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5/16/12 |
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Home / Issues / U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Programs |
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Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Series Seminar 3: Proliferation Dangers in Russia's Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons Complexes June 14, 2002 Prepared by Ingrid Staudenmeyer Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow On June 14, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held the third meeting in its 2002 "Seminar Series" for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. This seminar focused on the proliferation dangers resulting from the decline and decay of Russia's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons enterprises in recent years, and explored different points of view as to how the United States can more productively engage with Russia in reducing weapons of mass destruction proliferation risks. Remarks by Rensselaer Lee, Researcher, Terrorism, Drugs, and Homeland Security, Congressional Research Service Lee began by explaining that his remarks would center around three main questions:
Various factors underscore the significance of the threat. Contributing to the danger of nuclear theft on the supply side are weak protective regimes for nuclear material and in some cases weaponry, and also the strains of defense conversion and downsizing, reflected in diminished prospects for many nuclear workers. On the demand side, the governing factor is the reported efforts of adversaries such as Iran, Iraq and the al Qaeda organization to acquire lethal weapons or the materials and expertise to build them. So far, though, the threat of major nuclear leakages has not materialized - at least this is what the open source literature indicates. There have been hundreds of nuclear smuggling incidents since the collapse of the USSR; yet all but a handful of these have involved radioactive "junk"(such as low enriched uranium, contaminated scrap metal and various radioisotopic sources) that are useless in making fission weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which maintains a database of nuclear smuggling incidents, documents only 18 cases where weapons usable materials have been definitively involved. And if all the material seized in these cases is added up, it amounts to approximately 400 grams of plutonium and 6 kilograms of U-235 equivalent, much less than what is necessary to make a nuclear bomb. More importantly, almost no bona fide buyers have been identified for this nuclear contraband, even for the weapons material. When buyers surface they are not the emissaries of al Qaeda, Hezbollah or the Iranian or Iraqi military establishments that you might expect; they are likely to be undercover policemen, police decoys or journalists working with the authorities. Lee said he believes that either the threat of nuclear smuggling to terrorists or rogue states is greatly overblown or the international community has just been lucky that nothing terrible has happened so far. But it is possible that we are missing something, Lee cautioned. Some experts have suggested that the observations of the nuclear black market do not necessarily reflect the true shape of the market. It is conceivable that willing sellers and interested buyers of nuclear wares have converged in ways that have not been detected by Western intelligence or law enforcement agencies. A well-organized procurement operation involving inside collaborators at a nuclear site could manage significant diversions of nuclear material. The question is whether U.S. nuclear programs in Russia and elsewhere are prepared to deal with this contingency. The United States funds a broad variety of programs in these countries that aim directly or indirectly at containing proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons materials and design expertise. Critics of these programs argue that they represent stationary lines of defense that leave too many gaps in coverage. For instance, at the end of 2001 - 10 years after the collapse of the USSR - the new Department of Energy's Materials, Protection, Collection, and Assessment program (MPC&A) systems covered only about half of the 600-odd tons nuclear material in Russia considered at risk for threat or diversion. Full completion of the program is not envisioned until 2008. In the meantime we face the uncomfortable possibility the opportunistic thieves and criminals might target material in the less-well secured facilities. Furthermore the systems themselves are not fail safe. They are designed to defend against "snatch-and-grab" thefts by solitary employees collaborating with groups of criminals on the outside but they're not likely to be effective against high-level insider corruption - e.g. a company decision by top management to sell off the plant's stockpile of HEU or plutonium in response to an attractive offer from a well-heeled Middle Eastern customer. Similarly, the protection afforded by U.S. border security programs, sometimes termed the "second line of defense" after MPC&A, has thus far been more symbolic than real. Russia's frontiers with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan alone - which are likely conduits to Middle Eastern states and groups of concern - run more than 7800 kilometers and smuggling routes through this vast region are multitudinous. It can be argued that only the most intellectually challenged of smugglers would attempt to move their caches of bomb-grade uranium or plutonium through customs posts outfitted with the latest U.S.-supplied radiation monitors - at least without paying off the Customs officials beforehand. And there are many easier ways, such as smuggling the material in Russian military planes or charter aircraft, sailing it across the Caspian Sea or shipping it out via diplomatic pouch. Certainly no reasonable person would argue against the need for better materials security and improved border surveillance. Programs in these areas probably need to be expanded. But a number of observers have suggested that the United States needs a more dynamic non-proliferation concept that goes beyond "containment"- or at least broadens the definition of it. A possible approach is to focus more attention on the demand side of the proliferation equation-that is on the intentions and machinations of the adversaries themselves. The argument is similar to that used in current debates on homeland security in the United States - namely that security policy and resource allocation decisions should be based on a clear-eyed evaluation of terrorists capabilities and plans, rather than just on assessment of our own vulnerabilities, which are essentially limitless. Unfortunately, not a great deal is known about adversaries' nuclear procurement schemes - how they are organized and financed, what front companies, criminal groups or other intermediaries are used, what stratagems are used to gain access to nuclear facilities and what contacts, if any, already have been made. Tracking such activities can help to fine-tune our nuclear security preparations in Russia, providing information to disrupt nuclear deals-in-the making or alternatively to shut down established smuggling conspiracies before too much proliferation damage has been done. Remarks by Michael Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms ControlInstitute Moodie began by presenting a brief overview of the history of past Russian biological and chemical weapons programs. In terms of the chemical weapons programs, he explained that during the Soviet era, tens of thousands of employees were employed at over 100 facilities across the Soviet Union. The declared Russian chemical weapon stockpile currently stands at 40,000 metric tons, 80-85% of which is nerve gas. But U.S. officials believe that even today, neither the Russians nor the international community know the full extent of the Russian chemical weapons arsenal. Russia has committed to destroy its entire stockpile by 2007 under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but it is very unlikely that it will be able to meet these commitments under the CWC, even if it is granted the one-time, five-year extension provided for under the convention. This predicament is first and foremost a Russian problem. Moodie said he believes that Moscow is clearly committed to making progress, but its financial commitments will not be sufficient to meet its treaty obligations. Ways must be found to encourage a greater commitment from Russia itself. In addition to greater Russian expenditures, those countries that have an interest in the destruction of the Russian CW stockpile which is, in essence, every state party to the CWC, should provide more assistance. In particular, the Europeans and Japanese should contribute more to the international effort. The Soviet military biological weapons program dates from the 1920s. In the 1970s, however, the Soviets developed a secret germ warfare program known as Biopreparat. Until President Yeltsin ended the program in 1992, Russia's bioweapons employees totaled approximately 65,000 across 50 facilities. It is known that the Soviet Union developed genetically altered - antibiotic resistant strains of anthrax, plague, tularemia, and glanders. New biological weapons (lab prototypes and pilot-plant techniques) have been developed on a basis of genetically altered plague, anthrax and tularemia. For years the Soviets researched the ways to genetically alter the smallpox virus by inserting new genes in the virus genome. Moodie said that he believes some elements of offensive biological weapons capacity exists. Moodie named four current proliferation risks, in increasing order of concern. The first is the vulnerability of the Russian facilities. Huge collections of pathogens are stored in poor security environments, greatly increasing the proliferation risk. The progress that has been made is insuffucient to adequately meet the current threat. Most of the enhancements that the United States has helped install deal with outside threats exclusively. Closer concern needs to be given to the threat of the workers and the inside threat. The second proliferation risk is the threat of Russian scientific brain drain. With the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 came a loss of central political control, downward spiraling economies, the relaxation of Soviet-era emigration/immigration restrictions, and an escalation of crime and black market activity. These developments raised international concerns that idle and unemployed personnel from the Soviet Union's sprawling nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction complexes might sell their know-how or emigrate to countries of proliferation concern. Related to the issue of Russian brain drain is that of scientific contact with countries of proliferation concern. Reported cases of attempted and actual recruitment of former Soviet scientists, technicians, and engineers have been well-documented. Recruitment efforts have been initiated by China, Taiwan, North Korea, Libya, Iran, and other countries. Many of these same countries have established trade offices in Moscow. As recently as late 1995, sources in Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, as well as in the United States, were reporting that Libyan and Iranian "university representatives" had stepped up efforts to recruit biologists and physicists. The fourth and most dangerous proliferation concern surrounds the ongoing areas of research that Russian biological and chemical weapons facilities might be pursuing. There is worry that the lack of transparency associated with Russia's biological and chemical weapons industries might be shrouding 4th generation weapons development, with potentially hazardous results. Moodie recommended that, in order to counteract these four proliferation concerns, the United States must learn to leverage benefits in exchange for Russian transparency, increase aid to the Russian chemical demilitarization effort, encourage a more international-based approach to chemical demilitarization, and work to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Remarks by Dr. Roald Sagdeev, Distinguished University Professor, Department ofPhysics, University of Maryland Sagdeev began by saying that in an ideal world, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia would have defined its own post-Soviet disarmament and nonproliferation strategy. The reality of the situation, however, was that the United States bought good behavior from the Russians and was able to develop successful Nunn-Lugar programs as a result. Late in the Cold War it became clear, as many saw it, that Russia had nothing left to defend and the United States had nothing left to defend itself from. Today, many of Russia's problems stem from its economic difficulties. The size of Russia's economy is currently smaller than Portugal's, with Putin's operating budget being relatively equal to the CIA's. It is difficult to visualize the changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union since the days just before the collapse of the country. In the last ten years industrial production has dropped more than 50%, a figure that is twice the magnitude of America's great depression. Total cash receipts in 1997, available for all purposes, were the equivalent of $30 billion, not nearly enough money to provide for a society of 150 million people. No democratic tax reform could produce adequate receipts from an economy in which more than 70% of its transactions take place in barter. Under excruciating fiscal pressure, the Russian government has tried to sustain minimum consumption for their population by borrowing, but with recent defaults their ability to continue to do so is drastically curtailed. The Russian government now pays approximately 48% of its budget for servicing its debt-much of which is from the Soviet era. And, according to experts, one internal Russian source projects that not long after the turn of the century Russia could owe as much as $200 billion with debt servicing requirements claiming 73% of expected government revenues. Enterprises that employed whole cities and produced world class science and engineering have all but shut their doors. Not surprisingly, the Russian government has been deeply concerned about the collapse of this high technology sector, especially as we enter the new millennium when such industrial capability, it is acknowledged, will be crucial. Despite its concern for both the state of its high tech industry and its long-term cooperation with the West in this field, Russia no longer has the tools at its disposal to adequately nourish its scientific establishment. There is rising concern about Russia's partnership with countries of proliferation concern, especially Iran. Sagdaev noted that it is easy to mistakenly assume that the Russian-Iranian partnership is one which is supported by the entire Russian establishment. While the Russian government maintains that the technology being sold to Iran is strictly for civilian usage, the Russian security services want to limit these types of overseas exchanges. But the FSB cannot be too harsh with its use of export controls and other restrictive measures for fear of causing public worry through actions reminiscent of the Soviet police state. From a non-proliferation standpoint, keeping Russia as an active partner of the United States and the West is the only way to secure transparency and openness in the Russian WMD establishment over time. Given the catastrophic decline in Russia's industrial and scientific base, it is at the bottom with no place to go but up. Our concern should be that if the United States doesn't engage the Russians in that journey upward, someone else will. |
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