The presidents of Russian and the U.S. reviewed a specific plan forcomprehensive nuclear security and safety improvements at the MoscowSummit meeting held in April 1996.

The concepts laid out during the Summit incorporate nuclear energy safetyand the peaceful use of nuclear materials no longer needed for defensepurposes, as well as issues of nonproliferation; intervention to preventthe unlawful circulation of nuclear materials; nuclear material physicalprotection, control and accounting; effective regulation of civiliannuclear power; the conversion of nuclear military technologies and manyother aspects.

New approaches to the problem of nuclear disarmament were formulated bythe Russian and U.S. presidents during the Helsinki Summit in March 1997.Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton issued a joint statement on furtherreductions in strategic nuclear forces requiring that Start III include,among others, transparency measures associated with the destruction ofstrategic nuclear warheads which would promote irreversibility of thereductions. The Presidents stated that the U.S. and Russia wouldimmediately begin negotiations on a Start III agreement that would includemeasures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warheadinventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. Theco-chairs of the Committee agreed for the need to increase the momentum onseveral nonproliferation fronts in support of the Helsinki commitments.

The Energy Policy Committee under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission hasconsistently focused on a broad spectrum of Russian-American cooperation.New tasks in the area of nuclear disarmament, include development of jointtechnical and organizational measures on ensuring irreversibility of theprocess of nuclear weapons' reduction, consideration of issues related totransparency in the area of nuclear materials, investment, commerce, taxproblems, tasks of conversion of military technologies and production, andmany others - all these issues are a part of the Russian-U.S. cooperationin the nuclear area. Four committees in the Commission consider theseissues. Implementation of a combined approach, while keeping in mind theintegrated picture of the Russian-U.S. cooperation in nuclear areas, wouldallow decisions to be mutually coordinated but to achieve this goalrequires improvement of structural elements of the Committee. The Russianside noted the need for the establishment of a permanent Nuclear EnergyCommittee within the framework of the Committee as a practical andnecessary step that reflects the status and perspectives of Russian-U.S.cooperation. The Russian side asked the Commission to give theappropriate attention to the issue of establishment of the Nuclear EnergyCommittee.

Both sides acknowledge the challenges associated with coordinating nuclearcooperation. The U.S. pledged to promote a broader interagency dialoguebetween U.S. agencies and Russian ministries. The U.S. side agreed withthe need to establish a broader coordinating mechanism on nuclear issuesbetween the U.S. and Russian governments and agreed to develop an updatedand more detailed proposal from the one presented in August 1996.

The parties emphasized the critical importance of further cooperationbetween the two leading nuclear states in the broad areas of nuclearenergy use and technology in the interests of our countries and theinternational community.

Cooperation in Nuclear Disarmament

1. Settlement of the problems associated with implementation of theAgreement on the Use of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Nuclear Weapons

   The U.S. side noted the five year agreement on purchase quantitiesand price that was mutually entered into in December 1996. This five yearagreement addresses the sale of the natural uranium component and startingin 1997 allows the Russian side to market the natural uranium component.The Russian side continued to note difficulties associated with the directshipment from the U.S. to Russia of the natural uranium component becausethere is not a nuclear material trade agreement between Russia and theU.S.

   Advance payment under the HEU-LEU Contract

   The Russian side noted that the technological cycle of HEU reprocessingand shipment, as well as the receipt of payments from the U.S. EnrichmentCorporation for exported HEU, in accordance with the deadlines stipulatedby the Contract, have led to a situation in which Minatom enterprises arepaid 5-6 months after the beginning of production, i.e., they areproviding advances on the project. Given the severe economic conditionsin Russia, Minatom officials stated that the delayed payment situation iscreating additional financial hardships on the participating Russianenterprises. In previous years, this problem has been partially resolvedby providing advanced payments although these payments have been grantedon a one-time basis. The Russian side requested that the U.S. considerestablishing a policy of making 50% advance payments available on theHEU-LEU Contract. The U.S. side noted that one of the goals of theAgreement entered into in December 1996 was to reduce or eliminate theneed for advance payments because increased quantities of material arebeing purchased by the U.S. side.

   Transparency measures applying to HEU within the scope of the Russian-American HEU-LEU Contract

   Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of theRussian Federation and the Government of the United States of Americaconcerning Transparency Measures and supplementary initiatives in connection with the Agreement between the Government of the RussianFederation and the Government of the United States of America on the Useof Highly-Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons, signed September 1, 1993,and its associated protocol signed by Minatom and the U.S. Department ofEnergy March 18, 1994, the U.S. side has the right to monitor thereprocessing of HEU subject to the agreement into LEU and the Russian sidehas the right to monitor the use of Russian LEU subject to the Agreementin the production of fuel for civilian nuclear power plants.

   For purposes of conducting monitoring activities, a Minatom delegationconducted the first special inspection visits to two U.S. nuclear fuelproduction facilities from March 31 to April 18, 1997 (ABB CombustionEngineering, Hernetite, Missouri and Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg,Virginia) and also established a Minatom Permanent Presence Office at thePortsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Facility in Piketon, Ohio.

   The initial special monitoring visits by the Russian delegation to U.S.fuel fabrication facilities and the establishment of a Permanent PresenceOffice in Portsmouth have proven to be entirely worthwhile.

   The U.S. side has established a Permanent Presence Office at the UralsElectrochemical Works and has conducted special monitoring visits to theSiberian Chemical Combine (Seversk) and the Electrochemical Plant(Zelenogorsk). Additionally, the U.S. side has conducted familiarizationvisits to the Siberian Chemical Combine and the Mayak Chemical Combine(Ozersk) to observe new processing operations at these facilities.

   As a result of negotiations during October 1996, and a meeting of theTransparency Review Committee in December 1996, U.S. Nondestructive Assay(NDA) equipment is now used at the receiving areas in Russian Plants andthe Russian side uses NDA equipment at the U.S. Portsmouth Ohio Plant.U.S. flow measurement and enrichment measurement equipment is currentlybeing installed at the blend points in Russian facilities.

2. Russian-American cooperation in safe and reliable transport,storage and destruction of nuclear weapons and prevention of weaponsproliferation.

   The U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Federation Ministryof Atomic Energy have been cooperating on the design and construction of afissile materials storage facility at the Mayak Production Associationunder the agreement governing U.S. assistance within the scope of theCooperative Threat Reduction Program. This project has been implementedin accordance with the Agreement on a Fissile Material Storage Facility ofOctober 6, 1993 and September 2, 1993 as amended June 20, 1995 andSeptember 6, 1996.

   The 9TH Meeting of the Senior Joint Implementation Group for implementation of the Agreement to establish the fissile material storagefacility at the Mayak Production Association was held July 20-22, 1997.

   The Agreement was amended July 23, 1997 to incorporate an additionalallocation of 23.5 million USD in 1997 for the purchase of additionalcontainers for the storage facility.

   The Senior Joint Implementation Group drafted a report for Prime MinisterChernomyrdin and Vice President Gore on the status of construction of thestorage facility and problems associated with project implementation.

3. Nuclear Material Physical Protection, Control and Accounting

   The existing levels of cooperation, which include intergovernmentaland laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation under the Agreement BetweenMinatom and the U.S. Department of Defense on Nuclear Material Protection,Control and Accounting (MPC&A) of September 2, 1993 and direct contractsbetween Minatom institutes and U.S. DOE national laboratories, requirelogical integration and a uniform legal foundation.

   Russian-American cooperation to modernize MPC&A measures in Russianfacilities continues to evolve successfully in accordance with thedocuments adopted at the VI, VII and VIII Sessions of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. To date, 21 Minatom enterprises haveparticipated in cooperation with the U.S. on MPC&A, including 15institutes within the scope of the Agreement of September 2, 1993 and 6institutes within the scope of laboratory-to-laboratory contracts.

   A Joint Declaration of Minatom and the U.S. Department of Energy toinclude the Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Manufacturing(in Lytkarino) in the cooperative program for modernization of nuclearmaterial physical protection, control and accounting systems was proposedfor signature during VIII Session of the Commission. On July 21, 1997,Minister V.N. Mikhailov and Secretary F. Peña signed the joint Statement.An initial site visit was conducted in September 1997.

   The U.S. party has officially informed Minatom that responsibility forcoordination of the entire scope of cooperation in nuclear material physical protection, control and accounting will be the responsibility ofthe U.S. Department of Energy. Financing for such cooperation willcontinue to be provided primarily through the U.S. Department of Energy.The Russian-American Technical Working Group established to coordinatecooperation has repeatedly raised the issue of the feasibility of signingan MPC&A agreement between Minatom and the U.S. Department of Energy. Anagreement must reflect issues concerning financing of the effort,including payment for work and services to the Russian party forimplementation of the cooperative program; conditions for supervision ofdeliverables and disbursement of funding. The agreement must also setforth the terms governing customs and tax duties on Russian and U.S.producers, companies and organizations, bearing in mind that suchcooperation constitutes technical assistance to Russia for purposes ofimproving safety and nuclear weapons nonproliferation.

   The Transportation Security Program is in the final stages of developing aprototype rail car with upgraded security features for transportingMinatom's nuclear materials and a demonstration is planned for November.

   The sides also noted the effective cooperation that has developed betweenthe NRC and GAN. Strengthening the regulatory system for MPC&A is recognized as an integral part of efforts to work with the RussianFederation in enhancing its overall system of nuclear material control.

   The co-chairs urged the Commission to find a solution to the problem oftaxation of assistance as soon as possible with the hope that the sidescould conclude a new MPC&A agreement by the end of the year.

   It is also anticipating that the new Agreement will incorporate a JointCoordinating Committee, a move that will permit improvement bilateralcoordination of the program. A draft of a new agreement is currentlybeing coordinated with Russian organization and government departments.

4. Agreement on the Exchange of Technical Information on theSafeguarding and Security of Nuclear Weapons and Scientific and TechnicalCooperation on the Safeguarding and Security of Nuclear Weapons under theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

   At present, cooperation in this area is being implemented within thescope of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and U.S. Governmenton the Exchange of Technical Information on the Safeguarding and Securityof Nuclear Weapons signed December 16, 1994. This information exchange isof an unclassified nature.

   A new international organization has been established in Vienna as animplementing mechanism for the CTBT. A significant number of issues anddecisions concerning support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treatyare under the jurisdiction of Minatom, and require the direct involvementof Ministry specialists.

   A working meeting of Russian and U.S. experts on various aspects ofon-site inspections, in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test BanTreaty, was held April 2-4, 1997 at the Russian Federal NuclearCenter/All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics.

   The second meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the ComprehensiveNuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization was held in Vienna, May 10-17, 1997.

   Under the Working Group on Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security the following has occurred since GCC-8:

   • A seminar on advanced shipping and storage containers was conducted(Albuquerque, New Mexico, November 1996);
   • A working meeting on nuclear warhead accident environments wasconducted (Chelyabinsk, Russia, May 1997);
   • A seminar on remediation of response to nuclear munitions weaponsaccidents has also been conducted (Sarov, Russia, June 1997);
   • A seminar to determine the possibility of identifying the "agent"of a concealed nuclear test at sea has been conducted (Livermore,California, U.S.A., March 1997).

   There have also been preparations for a session to exchange certainseismic data from peaceful nuclear explosions, major chemical explosionsand man-made disasters. This suggests that there is already sufficientmaterial for discussion at the standard plenary sessions.

5. On the project for modification of plutonium productionreactors and termination of the use of newly-produced plutonium fornuclear weapons

   In accordance with the agreement reached at the VII Session of theRussian-American Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation in June1996, Minatom, in conjunction with representatives of other interestedRussian organizations, conducted a series of negotiations with the U.S.side on the development of new agreements for implementing a project forreactor modification (core conversion) for purposes of converting reactorcores to an operating state that physically eliminates the production ofweapons-grade plutonium. These negotiations have resulted in thepreparation and approval of all documents which were signed during the 9THSession of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (Plutonium Production ReactorAgreement, Core Conversion Implementing Agreement, Side Letter to theImplementing Agreement, and the Memorandum of Understanding on Liability).

6. Russian-American cooperation the disposition of weapons-gradeplutonium

   The declaration of the Russian Federation and U.S. presidents ofJanuary 14, 1994, "On the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructionand their Means of Delivery," charged experts from both countries with thetask of jointly analyzing options for long-term disposition of fissilematerials; specifically plutonium, taking into account issues ofnonproliferation, environmental protection, safety, technical and economicfactors.

   A Russian-American joint Steering committee (JSC) WAS establishedto coordinate these joint efforts and working groups have been establishedthat include representatives from Minatom, its institutes andorganizations (the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering; theAll-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials; theAll-Russian Research and Design Institute for Power Technology; and theInstitute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics, etc.). The Americanparty has been represented in such efforts by the White House Science andTechnology Policy Office, the U.S. Department of Energy and its nationallaboratories (Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia).

   A joint study was published in September 1996 as a follow-on effort ofsmall scale tests analysis and a demonstration of technologies forplutonium disposition is underway. This program of tests and demonstrations was endorsed at the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit in April1996, by a Joint Statement signed August 20, 1996 by Minister Mikhailovand former Secretary O'Leary and in the protocol from the internationalmeeting of experts which took place in Paris in October 1996.

   Minister Mikhailov noted that President Yeltsin has established a specialinteragency Russian committee on plutonium disposition.

   It was agreed that in 1997 the U.S. would finance a number of additionalresearch projects. Of significance is the development of a pilot-scalesystem for Russian for converting weapons derived plutonium metal oxidefor disposition.

   The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) has been active and is regularlyconducting sessions (May 1997 in the U.S. and July 1997 in Russia).Russian and American experts believe that the level of cooperative effortin this area urgently requires the drafting and signing of anintergovernmental umbrella agreement that will establish a legal foundation for further development of cooperation between our countries inorder to proceed with construction of pilot-scale projects to demonstratetechnologies for plutonium disposition. Once again the co-chairs notedthe need to resolve the problems associated with taxation of assistance inorder for this agreement to be concluded as soon as possible.

7. MPC&A at Serial Production Facilities

   During the 8TH Session of the Commission, the co-chairs of theCommittee agreed that cooperation in this area would be carried out inaccordance with law, norms, regulations and interests of national securityof both countries. The Russian side continues coordination of the "JointAgreement" and "Guide on Granting of Guarantees" which will allowconsolidation of agreements which were already achieved. The co-chairsagreed to speed-up the process of Russian interagency coordination ofthese agreements and to have technical experts meet as soon as possible tofinalize the documents.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Energy and Technology

1. Agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

   During the VII Session of the Commission, the Co-Chairman agreedto extend the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the UnitedStates of America on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the PeacefulUses of Nuclear Energy (PUAE) for a period of 18 months. There are fourMemoranda of Cooperation which were extended and include: safety ofcivilian nuclear reactors; controlled thermonuclear fusion employingmagnetic plasma confinement; environmental restoration and radioactivewaste disposal were extended. The memoranda were signed on September 16,1996.

   The U.S. side has proposed an 18 month extension and the Russianside is considering this proposal.

   The Russian side noted their interest in initiating negotiations to drafta new agreement reflecting the broader context of Russian-Americancooperation relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. Cooperation between the Russian Federation and U.S. Governments toimprove operational safety, adopt measures to reduce risk at existingpower plants and strengthen nuclear safety regulatory standards applyingto civilian facilities.

   Cooperation is evolving reasonably successfully. The primaryareas of activity include:

   • Support for operational safety through the establishment of emergencyprocedures regulatory documentation, personnel training and infrastructuredevelopment for training purposes, including the construction of varioussimulators, technology transfer for maintenance and repair of variousnuclear power plant components and systems;
   • Solutions to engineering and technical problems that involve upgradesto fire safety systems, the development of radioactive confinement(containment or sealed confinement) systems and engineering safetysystems;
   • Assessment of nuclear power plant safety through the transfer of computer safety analysis codes, training of specialists on new codes andthe performance of safety assessments reflecting the uniquecharacteristics of specific nuclear plants;
   • Strengthening nuclear safety regulatory authorities through provisionof training and equipment, and development of regulatory requirements andstandards.

   A meeting of the Joint DOE-Minatom Coordinating Committee for the nuclearsafety activities was held in Washington in March 1997. Joint projectsfor safety improvements at Russian nuclear power plants were discussed atthis meeting.

   The parties have noted that progress in implementation of the SafetyParameter Display System (SPDS) project for Russian RBMK nuclear powerpants is representative of progress achieved. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, in conjunction with the Research and Development Institute ofPower Engineering, Russia, have constructed and are currently successfullyoperating the WESTEK Russian-American Joint Venture which has made itpossible to significantly reduce the cost of installation of safetyparameter display systems at nuclear power plants. The SPDS installationproject is a critical effort in the international nuclear safetyimprovement program for Russian nuclear power plants and it is importantto have such systems on all Russian RBMK units. In depth safetyassessments are also underway for units at Kola, Leningrad, Novovoronezhand Kursk. These are the plants covered by the grant agreement Russia haswith the EBRD.

   The Committee discussed the role of the nuclear sector in Russia's overallpower sector restructuring efforts. It was noted that furthering marketreform in the Russian nuclear power sector would generate additionalresources for investment in safety upgrades and payment of wages.

   The parties also continued to stress the importance of a strong, independent regulatory authority in order to promote and maintain nuclearsafety. Highlights of recent NRC/GAN activities aimed towardsaccomplishing the goals of carrying out GAN's regulatory and safetyoversight functions, as defined by Russian Nuclear Laws and federaldecrees, include development of a regulatory training center, emergencyresponse capability and regulatory standards and criteria.

3. International Nuclear Safety Centers

   Establishment of the International Nuclear Safety Center underMinatom, Russia, has essentially been completed. An operational programfor the International Center has been developed.

   Initially Minatom developed plans for six primary joint projects. The leadRussian Organization which will perform these projects, as well, as theirrepresentative have been identified. This information has been providedto the U.S. side.

   A 1997 work program comprised of seven joint projects has been agreed uponand work is proceeding. The focus of these projects is on Russian andU.S. nuclear power plant safety.

   At present, the seven joint projects encompass the following nucleartechnology areas:

   • Continued development of an international nuclear safety database;
   • Neutronic-thermohydraulic computer codes;
   • Accident management research;
   • Sensor, system and equipment monitoring and diagnostics;
   • Structural analysis of components;
   • Facility description compilation; and
   • Computer safety code validation.

   Some projects aim to extend tangible support to other key programs, suchas computer code validation for in-depth safety analysis as part of theU.S. program to improve the safety of Soviet-designed Russian reactors andthe nuclear safety data base.

   The co-chairs agreed that the activities of the centers will improvenuclear safety in both countries and that both centers are open tocollaboration with other countries and international organizations such asthe IAEA, OECD/NEA, etc.

   A joint statement was signed about the status and prospects for thecenters.

4. Cooperation to Reduce Fuel Enrichment in Research Reactors

   Cooperation to reduce fuel enrichment in research reactors is currentlybeing implemented on a laboratory-to-laboratory contract level. Americanspecialists are demonstrating strong interest in continuing work in Russiato reduce uranium enrichment in research reactors.

1. Operations of the Russian-American Fuel Cell Consortium (RAFCO)

   In September 1996, the Russian Federation Minister of Atomic energyand the U.S. Secretary of energy signed an Agreement to establish theRussian-American Fuel Cell Consortium (RAFCO).

   Progress since the 8TH Session of the Commission has been considerable.Particular attention should be paid to the following RAFCO accomplishments:

   • Eight RAFCO R&D cooperative projects, which seek to overcometechnological impediments to the speedy commercialization of fuel cells,are now underway.
   • The U.S. Congress has agreed to provide initial funding for a RAFCOdemonstration project aimed at putting fuel cells in the villages of indigenous peoples of the Alaskan and Russian arctic. These fuel cellswill be sited in some of the most ecologically sensitive areas of theworld.
   • With the assistance of RAFCO, International Fuel Cells Corporation andRAO Gazprom, both active RAFCO members, signed a power facility purchasecontract. This is the first sale of a U.S. produced fuel cell to Russia.

   The parties agreed that future RAFCO activities will include: expansion inthe scope of project financing, including third country, world bank andU.N. resources; development of joint venture manufacturing activities withAmerican fuel cell companies; and cooperation with other commissioncommittees (environment, defense conversion) interested in RAFCOactivities.

2. Gas turbine Modular Helium reactor (GT-MHR)

   Under an agreement with Minatom and General Atomics that includes theRussian Science Center/Kurchatov Institute, the Luch Scientific ProductionAssociation, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of InorganicMaterials and the Siberian Chemical Works in Seversk, a conceptual designhas been under development since October 1995 for a gas turbine modularhelium reactor (GT-MHR) designed to burn weapons-grade plutonium andproduce high-efficiency electricity.

   Minatom and DOE acknowledged the development of a conceptual design forthe GT-MHR by Russian and American specialists, which makes use ofadvanced science and technology capabilities of each of their countries.They noted the progress achieved to date in addressing the uniquechallenges of this technology and further noted that commercialcooperation in this area is appropriate to solve them.

   Future efforts under this project will involve the development ofpreliminary and technical designs as well as scientific research andexperimental design work. This will require significant funding andpossible new forms of cooperation, including cooperation within theframework of an international technology company that will incorporateenterprises with expertise and knowledge of the design of high-temperaturegas-cooled reactors and the production of fuel for such reactors.

   During negotiations on July 21, 1997, U.S. Secretary of Energy F. Peñaexpressed support for the project and noted that the U.S. Department ofEnergy gave General Atomics permission to share technical data with theRussians for further development of the project.

3. The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)

   The International Science and Technology Center, founded at theinitiative of Russia and the U.S., is upgrading its activities and isexpanding both its scope of cooperation and its number of employees.

   An ISTC Board of Directors meeting was held March 13-14, 1997.This meeting approved financing of 63 new projects for a total of 15million USD. Between June 30 and July 1, 1997, the Board of Directorsapproved financing of 8 million USD for 51 additional projects.

   After approval of the new projects, ISTC will have a total of 450 projectswith a total financing of approximately 142 million USD. Approximately18,100 individuals will be involved in implementation of civilian projectsfor NIS scientists under ISTC programs which encompass a broad range offields in science and technology. The ISTC has proven to be an efficientand effective framework for carrying out projects of joint interest to theU.S. and Russia and has the potential to support activities related toRAFCO, CTBT Verification, MPC&A, radiation health effects research andoptions for disposition of fissile materials.

4. U.S. and Russian cooperation with the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) on fissile material verification

   In September 1996, the United States, the Russian Federation andthe IAEA commenced a Trilateral Initiative to consider practical measuresto fulfill statements by President Clinton of September 1993 and PresidentYeltsin of April 1996 concerning the application of IAEA verification ofweapons-origin fissile materials. During the meeting of theGore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the U.S. and Russia reaffirmed theimportance of these commitments as a significant contribution to thefulfillment of the principles and objectives agreed upon at the 1995Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Theparties also noted that the Trilateral Initiative is parallel andcomplementary to commitments made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin inSeptember 1994 and May 1995 regarding the transparency and irreversibilityof nuclear arms reductions.

   A joint working group was formed by the U.S., Russia and the IAEAto address technical, legal and financial issues associated with the IAEAverification of the relevant fissile materials. Since GCC-8,representatives have met in Vienna in March and May 1997. The RussianFederation hosted a visit by the IAEA's Director General, Hans Blix, andstaff to the fissile material storage facility being constructed at Mayakin August of 1997.

   The sides emphasized the importance of the continuation of thework, reaffirmed their commitment to the initiative and expressed thedesire for early progress on technical issues. Particularly the technicalissues with regard to discussion on technical methods designed to verifyfissile materials while protecting sensitive nuclear weapons informationand preventing its disclosure.

   Signed on Sunday, September 21, 1997.