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Statement of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 24 March 2004 (excerpted)
National Nuclear Security Administration
March 24, 2004

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Present and Future Nuclear Stockpiles

Our new approach, coupled with the judgment that we no longer need to plan our forces as if Russia presented an immediate threat to the United States, was the basis for dramatic reductions—codified in the Moscow Treaty—in operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces. Over the next eight years, the United States will cut the number of deployed warheads by approximately two-thirds from today’s level. But the experience of the past decade and a half makes it clear that it is unwise for us to base our security on the false belief that we can predict the future. Thus, while dramatically reducing the number of deployed weapons, we must plan against an uncertain future.

Specifically, the United States needs to be prepared to respond to both unforeseen technical problems and unanticipated geopolitical change. One element of such a response is a responsive infrastructure, which I will discuss in a moment. But another component of such a response is the non-deployed stockpile. As part of its plan to implement the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration is conducting an assessment that, when completed, will clarify the long-term requirements for non-deployed weapons. The Congress requested such a revised stockpile plan as well. The Administration is working to complete this complex task as soon as possible. While we regret the delay, the importance of nuclear weapons to our security makes it imperative to conduct a thorough review.

While I am not prepared to provide specifics—and could not do so in an unclassified forum in any case—I can provide some of the considerations factoring into the review. The 2012 nuclear stockpile will be substantially reduced from current levels. But reductions will not lower the stockpile to 1700-2200 total warheads. Additional warheads over and above the operationally deployed strategic warheads will be needed for routine maintenance of the stockpile including as logistics spares and to replace those warheads eliminated during destructive surveillance testing.

In addition, a small number of warheads (reduced by 90% from Cold War levels) for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear forces will be retained, among other things, to meet commitments to allies. Finally, warheads over and above the operationally deployed force will be retained over the near term for prudent risk management in connection with mitigating geopolitical and technical risks. In particular, sufficient warheads will be retained to augment the operationally deployed force in the event that world events require a more robust deterrence posture.

We also must preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall stockpile in order to mitigate technical risks. Although we are making progress in restoring a responsive nuclear weapons production infrastructure, we are not yet able to produce replacement warheads in sufficient quantity to respond if a technical problem called into question the safety or reliability of one or more warheads critical to our nation’s deterrent. Thus, for example, we are planning to deploy two types of ICBM warheads—the W87 and W78—and will retain sufficient numbers of these two types in reserve so that if a technical failure occurred in one type, there would be sufficient warheads of the other type to restore the operationally-deployed ICBM force. We seek to apply this approach, where appropriate, to other nuclear delivery means.

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