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NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

NUNN-LUGAR SCORECARD
Nunn-Lugar Scorecard


Nunn-Lugar Now
The next steps

-Congress needs to authorize the President to have certification waiver authority so that funding for the program can start again. New contracts were stopped for 6 months earlier this year and were stopped again on October 1. The Senate Defense Authorization bill includes permanent waiver authority and the House bill has a three year waiver authority. The bills are now in a House-Senate Conference Committee.

-Congressional restrictions have stymied the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. Those restrictions need to be lifted with inclusion of the language in the Senate Defense Appropriations bill, now in a House-Senate Conference Committee.

-Congress needs to authorize expansion of the Nunn-Lugar program to be used outside the former Soviet Union. Language in the Senate Defense Authorization bill would allow the Administration to use up to $50 million a year for emergency nonproliferation missions around the world.

-There needs to be an accelerated effort to begin destroying chemical and biological weapons in Russia.

-The elimination of nuclear weapons must continue. Only about half of the declared Russian stockpile has been destroyed. The program will also be needed to destroy weapons covered under the Moscow Treaty.

-Complete work on Lugar Top 10 list

-Implement 10+10 over 10


Nunn-Lugar Accomplishments

The greatest U.S. foreign policy challenge and global security threat are weapons of mass destruction and their availability to hostile nations and terrorist states.

As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command and control society, a vast supermarket of weapons and materials of mass destruction became potentially accessible to rogue nations and terrorists. A single act of nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism perpetrated against a major city would cause catastrophic disruption to peace, prosperity and stability.

To prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states, Senators Sam Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, and Dick Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, authored and advocated the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which became law in 1991.

Since then, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 5,990 nuclear warheads. It has destroyed 479 ballistic missiles, 435 ballistic missile silos, 97 bombers, 336 submarine-launched missiles, 396 submarine missile launchers, and 24 strategic missile submarines. It has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels. More than 22,000 scientists formerly employed in weapons of mass destruction programs have been employed in cooperative, peaceful endeavors.

The program also removed all of the nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. When the USSR dissolved, these nations respectively possessed the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear arsenals in the world.

Nunn-Lugar has accomplished these results by establishing a cooperative presence in the former Soviet Union. Over 80 percent of Nunn-Lugar funds have been awarded to American firms that do the work. A side benefit of Nunn-Lugar has been to establish many ties between the Russian and U.S. militaries and governments.

The Nunn-Lugar program also has facilitated several covert operations in the former Soviet Union:

** In 1994, Project Sapphire removed 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. The amount of material was sufficient to make between 20 and 30 nuclear weapons.

** In 1997, 21 nuclear-capable MIG-29C attack aircraft were acquired from Moldova before they could be purchased by another country.

** In 1998, Operation Auburn Endeavor removed 8.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the former Soviet state of Georgia.

In each case, rogue nations or terrorist groups attempted to acquire the material or weapons. Instead, U.S. officials using Nunn-Lugar funds and authorization were able to secure these items before theft or proliferation could occur.


Senator Dick Lugar's "Top Ten"

Senator Lugar's guide to former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological threats in need of immediate attention.

1. Chemical Weapons Destruction:

  • Two million rounds of chemical shells and warheads await destruction at Shchuchye.
  • Chemical weapons are also stored at six other sites awaiting destruction: Kizner, Pochep, Leonidovka, Gorny, Maradyokvsky, Kambarka.
  • Russia is falling far behind their commitments under the CWC.
2. Securing Biological Pathogens:

  • Russia has refused to grant access to four closed military institutes: Kirov 200, Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk), Sergeyev Possad, Military Medicine Institute at St. Petersburg.
3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination and Secure Storage:

  • Tactical nuclear weapons are more portable, less secure, and deployed closer to potential flashpoints than strategic systems.
4. Engagement of former Weapons Scientists and Engineers:

  • ISTC and IPP programs engage tens of thousands of former weapons scientists.
  • A successful end-game must include American corporate investment or purchase of Russian laboratories.
5. Material Protection, Control & Accounting Programs:

  • Only 40% of the facilities housing nuclear materials in Russia have received security improvements and only half of these have received complete security systems.
6. Radioactive Sources:

  • The Soviet Union manufactured RTGs to supply power at remote sites.
  • These generators pose a proliferation threat and are spread all over the states of the former Soviet Union.
7. Shutdown of Plutonium Producing Reactors:

  • Three nuclear reactors produce 1.5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium each year.
  • Russia has agreed to shut down the reactors if replacement power sources are built.
8. Plutonium Disposition:
  • The U.S. and Russia have agreed to eliminate 34 tons of plutonium by fabricating it into MOX fuel that will be irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors.
  • Disposition will require sizable up-front costs to construct required facilities.
9. Dismantlement of Non-Strategic Submarines:
  • Nunn-Lugar can only dismantle strategic submarines, but non-strategic subs are also a threat because some carry cruise missiles and others have highly-enriched nuclear fuels which are a proliferation threat.
10. Reactor Safety:
  • Converting reactors that utilize HEU to lower enriched fuels and safely storing spent fuel. (Concerns in Georgia led to Operation Auburn Endeavor, a classified mission to remove weapons-grade nuclear material from a dangerous situation.)

TOP TEN LIST DESCRIPTION:

CHEMICAL WEAPONS:
The United States and Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Today, some five years later, the U.S. in the midst of a very expensive destruction process but the Russians have barely eliminated 100 pounds of their estimated 40,000 metric ton stockpile. Senator Nunn and I have visited one of the seven locations that stores the materials at Shchuchye. At that location there are some 2 million shells and warheads filled with sarin and VX gas. The smallest of these, an 85 mm shell can easily fit into a suitcase and carried out of the facility. Just one briefcase could carry enough agents to kill thousands of people.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:
The United States must continue to work closely with Russia to assist in the conversion of former biological weapons facilities and scientists. The Nunn-Lugar program is working closely with the International Science and Technology Center at the State Department to upgrade security and engage workers in peaceful work. We have enjoyed great progress at places like Vector and Obolensk, but there are still some facilities Russia who will not engage with us. Specifically, there are four former military facilities that have not opened their doors. This is a mistake that must be corrected.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
U.S.-Russian cooperation must move beyond strategic systems into the tactical weapons arena. In many ways the threat posed by the proliferation of tactical nuclear systems is more serious than that posed by strategic weapons. Tactical warheads are more portable, usually deployed closer to potential flashpoints, and many are not secured at the same level as strategic systems. We must establish transparency in this area so that both sides can have confidence in weapons' quantity, status, storage, and security. Absent such progress our impressive record in the strategic arena might be undercut by the vulnerability of tactical weapons.

ENGAGEMENT OF FORMER WEAPONS SCIENTISTS:
Tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists have been employed by the U.S. in peaceful pursuits under the International Science and Technology Centers and the IPP program at the Department of Energy. These programs are critical to U.S. security. If desperation and bankruptcy become the norm, many weapons experts might leave Russia and renew their weapons careers. I encourage U.S. corporations and those from G-8 states to explore the possibility of purchasing or investing in Russian laboratories. Only when these scientists have long-term employment in peaceful pursuits and succeed in domestic and international markets, will we be able to scale back our efforts.

MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING:
After eight years of close cooperation and considerable effort, only 40% of the facilities housing nuclear materials in Russia have received security improvements through U.S. assistance. Unfortunately, only half of these facilities have received complete security systems. Russia should continue to consolidate materials in fewer locations, but if facilities housing nuclear weapons materials are vulnerable, we cannot wait until a convenient budgetary situation arrives to complete our work. We must commit ourselves to installing necessary security as quickly as possible. RADIOACTIVE SOURCES: The Soviet Union produced hundreds of small nuclear generators, known as Radioisotope Thermal Generators (RTGs), to supply power at remote sites. These RTG's are considered very dangerous because they hold nuclear material that might be used in a dirty bomb. The Russian government does not have an accurate accounting as to where all the generators are located. We must find these units, secure them and remove the dangerous materials.

SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCING REACTORS:
There are three nuclear reactors in Siberia that produce 1.5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium as a natural byproduct of their operation. Russia will not shutdown these reactors until replacement power sources are available because the reactors are the sole source of power and heat in the region. As we continue to safeguard and eliminate nuclear material in Russia we must also take steps to ensure that no additional weapons-grade material is created. This must be started immediately.

PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION:
The U.S. and Russia have agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Both sides will fabricate the material into mixed oxide fuel that will be irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors. The processes, on both sides, will require significant investments in new facilities that will be needed to fabricate the fuel. An estimated $2 billion will be needed to build and implement the Russian effort.

NON-STRATEGIC SUBMARINES:
Each time I visit Russian shipyards I'm startled by the enormity of the task that lies before us in the area of submarine dismantlement. Nunn-Lugar is limited to dismantling strategic misile submarines. This is a mistake. There are important non-proliferation and security benefits to the timely dismantlement of conventional submarines. Many carry cruise missiles which could prove valuable to rogue nation missile programs. Other submarines, such as the Alfa attack submarine, is powered by nuclear fuel enriched to very high levels which could pose serious proliferation risks if unsecured.

REACTOR SAFETY:
The United States and our allies must work together with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere to convert reactors that currently use weapons-grade material to a lower fuel level. Potential threats stemming from these kinds of reactors are not hypothetical. Operation Auburn Endeavor was launched to take material from a Georgian reactor to safekeeping.


Recent Nunn-Lugar Press Releases:

09/12/02 - Moscow Treaty Hearing #4 Opening Statement by Sen. Dick Lugar

08/1/02 - Lugar Amendment Added to Defense Bill

07/24/02 - Nunn-Lugar funds released

07/17/02 - Ports-of-entry are security concerns

07/10/02 - Lugar Report on Nonproliferation

07/09/02 - Lugar warns of delay in implementing treaty

06/27/02 - Lugar praises G-8 reinforcement of Nunn-Lugar

05/31/02 - Lugar Tours Premiere Soviet Era Biological Weapons Facility *Picture*

05/30/02 - Lugar Tours Chemical Weapons Storage Facility *Picture*

05/29/02 - Lugar detonates nuclear missile silo *Picture*

05/27/02 - Connecting the Dots: Report on a Conference Sponsored by The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

05/27/02 - Speech: Lugar envisions U.S.-Russian front against terrorism and weapons proliferation

05/24/02 - Lugar calls for new U.S.-Russia coalition to combat terrorism

04/23/02 - Lugar statement WMD proliferation

03/18/02 - Lugar introduces Nunn-Lugar expansion

02/04/02 - President proposes increases to Nunn-Lugar

12/12/01 - Nunn-Lugar 10th Anniversary today



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