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Home / Issues / Russian International Nuclear Cooperation |
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Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional "Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Series" Seminar 1: Russia's Nuclear Cooperation with Iran and China April 27, 2001 Prepared by Kelly M. Turner In late April, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) initiated a series of non-partisan seminar briefings for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The first seminar addressed Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran and China. (A list of the future seminars is provided at the end of this document.) Three speakers made presentations on these issues. The following is a summary of their remarks. Remarks by John Holum, Vice President for International and Governmental Affairs, Atlas Air; former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Russia-China Nuclear Cooperation Following a long-standing rift between both countries - dating from the late 1950s - Russia and China have resumed a cooperative relationship. A top Russia priority is the sale of civilian nuclear energy technology, including light water reactors, a fusion research reactor, and an IAEA-safeguarded enrichment facility. Details of Russian nuclear assistance to China with potential military applications, however, are not well known. There is speculation that Russia is working with China on a fast-breeder reactor, sharing technology that could contribute to Chinese MIRV capabilities, and conducting joint research on a secret nuclear center. Holum indicated that there are both political and economic incentives driving Russian cooperation with China. On the economic side, he pointed out that nuclear technology sales to China could provide Russia billions of dollars in revenue, as well as employment for former weapons complex personnel who are struggling to find work in post-Cold War era. Even though U.S. assistance programs created nonproliferation incentives for many nuclear institutes to carefully screen their exports and nuclear cooperation with sensitive countries, Holum noted that Russian authorities might be turning a blind eye to some of the "dirtier" entities that are marketing sensitive technology wherever customers can be found. Political motivations for closer cooperation between both countries are also emerging. Both countries view the United States as too powerful and seek to curtail that power abroad, and both oppose U.S. development of a national missile defense (NMD) system. The NMD issue in particular could be a catalyst for greater Sino-Russian cooperation. Since China sees NMD as giving the U.S. greater freedom to aid Taiwan during a crisis, it should be expected that China will do what it takes to modernize its forces to penetrate missile defenses, including seeking assistance from Russia. Russia may be willing to oblige, since Chinese force modernization will not materially alter the risks to Russia. Support for China's weapons would also fortify a common front against NMD, undercut U.S. defenses, and cement a lucrative civil nuclear relationship. However, Holum stressed that at this point in time, there are no confirmed reports of any broad-scale Russian support for Chinese nuclear weapons. Holum argued that even without Russian nuclear assistance, China currently has the capability, resources, and expertise to significantly modernize its arsenal. Russian assistance could save China time but not affect the outcome if China decides to move forward with a major modernization. The exact scope and size of military assistance provided to China could take any number of forms. At the furthest and most speculative extreme, it is not inconceivable that Russia could transfer entire strategic systems - such as the SS-27 ICBM - to China. China, for its part, may refuse such extensive cooperation, since it would become dependent on external suppliers for its defense needs. Holum concluded by saying US nonproliferation strategy should be grounded in several realities. First, China has the capacity to expand and upgrade its nuclear arsenal without assistance from other countries, and is capable of transferring enabling technologies to "rogue states." Second, regardless of how the United States proceeds on missile defense, it is still in our interest to prevent the emergence of a rogue state threat and limit its potential. Nonproliferation programs and policies, while not 100% effective in dealing with these issues, do constrain the threats to the point where other approaches can work. Defense and nonproliferation are not alternatives, but they work together, and the effect is cumulative. Third, nonproliferation efforts with China have made considerable progress over the past decade, but there is still much to be done. Finally, China and Russia must be engaged in efforts to limit to the spread of weapons of mass destruction; without them, there will never be a solution. Remarks by Gary Samore, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Department of State Russia-Iran Nuclear Cooperation In the early 1980s, Iran embarked on a program to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Unlike other countries that have gone down this path - such as India and Pakistan - Iran's nuclear program is heavily dependent on foreign assistance to develop nearly all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including technology to produce fissile material, which is the key factor in nuclear weapons development. As a result, maintaining an international nuclear embargo on Iran - even for civilian nuclear technologies - has been a top priority for the United States. Over the past 20 years, the United States has been largely successful in persuading European nations not to renew nuclear cooperation with Iran. Notably, the German government suspended its work on the partially completed nuclear power plan at Bushehr. As a result, Iran has turned to other potential suppliers, including Russia. In 1992, Russia agreed in principle to finish the Bushehr nuclear power plant and also began negotiating possible deals for research reactors and sensitive fuel cycle technology. The U.S. has tried to convince Russia to cancel the Bushehr project, arguing that Iran could not be trusted to abide by its NPT commitments to remain a non-nuclear weapons state, and that the project would help Iran develop broader nuclear expertise, even if the power reactor itself would not directly support a weapons program. Russia, however, continued to assist Iran at Bushehr, countering that Iran was not in violation of its NPT commitments and that light water nuclear power technology under IAEA safeguards does not pose a serious proliferation threat. When the U.S. learned in 1994 that Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov had promised to provide Iran with an entire nuclear fuel cycle, including additional power reactors, research reactors, fuel fabrication facilities, and uranium enrichment centrifuge plant, President Clinton complained to Russian President Yeltsin. This ultimately led to a confidential agreement penned by Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in late 1995 that stated Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran would be limited to unit 1 of the Bushehr plant (and related fuel and training). In Samore's opinion, if Russia had actually complied with the 1995 agreement, the issue of Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran would not have reemerged as such a major issue. However, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) constantly sought to overturn or evade the agreement, especially after Evgeny Adamov became minister in 1998. Many people suspected that Adamov was quietly encouraging - or at least tolerating - sales of fuel cycle technology to Iran as part of a package to sell additional power reactors. Adamov acknowledged in private that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons, but, according to Samore, he seemed to think Minatom could dangle enough sensitive technology to entice Iran to buy additional reactors, "without giving away the nuclear store." In response, the Clinton administration did three things:
Reflecting on future challenges, Samore stated that while Russia seems committed to civilian nuclear power cooperation with Iran, the prospects are good that this cooperation can be limited to non-sensitive areas for a couple of reasons. First, the new Atomic Energy Minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, comes from the Kurchatov Institute, an institute that has focused on scientific cooperation with the U.S. It is believed that Rumyantsev has a less personal interest in maintaining the nuclear connection to Iran, and has a clearer recognition of the benefits of cooperating with the U.S. Second, the Duma seems poised to amend a Russian law to allow for the importation and storage of foreign spent power reactor fuel, which Minatom estimates could be worth as much as $20 billion. The U.S. government has said little on this internal Russian matter, but the project will require U.S. support to succeed, because it has consent rights over the transportation and disposition of U.S.-origin fuel, which represents nearly 70% of the material available for storage in Russia. If the U.S. ultimately decides to support this project, it could provide leverage to convince Russia to limit its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Remarks by Andrei Zobov, Senior Consultant, Carnegie Moscow Center/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Program Russian Cooperation with Iran Zobov characterized the nuclear relationship between Russia and Iran as complex and identified several historical, political, economic, and strategic reasons for this cooperation. The change in leadership at Minatom from Adamov to Rumyantsev is likely to alter Russia's relationship with Iran, but it is still unclear how this cooperation will evolve. For example, Adamov argued that Minatom had the legal authority to provide the Bushehr nuclear power plant with four reactors instead of one, whereas now, under Rumyantsev, Minatom remains uncommitted to the number of reactors. Further, in Zobov's opinion, while Adamov was inclined to put other sensitive technologies on the negotiating table with Iran, Rumyantsev is likely to be more cautious in offering "sweeteners" in a reactor deal with Iran. Despite the uncertain policy positions Rumyantsev will take, Zobov highlighted a number of reasons why Russian-Iranian nuclear power cooperation will likely continue:
Zobov believed that civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran, however, would continue and argued that the United States should accept this cooperation as long as it is conducted within the NPT/IAEA framework. The Russian leadership understands that there have been strong negative reactions in the United States over the Bushehr nuclear power plant assistance, particularly regarding Russian pledges to provide fuel and related training. It should be noted, however, Russia is not the only country to have provided Iran with nuclear assistance; the industry was started by the United States and many Iranians have received nuclear engineering education and training in the West. Zobov recommended that Russia and the United States continue a dialogue to bridge the gap on the Iran issue. A key topic that should be addressed during future consultations with the United States is the evaluation of so-called "trigger-list" technologies that could contribute to a nuclear weapons production capability, and should, therefore, be subject to strict export controls and possibly sanctions. Although the IAEA has established a trigger list of sensitive nuclear equipment, Zobov recommended that a panel of experts from the United States and Russia be organized to develop a trigger list of items specifically in the case of Iran or other "rogue states." This would help achieve agreement on more precise boundaries for legitimate cooperation with Iran. Russian Cooperation with China Zobov also briefly reviewed Russia's nuclear cooperation with China since the late 1940s. Between 1955-1958, there were six Soviet-China agreements that helped China move forward in its nuclear weapons program. As the Sino-Soviet relationship began to deteriorate in the late 1950s, however, Nikita Khrushchev opted to withdraw Soviet assistance. Despite this disengagement, China constructed its first nuclear bomb in 1964. Although it is difficult to know with certainty the exact degree to which Soviet assistance accelerated the Chinese weapons effort, most experts believe that Soviet cooperation saved China 10-15 years in building its nuclear bomb. Cooperation between Russia and China has since renewed. However, the prevailing attitude in Russia, according to Zobov, is that nuclear cooperation with China is only temporary, and is unlikely to become a robust, long-standing Russian commitment. Russian political leaders realize China may be a good nuclear partner now but will not necessarily remain one in the future. Russian exporters genuinely interested in strengthening nonproliferation regimes and national security must therefore avoid providing China with nuclear and other strategically sensitive expertise. The future schedule of RANSAC briefings is as follows: May 18: Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Activities in Russia, Noon to1:30 PM, Mike Mansfield Room (S-207), Capitol June 8: Status and Future of Russian Nuclear Forces, Noon to 1:30 PM, Rayburn House Office Building, B-339 July 13: Russian Nuclear Security Decision-Making and Negotiating Behavior, Noon to 1:30 PM, Rayburn House Office Building, B-339 |
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