Cooperative Threat Reduction
IPP and NCI
Fissile Material Disposition
Other Arms Control
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Bill Language
TITLE XIII--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIETUNION
SEC. 1301. SPECIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND
FUNDS.
(a) SPECIFICATION OF CTR PROGRAMS- For purposes of section 301 and otherprovisions of this Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are the programsspecified in section 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362note).
(b) FISCAL YEAR 2000 COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FUNDS DEFINED- Asused in this title, the term ‘fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reductionfunds' means the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriationsin section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
(c) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS- Funds appropriated pursuant to the authorizationof appropriations in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programsshall be available for obligation for three fiscal years.
SEC. 1302. FUNDING ALLOCATIONS.
(a) FUNDING FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES- Of the $475,500,000 authorized tobe appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2000 in section301(23) for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, not more than the followingamounts may be obligated for the purposes specified:
(1) For strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia, $177,300,000.
(2) For strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, $41,800,000.
(3) For activities to support warhead dismantlement processing in Russia,$9,300,000.
(4) For security enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites inRussia, $20,000,000.
(5) For weapons transportation security in Russia, $15,200,000.
(6) For planning, design, and construction of a storage facility forRussian fissile material, $64,500,000.
(7) For weapons storage security in Russia, $99,000,000.
(8) For development of a cooperative program with the Government ofRussia to eliminate the production of weapons grade plutonium at Russianreactors, $32,300,000.
(9) For biological weapons proliferation prevention activities in Russia,$12,000,000.
(10) For activities designated as Other Assessments/AdministrativeSupport, $1,800,000.
(11) For defense and military contacts, $2,300,000.
(b) REPORT ON OBLIGATION OR EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR OTHER PURPOSES-No fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligatedor expended for a purpose other than a purpose listed in paragraphs (1)through (11) of subsection (a) until 30 days after the date that the Secretaryof Defense submits to Congress a report on the purpose for which the fundswill be obligated or expended and the amount of funds to be obligated orexpended. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed as authorizingthe obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reductionfunds for a purpose for which the obligation or expenditure of such fundsis specifically prohibited under this title.
(c) LIMITED AUTHORITY TO VARY INDIVIDUAL AMOUNTS-
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), in any case in which the Secretaryof Defense determines that it is necessary to do so in the national interest,the Secretary may obligate amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2000 fora purpose listed in any of the paragraphs in subsection (a) in excess ofthe amount specifically authorized for such purpose.
(2) An obligation of funds for a purpose stated in any of the paragraphsin subsection (a) in excess of the specific amount authorized for suchpurpose may be made using the authority provided in paragraph (1) onlyafter--
(A) the Secretary submits to Congress notification of the intent todo so together with a complete discussion of the justification for doingso; and
(B) 15 days have elapsed following the date of the notification.
(3) The Secretary may not, under the authority provided in paragraph(1), obligate amounts for the purposes stated in any of paragraphs (4)through (6), (8), (10), or (11) of subsection (a) in excess of 115 percentof the amount specifically authorized for such purposes.
SEC. 1303. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES.
(a) IN GENERAL- No fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds,and no funds appropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs afterthe date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated or expended forany of the following purposes:
(1) Conducting with Russia any peacekeeping exercise or other peacekeeping-relatedactivity.
(2) Provision of housing.
(3) Provision of assistance to promote environmental restoration.
(4) Provision of assistance to promote job retraining.
(b) LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO DEFENSE CONVERSION ASSISTANCE- Noneof the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriationsin section 301 of this Act, and no funds appropriated to the Departmentof Defense in any other Act enacted after the date of the enactment ofthis Act, may be obligated or expended for the provision of assistanceto Russia or any other state of the former Soviet Union to promote defenseconversion.
(c) LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS- No fiscal year2000 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended forelimination of conventional weapons or the delivery vehicles primarilyintended to deliver such weapons.
SEC. 1304. LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS FOR FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGEFACILITY.
(a) LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FISCAL YEAR 2000 FUNDS- No fiscal year 2000Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be used--
(1) for construction of a second wing for the storage facility forRussian fissile material referred to in section 1302(a)(6); or
(2) for design or planning with respect to such facility until 15 daysafter the date that the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress notificationthat Russia and the United States have signed a verifiable written transparencyagreement that ensures that material stored at the facility is of weaponsorigin.
(b) LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION- No funds authorized to be appropriatedfor Cooperative Threat Reduction programs may be used for constructionof the storage facility referred to in subsection (a) until the Secretaryof Defense submits to Congress the following:
(1) A certification that additional capacity is necessary at such facilityfor storage of Russian weapons-origin fissile material.
(2) A detailed cost estimate for a second wing for the facility.
(3) A certification that Russia and the United States have signed averifiable written transparency agreement that ensures that material storedat the facility is of weapons origin.
SEC. 1305. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.
No fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, and no fundsappropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs after the date ofthe enactment of this Act, may be obligated or expended for planning, design,or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.
SEC. 1306. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS UNTIL SUBMISSION OF REPORT.
Not more than 50 percent of the fiscal year 2000 Cooperative ThreatReduction funds may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defensesubmits to Congress a report describing—
(1) with respect to each purpose listed in section 1302, whether theDepartment of Defense is the appropriate executive agency to carry outCooperative Threat Reduction programs for such purpose, and if so, why;and
(2) for any purpose that the Secretary determines is not appropriatelycarried out by the Department of Defense, a plan for migrating responsibilityfor carrying out such purpose to the appropriate agency.
SEC. 1307. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS UNTIL SUBMISSION OF MULTIYEARPLAN.
Not more than ten percent of fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reductionfunds may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense submitsto Congress an updated version of the multiyear plan for fiscal year 2000required to be submitted under section 1205 of the National Defense AuthorizationAct for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note).
SEC. 1308. REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT REPORT.
Not later than December 31, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall submitto Congress a report including—
(1) an explanation of the strategy of the Department of Defense forencouraging States of the former Soviet Union that receive funds throughCooperative Threat Reduction programs to contribute financially to thethreat reduction effort
(2) a prioritization of the projects carried out by the Departmentof Defense under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs;
(3) an identification of any limitations that the United States hasimposed or will seek to impose, either unilaterally or through negotiationswith recipient States, on the level of assistance provided by the UnitedStates for each of such projects; and
(4) an identification of the amount of international financial assistanceprovided for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs by other States.
SEC. 1309 REPORT ON EXPANDED THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE.
Not later than March 31, 2000, the President shall submit to Congressa report on the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative. Such report shallinclude a description of the plans for ensuring effective coordinationbetween executive agencies in carrying out the Expanded Threat ReductionInitiative to minimize duplication of efforts.
SEC. 1310. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS UNTIL SUBMISSION OF CERTIFICATION.
No funds appropriated for fiscal year 1999 for Cooperative Threat Reductionprograms and remaining available for obligation or expenditure may be obligatedor expended for assistance for any country under a Cooperative Threat ReductionProgram until the President resubmits to Congress an updated certificationunder section 1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (titleXII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)), section 1412(d) of the FormerSoviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (title XIV of Public Law 102-484;22 U.S.C. 5902(d)), and section 502 of the Freedom for Russia and EmergingEurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-511;22 U.S.C. 5852).
SEC. 1311. PERIOD COVERED BY ANNUAL REPORT ON ACCOUNTING FOR UNITED
STATES ASSISTANCE UNDER COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS.
Section 1206(a)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 471; 22 U.S.C. 5955 note) is amendedto read as follows:
‘(2) The report shall be submitted under this section not later thanJanuary 31 of each year and shall cover the fiscal year ending in the precedingcalendar year. No report is required under this section after the completionof the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.'.
SEC. 1312. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is in the interest of Russia to fully implement the PresidentialNuclear Initiatives announced in 1991 and 1992 by then-President of theSoviet Union Gorbachev and then-President of Russia Yeltsin
(2) the President of the United States should call on Russia to matchthe unilateral reductions in the United States inventory of tactical nuclearweapons, which have reduced the inventory by nearly 90 percent; and
(3) if the re-certification under section 1310 is made, the Presidentshould emphasize the continued interest of the United States in workingcooperatively with Russia to reduce the dangers associated with Russia’stactical nuclear arsenal.
(b) Annual Reporting Requirement.—
(1) Each annual report on accounting for United States assistance underCooperative Threat Reduction programs that is submitted to Congress undersection 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year1996 (Public Law 104 106; 110 Stat. 471; 22 U.S.C. 5955 note) after fiscalyear 1999 shall include, regarding Russia’s arsenal of tactical nuclearwarheads, the following:
(A) Estimates regarding current types, numbers, yields, viability,locations, and deployment status of the warheads.
(B) An assessment of the strategic relevance of the warheads.
(c) An assessment of the current and projected threat of theft, sale,or unauthorized use of the warheads.
(D) A summary of past, current, and planned United States efforts towork cooperatively with Russia to account for, secure, and reduce Russia’sstockpile of tactical nuclear warheads and associated fissile material
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual report describedin paragraph (1) the views on the report provided under subsection (c)
(c) Views of the Director of Central Intelligence.—The Director ofCentral Intelligence shall submit to the Secretary of Defense, for inclusionas an appendix in the annual report described in subsection (b),the Director’s views on the matters described in paragraph (1) of thatsubsection regarding Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons.
Report Language
TITLE XIII—COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ADOPTED
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (secs. 1301-1312)
The budget request included $475.5 million for the Cooperative ThreatReduction (CTR) program.
The Senate bill would authorize the budget request, and contained provisions(secs. 1044, 1045, and 1085) that would: require the President to recertifythe eligibility of recipient countries for CTR assistance; adjust the deadlinefor submission of the annual report on accounting for CTR assistance; andrequire the inclusion in that report of information relating to Russia’sarsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
The House amendment would authorize $444.1 million for the CTR programfor fiscal year 2000, a $31.4 million decrease to the budget request andcontained provisions (secs. 1301-1309) that would: allocate fiscal year2000 funding for various CTR programs and activities; limit the availabilityof CTR funds; prohibit the use of funds for specific activities; prohibitthe use of funds for a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russiaand reallocate a portion of these funds to security enhancements at Russia’schemical weapons storage sites; increase funding for strategic offensiveelimination projects in Russia and Ukraine and for security enhancementsat Russia’s nuclear weapons storage sites; limit CTR funding for a fissilematerial storage facility and for biological weapons proliferation preventionactivities in Russia until various reports, notifications, and certificationsare received by Congress; and require a report on the Expanded Threat ReductionInitiative.
The conferees agree to a series of provisions that would authorize thebudget request of $475.5 million for the CTR program to include $177.3million for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia, $41.8 millionfor strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, $9.3 million for activitiesto support warhead dismantlement processing in Russia, $20.0 million forsecurity enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia, $15.2million for weapons transportation security in Russia, $64.5 million forplanning, design, and construction of a storage facility for Russian fissilematerial, $99.0 million for weapons storage security in Russia, $32.2 millionfor development of a cooperative program with the Government of Russiato eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium at Russian reactors,$12.0 million for biological weapons proliferation prevention activitiesin Russia, $1.8 million for activities designated as other assessmentsand administrative support, and $2.3 million for military to military contacts.The conferees also agree to limit the availability of CTR funds, establishsublimits for CTR activities, and provide the Secretary of Defense limitedauthority to exceed these sublimits for fiscal year 2000, pending appropriateCongressional notification.
In addition, the conferees agree to make permanent the long-standingprohibition on the use of CTR funds for: peacekeeping activities with Russia;the provision of housing; environmental restoration assistance; job retraining;and defense conversion activities. The conferees also agree to a prohibitionon the use of fiscal year 2000 CTR funds for the elimination of conventionalweapons and delivery vehicles primarily intended to deliver these weapons.The conferees believe that the CTR program should remain focused on eliminatingthe threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehiclesin the former Soviet Union. This provision would not restrict or otherwiseprohibit the destruction of delivery vehicles that are primarily intendedfor delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
The conferees are troubled by the fact that the United States is increasinglyabsorbing a greater share of the costs of the CTR program as a result ofRussia’s economic difficulties and are concerned that the Department ofDefense is agreeing to offset Russia’s financial obligations. The confereesbelieve that the Department should notify the Congress whenever the UnitedStates is confronted with a request or decision to absorb an additionalshare of CTR funding that Russia has indicated it cannot provide.
The conferees agree to include a provision that would prohibit fiscalyear 2000 funds, as well as funding for future years, from being used forthe planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destructionfacility in Shchuch’ye, Russia. The conferees agree to take this actionthis year in light of significant cost, schedule, and other concerns highlightedin a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report. The GAO report concludedthat this project will cost more, take longer, and achieve less nationalsecurity benefit for the United States than originally anticipated. Theconferees are also troubled by Russia’s apparent inability to fund adequatelythe necessary infrastructure costs that are associated with this chemicalweapons destruction effort. The conferees recognize the proliferation andother risks associated with Russia’s massive stockpile of chemical munitions.The conferees believe, however, that the more immediate goals of U.S. nonproliferationpolicy will be better served in the near term by redirecting CTR resourcesaway from the costly, long-term Shchuch’ye project and toward helping toensure that Russian chemical weapons are effectively safeguarded againstthe risk of theft or diversion. For this reason, the conferees have providedfunds to initiate enhanced security measures at Russia’s chemical weaponsstorage sites.
The conferees also agree to prohibit the obligation or expenditure offiscal year 1999 CTR funds remaining available for obligation until thePresident re-certifies the eligibility of the recipient countries for CTRassistance.
In light of concerns over nuclear transparency arrangements, the confereesalso agree to condition future funding for the second wing of a fissilematerial storage facility in Russia on several certifications and the negotiationof a signed transparency agreement with Russia that ensures that materialstored at the facility has been removed from dismantled nuclear weapons.
Finally, the conferees agree to limit the use of fiscal year 2000 CTRfunds pending the submission to Congress by the Secretary of Defense ofa report on executive agency responsibilities for executing CTR programsand an updated multiyear CTR program plan. The conferees also require thesubmission to Congress of various other reports dealing with: individualCTR projects and how those projects are prioritized within the Departmentof Defense; international financial contributions to the CTR program; relatedtactical nuclear weapons issues; and the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear CitiesInitiative (NCI)
Bill Language
SEC. 3136. NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES AND ACTIVITIES.
(a) INITIATIVE FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAM-
(1) Not more than 35 percent of the funds available in any fiscal yearafter fiscal year 1999 for the Initiatives for Proliferation Preventionprogram (IPP) may be obligated or expended by the Department of Energynational laboratories to carry out or provide oversight of any activitiesunder that program.
(2)(A) None of the funds available in any fiscal year after fiscalyear 1999 for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program maybe used to increase or otherwise supplement the pay or benefits of a scientistor engineer if the scientist or engineer—
(i) is currently engaged in activities directly related to the design,development, production, or testing of chemical or biological weapons ora missile system to deliver such weapons; or
(ii) was not formerly engaged in activities directly related to thedesign, development, production, or testing of weapons of mass destructionor a missile system to deliver such weapons.
(B) None of the funds available in any fiscal year after fiscal year1999 for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program maybe made available to an institute if the institute—
(i) is currently involved in activities described in subparagraph (A)(i);or
(ii) was not formerly involved in activities described in subparagraph(A)(ii).
(3)(A) No funds available for the Initiatives for Proliferation Preventionprogram may be provided to an institute or scientist under the programif the Secretary of Energy determines that the institute or scientist hasmade a scientific or business contact in any way associated with or relatedto weapons of mass destruction with a representative of a country of proliferationconcern.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘country of proliferationconcern’ means any country so designated by the Director of Central Intelligencefor purposes of the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program.
(4)(A) The Secretary of Energy shall prescribe procedures for the reviewof projects under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program.The purpose of the review shall be to ensure the following:
(i) That the military applications of such projects, and any informationrelating to such applications, is not inadvertently transferred or utilizedfor military purposes.
(ii) That activities under the projects are not redirected toward workrelating to weapons of mass destruction.
(iii) That the national security interests of the United States areotherwise fully considered before the commencement of the projects.
(B) Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary prescribesthe procedures required by subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submitto Congress a report on the procedures. The report shall set forth a schedulefor the implementation of the procedures.
(5)(A) The Secretary shall evaluate the projects carried out underthe Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program for commercial purposesto determine whether or not such projects are likely to achieve their intendedcommercial objectives.
(B) If the Secretary determines as a result of the evaluation thata project is not likely to achieve its intended commercial objective, theSecretary shall terminate the project.
(6) Funds appropriated for the Initiatives for Proliferation Preventionprogram may not be used to pay any tax or customs duty levied by the governmentof the Russian Federation. In the event payment of such a tax or customsduty with such funds is unavoidable, the Secretary of Energy shall—
(A) after such payment, submit a report to the congressional defensecommittees explaining the particular circumstances making such paymentunder the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program with such fundsunavoidable; and
(B) ensure that sufficient additional funds are provided to the Initiativesfor Proliferation Prevention Program to offset the amount of such payment.
(b) NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE-
(1) No amounts authorized to be appropriated by this title for theNuclear Cities Initiative may be obligated or expended for purposes ofthe initiative until the Secretary of Energy certifies to Congress thatRussia has agreed to close some of its facilities engaged in work on weaponsof mass destruction.
(2) Notwithstanding a certification under paragraph (1), amounts authorizedto be appropriated by this title for the Nuclear Cities Initiative maynot be obligated or expended for purposes of providing assistance underthe initiative to more than three nuclear cities, and more than two serialproduction facilities, in Russia in fiscal year 2000.
(3)(A) The Secretary shall conduct a study of the potential economiceffects of each commercial program proposed under the Nuclear Cities Initiativebefore providing assistance for the conduct of the program. The study shallinclude an assessment regarding whether or not the mechanisms for job creationunder each program are likely to lead to the creation of the jobs intendedto be created by that program.
(B) If the Secretary determines as a result of the study that the intendedcommercial benefits of a program are not likely to be achieved, the Secretarymay not provide assistance for the conduct of that program.
(4) Not later than January 1, 2000, the Secretary shall submit to Congressa report describing the participation in or contribution to the NuclearCities Initiative of each department and agency of the United States Governmentthat participates in or contributes to the initiative. The report shalldescribe separately any interagency participation in or contribution tothe initiative.
(c) REPORT-
(1) Not later than January 1, 2000, the Secretary of Energy shall submitto the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services ofthe House of Representatives a report on the Initiatives for ProliferationPrevention program and the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
(2) The report shall include the following:
(A) A strategic plan for the Initiatives for Proliferation Preventionprogram and for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, which shall establish objectivesfor the program or initiative, as the case may be, and means for measuringthe achievement of such objectives.
(B) A list of the most successful projects under the Initiatives forProliferation Prevention program, including for each such project the nameof the institute and scientists who are participating or have participatedin the project, the number of jobs created through the project, and themanner in which the project has met the nonproliferation objectives ofthe United States.
(C) A list of the institutes and scientists associated with weaponsof mass destruction programs or other defense-related programs in the statesof the former Soviet Union that the Department seeks to engage in commercialwork under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program or theNuclear Cities Initiative, including—
(i) a description of the work performed by such institutes and scientistsunder such weapons of mass destruction programs or other defense-relatedprograms; and
(ii) a description of any work proposed to be performed by such institutesand scientists under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention programor the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
(d) NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE DEFINED- For purposes of this section,the term ‘Nuclear Cities Initiative’ means the initiative arising pursuantto the March 1998 discussions between the Vice President of the UnitedStates and the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and between theSecretary of Energy of the United States and the Minister of Atomic Energyof the Russian Federation.
Report Language
Nonproliferation initiatives and activities (sec. 3136)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 3136) that would: (1) limitthe percentage of appropriated funds that may be spent by the Departmentof Energy (DOE) laboratories to 40 percent; (2) express a sense of Congressthat the President enter into negotiations with the Russian governmentfor the purposes of entering into an agreement between the U.S. and Russiato provide for a permanent exemption from taxation for the Initiativesfor Proliferation Prevention Program (IPP); and (3) enhance the management,accountability, and oversight of the IPP and Nuclear Cities Initiative.
The House amendment contained similar provisions (sec. 3131-3132) thatwould limit the percentage of funds appropriated for the IPP program thatare spent at the DOE laboratories to 25 percent and would prohibit fundsappropriated for the IPP program from being used to pay Russian governmenttaxes and customs duties.
Both the Senate and the House recede.
The conferees agree to combine all three provisions. The provision wouldprohibit the payment of Russian taxes but in the event that the paymentof Russian taxes is unavoidable, the Secretary of Energy shall: (1) aftersuch payment, submit a report to the congressional defense committees explainingthe particular circumstances that would make such payment under the IPPprogram unavoidable; and (2) ensure that sufficient additional funds areprovided to the IPP program to offset the amount of such payment.
The conferees intend that in implementing the requirements of subsection(6), subparagraph (B) of this provision, if funds are reprogrammed to theIPP program to offset the funds used to pay taxes, the Secretary shalluse established reprogramming procedures. The conferees note that if theDepartment of Energy learns that recipients of IPP funds have paid incomeor other taxes, the conferees expect that the Secretary of Energy willnotify the congressional defense committees in accordance with subsection(6), subparagraph (A).
The conferees, troubled by the disproportionally large share of theIPP funds that have remained in the DOE national laboratories, have agreedto a funding restriction that limits the amount of IPP funds spent in theDOE national laboratories to 35 percent of the overall program funding.The DOE had previously committed to achieving a 40 percent limitation.The conferees recognize that meeting the 35 percent in fiscal year 2000will be a challenge. While clearly the goal of the IPP program is to ensurethat the maximum amount of IPP funds reach the program participants, DOEmust also ensure that there is adequate program oversight.
Fissile material control and disposition
Report Language
The conferees recommend $200.0 million for fissile materials controland disposition, the requested amount.
The conferees believe that many activities currently carried out bythe Office of Defense Programs would be more appropriately carried outby the Office of Fissile Materials Control and Disposition. The confereesdirect that the Office of Fissile Materials Control and Disposition assumeresponsibility for the following activities currently funded within theweapons activities account: storage of special nuclear materials that havebeen designated surplus to U.S. military needs; the Parallax mixed oxidefuel project at Los Alamos National Laboratory; the Amarillo PlutoniumResearch Center; and surplus plutonium pit disassembly and conversion activities.The conferees believe that this action will more accurately reflect themissions and functions of the Office of Fissile Materials Control and Disposition.The conferees expect that future year funding requirements for these activitieswill be reflected in the materials disposition program budget account.
The conferees believe that the Amarillo Plutonium Research Center ismore appropriately funded by the Office of Fissile Materials Control andDisposition and, accordingly, recommend $5.0 million for this activity.
The conferees are pleased to note the continuing progress of the gasreactor development program and hope that this might provide additionalplutonium burning capacity in Russia.
Other arms control matters
Bill language
SEC. 1501. REVISION TO LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OFSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.
(a) REVISED LIMITATION- Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1302 of theNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85;111 Stat. 1948) are amended to read as follows:
‘(a) FUNDING LIMITATION-
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), funds available to the Departmentof Defense may not be obligated or expended for retiring or dismantling,or for preparing to retire or dismantle, any of the following strategicnuclear delivery systems below the specified levels:
‘(A) 76 B-52H bomber aircraft.
‘(B) 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines.
‘(C) 500 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.
‘(D) 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles.
‘(2) The limitation in paragraph (1)(B) shall be modified in accordancewith paragraph (3) upon a certification by the President to Congress ofthe following:
‘(A) That the effectiveness of the United States strategic deterrentwill not be decreased by reductions in strategic nuclear delivery systems.
‘(B) That the requirements of the Single Integrated Operational Plancan be met with a reduced number of strategic nuclear delivery systems.
‘(C) That reducing the number of strategic nuclear delivery systemswill not, in the judgment of the President, provide a disincentive forRussia to ratify the START II treaty or serve to undermine future armscontrol negotiations.
‘(D) That the United States will retain the ability to increase thedelivery capacity of its strategic nuclear delivery systems should threatsarise that require more substantial United States strategic forces.
‘(3) If the President submits the certification described in paragraph(2), then the applicable number in effect under paragraph (1)(B)--
‘(A) shall be 16 during the period beginning on the date on which suchcertification is transmitted to Congress and ending on the date specifiedin subparagraph (B); and
‘(B) shall be 14 effective as of the date that is 240 days after thedate on which such certification is transmitted.
‘(b) WAIVER AUTHORITY- If the START II treaty enters into force, thePresident may waive the application of the limitation in effect under paragraph(1)(B) or (3) of subsection (a), as the case may be, to the extent thatthe President determines such a waiver to be necessary in order to implementthe treaty.’.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Such section is further amended—
(1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking ‘during the strategic deliverysystems retirement limitation period’ and inserting ‘during the fiscalyear during which the START II Treaty enters into force’; and
(2) by striking subsection (g).
SEC. 1502. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that, in negotiating a START III Treatywith the Russian Federation, or any other
arms control treaty with the Russian Federation that would requirereductions in United States strategic nuclear
forces, that—
(1) the strategic nuclear forces and nuclear modernization programsof the People’s Republic of China and every other nation possessing nuclearweapons should be taken into full consideration in the negotiation of suchtreaty; and
(2) the reductions in United States strategic nuclear forces undersuch a treaty should not be to such an extent as to impede the capabilityof the United States to respond militarily to any militarily significantincrease in the threat to United States security or strategic stabilityposed by the People’s Republic of China and any other nation.
SEC. 1503. REPORT ON STRATEGIC STABILITY UNDER START III.
(a) REPORT- Not later than September 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defenseshall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committeeon Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report, to be preparedin consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, on the stabilityof the future strategic nuclear posture of the United States for deterringthe Russian Federation and other potential nuclear adversaries.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED- The Secretary shall, at a minimum, includein the report the following:
(1) A discussion of the policy defining the deterrence and military-politicalobjectives of the United States against potential nuclear adversaries.
(2) A discussion of the military requirements for United States nuclearforces, the force structure and capabilities necessary to meet those requirements,and how they relate to the achievement of the objectives identified underparagraph (1).
(3) A projection of the strategic nuclear force posture of the UnitedStates and the Russian Federation that is anticipated under a further StrategicArms Reduction Treaty (referred to as ‘START III’), and an explanationof whether and how United States nuclear forces envisioned under that posturewould be capable of meeting the military sufficiency requirements identifiedunder paragraph (2).
(4) The Secretary’s assessment of Russia’s nuclear force posture underSTART III compared to its present force, including its size, vulnerability,and capability for launch on tactical warning, and an assessment of whetherstrategic stability would be enhanced or diminished under START III, includingany stabilizing and destabilizing factors and possible incentives or disincentivesfor Russia to launch a first strike, or otherwise use nuclear weapons,against the United States in a possible future crisis.
(5) The Secretary’s assessment of the nuclear weapon capabilities ofChina and other potential nuclear weapon ‘rogue’ states in the foreseeablefuture, and an assessment of the effect of these capabilities on strategicstability, including their ability and inclination to use nuclear weaponsagainst the United States in a possible future crisis.
(6) The Secretary’s assessment of whether asymmetries between the UnitedStates and Russia, including doctrine, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, andactive and passive defenses, are likely to erode strategic stability inthe foreseeable future.
(7) Any other matters the Secretary believes are important to sucha consideration of strategic stability under future nuclear postures.
(c) CLASSIFICATION- The report shall be submitted in classified formand, to the extent possible, in unclassified form.
Report language
TITLE XV—ARMS CONTROL AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION MATTERS
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
International border security
Among the efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) to counter thethreat of terrorist activities involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)or WMD materials, as well as the threat of proliferation of such weaponsand materials, the conferees recognize the contribution being made by theInternational Border Security Training Program authorized in Sec. 1424of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. At relativelylow cost, DOD has worked with the Customs Service to train border securityofficials from throughout Central Europe and the Newly Independent States(NIS) of the former Soviet Union to enhance their capabilities to preventthe flow of WMD or associated materials across their borders. The valueof this program has been demonstrated by seizures of sensitive materialsin Eastern Europe, including nuclear reactor components destined for Iranand a small quantity of Uranium-235. The border security officials responsiblefor both of these seizures attribute their success to the training theyreceived in this program. The conferees commend those responsible for thesuccess of this program.
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ADOPTED
Revision to limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nucleardelivery systems (sec. 1501)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1041) that would: (1) extendby one year section 1302 of the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85) relating to the retirement or dismantlementof specified strategic nuclear delivery systems until the START II Treatyenters into force; and (2) provide for the reduction of a number of Tridentsubmarines.
The House amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1033) thatwould amend section 1302 of the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 1998 to prohibit the retirement or dismantlement of specifiedstrategic nuclear delivery systems unless the President makes certain certifications.
The Senate recedes with an amendment that would: (1) amend section1302 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 toprohibit the retirement or dismantlement of specified strategic nucleardelivery systems unless the President makes certain certifications; and(2) allow for the retirement of a number of Trident submarines if suchcertification is provided.
Sense of Congress on strategic arms reductions (sec. 1502)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1042) that would limit theuse of funds during fiscal year 2000 to reduce specified strategic nuclearforces below the maximum number of those forces permitted the United Statesunder the START II Treaty unless the President submits to Congress a reportcontaining an assessment indicating that such reductions would not impedethe capability of the United States to respond militarily to any militarilysignificant increase in the challenge to United States security or strategicstability posed by nuclear weapon modernization programs of the People’sRepublic of China or any other nation.
The House amendment contained no similar provision.
The House recedes with an amendment that would express the sense ofCongress that, in negotiating a START III Treaty with the Russian Federation,or any other arms control treaty with the Russian Federation that wouldrequire reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces, that: (1) the strategicnuclear forces and nuclear modernization programs of the People’s Republicof China and other nations be taken into full consideration; and (2) thereductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces should not be to such an extentas to impede the capability of the United States to respond militarilyto any militarily significant increase in the threat to the United Statesposed by the People’s Republic of China and any other nation.
Report on strategic stability under START III (sec. 1503)
The House amendment contained a provision (sec. 1201) that would requirethe Secretary of Defense to prepare a report on strategic stability underSTART III.
The Senate bill contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes with a clarifying amendment.
HOUSE BILL AND REPORT (H.R. 1401; 106-62)
SENATE BILL AND REPORT (S.1059; 106-50)
