5/16/12 Home / Issues / Russian International Nuclear Cooperation www PGS Printer Friendly Page   House International Relations Committee Russian Foreign Policy and Proliferation to Rogue Regimes Thursday, March 25, 1999 2172 Rayburn House Office Building Committee Members Present: Rep. Gilman (Chairman, R-NY), Rep. Gejdenson(Ranking Member, R-CT), Rep. Berman (D-CA), Rep. Delahunt (D-MA), Rep.Hyde (R-IL), Rep. Campbell (R-CA), Rep. Bereuter (R-NE), Rep. Hastings(D-FL), Rep. Lee (D-CA), Rep. Cooksey (R-LA) Witnesses: Mr. James Woolsey, Former Director of CIA; Partner, Shea & Gardner Mr. Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Mr. Anthony Cordesman, Co-Director, CSIS Middle East Program Mr. Sherman Garnett, Director, Carnegie Project on Russian-ChineseRelations Mr. John McMahon, Former Deputy Director, CIA; Board Member, LockheedKhrunichev Energia, Inc. The House International Relations Committee held a hearing on Russia'sforeign policy and how it relates to proliferation of weapons to rogueregimes. There was consensus among the witnesses that the crux of theproliferation problem is Russia's foreign policy toward rogue states, anda particular desire by Prime Minister Primakov to undercut US dominance. Mr. Woolsey argued that Mr. Primakov continues to view the strategicrelationship with the US as a zero-sum game, in which Russia's security asa great power is only possible by a weakening of its counterparts. Hebelieves Primakov is trying to create a bloc against US leadership bycollaborating with countries such as Iran and Iraq that share in hisanti-American sentiment. To illustrate, Woolsey referred to a recent CISmeeting where there was talk of Iran joining the Commonwealth. Anothercontributor to the proliferation threat is Russia's failure to establish arule of law that could be instrumental in identifying and prosecutingpotential proliferators. The problem, however, is not exclusivelypolitical and social in nature. Woolsey also cited economics as a majorfactor driving proliferation risks from Russia. As the enormous Sovietmilitary-industrial complex crumbles, hardware, materials, expertise andtechnologies are up for sale to the highest bidder. Woolsey does not, however, find Russia solely culpable for the breakdown.He argues that the United States is also partly to blame due to misguidedpolicies (such as supporting President Yeltsin unconditionally throughoutthe Chechen war and other questionable campaigns), and assuming thateconomic market reforms would rectify all other difficulties. Mr. Sokolski pointed out that proliferation from Russia is not a newphenomenon, as it can be traced back some thirty years. What is new, heargues, is Mr. Primakov's foreign policy considerations with rogue statesthat could blatantly disrupt nonproliferation efforts. Sokolski feels thatthe excessive militarization of the Russian economy drives Russia'scurrent policies and creates proliferation incentives. As nearly 80percent of all Russian industrial exports are composed of military sales(not including illicit transfers), sanctions against weapons transferswould be futile as these sales are the largest source of Russian revenue.Little progress can be made in nonproliferation efforts as long as Russiarelies so heavily upon these sales. Therefore, Sokolski stressed the needfor Russia to restructure and demilitarize its economy. Also important is to prevent US financial assistance from fueling Russianmilitary-related industries that support or finance weapons exports tocountries of proliferation concern. The answer to such problems is toengage Russian experts in nonweapons work through increased joint privateventures, and to invest more in Russia's energy sector in order to employRussia's highly educated workforce. In addition, the US must insist uponverification of all transfers of aid and assistance to Russia in order toensure that the money is reaching the scientists and technicians. Mr. Cordesman focused more on the flow of increasingly sophisticatedtechnologies to countries like Iran, China and North Korea. He stressedthat while it is very important to look at the crumbling state of Russia'snuclear complex as a key source of this outflow, it is equally importantto focus on the buyer of these technology transfers. The vast networksthat exist among nations of proliferation concern could transfer materialsand technologies from suppliers such as Russia and China to rogue statessuch as North Korea, Syria, Libya and Iraq. He emphasized that the threatis not due to a deliberate strategy by the Russians to proliferateweapons. Rather, the pressures to sell stem from desperate Russian hardcurrency needs. The urgency for money gives Russians every possibleincentive to maximize their sales of arms and technology, indiscriminateof the buyer. Mr. Garnett reinforced Cordesman's point of concentrating more on thebuyers of weapons technology rather than just Russia as the supplier. Heis critical of the Clinton Administration's failure to pay adequateattention to Sino-Russian security cooperation, which could have graveconsequences for US interests in Asia. Since China is not classified as a"rogue" state, more attention is given to technology transfers to Iran,despite the enormous market with China. Just as China's steady militarymodernization poses a threat to US interests, Garnett argues that thetransfer of technologies to China is likewise against the long-terminterests of Russia. This may lead to a more complex military global orderthat may complicate Russia's relations with China and the internationalcommunity in the future. Mr. McMahon, on the other hand, applauded both the Bush and Clintonadministrations for their recognition of the proliferation threat andtheir efforts to address it. He believes that their "dual-track" policiesof strongly opposing dangerous transfers while engaging the Russians incooperative efforts have been very effective. Through such programs as theISTC, CTR, HEU deal, and space ventures, Russia is able to see thebenefits of working with the United States rather than turning to rogueregimes. To illustrate the progress made by such cooperative efforts,McMahon cited a joint commercial satellite launch venture that hasgenerated economic activity supporting some 1.2 million Russians. Despite strides made with joint private ventures, McMahon warned thatcommercial cooperation is in jeopardy due to economic sanctions. He arguedthat sanctions detract enormous revenue from peaceful cooperative work,thereby increasing the incentive for Russia to turn to illicit activities.Furthermore, it sends a message that the United States is an unreliablepartner in commercial ventures, consequently robbing the US of leveragefor further cooperation over the long-term. This issue of sanctions was of great concern to all of the witnesses. Thegeneral contention was that punishing Russia's legitimate businesses suchas space launch programs in an effort to curb proliferation is moredestructive than effective. This policy, characterized by McMahon as"shooting the hostages," destroys incentives for cooperative peacefulventures. In addition, economic sanctions are merely "small solutions tobig problems." The primary hurdle is a weak Russian government that isunwilling to address proliferation risks. Mr. Woolsey warned that Primakov may be attempting to undermine incentivesoffered by the US to other countries to earn their nonproliferationcooperation. Therefore, Woolsey encouraged the US to crack down onRussia's disruptive policies. Woolsey suggested one approach to deal effectively with the Russiangovernment. Because Russia is driven by hard currency, the West wieldssignificant financial leverage. Withholding IMF funds, or placing rigidconditions on loans and other assistance may serve as "sticks" tomotivate Russian leadership in the desired direction. On the micro level,Sokolski reinforced the necessity to tap into Russia's human capital andengage them in cooperative ventures including space launches and similarprograms. This action, he feels, would increase the chances ofrestructuring Russia's economy from within, thereby decreasing incentivesto resort to proliferation. *This report was produced by RANSAC's Research Associate, Elena Thomas.

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