2/6/12 Home / Issues / Proliferation Risks & Threats www PGS Printer Friendly Page   Seminar 1: Russian Contributions to Nonproliferation Diplomacy and Anti-Terrorism Efforts March 14, 2003 Prepared by Lauren Arestie On March 14, 2003, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held the first meeting of its 2003 seminar series for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The session addressed Russia's role in nonproliferation diplomacy-specifically in the cases of Iraq, Iran and North Korea-and in the war on terrorism. Remarks by Dr. Ariel Cohen, Research Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation: This is a critical period in terms of the number of countries seeking and gaining nuclear capabilities. For example, North Korea likely already has two bombs and is actively making more, and Iran is in rapid pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iraq's program to create weapons of mass destruction has been ongoing for 25 years, although it went somewhat off-track under UN sanctions. The country feels that it needs such weapons to be a dominant power in the Middle East. Iraq has received assistance in terms of supplies and technical knowledge from countries in the former Soviet Union, but its early nuclear reactors and centrifuges came from France. There is a historically close relationship between Baghdad and Moscow. Russia had several lucrative military agreements with Iraq, and Iraqi scientists often studied at Russian universities. There are currently Russian missiles in Iraq, but they are likely the result of illicit arms deals rather than official contracts. It is difficult to track the origin of these missiles because they passed through many countries before arriving in Iraq. Iran is currently more dangerous to Western interests than Iraq because it is not under sanctions. Additionally, Russia is actively pursuing proliferation to Iran under the umbrella of civilian nuclear projects that utilize dual-use technologies. Recently discovered centrifuges in Iran are ostensibly intended to enrich uranium to reactor-grade, but it would not be difficult to use their technology to produce weapons-grade uranium. Even indigenous production of reactor fuel is dangerous; it means that Russia will no longer control the spent fuel from reactors it is building. It is the greed of Russian officials that keeps them from seeing the strategic threat of providing nuclear capabilities to Iran. Iran maintains that it has a right to nuclear weapons, and has stated that it would like to eradicate Israel. Its desire for nuclear weapons is indicative of an emerging coalition of countries that oppose U.S. dominance in the region. There is no economic reason for Iran to have nuclear reactors. The country regularly flares off more natural gas from its immense reserves than the total power its nuclear reactor projects would provide. Therefore, it is imperative for the United States to obtain international cooperation from Russia, France and Germany to stop the sale of dual-use nuclear technologies to Iran. Remarks by Dr. Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The current dispute between "Old" Europe and the United States over Iraq is a problem for Russia. Russia's principle direction in recent years has been toward integration with the West. A fractured West, therefore, puts President Putin in an awkward position, and he would like to see the differences between the two sides bridged. It is not certain how Russia would vote on a UN Security Council resolution calling for military force in Iraq. Putin keeps his own council, separate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he might take a different direction than that stated by his foreign minister. Business interests in Russia, who have more direct contact with Putin, have actually been urging him to side with the United States. But there is a presidential election next year, and Putin has no incentive to support the United States in a policy that is unpopular domestically. A Russian veto of a Security Council resolution, however, would not be a watershed event in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Russians believe that war does not make sense, but their primary concern is the protection of their economic interests in Iraq. Iran is a bigger thorn in the side of the U.S.-Russian relationship. There is a fear in Russia that the United States could become dizzy with success after a easy invasion of Iraq, and might seek to invade Iran. This is troubling because there is a deeper relationship between Moscow and Tehran, including their common interests in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran has acquired nuclear-related technology from many sources. The source of its technical expertise, however, is very unclear. It is not certain that Iran will build nuclear weapons, but it is now in a position to do so. It is also not clear if and when Russia became aware of Iran's enrichment program. Russia and Iran are close to securing a deal for Russia to remove and dispose of the spent fuel in the reactors it is building. But by creating its own reactor fuel processing facilities, Iran is hedging its bets so that it does not become dependent on Russia. Remarks by Dr. Angela Stent, Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and Eastern European Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University The UN Security Council is one of the few remaining arenas where Russia can still play the role of a great power. Putin has renounced some of Yeltsin's great power aspirations, and is focused on economic modernization to improve its domestic and international situation. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) operates semi-independently from the Russian government, as do most of the country's private energy companies. Minatom signs contracts with states such as Iran, Iraq or North Korea largely out of economic need. The government itself receives little money from these nuclear agreements. Russia says officially that it supports WMD nonproliferation, but it often challenges the United States' definition of what constitutes proliferation. There is an important economic element to Putin's courting of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, namely the desire to link Russian and Korean railroads. Russia's close relationship with Iran, by contrast, has domestic political as well as economic roots. There is the fear that Iran could destabilize the Russian Federation if it so desired, by appealing to fundamentalist Islamic elements within Russia. There is more that the United States could do to secure Russian assistance in the cause of WMD nonproliferation. Thus far, the Russians feel that they have been loyal partners in the war on terror, but have not received enough rewards for doing so.

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