Issues / International & G-8 Threat Reduction Project |
|
||||||||
|
|||||||||||
|
Perspectives On The G-8 Global Partnership Against The Spread Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction Testimony Og Kenneth N. Luongo Executive Director, Russian-AmericanNuclear Security Advisory Council To TheCommittee On Foreign Relations United States Senate Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to testify before the committee today on the G-8 Global Partnership, also known as the 10+10 Over 10 program. I am currently the Executive Director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a non-profit research organization dedicated to supporting cooperative threat reduction efforts with Russia and the Former Soviet States. RANSAC works closely with many governments, particularly in the U.S., Russia, and European states, to develop new cooperative nuclear security initiatives and to ensure the timely and effective implementation of existing cooperative threat reduction programs. I applaud the committee for holding this hearing at this time. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a very serious issue and the global effort to stem this proliferation and secure and destroy existing weapons and materials requires high-level attention and scrutiny of the type that this committee is providing today. I am pleased to address the committee today on the subject of the G-8's contributions to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction as I just returned from a week in Europe where I had many discussions on this subject. While the Global Partnership has very broad principles that span many global objectives, the heart of the initiative is focused initially on specific non-proliferation projects that can be undertaken with Russia. Therefore, my remarks will focus primarily on G-8-Russian non-proliferation activities. Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my formal statement and ask that the full text of my testimony be included in the official record of the hearing. The Status of Threat Reduction The U.S. Congress, in bipartisan action in 1991, laid the foundation for the cooperative security agenda by enacting what became known as the Nunn-Lugar program, named for its primary cosponsors, Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN). This initiative has since developed into a broad set of programs that involve a number of U.S. agencies, primarily the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. The government now provides these programs with approximately $900 million to $1 billion per year. Among the program's highlights:
In Russia, roughly 6,000 nuclear warheads have been removed from deployment; more than 400 missile silos have been destroyed; and almost 1,400 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers have been eliminated. The transportation of nuclear weapons has been made more secure, through the provision of security upgrade kits for railcars, secure blankets, and special secure containers. Storage of these weapons is gradually being upgraded at some sites, through the employment of security fencing and sensor systems, and computers have been provided in an effort to foster the creation of improved warhead control and accounting systems. With construction of the first wing of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, the nuclear components from more than 12,500 dismantled nuclear weapons will be safely stored in coming years. Security upgrades also are under way to improve the security of the roughly 600 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that exist outside of weapons primarily within Russia and improvements have been completed at all facilities containing weapon usable nuclear material outside of Russia. Through the Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, 150 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium has been eliminated. On the human side of the equation, almost 40,000 weapons scientists in Russia and other nations formed from the Soviet breakup have been provided support to pursue peaceful research or commercial projects. Beyond yielding such statistical rewards, these cooperative programs also have created an important new thread in the fabric of U.S.-Russian relations, one that has proven to be quite important during times of tension. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of the cooperative effort and the constant interaction among U.S. and Russian officials, military officers, and scientists has created a relationship of trust not thought possible during the Cold War. These relationships are an intangible benefit that is hard to quantify in official reports, but they are a unique result of this work. However, the news in threat reduction is not all good. Progress on this essential agenda has been lagging in key areas and in some projects work is at a virtual standstill. Cooperation under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was virtually suspended this Spring and Summer over a dispute concerning Russia's chemical and biological weapons declarations. This issue is likely to linger. U.S. restrictions on funding for chemical weapon destruction at Shchuch'ye have created a crisis that could result in the termination of the project. Access and transparency disagreements are impeding warhead and fissile material security efforts. The redirection of weapons scientists is not producing lasting and career-changing new employment opportunities. And our understanding of the Russian bio-weapons complex and its security needs are incomplete and therefore our efforts to manage this threat are lacking. Contributions From The G-8 To Threat Reduction Many of the recent G-8 summits have addressed the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Past summit statements have specifically focused on: nuclear reactor safety, radioactive environmental dangers, and the threat of nuclear proliferation from the FSU. However, there has been a mismatch between U.S. and other nation's financial contributions to the non-proliferation agenda. Since 1992, the U.S. has provided approximately $7 billion to nonproliferation activities in Russia while G-8 nations have spent substantially less. Some of the key G-8 activities are: Nuclear Reactor Safety During the Munich Summit in 1992, the G-7 established a multilateral program for financing nuclear safety improvements for countries in Central Europe and the FSU, and in 1993 proposed that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) establish the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) to receive contributions from donor countries for the financing of short-term operational and safety improvements of civilian reactors, specifically the VVER 440/230 and RBMK-type reactors. NSA played a critical role in officially decommissioning the Chernobyl site in December 2000. In addition to the NSA, the EBRD also administers the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF). This program was established after the 1997 Denver Summit, during which the G-7, European Union, and Ukraine agreed to establish a multilateral funding mechanism to assist Ukraine to transform the existing Chernobyl sarcophagus over the destroyed Unit 4 into a stable and environmentally safe system. The objective of the program is to stabilize the existing sarcophagus and to build a confinement facility around it to isolate its radioactive materials from damaging the surrounding environment and water supplies. Stabilization is expected by 2003, while completion of the confinement is anticipated in 2006. Nuclear Smuggling During the 1996 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in Moscow, the G-8 initiated the "Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material." The G-8 made the following pledges:
Plutonium Disposition Also during the 1996 Summit, the G-8 began to identify possible means of international cooperation to address the management and disposal of plutonium no longer required for defense purposes. Since 1996, G-8 countries have been examining the mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel pathway and/or immobilizing plutonium. France, Germany, Canada, and Japan have all been involved in the investigation of MOX fuel fabrication in Russia. Now that both Russia and the United States have signed an agreement to dispose 68 metric tons (34 tons each) of excess weapons-grade plutonium no longer needed for defense purposes, plans are starting to move forward. Beyond the studies, however, limited funding has been provided. Other Multilateral and Bilateral Efforts Involving G-8 Nations Besides activities undertaken through the G-8 auspices, individual G-8 nations have developed specific bilateral non-proliferation cooperation with Russia and the FSU states and are participating in other multilateral activities. International Science and Technology Center All of the G-8 nations are partners in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. Through September 2002, the international contributions to ISTC from the donor countries have totaled $452.8 million, for 1,625 projects. This program has, according to ISTC, provided employment to more 30,000 weapons scientists. The European Nuclear Cities Initiative In December 1999, Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a program called the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI). This program is envisioned as a complement to the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) in its effort to facilitate economic development and downsizing in the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Like NCI, ENCI will address ways to eliminate the economic strain on key facilities in the Russian nuclear complex---in particular the cities of Sarov and Snezhinsk---thus eliminating a source of potential leakage of fissile materials and knowledgeable scientists to countries posing a proliferation risk. The ENCI, through a working group it has established consisting of European, Russia, and U.S. representatives, hopes to coordinate the various European countries' inputs into Russian nonproliferation projects to avoid overlap. The immediate ENCI priority is to focus on the development of a "roadmap" of pilot projects in Russia's closed nuclear cities that meet key criteria such as a demonstrated market demand, and an ability to meet international product manufacturing and quality assurance requirements. As currently envisioned, funding for ENCI projects is likely to be channeled through the European Union's Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, the ISTC, and bilateral programs. Plutonium Disposition Throughout the 1990s, both Germany and France supported bilateral plutonium disposition technology development in Russia. In 1998, the two countries decided to merge their efforts under a trilateral agreement. The main objective of this program was the construction of a plutonium conversion facility and a MOX-fuel fabrication facility capable of processing 2.3 MT of weapons plutonium each year. The project would utilize German technology and French financing. The U.S., Italy, and Belgium also planned contributions to the construction of the facility. The total cost of the project was believed to be $1.7 billion. This project was frozen when funding provided by the U.S. and France was not sufficient to meet required costs, and Siemens, the German contractor, discontinued its plans to produce the necessary equipment in 2001. Nuclear Submarine and Fuel Management Since the days before the Soviet Union's dissolution, Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway, have been concerned about dumping of nuclear waste in northwest Russia in the Barents and Kara Sea region. Additional concerns have focused on Russia's many retired and deteriorating nuclear reactor-powered vessels, some of which are still fully fueled, and pose a proliferation threat. In 1994, after conducting a series of studies in search of solutions, Norway developed a "Plan of Action" to address concerns of an aging Russian nuclear fleet in the region. The Plan of Action has four priority areas: 1) safety measures at nuclear facilities; 2) spent fuel management and radioactive waste issues; 3) radioactive pollution in the Barents and Kara Seas; and 4) arms-related environmental hazards. In addition to its bilateral relationship with Russia, Norway is also involved in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Initiative (AMEC), which includes the U.S., Russian, and Norwegian defense establishments. Established in 1996, AMEC focuses on environmental hazards associated with military activities in the Arctic. To a great extent, AMEC initially complemented the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which, among other things, is assisting in the dismantlement of Russian strategic submarines. The three militaries work together on specific environmental issues associated with the removal and storage of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines being decommissioned and dismantled in Northwest Russia. This spent fuel, if not properly managed, could release significant concentrations of radioactivity into the sensitive Arctic environment and ecosystems. Additionally, this nuclear fuel material poses a serious security issue. Bilateral Activities of the United Kingdom In addition to the roughly $36 million the United Kingdom has contributed to the Nuclear Safety Account, a new effort was launched in late 2000, in which the UK government pledged up to $120 million over three years for nuclear problems in Russia and the FSU. This budget will cover work in Northwest Russia to decommission Russian nuclear submarines, the UK commitment to plutonium disposition, security, material accountancy and physical protection projects, commitment to the international Chernobyl shelter fund and projects to assist diversity and business development in the closed nuclear cities. Within this commitment, the U.K. intends to provide $4.5 million for cooperation with closed city scientists. Concerning the decommissioned submarines, both sides hope to begin work soon on the construction of a UK-funded interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility in the Murmansk region, costing up to $7.5 million. Discussions about other projects are ongoing, pending the final establishment of a legal framework for nuclear cooperation between the UK and Russia. Bilateral Activities of Canada Bilateral relations between Canada and Russia on nuclear issues were established in 1989 when they signed a nuclear cooperative agreement. In June 1992, both countries launched a three-year, $30 million program called the Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative (CNSI). The main purpose of CNSI was to enhance the short-term safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power stations through technical assistance and safety and regulatory training. Canada established the Nuclear Safety and Engineering Program in which nuclear experts from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) work directly with Russian personnel on RBMK nuclear plant management and safety procedures at a handful of Soviet-designed plants. In addition to CNSI, the Canadian government administers an internship program for high-level officials of Russian regulatory agencies to study nuclear safety issues at its Atomic Energy Control Board. Canada has also started receiving shipments of MOX nuclear fuel under the Parallex Project, which will provide technical information on the performance of Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors to facilitate the disposition of excess U.S. and Russian weapons plutonium. Bilateral Activities of Germany The Federal Republic of Germany's most sustained nonproliferation support to Russia has focused on chemical weapons destruction. In 1993, it committed funds to the production of a facility for this purpose in Gorny, which initiated its pilot destruction activities this year. Germany has committed approximately $30.5 million to chemical weapons destruction in Russia. Germany also supported limited upgrades of physical security systems and analytical and accountancy capabilities for nuclear materials in the Russian Federation. Bilateral Activities of Japan Japan is another important contributor to enhancing nuclear security in the FSU. Most of its funding for nuclear efforts goes through nongovernmental organizations, and most of this cooperation has consisted of information exchanges and delegations, and seminars on specific topics in both countries. Japan began government-to-government cooperation with Russia in the 1990s. In 1993, the Japanese government pledged approximately $100 million to support the dismantlement of nuclear submarines in Russia, primarily focusing on the disposal of radioactive liquid waste. In June 1999, at the Cologne Summit, Japan pledged an additional $200 million for continued support of dismantlement of decommissioned submarines in the Russian Far East, conversion of Russian military resources to the private sector, and disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. Japan's nuclear assistance can be largely broken down into four areas: 1) management of radioactive waste; 2) dismantlement of nuclear submarines; 3) maintenance of civilian reactors; and 4) fast-breeder reactor development. Bilateral Activities of France France's bilateral cooperation with Russia has been somewhat limited, though valuable. The government of France has provided 100 super-containers to Russia to facilitate the transport of nuclear warheads from heavy SS-18 missiles by railcar. European Union Activities The European Union has been identified as a potential contributor to the Global Partnership and therefore it seems appropriate to provide a brief overview of its threat reduction related activities. Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States The European Union has provided over €140 million through the TACIS program for nonproliferation programs in Russia. It has provided assistance in market reform, grant assistance and research projects for weapons scientists. Nuclear Safety Including the funds given by EU countries of the G-8 to aid in decommissioning Chernobyl, the EU, through TACIS, has over the period of 1991-1999 committed roughly $640 million to international efforts to improve FSU nuclear safety. A total number of 650 projects have been financed, 450 projects are ongoing and another 200 are in the pipeline. The EU plans to continue its nuclear safety program in the FSU well into the next decade. The European Union Cooperation Programme for Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation This program, also, known as the Joint Action Russia Programme (JARP), was formed as a result of the EU Common Strategy on Russia. Its objectives include:
The Northern Fleet's Lepse Vessel Beyond reactor safety, the EU has also become involved in securing the Lepse fuel storage vessel, a program that was initiated by Norway. Between 1962 and 1981, the Lepse was used as a service ship at the nuclear icebreaker base in waters in Northwest Russia. Since then, the Lepse has been used as floating storage for spent nuclear fuel from the reactors of nuclear icebreakers. The 624 spent fuel assemblies onboard the Lepse today are under highly unsatisfactory conditions; the fuel has become partially jammed in the holding tubes and is now difficult to remove. The EU expert group appropriated $18.5 million for a technical solution to the Lepse problem. Funding was provided by the EU's TACIS program. The G-8 Global Partnership The statement at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit on the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction was a major step forward for G-8 threat reduction efforts. Under this initiative, the G-8 nations committed to support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Since threat reduction activities had recently passed their ten-year anniversary the agreement at the Summit, that these programs should continue for another decade but with substantially more funding and participation from countries other than the U.S., has provided a framework for thinking concretely about the future of threat reduction with Russia and the FSU. Further, the G-8 leaders called on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology:
While these broad principles may form the basis of a global effort to control WMD, the immediate objective of the G-8 initiative is to raise up to $20 billion for these projects over the next ten years. The G-8 statement does specify projects that are of interest, including: destruction of chemical weapons; dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines; the disposition of fissile materials; and employment of former weapons scientists. The assumption is that the U.S. would bear the cost of about half the $20 billion since it is currently spending about $1 billion per year on threat reduction activities in Russia and the FSU. However, as the attached table indicates, even if the U.S. spends $10 billion over the next decade, only $3.4 to $3.8 billion - or slightly more than one-third - of the remaining $10 billion has been publicly pledged by other G-8 nations to date. If an EU contribution of $1 billion over ten years is added in then the contribution percentage is raised to almost half. But the source of the remainder of the G-8 funding is not completely clear at this point. Further, under the terms of the statement made by G-8 leaders regarding the crediting of contributions against the $20 billion target, there are some accounting loopholes. For example, funds that are obligated to nonproliferation efforts by G-8 countries from the date of the statement can be included in the total contribution. This would allow prior appropriations made by member countries to be counted toward the $20 billion contribution. There are numerous sensitivities regarding the G-8 initiative and the financing is chief among them. Given the budgetary pressures on the other G-8 nations it is not clear that they will be able to find substantially new money to support this initiative. Therefore, one option is to exchange Russian debt to key nations in return for non-proliferation activities in Russia as a source of meeting the $10 billion pledge. In this regard, the passage of the Russian Federation Debt for Non-Proliferation Act of 2002 as part of the FY03 Foreign Relations Authorization Act is a welcome development. The legislation could allow the U.S. to trade up to $2.7 billion in Russian lend-lease and agricultural debt for equivalent amounts of non-proliferation investment. I applaud the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its essential role in sponsoring and passing this legislation. However, if the U.S. decides to trade some or all of its debt for non-proliferation activities in Russia, these funds should supplement the roughly $1 billion that the U.S. is currently spending on threat reduction. These funds should not be used as a substitute for this appropriated funding. The infusion of additional funding could create new opportunity for progress on this agenda. The G-8 member state attitudes on reducing Russia's debt burden, however, are varied. Germany, which is by far the largest creditor in the Paris Club where Russia owes them over $20 billion, has concerns about the reduction of Russia's debt. Some states, however, such as Italy and France, have both expressed support for debt reduction initiatives. Neither Canada, the United Kingdom, nor Japan have made direct statements on relieving Russia's debt, although in general international financial negotiations, the former two have tended to be supportive of debt relief initiatives like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, whereas Japan has usually been opposed. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Russia's position on a debt-swap program is not completely clear. Some officials are arguing that it may hurt their international credit rating at a point when Russia has begun to manage its foreign debt sufficiently or that it could spur inflation. Global Partnership Programmatic Priorities Another set of issues that the Global Partnership will need to deal with is the prioritization and coordination of activities. The initiative must be carefully structured and coordinated to ensure the maximum efficient use of the funds and to generate real progress. It is clear from the attached table that the major interests of the G-8 nations other than the U.S. are in chemical weapons destruction, submarine dismantlement, plutonium disposition, and nuclear safety. Some of these interests overlap with the U.S. and some could cover areas where the U.S. is not currently focused. Coordination will be necessary to avoid duplicative spending. But there are some hints that some G-8 nations may be interested in additional activities including assisting with the security of nuclear material and the physical protection of sub-strategic warheads. What is lacking, however, in the statements by G-8 nations on the projects that they want to fund, is an urgent focus on brain drain and the redirection of former weapons scientists. This is a persistent problem that will increase in importance in coming years. In recent months there have been clear indications that the conversion of defense production facilities in Russia ranks very high on Washington's list of non-proliferation priorities. Such a focus will generate more excess weapons scientists. To date, the re-employment programs for weapons scientists, while essential, are not working well in any of the WMD complexes in Russia and the FSU. While some European G-8 nations believe that the issue of scientist conversion is to be dealt with at the EU level, it is clear that no G-8 country or the EU is doing enough in this area. It has been reported that the EU is to contribute $1 billion to the Global Partnership and it has been speculated that these funds may be primarily utilized for plutonium disposition. Addressing the redirection of weapons scientists is an equal if not greater priority than plutonium disposition and the EU and individual G-8 nations should seriously consider providing substantial funding for this purpose. Besides the U.S., Germany, Canada, and the U.K. have spelled out their Global Partnership contributions in the greatest detail to date. In Canada the top program priority is the security and disposition of submarine fuel. For Germany the top three priorities are facilitating chemical weapons destruction at Kambarka, submarine dismantlement, and securing nuclear materials and waste. While Germany has been active in plutonium disposition in the past, the recent election has made German participation in MOX-based plutonium disposition impossible. Germany will utilize a pre-existing agreement with Russia to implement its programs. The U.K. has increased its participation in threat reduction activities over the past few years, previously approving $125 million over three years. But at the Kananaskis Summit, the U.K. committed another $750 million over 10 years. The top U.K. priorities are nuclear safety and security, plutonium disposition, and submarine dismantlement and disposition. However, the U.K. has run into substantial difficulty in finalizing an agreement with Russia that would exempt British funds from taxes and protect the country from liability in nuclear projects. As a result, some of the original $125 million is being spent on U.S.-developed projects and the expenditure of the promised $750 million awaits the finalization of the agreement. The experience of the U.K. raises questions about how Russia will improve the overall environment in which threat reduction operates. Financial transparency, facility access, and legal protections are all key issues that are impeding many threat reduction efforts among the G-8 nations and the EU. There is also a question about the structural ability of Russia to absorb a potential doubling of threat reduction funding. Only Russia can address these issues authoritatively. Therefore, strong political will is necessary in that country to ensure that the G-8 initiative is kindled to life and that it thrives. Conclusion In conclusion, I would leave the committee with five questions that I believe are not yet answered about the G-8 Global Partnership.
The 10 plus 10 over 10 Initiative: Contributions and Proposed Projects
Biography KENNETH N. LUONGO Mr. Luongo is currently the Executive Director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, an organization dedicated to the preservation and expansion of U.S.-Russian cooperative nuclear security activities. He is also a Visiting Research Collaborator with Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security. Prior to these positions, Mr. Luongo served as the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy and the Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of Energy. In addition, Mr. Luongo served as the Director of the Department of Energy's Russia and Newly Independent States Nuclear Material Security Task Force and as the Director of DoE's North Korea Task Force. Prior to these positions, he served as a staff member in the U.S. Congress with the House Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), and Senator William Proxmire (D-WI); as the Senior Washington Representative for Arms Control and International Security with the Union of Concerned Scientists; and as a Senior Program Associate at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Mr. Luongo is a member of the Board of Directors of the Arms Control Association, and the Federation of American Scientists, and a Member of the Council of the British American Security Information Council. October 2002 [1] Werner Kolhoff. “Russischer Atomschrott und deutsche Geschäfte,” Berlinter Zeitung. June 28, 2002. Personal Translation. [2] Agence France Press. “G8 Clinches deal to secure Russian plutonium: German source.” June 27, 2002. Informal remarks of German official. [3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin. “Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Russia's Political Director in the Group of Eight, Meets with Gianfranco Facco Bonetti, Italian Ambassador to Moscow.” September 17, 2002. [4] Charles Digges. “G8 Pledges $20 billion to Secure Russian Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Bellona. June 28, 2002. [5] “U.S.-Russia Identify New Ways to Reduce Excess Nuclear Materials”. Washington File, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, September 17, 2002. http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile. [6] Asahi News Service. “Japan to sweeten Russia arms proposal.” June 29, 2002. [7] Kyodo News Service. “Japan backs weapon disposal with $200 million.” June 28, 2002. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20020628a2.htm. [8] Mike Trickey. “Russia, Mideast steal Africa’s limelight: Big bucks go to Putin, media focus on peace plan,” Ottawa Citizen. June 28, 2002. [9] Reuters. “G8 frets on ex-Soviet nuclear arms, works on deal.” June 27, 2002. [10] Nikolai Vlasov. “Canadian PM satisfied with agreement on financing elimination of Soviet weapons of mass destruction,” RIA Novosti. June 28, 2002. [11] Tony Blair. “Statement on the G8 Summit in Kananaskis,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office. July 1, 2002. [12] Reuters, ibid, AFP, ibid. |
|
|
|
© 2007 Partnership for Global Security. All rights reserved. Privacy Statement.