5/16/12 Home / Issues / U.S.-Russian Relations www PGS Printer Friendly Page   Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Series Seminar 4: Bush, Putin and the Future of U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations July 13, 2001 Prepared by G. J. Marsh On July 13, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held its fourth briefing in a series of seminars for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship. The July seminar focused on prospects for future U.S.-Russian relations following the second meeting of Presidents Bush and Putin at the G-8 summit in Genoa. The panel featured three expert speakers, whose remarks are summarized below. Remarks by Arnold L. Horelick, Co-Director, Aspen Strategy Group U.S.-Russia Dialogue Project, The Aspen Foundation Horelick noted that relations between the United States have recently warmed quite a bit after a frosty start at the beginning of the Bush administration. Is there anything substantial about the new warmth, he asked, or is it a tactical ploy by one or both parties? Prospects for a strategic agreement seemed remote in the first few months of the Bush presidency. The new administration did not come to office with a full-blown Russia policy, seeming content to lay down "We're not Clinton" markers. In this view, Russia in the past had received too much attention, much of it wrong and counterproductive. Under the Bush administration, Russia was to be downgraded, neither friend nor enemy, while China was labeled a "competitor," to be taken more seriously. Russia's near-term prospects were too poor, and engagement was to be narrow and selective. Those in the administration who wanted to move quickly and unilaterally to national missile defense (NMD) said so. Then there was a sharp spike of confrontational rhetoric with the Hanssen case and mutual expulsions of diplomats. Today, at least on the surface, a very different atmosphere prevails, with frequent consultations on missile defense and strategic offensive forces and effusive expressions of goodwill from both leaders at their first meeting in June. What accounts for the striking change in atmosphere? There are two major factors: First, the abrupt souring of relations with China spurred by the reconnaissance plane affair and the toughened Bush position on defense of Taiwan. Clearly, in Washington and in allied capitals, there was discomfort, to say the least, about having tensions rise simultaneously between the US and both the largest emerging nuclear-armed power, China, and the largest declining, but still far more heavily-armed former superpower, Russia. Second, Washington's troubles over NMD and the ABM treaty with its own allies, already incensed over the new administration's position on Kyoto and suspicious about its intentions in Yugoslavia. To get its allies to go along, the U.S. now had to engage Russia, whose agreement and cooperation had otherwise been deemed non-essential and with whom engagement had been seen as a threat to the free hand that the Bush Administration sought on NMD. The Russian response has been welcoming on a formal level, but substantively there has not been much change on the key issues. Russia continues to reiterate its long-standing objections to the scrapping of the ABM Treaty, but wants to appear to be willing to engage in dialogue. To keep pro-Treaty forces (some Senate Democrats, the US's European allies) in play, Russia cannot just say "no"; it has to engage on the diplomatic track. Against this background, the outcome is going to depend on whether a dialogue that has been motivated on both sides by largely tactical political considerations can evolve into a serious effort to reach a broad agreement on both strategic offense and defense issues. Any plausible agreement would impose at least some defense constraints on the U.S., but given the present asymmetry of power would require far more changes in long-standing Russian positions. Whether Moscow will choose to pursue that course depends in turn on larger more fundamental policy choices that Putin and the Russian foreign policy and defense establishment have been grappling with since he took office. That is, choices about the basic direction Russia should now take in international affairs as it struggles to maintain and accelerate the recent and still fragile internal recovery now underway. A recent report by the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy laid out the following options for the future direction of Russian foreign policy, taking into account Russia's weakness and the urgent necessity to overcome it: Pursue economic modernization by trying to join the West, inevitably as a second-rank partner, subordinating foreign policy to the U.S., and eschewing traditional external interests; Play the strategic "multipolarity" game to oppose American "hegemony," moving closer to China, India, etc., a course that would lead to diversion of scarce resources needed for internal development, with a weakened Russia in the end having anyway to accept the leading role for China; Maneuver between the first and second options, gaining occasional short-term boosts in prestige, but having in the crunch to retreat in the face of superior political and economic forces; Russia's deeper integration into the globalized world economy was strongly favored, but there was widespread questioning whether the West, and specifically the U.S., was really ready to integrate even a compliant Russia. Therefore, no consensus was found on an acceptable and feasible fourth alternative that would serve and not encumber Russia's primary goal of economic and societal regeneration, while avoiding both confrontation and self-isolation in foreign policy. Can the U.S. and Russia build a brave new strategic world that takes them beyond Mutual Assured Destruction, the ABM Treaty, and the negotiated treaties of the SALT and START type? Not likely, unless it is part and parcel of a larger world economic and political community into which Russia has been integrated or toward which it is moving with some degree of assurance. That means Russia itself has first to make such a choice unambiguously and that the U.S. and the West must commit to promoting that integration as a matter of highest priority. As of now, neither of those conditions is close to being met, so the Bush Administration's vision, even if it is more than an attractive rationale for deploying a national missile defense, is, at the very least, not yet ready for prime time. Remarks by Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russian and Eurasian Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Kuchins defined five arenas in what might be termed Russia's strategic environment: Domestic stability and cohesion of the Russian Federation; looking east; looking south; looking west to Europe; looking to the U.S. The lesson of the 1990s, said Kuchins, is that nothing will be more important to the future of Russia than decisions Russians themselves will take about the social, economic, and political organization of their own country. Impending threats include economic backwardness, social disorder, and coming demographic disaster. President Putin understands that putting the country on a track of economic growth should be the number-one priority. He also recognizes the looming demographic crisis; Russia's population will be severely reduced by mid-century. Russia has decisions to make about open society, free speech, and democracy. The U.S. can do things strategically and at the margins to affect these issues, but cannot have the hubris to think it can dictate to the Russians. Our current position too much reflects a Cold War agenda. Currently the most vulnerable areas - Siberia and the Far East - are where the Russians need to make some decisions that will make the region more attractive for foreign investment and development. Russia does not have the capital and the technology to do it on its own - and neither does any one firm or interested country like China, Japan, Korea, or even the United States. Successfully developing this region and integrating it into the world economy will require multilateral efforts and cooperation that will have a tremendous impact on Russia's future. Chinese President Jiang Zemin is coming to Moscow later in July for the Russians and Chinese to sign a new treaty of friendship and cooperation. The Russian - Chinese relationship has been developing positively over last decade, but much commentary on it has been frustrating and misleading, with their strategic partnership oversold as an alliance. The Russians have powerful reasons to want constructive relations with China, not all of them having anything to do with the U.S. Russia is not in a position to challenge rising powers any time soon. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese desire a real alliance - both have an even greater interest in having good relations with the U.S. than with each other. How, for instance, could Russia provide China security guarantees over Taiwan? On strategic issues with the United States, Russia would like to compromise by amending the ABM Treaty or develop a new strategic framework. This is not going to be easy in and of itself and is made more difficult by Russia's need to maintain good relations with China, with whose positions it differs; the Chinese are concerned more with theater missile defense (TMD), Russia with NMD. China is wary of Russian offers to cooperate with the U.S. and Europe. There can be no doubt that the Chinese are putting pressure on the Russians not to compromise, but the Russians do not want to be left out of a Western-led security architecture, nor see the Chinese expand their nuclear forces. The trend lines of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces are moving in opposite directions and may reach parity in future, a result the Russians are not eager to see. While China only has 20 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), it has hundreds of shorter-range missiles that can be targeted on Russia. Nuclear equivalence between China and Russia is not imminent nor even likely within 20 years, but it is important to understand Russian sentiments on the issue. To the south, Russia faces real-time security threats like the continuing Chechen war. Russia's portrayal of itself as the frontline bastion against Islamic terrorism is illustrative of a broader security challenge: maintaining stable regimes in the increasingly weaker and more authoritarian Central Asian states. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization seems to be an emerging collective security organization to this end, as its charter agrees to allow for Chinese forces intervening in Central Asia, and may ultimately include India, Pakistan, or even Iraq. By contrast, U.S. concerns in the region have more to do with terrorism and proliferation than separatism. To the west is Russia's most benign security environment in terms of intentions if not capability; its negative response to NATO expansion is emotional rather than rational. Integration of the Baltics into European institutions would in fact guarantee protection of the rights of the Russian minorities there. In asking how to bring Russia into a European collective security arrangement, the discussion should not at first be about membership, which puts the cart before horse. The next test case of whether Russia can participate within a greater European security framework will be Macedonia. The prospects of Russia moving closer to the west are hopeful as long as the U.S. administration does not move too precipitously on NMD. It hopes to reach a new framework with the Russians within the next few months. However, Russia does not really have a great deal of leverage. Is Russia really going to seek a stronger alliance with China -- or Iran? Ultimately that would not serve its interest, but one cannot always rely on Russia to act rationally. Remarks by Celeste A. Wallander, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies Wallander asked the audience to conceive of Russian threat perceptions and policies in terms of domestic actors and interests. These factors are driving Russian foreign policy and should be the focus of American foreign policy. The Putin administration's primary national security interests are (1) to reform and invigorate the domestic economy, and (2) to foster an environment of international stability, especially on the Russian Federation's borders. The Russian leadership still seeks to gain access to Western military, political, and particularly economic circles and to play an influential role in such organizations as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the G-8. In this respect, there has been no change since the Yeltsin period. Russia's preferred strategy is integration into the international economy, which is no longer the primary threat to Russian international interests, as in the Soviet period. The terms for integration, however, will be different under Putin. Under Yeltsin, integration was attempted by establishing close relations with the U.S. and particularly with the U.S. president, but domestic actors also had a role to play. The "oligarchs" privatizing the economy had more incentives to engage in asset stripping than production and long-term investment. After the crash of 1998, the economy has been on a different footing; it is now doing relatively well, partly because of high energy prices and partly due to default and devaluation. While weak, it is not the same kind of weak economy it was in the 1990s; we are witnessing the slowing of capital flight and the beginning of consolidation of businesses. There have been changes not only in the economy overall, but in important actors and players. The Putin administration has so far focused on energy sectors, gas and oil, which are successful on the international market and provide a reliable source of revenue. Other sectors of the natural resource economy, such as metals, provide the base necessary for future industrial growth. The defense industries get virtually no money from domestic procurement (only the "Topol" ICBM and a little in dual-use aircraft components) and are supported by foreign arms sales, which last year amounted to $4 billion. The degree of profit is not so important as the ability to keep industries open, which is tied to rebuilding Russian strength and power. Theoretical debates about whether Russia should look west or east are beside the point. To Russian officials, there is no contradiction in their foreign policy alignment, the record of which is consistent with regard to the governing domestic political/economic coalition. Some regions (such as the Northwest) have an interest in opening to the international economy, while the agricultural sector does not. Russian threat perception is driven by sense of weakness and of late has focused on whether the U.S. seeks to include or exclude a Russia desirous of integration. This is why NATO continues to loom so large in Russian threat perception. The question of WTO membership for Russia presents a real opportunity for the U.S. to engage Russia in discussion, but only if we understand there will be domestic give and take, winners and losers. Because of the importance of domestic economic actors to the Putin administration, its decision process is largely impervious to U.S. influence. Russia is not seeking arms sales to China to stick a thumb in our eye, so holding out the carrot of better relations won't work to stop it. Similarly, Russian trade with Iran is deeply rooted in domestic economic and political interests. The U.S. will not be able to stop transactions widely perceived in Russia as legal. The diversity of foreign policy and security interests within Russia will persist even if there is no forthcoming agreement over NATO and NMD. The opportunity to continue the relationship will still be there. Not all actors in Russia are concerned about missile defense and some consortia would like to participate in its technical development. The "contradictions" in the Russian position depend upon whom you are talking to, when - so the opportunities for managing difficult issues are still there.

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