5/16/12 Home / Issues / U.S.-Russian Relations www PGS Printer Friendly Page   Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Series Seminar 1: U.S.-Russian Relations in the post-September 11 World April 19, 2002 Prepared by Ingrid Staudenmeyer On April 19, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held the first meeting in its 2002 "Seminar Series" for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The first seminar addressed issues related to U.S.-Russian cooperation inthe war on terrorism and the issues affecting the long-term prospects for improved U.S.-Russian relations following September 11. Remarks by Dr. Alexei G. Arbatov, Member of the Russian Parliament (State Duma) andDeputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense Arbatov began by describing the situation between the United States and Russia as a "unique and historic period" in the two nations' longstanding relationship. Not since WWII have the two countries been as close as they are today. But the relationship is not completely solid-it is unpredictable, fragile, vulnerable, and oftentimes shallow. Arbatov cited four main problems hindering the further positive development of the U.S.-Russia relationship: 1. United States foreign policy 2. Russian domestic policy 3. Liberal opposition in both countries 4. Current method of leadership In Russia, only a minority of the Russian people supports the present level of cooperation with the United States. September 11 caused an outpouring of sympathy from Russians for America, but Arbatov stressed that Russian domestic and foreign policy-making is not based on emotions. Russia's position on terrorism includes full moral support for the American people and political backing for the U.S. administration's decision to initiate a far-reaching war against international terrorism. However, retaliation against terrorism must be carefully focused on the international terrorist network that is responsible for the attacks against New York and Washington; September 11 should not be used as a pretext to go after countries and regimes that may have no involvement in these attacks. Putin has positioned Russia as one of the United States' most important allies in the international war against terrorism. At first, Russia suffered from what Arbatov described as an "Afghan syndrome"-- Russia's worry that it would be stuck in a long-term war and that the U.S. would pull out when it was ready, leaving Russia to shoulder the responsibility. But, because of Russia's influence on Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and other countries in the region, the United States' ability to conduct a long-term operation in Afghanistan will depend on Russian support. Compared to many of the United States' more traditional allies, Russia is contributing real resources to the war in Afghanistan, offering military supplies and intelligence cooperation. Despite these contributions, however, many in Russia feel that there has been no reciprocity by the U.S. on key issues important to Russia. For example, in exchange for its assistance in the war on terrorism, Russia wanted to begin dialogue on restructuring its Soviet-era debt to the West, its entry status into the World Trade Organization (WTO), issues concerning the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), NATO enlargement, and the ABM Treaty. Arbatov stated that while the United States' post-September 11 attitude towards Russia is certainly favorable, in practical terms no concessions have been provided to Russia. This situation has quietly stoked anti-U.S. feelings among a silent majority of Russians. This popular hesitancy to engage with the West is most visible in the Duma, which acts as a strong gauge of the Russian people and their opinions. Arbatov explained that a closer look into Duma politics shows simple and direct correlations between parties and specific hot-button issues: liberals want Russia to enter the WTO, the Communists are pushing for greater Russia-China ties, and the nationalists want Russia to forge a closer relationship with Iraq. Today the Communists are much weaker than before. Nationalists have declined in strength, which Arbatov stressed as a positive improvement, but he said that almost all parties in the new Russian Parliament have some nationalistic tendencies. Still, Putin's government carries great influence in the Duma. Arbatov observed that in most parliamentary democracies, governments are formed by the parties which win the parliamentary elections. In Russia, it often seems that it is the other way around: it is as if the government created its preferred party and ensured that it would be the dominant party in the parliament, which is suitable and convenient for Putin. Arbatov said that he believes that the West is capable of affecting what is happening inside Russia. He said that international foreign policy aimed at Russia, especially that of the United States, has the potential to affect the evolution of Russian domestic politics. With several real steps aimed at showing Russia the credit it deserves, the tide of public opinion can turn into more favorable feelings towards the United States. Arbatov suggested that the upcoming Bush-Putin presidential summit, if approached correctly, could produce a great new beginning for the two nations. Remarks by Dr. Leon Aron, Director of Russian Studies, the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Aron began by stating that the behavior of Russia post-September 11 is entirely unprecedented, and indicative of the new strategic relationship that exists between Russia and the United States. Most interpretations of Russia's post-September 11 behavior have combined variations on three themes: a tactical quid pro quo, an inability to "afford" military expenditures, and a leader's whim. This new partnership, however, is in no way a sudden breakthrough, but is due to a combination of domestic and foreign policy factors that have developed over the past decade. Most unprecedented was the Russian public outcry in solidarity with America following the September 11 terrorist attacks. On September 13, flags flew at half-mast throughout Russia. On October 3, American troops arrived in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the first instance of American soldiers on former Soviet territory since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russian acquiescence on this issue transcended tactical calculations. Aron stated that he did not believe that Russia under Putin was pursuing a traditional tit-for-tat foreign policy. Putin is not one to make rash decisions, believe in epiphanies, or take unnecessary risks. The "quid-pro-quo" theory argues that Moscow's support for the U.S. post September 11 would lead to real benefits for Russia, including: a delay in a United States decision to withdraw from the antiballistic missile treaty; Russian entry into the World Trade Organization; delaying the second round of NATO expansion, particularly the inclusion of the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; rescheduling and partially forgiving Soviet-era debt to the lenders of the Paris Club; and muted criticism of alleged Russian human rights abuses in the war against separatists and militant Muslim fundamentalists in Chechnya. Almost five months later, not one item on that alleged agenda has been attained. The United States has served a six-month withdrawal notice from the ABM treaty; no exceptions have been made to WTO membership requirements for Russia; NATO is expected to announce new members at the end of the year; the Paris Club has not softened its position about repayment on schedule; and after a brief lull, U.S. officials resumed criticism of Moscow's Chechnya policy. If quid pro quo had been Russia's strategy, it was an obvious miscalculation and, as such, should have been abandoned quickly. Aron stated that this change in Russian willingness to enter into such a partnership with the United States results from a profound shift in Russia's strategic priorities. Since 1990 there has been an 85% decrease in defense spending, the military has reduced from 4 million to 1 million, and moves have been initiated to transform the Russian military into an all-volunteer force and eliminate conscription. On the economic front, the Russian economy has grown in leaps and bounds, and is 75% larger than during the Soviet era. There has been an emergence of strong economic elites, committed to boosting the overall economic output of the nation. Putin's recent state of the nation speech attested to these profound economic changes. And as Putin continues to centralize Russian politics, the radical left will continue to be pushed out. Aron said the significance of Russia's post-September 11 behavior goes far beyond short-term relations with the United States. Russia's steps have indicated a profound and continuous shift in national priorities brought about by the revolutionary changes of the past decade: demilitarization and the end of the Soviet empire; the emergence of competitive politics and of public opinion as key factors in policymaking; the slow but inexorable erosion of the nationalist anti-Western Left; acceptance of a private economy and a free market by a majority of the political class; the diffusion of the first significant benefits from the new economic system; and the growing perception of the necessity of integration into the world economic system by the elite and general public alike. He encouraged the development of this increasingly positive relationship between the two nations and stressed mutual need for cooperation in the post-September 11 security environment. Remarks by Susan Eisenhower, President and CEO of the Eisenhower Institute Eisenhower began by saying she believes that there is a large gap between perception and reality when it comes to the Russian Federation. There is a need to step back and examine the shift in history that has occurred since the beginning of the 20th century. While the former Soviet Union was the United States' Cold War rival, a massive military machine, and a Communist giant in an uncertain world, today the Russian Federation is the United States' ally in the war against terrorism, holds the world's second largest energy supply, and has proven itself to be of critical strategic importance to the United States. Despite their present partnership and beyond the issues of the ABM Treaty, NATO enlargement, and WTO accession that Arbatov and Aron highlighted in their presentations, Eisenhower suggested that there were other areas of concern that threaten to undermine the U.S.-Russian relationship. The United States' most recent Nuclear Posture Review identified Russia and its nuclear forces as a continuing threat to the U.S., justified continued U.S. targeting of Russia, and declared the need to maintain a large nuclear arsenal. In addition, the recent U.S. restrictions on Russian steel imports have also been points of contention. Given the impact this will have on the Russian economy, this policy has undermined Russian domestic support for the U. S. Third, further US-Russian cooperation on the International Space Station, which Russia considers to be of fundamental importance, is also in jeopardy due to uncertainty about the station's size and scope, as well as sanctions legislation. Finally, the U.S. decision to delay renewal of Russia's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) certification is also potentially disastrous to both the present and future of nonproliferation cooperation between the two nations. Because the United States is unhappy with Russian progress and declarations on the BW and CW front, it is setting itself up to lose progress in containing Russian proliferation risks. United States action on these issues does not demonstrate, in either practical terms or in a general mindset, that U.S. policy towards Russia has evolved beyond what it was during the Cold War. Eisenhower stressed that the United States cannot fight a Cold War and a war on terrorism simultaneously: maintaining a Cold War style mentality will cause the United States to lose the war on terrorism. Russia is essential to this fight, but the United States has continually pushed Russia away on issues that could strengthen the relationship. Even if these issues are more symbolic than practical, Eisenhower stressed that symbolism matters. The United States cannot risk damaging its relationship with Russia. The U.S. needs Russia for the long haul. In this age of uncertainty, a nation cannot afford to undermine any relations: the United States needs all the allies it can get.

© 2007 Partnership for Global Security. All rights reserved. Privacy Statement.