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Measure Helps Assure Continuity of Nunn-Lugar Program
Office of Senator Richard Lugar
December 22, 2005

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program will have added assurance of continuity because the new Defense Authorization bill allows the President to waive the certification requirements for Russia to meet certain conditions placed by Congress on the Nunn-Lugar program, which destroys weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union.

In July, the U.S. Senate approved by a vote of 78-19 an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would eliminate conditions that have delayed the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. The amendment authored by U.S. Sen. Dick Lugar would have removed congressionally imposed restrictions that complicate or delay the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar program. House and Senate Defense committees compromised on language from their two versions of the bill to provide the waiver authority permanently.

“What national security benefit do the certification requirements provide the American people? Do the conditions make it easier or harder to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Russia or elsewhere? Do the conditions make it more likely or less likely that weapons are eliminated?” Lugar said during the floor debate in July.

Lugar also said at the time that while permanent waiver authority would “permit the program to continue its important work, I do not believe the waiver solves the underlying problem.”

“In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian commitments to nonproliferation led the original Nunn-Lugar legislation to require the President to certify annually that each recipient is ‘committed to’ meeting six conditions: (1) making a substantial investment in dismantling or destroying such weapons; (2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; (3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; (4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out under the program; (5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and (6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities,” Lugar said.

“Congress imposed an additional six conditions on construction of the chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye. These conditions include: (1) full and accurate Russian declaration on the size of its chemical weapons stockpile; (2) allocation by Russia of at least $25,000,000 to chemical weapons elimination; (3) development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; (4) enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve agents at a single site; (5) an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and (6) a demonstrated commitment from the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.

“Some will suggest that the certification process is, at most, an annoyance, but not a serious programmatic threat. I disagree. While well intentioned, these conditions delay and complicate efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. If the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing our country, we cannot permit any delays in our response,” Lugar said.

“While awaiting temporary waiver to be authorized in law, new Nunn-Lugar projects were stalled and no new contracts could be finalized from April 16 to August 9, 2002. This delay caused numerous disarmament projects in Russia to be put on hold, including: (1) installation of security enhancements at ten nuclear weapons storage sites; (2) initiation of the dismantlement of two strategic missile submarines and thirty submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and (3) initiation of the dismantlement of SS-24 rail-mobile and SS-25 road-mobile ICBMs and launchers. Clearly, these projects were in the national security interest of the United States, but they were delayed because of self-imposed conditions and bureaucratic red tape. A second period of delay began on October 1, 2002, with the expiration of a temporary waiver. Again, U.S. national security suffered with the postponement of critical dismantlement and security activities for some six weeks until Congress acted.

“The certification and waiver processes consume hundreds of man-hours of work by the State Department, the Intelligence Community, the Pentagon, as well as other departments and agencies. This time could be better spent tackling the proliferation threats facing our country. Instead of interdicting WMD shipments, identifying the next A.Q. Khan, or locating hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons, our nonproliferation experts spend their time compiling reports and assembling certification or waiver determinations. Even more frustrating is the fact that the majority of these reports are repetitive, in that the Department of State already reports on most of these issues in other formats,” Lugar said.

Lugar did note today that permanent waiver authority granted to the President by the congressional defense committees is an improvement over the precariousness that has faced the program.

In 1991, Senator Lugar (R-IN) and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This program has provided U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, related materials and delivery systems. In 1997, Lugar and Nunn were joined by Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) in introducing the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which expanded Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise to first responders in American cities. In 2003, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet Union to address proliferation threats. In October 2004, Nunn-Lugar funds were used for the first time outside of the former Soviet Union to begin dismantling chemical weapons in Albania, under a Lugar-led expansion of the program.

The latest Nunn-Lugar Scorecard shows that the program has deactivated or destroyed: 6,760 nuclear warheads; 590 ICBMs; 484 ICBM silos; 32 ICBM mobile missile launchers; 150 bombers; 789 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 436 submarine missile launchers; 549 submarine launched missiles; 28 nuclear submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels.

Beyond the scorecard’s nuclear elimination, the Nunn-Lugar program secures and destroys chemical weapons, and works to reemploy scientists and facilities related to biological weapons in peaceful research initiatives. The International Science and Technology Centers, of which the United States is the leading sponsor, have engaged 58,000 former weapons scientists in peaceful work. The International Proliferation Prevention Program has funded 750 projects involving 14,000 former weapons scientists and created some 580 new peaceful high-tech jobs. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. They otherwise would be the world’s the third, fourth and eighth largest nuclear weapons powers, respectively.

For more information on the Nunn-Lugar Program, visit http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.html.