The cooperative U.S.-Russian effort to ensure that Russian bomb materialdoes not fall into hostile hands - known as the Material Protection, Control,and Accounting (MPC&A) program, managed by the Department ofEnergy (DOE)—is absolutely crucial to U.S. national security, playing afundamental role in the global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons.Precisely because of the urgency and importance of the task, however, itis essential to ensure that it is being carried out in a manner that willreduce the security threat posed by insecure nuclear material as quicklyand effectively as practicable.
This report provides an assessment of the current MPC&A programand makes recommendations designed to accelerate and strengthen the effort,including steps toward the difficult goal of achieving sustainable securityfor nuclear material in the former Soviet Union over the long term. The report’s major findings are as follows:
The MPC&A program is achieving major successes in addressing the threatof nuclear theft, having substantially increased security for large amountsof vulnerable nuclear weapons-usable material in Russia and the other statesof the former Soviet Union. The program deserves strong support, includingincreased funding and personnel.
Most of the work, however, remains to be done, and a substantial accelerationof the effort is urgently needed.
The scope of the work to be done is now understood to be substantiallylarger than originally believed, but the program’s planned budgets havenot increased commensurately.
The projected completion of the initial security upgrades and materialconsolidations has been delayed by many years, and planned schedules arenow unacceptably stretched out, given the grave danger to inter-nationalsecurity now posed by inadequately protected fissile material.
Balanced MPC&A systems involving physical protection, material control,and material accounting are needed to effectively protect against outsiderand insider threats. Much less progress has been made in material accountingto date than in physical protection.
The program has usefully begun to focus on material consolidation and conversion,but this aspect of the program has not moved forward as aggressively asnecessary.
Realistic testing of the performance of MPC&A systems in defeatinginsider and outsider threats is absolutely essential to achieving highlevels of security and sustaining the systems for the long haul. Littlerealistic performance testing has so far been accomplished in U.S.-RussianMPC&A cooperation.
The development of effective regulation of MPC&A in Russia is an essentialelement of the long term sustainability of security upgrades. The developmentof effective MPC&A regulation has been slow, however, and the emphasison regulation in the cooperative MPC&A program has been reduced inrecent years.
Sustainability of the MPC&A effort is essential and complex. A broadrange of steps are needed to help ensure that Russia and the other formerSoviet states have the resources, incentives, and organizations in placeto ensure that improved MPC&A systems and approaches will be sustainedover the long haul. Insufficient attention to sustainability in both theUnited States and Russia, as well as congressional skepticism about thescope and cost of the proposed sustainability measures, have retarded progressin this essential area.
While there have been management improvements in recent years, rangingfrom establishing consistent objectives for MPC&A upgrades to improvingfinancial tracking, there have also been a number of negative steps, thatcould, if not correct-ed, substantially undermine the program’s prospectsfor future success, including:
The downgrading of the policy role of the U.S. laboratories - who havemore MPC&A technical expertise, on-the-ground experience and personalrelationships in Russia, and creative energy than DOE headquarters - andtheir removal from the management structure of the program;
A substantial decrease in emphasis on maintaining a genuine partnershipwith Russian participants, and particularly the Russian nuclear laboratories,excluding them from many key decision-making processes. This has createdcontroversy and resentment in Russia and has slowed the program’s progress;
A U.S. decision to cut off new work on MPC&A upgrades at the weapondesign and assembly/disassembly facilities in the Russian nuclear weaponscomplex (which contain huge quantities of fissile material) until Russiaagrees to provide access to these facilities, after the United States hadalready negotiated and signed agreements providing for methods to carryout upgrades effectively without direct U.S. access
Sustained high-level support and attention - which has frequently beenlacking in recent years - is needed to overcome obstacles to acceleratedprogress as they arise. To succeed, the program requires energetic, visionaryleadership with access to the highest levels of the U.S. government.
Immediate steps are needed to address these issues. This report recommendsthe following actions.
The President of the United States should make achieving an agreement withRussia to work out an accelerated plan to reduce this security threat atop priority. The plan should focus on completing the security improvementsin the shortest possible time.
DOE should develop, in partnership with Russian experts, an acceleratedstrategic plan designed to reduce the proliferation threats posed by insecurenuclear material in the former Soviet Union as rapidly as possible.
The President and DOE should work closely with Congress to ensure thatadequate funding and personnel resources are provided to implement theaccelerated plan.
Working jointly with Russian experts, conduct a comprehensive materialconsolidation analysis that would address the scope of consolidation, possibilitiesfor substantial acceleration of the process, consolidation bottlenecksand ways of eliminating them, and consolidation schedule and budget requirementsscenarios. The aim should be to reduce the number of buildings and facilitiesholding plutonium or highly-enriched uranium (HEU) as much as possible,as rapidly as possible.
Work to convince the top leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom)to issue a high-profile directive ordering their facilities to consolidatetheir material into the fewest possible locations (following the exampleof the top Navy leadership in emphasizing consolidation), and to preparestrategic plans to accomplish that objective for Minatom review by a specifieddate.
Increase the priority of working with the large defense and fuel cyclefacilities to carry out such consolidations, including seeking to workwith the leadership of each facility to flesh out strategic plans detailinghow much consolidation is to be accomplished by when, and with what resources.
Provide adequate financing for preparing and transporting nuclear material,and rapidly providing secure storage facilities to which it could be shipped.
Work to strengthen MPC&A regulation (at Gosatomnadzor, within Minatom,and within the MOD), and work to ensure that all facilities are informedof the likely costs of maintaining their HEU or plutonium stockpiles whilecomplying with the regulations.
Undertake an intensive program to pro-vide comprehensive incentives tosmall, vulnerable research sites to give up their HEU stockpiles, includingcash for purchasing the HEU, funding for alternative research not requiringHEU, and assistance in converting to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels whereappropriate. (This would include strengthening the Reduced Enrichment forResearch and Test Reactors (RERTR) cooperation program, and improving coordinationbetween this effort and the MPC&A program.)
Ensure that the MPC&A material consolidation and conversion (MCC) effortand other initiatives involving blending of HEU are properly coordinatedand have clear and compatible objectives. In particular, since the blendingenvisioned under the MCC project is a tiny fraction of the amount of HEUbeing blended in the HEU purchase agreement, the MPC&A program shouldplace primary emphasis in MCC not on the amount of HEU blended but on thenumber of buildings or facilities from which all weapons-usable materialhas been removed (which is what most reduces the threats of theft and thefuture costs of MPC&A); the amount of material blend-ed down is relevantprimarily with respect to the degree of incentive the payment for thisblended material provides to Russian organizations to clean HEU out ofbuildings and facilities.
Provide extensive briefings for senior Minatom officials and site managerson the dramatic savings in safeguards and security costs that are beingachieved through consolidation in the United States.
MPC&A UPGRADES
The United States should:
Continue to prioritize those upgrades likely to provide the largest andfastest sustainable reduction in theft risk per dollar spent, with an integratedapproach to MPC&A.
Improve U.S.-Russian coordination and joint planning, and resolve currentaccess issues stalling upgrades at key sites (see sections on partnershipand access below for more detailed recommendations).
Conduct lessons-learned sessions with representatives of various Russiansites, and establish other regular mechanisms for lateral communicationbetween experts working on different sites and different parts of the MPC&Aprogram.
Work with Russian experts to improve the understanding of material controland accounting practices at Russian facilities.
Undertake a high-level effort to gain Russian agreement to carry out rapiditem inventories, identifying, tagging, and sealing each item or containerwith plutonium or HEU. As part of that effort, the U.S. government shouldwork out an arrangement to overcome disincentives, such as an “amnesty”period in which inventories could be carried out without repercussionsif they did not match past paper records.
Increase the scale of support for actual measured inventories of material.
Redouble efforts to put in place an effective national inventory systemas rapidly as practicable.
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY
Sustainability Resources
The United States should:
Expand and plan for funding of “emergency measures” where needed—fundingto keep guards on the job, keep security systems running temporarily, providebackup electricity supplies, and the like—as DOE did on a small scale inthe winter and spring of 1998–99.
Finance the first 2–3 years of operations and maintenance of systems installedwith U.S. assistance, as an initial settling-in period, and work duringthat period to reach firm commitments that Russia will pay to keep thesystems operational after that.
Begin working with the Russian government now to gain Russian commitmentto specific steps to provide adequate funding for sustaining effectiveMPC&A after U.S. assistance phases down in the future.
Put increased reliance on indigenous personnel and firms to design, build,upgrade, and operate MPC&A systems, building up the indigenous capacitiesto carry out these missions in the former Soviet states.
Simultaneously (a) work to reestablish good relations with Eleron, andto improve its capability to produce high-quality equipment to be usedfor MPC&A and warhead security, and (b) continue to work to broadenthe base of indigenous suppliers of such equipment in the former SovietUnion.
Initiate the establishment of, and provide funding for, a program of realistictests of the performance of MPC&A systems at Russian facilities againstboth outsider and insider threats, relying primarily on Russian testingteams—with wide dissemination of test results and lessons learned, andfunding for fixing problems identified (see more detailed recommendationson performance testing below).
Help finance transition costs (recruitment, training, equipment, and thelike) for a shift to more professional guard forces for nuclear material—eitherhighly trained officer-dominated forces comparable to those that guardnuclear weapons, or (at least at civilian facilities) commercial firmssuch as those that guard Russian banks, or nuclear facilities in the UnitedStates.
Finance expanded training programs designed to build the cadre of qualifiedMPC&A personnel, including regular training at individual sites aswell as the existing national training effort, with a focus not only ontechnical MPC&A but also on the critical importance to Russia and theworld of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and the key role ofeffective MPC&A in that effort.
Explore possible new revenue streams that could finance robust securityand accounting programs for nuclear material in the former Soviet Unionafter international assistance declines, ranging from spent fuel storageto additional HEU purchases to “debt for security” swaps.
Sustainability Incentives
The United States should:
Put nuclear security and accounting at the top of the U.S.-FSU nonproliferationagenda, as a fundamental requirement for preventing the spread of nuclearweapons, which all states handling weapons-usable nuclear material mustmeet. This issue should be accorded an importance at least comparable tothat of ratification of arms control treaties and enforcement of effectiveexport controls. The United States should make clear that this is a fundamentalrequirement for improved nuclear relations, something to be emphasizedat every level on every occasion until the problem is adequately addressed(as is now done with issues such as cooperation with Iran, to take oneexample)—and work with other leading nuclear powers to convince them totake a similar approach.
Increase the priority devoted to strengthening regulation of MPC&A.A realistic prospect of being fined or shut down if MPC&A did not meetstringent standards would create a major incentive for facility managersto invest scarce resources in ensuring adequate security and accounting.
In particular, provide adequate funding for Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) support of MPC&A regulation in the former Soviet states; expandefforts to improve Minatom’s internal regulatory capabilities; and developregulatory sup-port and training programs with the Ministry of Defensebody responsible for regulating military-related facilities in Russia comparablein scope and level of effort to those pursued with Gosatomnadzor and Minatom.
Write requirements for MPC&A operations and maintenance, and realistictesting, into MPC&A contracts with facilities, with incentives writteninto the con-tracts to fulfill these commitments.
Give preference to facilities with good MPC&A in all U.S. governmentcon-tracts, and use the leverage provided by such contracts to pursue MPC&Aobjectives. Over time, facility managers in the former Soviet Union shouldcome to understand that excellent MPC&A is a basic “price of admission”for doing business with the United States, just as refraining from transfersof sensitive technology to potential proliferators is—and the United Statesshould work with other leading nations to convince them to take the sameapproach. At the same time, the United States should seek to use the considerableleverage that funds flowing to Russian facilities from U.S. programs pro-videto seek additional MPC&A progress—for example, using the fact thatsome large Russian facilities receive most of their cash income from theHEU deal to convince them to cooperate in ensuring stringent standardsof security and accounting.
Make achievement of high standards of MPC&A a prerequisite for U.S.support for new efforts involving bulk processing or transport of fissilematerial, which would otherwise increase, rather than decrease, the risksof theft and proliferation. At the same time, the United States shouldplace high priority on working with Russia to upgrade MPC&A for thosebulk processing and transport programs that are already under way withU.S. sup-port, such as the HEU deal.
Consciously attempt to identify and sup-port individuals at facilitiesand within organizations who are working to change their institution’sapproach to MPC&A for the better—known in the managerial literatureas “change agents.”
Sustainability Organization
The United States should work with Russia and the other former Sovietstates on a systemic program of reform of the organizations involved inMPC&A, designed to ensure that:
Each facility with weapons-usable nuclear material has a designated officefor MPC&A, with appropriate personnel and authority;
Each national institution with facilities with weapons-usable nuclear materialunder its control has appropriate institutional procedures and regulationsfor managing this material, and a designated office for MPC&A, withappropriate personnel and authority;
The facility offices communicate appropriately with each other, and withthe national authorities;
There are clear and authoritative laws and regulations in place requiringMPC&A measures which, if complied with in their entirety, would ensurean effective system;
The regulatory authorities have the authority, independence, personnel,equipment, and procedures required to carry out effective MPC&A regulation,including the authority to impose fines or close facilities for failureto comply with MPC&A regulations;
There are recruitment, compensation, promotion, and training proceduresin place to ensure that highly qualified people are available for all aspectsof MPC&A, and have incentives for good performance;
There are effective mechanisms in place for interagency coordination, jointaction, and dispute resolution on MPC&A issues;
There exists a substantial body of non-governmental organizations, journalists,and legislators interested in monitoring MPC&A progress and lobbyingfor change when that is necessary.
Types of Material to be Protected
The United States should:
Revise the MPC&A program guidelines to ensure that theft of enoughmaterial for a bomb in the form of low-weight-percent-age material is notsignificantly easier than theft of enough pure material for a bomb—bringingthe guidelines closer to conformance with international standards.
At the same time, instruct the MPC&A teams to place first priorityon security and accounting for pure material that could be used in weaponswithout chemical processing.
Provide funding for a sustainability program for the non-Russian facilitiescom-parable to the program needed for Russian facilities.
Undertake a high-priority effort to convince as many of these facilitiesas possible to give up their fissile material stockpiles completely withina few years, offering targeted packages of incentives tailored to the needsof each facility.
Undertake a similar effort for other states that received HEU from theSoviet Union, outside the former Soviet Union itself.
The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Energy, and other seniormembers of the national security team should make reducing the threat posedby insecure nuclear material a top priority, and should devote the sustainedtime and effort needed to ensure that the MPC&A program is carriedout as rapidly and effectively as possible, and that obstacles to progressare quickly overcome.
The U.S. national laboratories should be given a stronger voice in keypolicy decisions on the future of the MPC&A program. Specifically,senior laboratory experts should be brought back into the DOE managementstructure, and the laboratory advisory committee should be given a greaterrole, with its input solicited on all key policy and technical decisions.
In addition to this strengthened laboratory committee, DOE should establishan independent committee of outside experts to advise on the best approachesfor carrying out the MPC&A program.
The MPC&A program should adopt as a fundamental principle that everyobjective will be achieved in partnership with the Russians, with programsdesigned to serve both U.S. and Russian interests, and Russian expertsintegrated into all phases of program design and implementation; the missionstatement should make unambiguously clear that the goal of the programis to serve both U.S. and Russian interests.
The MPC&A program should work with Russia to build a central policyrole for the Joint Coordinating Committee called for in the 1999 government-to-governmentagreement, and to ensure that senior technical experts (as well as regulators)are represented on both sides of that committee.
The MPC&A program should work with Russian experts to develop a newjoint strategic plan for the MPC&A effort—a greatly accelerated one.In particular, the U.S. side should work with the leaders of key Russiansites with large quantities of material and ask for their perspectiveson how best to rapidly consolidate and upgrade security for the materialat their sites. The U.S. side should seek a political- level mandate—perhapsfrom the U.S. and Russian Presidents—to work out such an accelerated jointplan.
The MPC&A program should develop a new joint version of the programguidelines and objectives, giving Russian experts an important voice inthe final product.
The MPC&A program should establish mechanisms for integrating Russianperspectives into the work of the Technical Survey Team. Potential optionsinclude encouraging the establishment of a parallel Russian team, or evenintegrating Russian participants into what has until now been a U.S.-onlyteam.
The MPC&A program should seek to establish Russian teams that can playkey roles in designing and carrying out upgrades, on the model of the workthe Kurchatov Institute experts have done on the Navy projects. This couldultimately include encouraging the establishment of additional privateRussian firms that would receive MPC&A contracts on a for-profit basis,giving them an incentive to find ways to overcome obstacles and expandcooperation.
The MPC&A program should seek to increase the management and problem-solvingroles of both the U.S. and Russian laboratories and facilities, de-emphasizingreliance on talks between DOE and Minatom headquarters officials to theextent possible.
U.S. project leaders should be instructed not to present new ideas as U.S.demands, but rather to seek to work with their Russian counterparts tojointly develop MPC&A approaches and modify them as necessary, withthe goal of achieving maximum Russian “buy-in” and support for upgradesand changes in procedures and culture.
Where possible, experts selected to be U.S. project leaders should haveprevious successful international experience (ideally experience workingwith Russian nuclear experts), and project and team members should be givenat least introductory training in Russian culture and negotiating in aRussian context.
The MPC&A program should avoid sudden drastic changes in technicalapproaches taken at individual sites, and should seek to keep the sameU.S. project leaders for individual MPC&A sites for several years,to improve program consistency and allow personal relationships and trustto build up over time.
As recommended in more detail below, the United States should resolve theaccess issue quickly, returning to its past commitments in this area.
DOE should immediately lift the cutoff of further contracts at the twoweapons design laboratories and the four weapons assembly and disassemblyfacilities. DOE should send the message to Russia that new management istaking a new approach, and return to implementing the agreements previouslyreached.
At the same time, DOE should continue to work with the Russian side, ina problem- solving spirit, to work out improved approaches to providingsufficient information to prioritize MPC&A upgrades and confirm theappropriate use of U.S. assistance. The use of trusted Russian citizens,as in the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program, shouldbe explored.
DOE should offer Russian experts reciprocal access at U.S. facilities engagedin comparable activities. Offering to let the Russians see the same thingsthe U.S. wants to see will help build trust, under-mine the argument thatthe United States is spying through such visits, familiarize additionalRussian experts with how similar security and accounting issues are addressedin the U.S. system, and make clear to U.S. officials just how difficultand sensitive it is to arrange the kinds of access they are seeking inRussia.
DOE should work closely with Congress to demonstrate that it is possibleto have confidence that U.S. assistance is being used appropriately evenin the absence of direct U.S. access to these sensitive facilities, andto emphasize that the cooperation at these sensitive sites is crucial toreducing the threat of nuclear material theft.
Place high priority on working to establish effective performance-testingprograms both at individual facilities, and within agencies with regulatoryresponsibilities including Minatom, Gosatomnadzor, and the Ministry ofInterior (MVD).
Work with Russia to develop performance-oriented safeguards regulations.In particular, the MPC&A program could work with Minatom, Gosatomnadzorand other organizations to encourage the development and use of a practicaldesign basis threat as a part of the regulatory process.
Sponsor performance testing methodology workshops. Performance testingwork shops could be conducted at the Russian Methodological and TrainingCenter (RMTC), other training centers, and regional Gosatomnadzor offices.
Conduct inspector-accompaniment missions for performance testing inspectionsin the United States as well as (possibly simulated) inspections in Russia.Because of access difficulties at DOE facilities, it might be easier toorganize Russian visits to nuclear power plants. Russian experts have alreadyobserved some of NRC’s performance testing inspections at U.S. civilianpower reactors.
Write requirements for facility-level performance testing programs intoMPC&A contracts at individual sites and facilities.
Provide limited training in performance testing techniques to selectedpersonnel from nuclear facilities, Gosatomnadzor, Minatom, and MVD.
Provide equipment that enhances the effectiveness of performance testing(for example, Multiple Independent Laser Engagement System (MILES) equipmentfor force-on-force drills).
Support and sponsor the development of a performance testing core groupat Gosatomnadzor and/or Minatom head-quarters.
Work to establish in Russia a group that is professionally in the businessof con-ducting such performance tests, with appropriate knowledge of MPC&Asystems and adversary tactics and characteristics, comparable to the contractorsin the United States who support performance testing at DOE facilitiesand work with NRC-licensed facilities to help them prepare for performancetests.
The Secretary of Energy should send a clear message that MPC&A is atop nuclear security priority and that travel for the purpose of implementingMPC&A should not be interfered with. He should task a senior stafferwith the job of overcoming the obstacles to MPC&A travel and greatlystreamlining the process.
Increased emphasis should be placed on establishing teams on the groundin Russia that can do much of the MPC&A design and implementation work,on the model of the Kurchatov Institute team that works with the RussianNavy programs, lessening the travel burden on U.S. experts and the portionof the program cost that must be spent at the U.S. laboratories.
