Mr. Chairman, in my testimony today I will providea summary of Russian assistance to Iran's weapons of mass destruction programsand its ballistic missile delivery systems. The Iranians regard these programs-- and assistance to them -- as among their highest state secrets and goto great lengths to hide them from us. As a result, our knowledge of theseprograms is based on extremely sensitive sources and methods. This precludesme from providing many details in open session. But I hope this summarywill be of use to the Committee, and we will continue to keep the Committeeinformed of additional details in classified briefings.

Nuclear

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a fewcomments on Russian aid to Iran's nuclear power and nuclear weapons program.The Intelligence Community judges that Iran is actively pursuing the acquisitionof fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary to formthe material into nuclear weapons. As part of this process, Iran is attemptingto develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly-enricheduranium.

As part of this effort, Iran is seeking nuclear-relatedequipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of foreignsources, most notably in Russia. Tehran claims that it seeks foreign assistanceto master nuclear technology for civilian research and nuclear energy programs.However, the expertise and technology gained -- along with the contactsestablished -- could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons effort.

-- Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawattnuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This project will not directlysupport a weapons effort, but it affords Iran broad access to Russia'snuclear industry.

-- Russian entities are interacting with Iraniannuclear research centers on a wide variety of activities beyond the Bushehrproject. Many of these projects, ostensibly for civilian nuclear uses,have direct application to the production of weapons-grade fissile material.

The United States has levied trade restrictionsagainst two Russian entities and Mendeleyev University -- for providingnuclear assistance to Iran.

Chemical

I would like to touch briefly on assistance byRussian entities to Iran that could contribute to Tehran's chemical warfare(CW) program. Iran launched its offensive CW program in the early 1980sin response to Baghdad's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. We believethe program remains active despite Tehran's decision to ratify the ChemicalWeapons Convention (CWC). Iran has a large and growing CW production capacityand already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister,choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a stockpile of at leastseveral hundred metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent.

Tehran's goals for its CW program for the pastdecade have been to expand its production capability and stockpile, reachself-sufficiency by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical productionequipment and precursors, and diversify its CW arsenal by producing moresophisticated and lethal agents and munitions.

Numerous Russian entities have been providingIran with dual-use industrial chemicals, equipment, and chemical productiontechnology that could be diverted to Tehran's offensive CW program.

-- In 1999, for example, Russian entities providedproduction technology, training, and expertise that Iran could use to createa more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.

Biological

I would like to now turn to assistance by Russianentities to Iran's bio-technical programs is pursuing both civilian biotechactivities and a biological warfare (BW) program. Assistance by Russianentities to the former could further Iran's pursuit of biotechnology formilitary applications.

Iran's BW program was initiated in the 1980sduring the Iran-Iraq war. The program is in the late stages of researchand development, but we believe Iran already holds some stocks of BW agentsand weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live organismsas BW agents, and for BW dissemination could use many of the same deliverysystems -- such as artillery and aerial bombs -- that it has in its CWinventory.

-- Iran has the technical infrastructure to supporta significant BW program. It conducts top-notch legitimate biomedical researchat various institutes, which we suspect also provide support to the BWprogram.

Iran is seeking expertise and technology fromRussia that could advance Tehran's biological warfare effort. Russia hasseveral government-to-government agreements with Iran in a variety of scientificand technical fields.

-- Because of the dual-use nature of much ofthis technology, Tehran can exploit these agreements to procure equipmentand expertise that could be diverted to its BW effort.

-- Iran's BW program could make rapid and significantadvances if it has unfettered access to BW expertise resident in Russia.

Missile

I will now discuss Russian aid to Iran's ballisticmissile program. Iran's ballistic missile program is one of the largestin the Middle East. Tehran already has deployed hundreds of short-range(150-500 km) ballistic missiles, covering most of Iraq and many strategictargets in the Persian Gulf. It is developing and may soon deploy the 1,300km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which would allow Iranto reach Israel and most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Tehran probably hasa small number of Shahab-3s available for use in a conflict; it has announcedthat production and deployment has begun, and it publicly displayed threeShahab-3s along with a mobile launcher and other ground support equipment.

Iran's public statements indicate that it plansto develop longer range delivery systems. Although Tehran stated that theShahab-3 is Iran's last military missile, we are concerned that Iran willuse future systems in a military role.

-- Iran's Defense Minister announced the developmentof the Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missilethan the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as a space launch vehiclewith no military applications.

-- Tehran has also mentioned plans for a Shahab-5,strongly suggesting that it intends to develop even longer range ballisticmissiles in the near future.

-- Iran has displayed a mock-up satellite andspace launch vehicle (SLV), suggesting it plans to develop an SLV to deliverIranian satellites to orbit. However, Iran could convert an SLV into aballistic missile by developing a reentry vehicle.

In this context, cooperation between Tehran andRussian aerospace entities has been a matter of proliferation concern sincethe mid-1990s. Iran is acquiring Russian technology which could significantlyaccelerate the pace of its ballistic missile development program.

-- Assistance by Russian entities has helpedIran save years in its development of the Shahab-3, which was flight-testedin 1998 and twice again this year.

-- Russian assistance also is playing a crucialrole in Iran's ability to develop more sophisticated and longer-range missiles.

Russian entities have helped the Iranian missileeffort in areas such as training, testing, and components. These entitiesvary in size and cover a wide range of specialties. The scope of assistanceis illustrated by the variety of organizations that have been subjectsof US trade restrictions.

-- Such restrictions have been levied againstRussia's government-owned space-technology marketing agency Glavkosmos,the aerospace materials research institute NIIGrafit, the guidance technologydeveloper Polyus, and several smaller and less prominent entities.

-- Further, trade actions have been imposed againsttwo major educational entities, the Moscow Aviation Institute and the BalticState Technical University.

Russian Oversight

Finally, I would like to turn to the issue ofRussian efforts to curb the transfers of WMD) and missile technology toIran. Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number ofsteps to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings with Iranand other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it passed a new exportcontrol law intended to strengthen restrictions on the export of weaponsof mass destruction, missile systems, and related technologies.

-- However, the government's weak enforcementof export control legislation has facilitated some Russian companies' effortsto circumvent export controls in the interest of financial gains.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement.I will attempt to answer the Committee's questions within the constraintsimposed on us by the need to protect sensitive sources and methods. Wewould be delighted to present Committee Members with a more detailed assessmentof Russian assistance to Iran's WMD and ballistic missile programs in aclosed setting.

Our intelligence reporting and analysis alsoprovides the underpinnings for policy efforts to stop the flow of weapons-relatedtechnology to Iran.