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Home / Issues / U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Programs |
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Seminar 2: Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Activities in Russia May 18, 2001 Prepared by Bill Hoehn On May 18, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held the second briefing in a series of non-partisan seminars for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The May seminar focused on issues related to U.S.-funded nuclear threat reduction programs in Russia, and featured three expert speakers. The following is a summary of their remarks. Remarks by Kenneth A. Myers, III, Legislative Assistant for National Security and Foreign Affairs for Senator Richard G. Lugar Myers opened by distinguishing between "Cooperative Threat Reduction" programs and other U.S. activities to reduce nuclear dangers in Russia. He noted that a strict definition of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) refers to the program led by the Department of Defense, based on the "Nunn-Lugar" legislation of 1991. Some efforts have been split off from, or built on, the original CTR program. These complementary efforts are administered by a variety of other agencies - most notably the Department of Energy and the Department of State, but also including contributions from the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, and other agencies. For example, the largest "threat reduction" program supported by the State Department is the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). U.S. contributions represent 30-70% of the Center's budget, depending on the year. The ISTC uses this funding, as well as contributions from other countries, to provide short-term grants and contracts to Russian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scientists, which allow them to apply their skills to peaceful, civilian-oriented research. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) recently conducted an assessment of ISTC project selection processes and criteria, and declared that the Center is generally "doing a good job." Myers also touched on four "threat reduction style" efforts led by the Department of Energy. The first, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, is a "cousin of the ISTC" which seeks to employ ex-WMD scientists by partnering them with Western industry. Despite criticisms of the program raised by a GAO report two years ago, the IPP now seems to be on a much stronger footing. Second is the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which Myers regarded as "one of the most important efforts" to reduce the proliferation threat by establishing security systems around the hundreds of buildings and facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear materials in Russia. A recent GAO study of this program was fairly positive, although it did make a point that Russia has been hesitant to provide wide-ranging U.S. access to a number of sensitive facilities. The DOE has denied MPC&A assistance to those facilities where access has not been permitted, but it is working with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy on a draft access agreement that would give the United States assurances without physical access and intrusive inspections that MPC&A upgrades are being installed and maintained. Myers hoped that this agreement would be completed soon as it is important that the United States be able to verify that MPC&A funds are being used for the intended purposes. Third is the Nuclear Cities Initiative, which is attempting to facilitate the elimination of Russian nuclear weapons production capacity by creating new jobs for the weapons scientists and workers that will be unemployed as a result of the downsizing. The program has achieved mixed results, and has faced a number of criticisms regarding its management, implementation, and allocation of funding. Myers believed that "reasonable people can argue" about these criticisms and seek solutions. However, he observed that it is difficult to quibble with the program's goal, and noted that the United States must have a "tool to turn these cities around." Fourth is the plutonium disposition program which is working to transform weapons-grade plutonium excess to defense needs in the United States and Russia into forms that make it permanently unavailable for weapons. Critics have argued about the size and the cost of this effort, and it will no doubt take large appropriations in the coming years to complete the necessary facilities and begin actual disposition. The Department of Defense runs the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. It is a multifaceted effort. Its primary objective is to assist in the elimination of excess offensive weapons in the former Soviet Union, including ICBMs, ICBM silos, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, and strategic bombers. The program has enabled Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to become non-nuclear weapons states, and the efforts are continuing in Russia to help bring Russian strategic forces into compliance with existing arms reductions agreements. The CTR program is also facilitating the elimination of biological weapons production infrastructure in the former Soviet Union, and is cooperating with other cooperative nonproliferation programs to identify alternative forms of employment for unemployed BW scientists by engaging them with western commercial partners. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has made demonstrable progress in most of its missions, but two program activities have encountered opposition. The first is the effort to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. There have been concerns that Russia is not contributing a fair share of support for construction of the facility, and that contributions from the rest of the international community have been insufficient. These and other issues have limited recent CTR funding to research and design of the facility. Myers believed that a good deal of progress has been made over the past two years in resolving these concerns, and he anticipated a major debate this year in the Congress on allowing use of U.S. funds for construction of the facility to proceed. The second activity is an effort to phase out production of weapons-grade plutonium at Russia's last three remaining production reactors. These reactors continue to operate in order to provide heat and electricity to the surrounding cities. For a number of years, CTR had been involved in attempting to convert the cores of the reactors, so that they could continue operating without creating weapons-grade plutonium. Consideration is now being given to shutting down the reactors altogether and replacing them with fossil fuel power plants. The Defense Department is currently evaluating how to proceed with this project, though the current law prohibits use of FY 2001 CTR funds to be used for construction of a fossil fuel replacement plant. Overall, Myers asserted that the mood in Congress toward the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is good, and that there is fairly solid recognition of the threat posed by weak controls over WMD in the former Soviet Union. If there is disagreement over the program, it is on where threat reduction-style activities should rank relative to other national security programs. Myers reasoned that CTR is simply one part of a multilayered defense that also incorporates programs to intercept nuclear and other WMD materials at Russian and other FSU borders; tighter customs and security controls at U.S. borders; enhanced domestic preparedness to respond to a WMD attack on U.S. soil; and steps forward in the area of missile defenses. Finally, Myers applauded the Bush Administration's review of U.S.-sponsored nonproliferation activities in Russia, arguing that a nuts and bolts assessment of the programs was overdue. He believed it was important to take a fair look at all of these programs, discern what they have accomplished, evaluate whether they continue to serve national interests, and examine whether there are redundancies that could be reduced through consolidation of efforts. Myers hoped that the review would result in a comprehensive plan for dealing with the WMD threats. As for the status of the review, Myers indicated that few details have trickled out of the White House, and that all rumors regarding the review should be treated as highly speculative. But Myers felt that it was fair to say that the review is taking a hard look at what programs are working, which activities have encountered problems, and what, if any, new programs should be initiated to deal with the proliferation risks emanating from Russia. In the end, however, Myers predicted that it would be a fairly "normal" year for all the threat reduction-style programs on Capitol Hill. Programs that have demonstrated results well will fare well in the Congressional authorization and appropriations processes, while other programs where it has been harder to quantify achievements will continue to be scrutinized. Remarks by Ken Luongo, Executive Director, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) Luongo opened by recalling the Congressional origins of the Nunn-Lugar agenda, and the fact that it was not initially popular with the first Bush Administration. There was a serious budget deficit at the time and the funds for working with countries that were enemies of the United States just months before were coming from the defense budget. But ultimately, the Administration embraced the concept. During the past decade the United States has learned much about Russia's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons infrastructure, and has done much to reduce proliferation risks emanating from Russia and the other former Soviet states. Luongo maintained that the list of accomplishments is quite substantial when one examines the number of missiles and silos destroyed, warheads dismantled, and nuclear material placed under improved protection. More important than the quantifiable achievements, Luongo asserted that this process has fueled a relationship of trust between both countries that was unimaginable during the Cold War. These relationships are an intangible benefit that is hard to quantify in GAO reports or other audits, but they are a completely unique result of this work. And these relationships have proven to be important in influencing decision-making in Russia and other countries. However, despite all that has been achieved over the past decade under the "Nunn-Lugar" banner, this collaboration is now coming under greater scrutiny in both countries and the political support for sustaining this collaboration is being tested. Luongo highlighted financial support as one of the primary tests of this collaboration. The financial aspect of the U.S.-Russian collaboration is very important because it allows projects to be implemented and it provides some financial sustenance to impoverished weapons scientists and institutes. However, the Bush Administration's planned FY 2002 budget is the first in a decade makes significant cuts in major U.S.-Russian nuclear security programs. There have been times in the past when the Congress has reduced the funding for certain programs, but cuts in continuing programs have not been initiated by a sitting administration. Luongo respected the Bush Administration's desire to conduct a review of the many programs that constitute the cooperative nuclear security agenda with Russia. The problem, according to Luongo, is that the Administration seems to have put the cart before the horse, by telegraphing diminished support for this work before the review was even initiated. Luongo noted that the only budget cuts that have been made public are those to the DOE programs, which focus primarily on nuclear security work. The budget for the DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program is not yet known and will be revealed with the defense budget details later this summer. State Department non-proliferation efforts seem to have been increased - including a slight increase in support of the ISTC - but it is very difficult to know at this point how much of the requested increase will be devoted to Nunn-Lugar type activities. Luongo complained that a major part of the problem with the proposed cuts to the DOE budget is that they lack a cohesive theme or strategy. The most significant cuts came in some of the most important programs. For example, the effort to ensure that Russia's bomb grade material and some portion of its warheads are adequately protected was cut by almost 20%. Similarly, funding to assist the disposal of Russian plutonium from retired warheads was significantly decreased. Perhaps even more distressing, Luongo continued, is that the budget eliminated a $500,000 effort to convince Russia to prepare a comprehensive inventory of its weapon plutonium holdings. Without knowing how much plutonium is there, it is impossible to know how much excess must ultimately be eliminated. The U.S. has published its plutonium inventory and it should be encouraging Russia to do the same. Finally, Luongo criticized the budget request for decimating the Nuclear Cities Initiative that is designed to help Russia shrink its massively oversized nuclear weapons complex and help create jobs for the excess weapons scientists and workers. Luongo noted that the program has had problems in part because its mission is very difficult. But by placing the program on a trajectory for elimination, the budget not only leaves an important national security objective inadequately funded, it also jeopardizes European contributions to this nuclear cities process, which are beginning to materialize for the first time in a decade. Luongo acknowledged that there are implementation problems with some of the programs. Milestones have been missed. Promises have been made and then not kept. Access to sensitive facilities has emerged as a roadblock that has not yet been overcome. Russian cooperation with Iran is an enduring cloud over this cooperation that could become worse. The political atmosphere on both sides is less friendly. Under these circumstances, Luongo remarked that it is appropriate to ask whether the approaches undertaken ten years ago are still effectively increasing nuclear security in Russia. But Luongo feared that instead of seeking to strengthen the agenda, the review process may be looking to identify flaws and problems with the possible focus on eliminating programs, rather than identifying new ideas to treat the problems. In any case, Luongo explained, it is hard to know what exactly is occurring in the review process because the Administration has not invited input from outside experts. Luongo argued against abandoning cooperative nuclear security work with Russia due to "political annoyances" or implementation problems. Through this cooperation, the United States now knows much more about the operation of weapons facilities that were the Soviet crown jewels of the Cold War. Cooperation occurs on topics that were once unfathomable. The collaborators on the Russian side were among the most secretive scientists of the Soviet Union. In short, there is a much different relationship with Russia on this agenda than existed even five years ago. Because of these multiple benefits, the United States should not be deterred from expanding its nonproliferation cooperation with Russia, and Luongo called on Congress to renew its commitment to the Nunn-Lugar agenda that it created. He stressed that while there will be moments of tough sledding with Russia on many threat reduction projects and programs, the obstacles are not insurmountable. Moreover, there is simply too much at stake to allow this agenda to crumble in order to save a few hundred million dollars, which represents less than one percent of overall annual U.S. defense spending. Remarks by Anatoli Diakov, Director, Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Diakov highlighted the importance of threat reduction efforts and the value that Russian officials have placed in cooperating with the United States in eliminating weapons of mass destruction and preventing their proliferation. Diakov enumerated some of the major threat reduction achievements of the past ten years:
Another potential problem, according to Diakov, is the potential linkage between future U.S. threat reduction assistance and actions and decisions by Russia on other unrelated issues. This artificial political linkage is incomprehensible and disappointing to many in the Russian MOD, Ministry of Atomic Energy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it strengthens the parts of the Russian bureaucracy that object to cooperation with the United States. To Diakov, the Nunn-Lugar program has developed into a self-sufficient element of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, and it is desirable that the future of this cooperative agenda not be endangered by disagreements between both countries on broader domestic or international political issues. While the disagreements between the United States and Russia on other issues are important, these differences should not interfere with the strategy and efforts of the Nunn-Lugar agenda. In any case, pressure from the United States to link threat reduction assistance to other political issues would surely be counterproductive, and would cause the Russian parliament (Duma) to block any further implementation of threat reduction programs and activities by refusing to ratify the 1999 protocol extending the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, as required under Russian law. On the whole, however, Diakov believed that threat reduction efforts have promoted a close and effective working relationship between the Russian nuclear establishment - both the Ministries of Atomic Energy and Defense - and their counterparts at the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. It was difficult to imagine ten years ago that the United States and Russia would be working together on such sensitive nuclear security issues. This collaboration is a big achievement in and of itself because it facilitates a dialogue on very sensitive questions and creates trust needed to overcome the vestiges of mutual suspicion that have not fully dissipated since the end of the Cold War. The CTR program is highly respected by the participating Russian governmental agencies and other senior Russian officials. These positive attitudes have proven to be quite resilient in Russia. Even during a deterioration of the broader U.S.-Russian relationship over the bombing of Yugoslavia, Nunn-Lugar projects continued largely without interruption. Diakov also addressed the "unfinished business" of threat reduction efforts in Russia. In Diakov's judgment, there is still much to be done. For example, in the next several years the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces are planning to deactivate about of 8,000 warheads, destroy more than 1,000 ICBMs, and eliminate 495 ICBMs silos. Similarly, the Russian Navy is planning to eliminate 420 SLBM Launchers and 674 SLBMs. U.S. assistance will be instrumental in facilitating the elimination of these systems. One of the big problems facing Russia is the dismantlement and disposal of multi-purpose nuclear submarines (SSNs). To date, 146 Russian SSNs have been retired but only 53 have been partially dismantled. Most of these submarines are in very deteriorated condition, and represent huge ticking time bombs for the environment and public safety. As an example of the worsening situation surrounding Russian SSNs, Diakov stated that last year two retired nuclear submarines sank near the pier where they were moored at the Petropavlovsk-Kamshatskii Navy base. Another major challenge on the horizon is the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium. The United States and Russia completed an agreement on excess military plutonium disposition last September that commits both countries to convert 34 tons of its excess weapons plutonium into forms unusable for nuclear weapons. The cost of disposition activities in Russia is estimated at approximately $2 billion. Russia will not be able to finance the disposition of its excess plutonium alone, and will require assistance from the United States and other countries to implement its disposition program. In closing, Diakov commented that the political changes in the United States over the past six months has spawned questions in Russia about the future of cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation activities with the United States. While the United States is questioning the future of these cooperative programs, it is the clear majority view in Russia that the overall Nunn-Lugar agenda has served Russian national (and global) interests and helped preserve a solid U.S.-Russian relationship. |
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