5/16/12 Home / Issues / U.S.-Russian Relations www PGS Printer Friendly Page   Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Seminar 3: Status and Future of Russian Nuclear Forces June 8, 2001 Prepared by G. J. Marsh On June 8, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held its third briefing in a series of seminars for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship. The June seminar focused on developments in the Russian nuclear forces and the prospects for future U.S.-Russia strategic arms reductions. The panel featured three expert speakers, whose remarks are summarized below. Remarks by Pavel Podvig, Research Analyst, Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Podvig opened by saying that he would try to present facts about the current state of Russia's strategic forces rather than offer a personal interpretation. For the last ten years, there have been several significant problems facing the Russian strategic nuclear forces -- primarily lack of resources, but also uncertainty about obligations connected to the START II treaty and now U.S. plans for a national missile defense system. More problems stem from internal power struggles in the Russian military and government, and all the factors are connected. Russia's strategic forces were essentially in stasis during the five years from 1993 to 1998. At that time, it was not clear whether Russia would ratify START II or what shape strategic force development would take. In 1997, a protocol was attached to START II extending implementation deadlines to December 2007. The core modernization program features development of the SS-27 Topol-M ground-based missile. By the beginning of 2001, 24 SS-27s had been deployed in silos. A mobile version is currently under development. The plan is to make the SS-27 the core system of Russia's land-based missile force. Current production is under 10 units per year, with planned acceleration to 40-50 per year, though there are questions about whether that rate can be achieved. The Russian Navy will have to begin to replace its current fleet of nuclear missile submarines in the next five to seven years. The Yuri Dolgorukiy strategic submarine is scheduled for launch in 2005, but this date will likely be delayed, as construction has been halted to accommodate the inclusion of an entirely new SLBM system. That missile is now in development by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, the same contractor responsible for the SS-27, and was supposed to have maximum compatibility with that system. It is safe to say that the new submarine will not be in operation before 2007. Production of the liquid-fueled, four-warhead SS-N-23 SLBM was resumed last summer to allow the Delta IV-class submarines to remain operational until the new class of SLBMs comes on line. Russia's strategic aviation has received an apparent boost in the last two years. In 2000, Russia bought eight Tu-160 "Blackjack" strategic bombers from Ukraine and completed construction of another bomber of this type at the plant in Kazan. With still one or two more under construction, Russia's Blackjack fleet will stand at fifteen to seventeen. Work continues on a new air-launched cruise missile system for these bombers. However, despite this relatively modest modernization, Russia will still not have more than 1,500 strategic warheads deployed within seven to eight years. Russia has almost completely fulfilled its obligations under START I with the recent elimination of a heavy missile division. It now has 154 heavy SS-18 missiles as is required by START I. Currently deployed missiles are heavy SS-18s, SS-19s, rail-mobile SS-24s, land-mobile SS-25s, and silo-based SS-27s. None of these systems, with the exception of the new SS-27s, will be around by 2008, partially because of treaty obligations and partially because of their aging. The Delta IV subs should last to 2008, and according to some optimistic projections, one "Typhoon"-class submarine will last to that time as well, although this is highly questionable. Most of Russia's bomber force was built in the mid-to-late 1980s, so even turboprop Tu-95MS "Bear-Hs" will remain in service for at least a decade. If Russia decides not to abide by the terms of START II and keep land-based missiles with multiple warheads, it would do better in terms of numbers, as it would be capable of deploying about 2,500-2,800 warheads. Most of these warheads, though, would be on older SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, which will obsolesce by 2008-10. Podvig remarked that the condition of early-warning (EW) systems is often cited for concerns about the current ready status of the Russian nuclear force, but the situation is not as bad as it may seem. Russia has a significant number of EW radars still operating, with the new "Volga"-type just having gone online in Belarus. It is true that the system cannot provide warning against launches from the North Atlantic or Alaskan gulf, but neither did the USSR's. Russia's satellites are in worse shape than they used to be but are still operable. The four in orbit are adequate for 24-hour coverage of US ICBM silos, which is the best the Soviet Union ever had, thus there has been no real deterioration in capabilities. Second-generation systems are coming online and there are plans to deploy satellites that would detect SLBM launches from Atlantic and Pacific. Russia now has a civilian defense minister, the result of a fierce struggle within the Ministry of Defense (MoD) for resources that has yet to subside. Indicative of this is the separation of the space forces into a separate branch, and the strategic rocket forces' demotion from the status of a service to that of a branch. Remarks by Linton F. Brooks, Vice President and Assistant to the President for Policy Analysis, Center for Naval Analyses Ambassador Brooks outlined the advantages and disadvantages to negotiated strategic nuclear reductions versus a less formal unilateral approach. He opined that START II is never going to be in force. However, Brooks noted, Russia, like the U.S., has been basing its nuclear planning on projected START II levels, proving it is possible to implement an informal, non-treaty based approach to reductions. Brooks cited hard data on both approaches. START and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) stand as examples of the negotiated approach; the reciprocal presidential nuclear initiatives of 1991 and 1992, in which weapons were moved back from ships and aircraft-delivered weapons were removed from Europe in the hope that Russia would respond commensurately, exemplify the unilateral approach. As to the pros and cons of different approaches, Brooks reminded the audience that "the commonest form of stupidity is forgetting what you're trying to accomplish," noting that arms control is not an end in itself, but a means to improve international security and stability. There are four broad goals for arms control, Brooks stated: To make war less horrible -- but this is not so relevant to the nuclear field, since any nuclear conflict will be assuredly horrific; To improve short-term crisis stability by structuring forces so that neither side feels it must shoot first in a time of extreme tension. Therefore, the arms control approach tends to be biased toward survivable systems like submarines, as opposed to targetable MIRVed ICBMs in silos. To improve long-term stability by improving predictability and each side's picture of what the other is doing, theoretically eliminating the impetus to build potentially unnecessary weapons to meet projections of future enemy forces. Finally, to save money. According to Brooks, none of these goals necessarily imply a need for reductions, still less for elimination of nuclear weapons. The shape of forces is more important than the size; a large force of survivable weapons is better than a few vulnerable warheads. In Brooks' view, total elimination is neither technically nor politically feasible in the foreseeable future, and therefore time need not be wasted arguing about whether it is desirable. Brooks cited the following advantages of negotiated reductions: The approach is well understood. A large bureaucracy that knows how to analyze and implement formal agreements already exists. They provide predictability via data exchanges and can be binding for long periods. They are accompanied by extensive intrusive verification measures, increasing mutual confidence that they are being followed. Our allies like formal agreements, which bring a sense of predictability to the international order. These advantages have traditionally led the U.S. to favor formal agreements, but there are also disadvantages: Formal treaties limit our ability to react to change. The 1972 ABM Treaty is a good example of this problem; the reluctance of many to even consider modifying it is limiting the U.S.'s ability to prepare for future defense needs. Formal agreements often have unwanted side effects and may actually prevent reductions. Treaty ceilings have a tendency to become floors. Our present strategic nuclear forces are unnecessarily large, still stuck at START I numbers because Congress has prevented the military from going below that level. They hamper informed dialogue. We are still given to discuss nuclear capability in arms-control jargon (i.e. "START I limits us to 6,000 warheads,") even though such terms may not accurately reflect our genuine military capability. Accuracy can be lost in arms control terminology. Treaties take a long time to negotiate, and both parties are reluctant to eliminate even an unneeded force when they might want to trade it for some other concession later in the process. They are expensive. Verification and investigation are high-budget processes. They are inherently a process between adversaries. Formal agreements regulate but also conceptually preserve an adversarial relationship that the U.S. and Russia are trying to leave behind. It is widely assumed that the President will announce unilateral force reductions later this year. There are two possible approaches to unilateral reductions: (1) to make the desired force cuts all at once; or (2) to reduce by steps and gauge the Russian reaction at each milestone. The advantages and disadvantages in both approaches to unilateral reduction are similar. The advantages include: It is possible to act without prolonged negotiations. It is simple and direct, and perhaps less costly because reductions can be pursued without negotiated verification procedures. The reduction can be revised or reversed as circumstances warrant. It may help to ameliorate adversarial relations. The unilateral approach moves us beyond a treaty-based framework that presumes an adversarial relationship between Moscow and Washington. There are, however, some disadvantages: The size and scope of the reductions each side promises can be unclear. Since there are no means of verification, more doubt exists over whether each side has done what they claim. Unilateral reductions are by definition reversible and may not produce the atmosphere of predictability that brings stability. Some of the United States' allies are less happy with unilateral reductions than formal agreements. The Bush administration seems to be moving towards the unilateral approach, but it may be possible to integrate some benefits of the negotiated approach, such as negotiated confidence-building measures. The United States and Russia must find a way to adopt a less rigid, legalistic approach, but preserve the advantages of negotiated reductions, particularly the transparency and predictability of traditional arms control processes. Along those lines, the U.S. and Russia might consider negotiated confidence-building measures, building on their experiences with START I and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). CTR provides the U.S. with insight into Russian programs; the U.S. might consider developing a mechanism that provides Russia with reciprocal visibility into its activities. Existing START and CTR procedures might also be augmented by mutual exchanges of future strategic force plans. The arms control community needs to find ways to adapt to this new, less rigid approach in order to preserve the transparency and predictability of arms control while allowing the United States the flexibility to adapt to changing international circumstances. Remarks by Jack Mendelsohn, Vice President and Executive Director, Lawyers' Alliance for World Security Mendelsohn began his remarks with a reminder that the ultimate justification for arms control should be to preserve and enhance U.S. security. Arms control does this in five ways: It "delimits" the threat, defining a set of countries or systems that should (or should not) present concern to the U.S. For example, an agreement like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) affirms that Germany and Japan will not develop nuclear weapons, even though they are capable of doing so. It can eliminate part of the threat; the INF treaty eliminated an entire class of weapons and START I reduced Russia's SS-18 force by half. It impedes the development of the threat. This is not to say that Iraq won't pursue nuclear weapons projects, but arms control and suppliers' agreements make it a longer, more difficult process. It makes the world more transparent. National technical means (NTM), data exchanges, confidence-building measures, and on-site inspections give us a handle on the nuclear infrastructure of potential adversaries. It creates pressure to conform to a norm. Take as an example the U.S. reaction to North Korea's violation of the NPT: It was very useful politically and diplomatically to have a formal agreement to which North Korea could be held responsible and around which the U.S. could rally support. According to Mendelsohn, policies currently being pursued by the Bush administration are moving in the direction of destroying the arms-control framework. A robust and basically unconstrained national missile defense (NMD), for example, would destroy the ABM Treaty, undermine Russia and China's confidence in their deterrent ability, and jeopardize the basis for negotiated reductions in the future. The argument behind the drive to eliminate, circumvent, or abrogate the ABM Treaty, Mendelsohn said, is that it underpins arms control and it is arms control limitations that preclude the U.S. from adjusting its strategic nuclear forces to fit a changing environment. Behind this rationale is a prevailing sentiment among conservatives that arms control was in the U.S. interest as long as it faced a reasonably powerful adversary but has now become a process that allows the weak to control the strong. Arms control's utility to the U.S. has thus waned. Mendelsohn noted that the U.S. relationship with Russia and China is still governed by deterrence. It is impossible to tamper with such a deterrent relationship without provoking a response. U.S. relations with China may be even more seriously damaged than those with Russia, as the proposed NMD would more immediately and negatively impact on the deterrent capability of China's smaller nuclear arsenal. Mendelsohn warned that if the U.S. goes ahead with a serious NMD program as it is now proposed, the ABM Treaty would have to be scrapped. It would be possible to devise an NMD deployment that would require only modest changes to the treaty, but it would be limited rather than open-ended -- for example, basing interceptors in North Dakota. The unilateral force reductions proposed by the Bush administration are an effort to respond to concerns over the destruction of the ABM Treaty and the disruption of the nuclear arms reduction process. According to Mendelsohn, it would be better for the reasons mentioned earlier to stay with negotiated agreements. The structure provided by agreements affords predictability and ensures transparency, most of which will be lost in the absence of the established arms-control framework. Even if unilateral cuts were reciprocated but not subsequently formalized, they would almost certainly not improve the long-term stability of the relationship. Also, since unilateral cuts are reversible, they will not satisfy over time the Article VI expectations of the non-nuclear members of the non-proliferation regime.

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