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42nd Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

42nd Annual Conference of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

Robert Kuckuck
July 16, 2001

Ladies and Gentleman, as J.D. Williams has already said, John Gordon is unable to attend. John was personally requested by Secretary Abraham to participate in the "Human Capital Summit", an initiative endorsed by our President, geared toward effectively improving the Department's management of its human capital. John strongly believes, and I share this belief, that people are our most valuable assets in the NNSA and our highest priority. Only an activity of highest priority would prevent John from personally delivering this key note address. He was looking forward to discussing the many diverse NNSA activities with recognized leaders in nuclear materials management in industry, government, academia, and international organizations throughout the world. However, that pleasure is now mine.

As many of you know, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established in March of last year, pursuant to legislation passed by a Republican Congress and signed into law by a Democratic President. Early this year, the outgoing Democratic President and then the incoming Republican President submitted NNSA budget proposals for FY 2002 to a Republican Congress. Now, the new Republican Administration is conducting a strategic review of US national security matters to include the NNSA programs and budget and will probably soon submit revisions stemming from the review to a Democratic Senate and Republican House of Representatives. Fortunately though, I can report to you that, throughout this period of exceptional political change, our newly established organization has covered a lot of ground and our compass point has remained remarkably steady.

That has been so largely because NNSA has enjoyed bipartisan support and bipartisan agreement on the direction it must take and the strategic importance of its work. All the key players, for example, tout the vital nature of NNSA's mission: to strengthen national security and reduce the global threat from weapons of mass destruction, through the application of science and technology.

One of the most important initiatives the NNSA undertakes to maintain and strengthen our national security is the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM (SSP) was established in response to the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which called on the Secretary of Energy to "establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons."

In the absence of nuclear testing the Stockpile Stewardship Program must:

As the civilian steward of the nation's nuclear weapons complex, the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible to the nation for the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear arsenal. The Department of Defense (DoD) is the military customer for the nuclear stockpile and partners with the DOE in setting requirements and establishing production goals. The Secretary of Energy represents and is obligated to the United States public to ensure that the nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and reliable. A key challenge of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is to balance military weapon performance goals against civilian and military surety and safety concerns.

THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF the SSP is to ensure the operational readiness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The SSP program is organized into three focus areas:

During the last year, DOE's Office of Defense Programs (DP) has undertaken a major shift in program management strategy, which has resulted in significant changes to the supporting planning, budgeting, and organizational structure of the SSP. The change in approach responds to important drivers that DP presently faces. These include weapon refurbishments starting in FY 2006, an aging workforce in the nuclear weapons complex, and an aging stockpile that must be maintained. It also responds to the need for intensive internal and external review to ensure that the program will achieve its goals, while preserving the institutional viability of the laboratories, production plants, and the test site.

Another business practice introduced this year by DP was the establishment of a rigorous planning process that clearly lays out programmatic milestones to be achieved within each element of the SSP. The complete Stockpile Stewardship Program is now defined by a series of program plans that have a five-year planning horizon, each with an accompanying annual implementation plan. The five-year program plans describe the goals and objectives of the program elements, and the annual implementation plans provide detailed sets of milestones that allow for accurate program tracking and oversight.

The changes made to the Stockpile Stewardship Program are expected to provide an increased level of focus and integration within the program, and a much greater level of resolution of program activities. Because of the increased focus, this approach will significantly improve the laboratories' and production plants' ability to support, maintain, and build an excellent work force with the skill mix needed to ensure success of the SSP. This approach also is key to sustaining the laboratories as premier scientific and engineering institutions, supporting the manufacturing activities necessary to maintain and modernize the stockpile.

While our activities in direct support of national defense are critical, it is widely recognized that they must be complemented by robust nonproliferation and arms control initiatives.

In its recently published report, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler Task Force concluded that:

     "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states, and used against American troops abroad or our citizens at home. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international community as well as to American lives and liberty."

At a hearing he chaired in March on the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs, Senator Richard Lugar stated,

     "No issue better illustrates the new challenges, complexities, and uncertainties faced in the post Cold War era than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. American efforts to slow or stop proliferation are perhaps the most important foreign and national security policies our government is implementing today."

Senator Joseph Biden, in a speech some of you heard him give last month in Washington, said,

     "Nonproliferation works. It isn't fun; it isn't easy; it isn't quick - but it works. So we must increase our efforts, rather than giving up hope or fixating on the difficulties."

And yes, there have been difficulties. From the beginning, there was bipartisan agreement that much work had to be done. John Gordon assumed his job, for example, at a moment when the whole enterprise was struggling - struggling with security concerns, fundamental questions about its own future, and confused lines of authority and accountability. The morale of our people was at an all-time low. We are all familiar with the often voiced concerns about the need for an overarching strategy, the adequacy of funding for our nonproliferation programs, the percentage of that funding that goes to Russian scientists versus Americans, the effectiveness and possible duplication of effort involved in some of our programs, and the performance of the Russians and the access they provide us. Before addressing such concerns, however, let me provide some basic points of reference by briefly outlining NNSA's principal nonproliferation programs.

The NNSA is a key player in U.S. nonproliferation programs and in large measure this is due to its unique expertise in nuclear weapons and nuclear power, including the world-class expertise of the national labs. Our goal is to ensure the close integration of technical talent and policy expertise with the efforts of other U.S. agencies working in the nonproliferation arena. Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN) is responsible for the nonproliferation mission. NN's mission is to support U.S. national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD through programs that:

Detect

Prevent

Reverse

The threefold threat of unsecured material, widely available technology and underemployed expertise combined to make an urgent case for actions following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The NNSA is addressing this complex, multifaceted issue in a comprehensive way, with specific, realistic goals for each part of the program. NN's efforts address different types of problems, and they are designed to do different things, while working to achieve the same overall goal of reducing the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The NNSA programs together offer a synergy of effect resulting in a sum greater than their parts. For example, the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention are two programs that are helping to address issues related to Russian nuclear complex downsizing, including the human factor. Each has its unique strengths and together are a more comprehensive way to address the problem. On the material side of the equation, the MPC&A program and the Second Line of Defense program work hand in hand to help prevent the theft or diversion of weapons useable material -- one at the site and one is at the borders. Together they form a more effective means to prevent "loose nukes" or nuclear material. As for eliminating excess fissile material, the HEU Purchase Agreement transparency program is ensuring that weapons HEU is being blended down into LEU and a relatively new project within the MPC&A program called the Material Consolidation and Conversion program is working with the Russians on a site by site basis to reduce the overall amounts of non-weapons HEU that exists, and to store the material in fewer more secure sites. As you can see, NNSA has a wide variety of programs, but what I want to do next is show how they all fit into overall USG national security interests with regard to Russia.

THE RUSSIA PROGRAMS

I will begin with five broad objectives of our overarching U.S. government threat reduction efforts with the Russians and discuss NNSA contribution to these efforts:

The first objective - reducing the threat from nuclear delivery systems - is the primary goal of the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction program. As most of you know, that program has enjoyed myriad successes and continues to make substantial progress.

In terms of the second objective -- reducing the potential for diversion of Russian nuclear warheads to countries of concern or terrorist groups - both the Department of Defense and NNSA have programs for working with the Russian military to improve the safety and security at nuclear weapons storage sites.

One of the NNSA Programs is with the Russian Navy and grew out of cooperation on securing HEU reactor fuels on Russian ships. We have excellent cooperation with the Russian Navy on this program to help them better protect their nuclear warheads and are making good progress.

Another DOD and NNSA program is the U.S.-Russian Warhead Safety and Security Agreement. Under this Agreement, the United States and Russian Federation have exchanged unclassified information to increase the safety and security of nuclear warheads and fissile material. This Agreement was extended for an additional five-year period at the U.S-Russian Summit last June and last Fall additional topics were approved by the WSSX Steering Committee to significantly expand our cooperation in this area.

The central effort on our third objective -- reducing the potential for diversion of Russian weapons-usable nuclear materials - is the flagship of NNSA's cooperation with Russia, the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program. Since 1993, MPC&A has anchored the First Line of Defense by working with the Russians to improve security at 95 weapons-usable material storage sites, both civilian and military. We have completed rapid security upgrades for thousands of Russian Navy warheads and 220 metric tons of HEU and plutonium in Russia and other newly independent states-enough material to make roughly 20,000 nuclear devices. One of our goals for FY 2002 is to complete security upgrades at an additional thirteen sites, bringing the total number of completed sites to fifty. Our strategic plan estimate is that we will complete security upgrades on approximately 4,000 Russian Navy nuclear warheads, as requested by the Russian Navy, as early as 2007 and for over 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material by 2010.

An integral part of our MPC&A mission is promoting sustainable security improvements. We want the security systems we help install maintained and effectively operated over the long term, which entails preparing Russians to maintain and operate these systems on their own. Consequently, we are establishing training centers, identifying reliable Russian suppliers of MPC&A equipment, helping draft Russian regulations and security force procedures, and establishing an information accounting system to track all of Russia's nuclear materials. We are also consolidating Russian materials into fewer buildings at fewer sites and converting some materials to forms less attractive to potential proliferators. The Material Consolidation and Conversion project is active at two downblending sites: the Scientific Production Association (Luch) [looch] located in Podolsk, [po-DOLsk] and the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors located in Dimitrovgrad [duh-MEE-trohv-grahd]. Thus far, this project, still in the pilot phase, has downblended nearly 2.2 metric tons of weapons-usable High Enriched Uranium (HEU).

Through the Fissile Materials Disposition program, NNSA is responsible for disposal of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium and HEU and for efforts to secure reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian weapons-grade plutonium.

The goal of the plutonium disposition program is to prevent the spread of weapons material through the eliminate stockpiles of surplus Russian weapon-grade plutonium. Under an international agreement signed late last year, the U.S. and Russia have committed to dispose of 68 MT of surplus weapon-grade plutonium in Russia and the United States (34 MT in each country) either by irradiating the material as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel or by immobilizing the plutonium, at a rate of at least two metric tons per year. We are also going to work to identify additional reactor capacity to at least double the disposition rate in each country. Along with this agreement, we committed ourselves to develop and implement an effective monitoring and inspection regime for plutonium disposition. Our goal is to begin operating industrial-scale plutonium disposition facilities beginning in 2007. However, in order for this program to succeed, we need to identify significant international financing for plutonium disposition efforts in Russia.

The current FY 2002 budget request would fund completion of the mixed oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility design with related MOX fuel qualification activities. We plan to continue design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility at a reduced rate and suspend design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant. These changes are necessary to reduce the future-year peak funding requirements for building three plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site. Our plans will enable us to meet the requirements of the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

Our work with Russia to convert highly enriched uranium from the Russian military stockpile into a non-weapons-usable form is progressing well. The 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement remains one of the most impressive nonproliferation achievements of the last decade. Our associated transparency program is designed to provide increased confidence that HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons is down-blended to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in Russia and made into power reactor fuel to be used here in the United States. As of May of this year, more than 117 metric tons of HEU -- enough material to make roughly 4,700 nuclear devices -- had been removed from the Russian military program. Our goal for 2001 is to convert another 30 metric tons.

In the Second Line of Defense program, we work with the Russian Customs Service to improve Russian capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear materials at border checkpoints and airports. Radiation detectors have been installed at the international airports in Moscow and St Petersburg and at a port on the Caspian Sea. Ninety Customs officers have been trained and training manuals widely distributed. We plan to expand to half a dozen other critical transit points in the next year. While we have made some progress in this program, it is a huge job. Russian borders are thousands of miles long and some are with countries of proliferation concern. We may need to increase our effort in this program or develop feasible alternatives.

In addressing our fourth objective - reducing the potential for reversibility of downsizing - NNSA shares responsibility with the Department of Defense. A key concern here is with the size of the Russian nuclear weapons complex. While the U.S. complex has been reduced significantly, the Russian complex remains basically unchanged since the Cold War. However, the Russian Government has stated that it intends to close two of the four production facilities in the next few years, but they have asked for our help. It is in the national security interest of both the U.S. and Russia that the Russians reduce their production complex to a size consistent with the much lower stockpiles currently foreseen. We recognize the Russian concern about the human costs of such downsizing. The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) is being developed to help reduce the size of the Russian weapons complex along with the associated human costs. Last year, NCI scored an historic achievement when the Russians moved the concrete fence at the Avangard weapons facility inward to create an open Technopark for commercial businesses. This was the first time the footprint of a nuclear weapons facility was reduced as part of the downsizing to which Russia has committed itself.

Of course, some of NNSA's programs are applicable to several of the U.S. objectives. The U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, for example, with its plan to down-blend 500 metric tons of Russian HEU, helps reduce the potential for diversion of Russian weapons materials, and we also monitor the Agreement for its contribution to downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Likewise, while we view NCI primarily as part of the effort to reduce the size of the Russian weapons complex, that program can make significant strides toward accomplishing our fifth objective -- reducing the potential for diversion of nuclear-weapon/dual-use technologies and expertise.

This objective involves two separate but related needs. The first is to work with the Russian Government on limiting the export of technology and equipment that might help countries trying to develop nuclear weapons. Such exports, in our view, are not in the interest of the United States or the Russian Federation and, for that matter, the world. Developing ways to mitigate the economic incentives that seem to propel the Russians in the wrong direction would help both countries achieve their goals.

The second need involves the "brain drain." Thousands of Russian scientists from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs have been unemployed, underemployed or unpaid since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is clearly in U.S. interests to help reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of talented scientists. Lacking the resources necessary to care for their families, such talented scientists may well be tempted to sell their expertise to countries of proliferation concern. As former Senator Sam Nunn says,

"We dare not risk a world in which a Russian scientist can take care of his children only by endangering ours."

NNSA and the State Department have a number of programs in place to try to develop alternative employment to as many of these scientists as possible and integrate them into the international scientific community. The State Department program is the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC), which was created in 1992 and became operational in 1994. The ISTC is a multilateral organization and has strong support from the international community and the Russian Government. It focuses on jobs in the basic sciences and exploring potential commercial applications of basic technologies.

NNSA programs work in close cooperation with ISTC in attempting to accomplish the fifth objective. For example, our Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program focuses on the commercialization of Russian technologies in partnership with U.S. industry. The IPP program is designed to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction technologies and expertise by engaging former Soviet weapons scientists in non-military activities. It funds self-sustaining joint R&D projects involving commercial applications for weapons-related technologies. A rigorous interagency project review process has been established to ensure that no projects have dual-use potential.

We are pleased with the progress the IPP program has made over the past couple of years. Its commercialization efforts have begun taking off. Eight IPP projects are now commercially successful, providing about 300 long-term, private-sector jobs in Russia and more than $17 million in annual sales revenues. There are another 20 IPP projects poised for commercialization over the next year. IPP projects are successful due to U.S. private sector involvement from the beginning and the requirement for businesses to match NNSA funding. On average, U.S. industry contributes almost three dollars for every two dollars provided by the U.S. taxpayer. This year we have also started to see infusions of substantial venture capital in IPP. Two US companies, for example, have attracted over $40 million in private sector investment, as a result of technologies developed through IPP projects. We know that the long-term solution to the problem of unemployed Soviet weapon scientists, as well as our exit strategy, lies with the private sector and commercial self-sustainability. We have generated substantial momentum in the U.S. industrial community, with roughly 30 million private-sector dollars ready for investment in new IPP projects. A good example of this success is the project for soilwashing remediation for contaminated sites, with the U.S. company Pulse Technology Systems and the Russian Bochvar [BOACH-var] Institute. Annual sales of $2M and so far 110 Russian employed. The units are manufactured entirely in Russia and two units have been sold to Mexico and France. The Mexicans are using it at a gold mine for cleaning (or recovering) additional gold from mine tailings.

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OUTSIDE RUSSIA

NNSA is involved in nonproliferation and arms control projects in many other countries. We provide the technical base for much of what the U.S. Government does in developing new technology to detect chemical and biological weapons, to monitor nuclear testing worldwide, to implement export controls on nuclear technology, to support international nuclear safeguards, and to strengthen the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.

One case in point is our joint effort with Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's BN-350 fast breeder reactor is part of a state Atomic Energy Complex. In 1997, the Department of Energy and the Republic of Kazakhstan established a joint program for the long-term secure and safe disposition of the BN-350 spent fuel. Located in close proximity to the Caspian Sea and Iran, the BN-350 has in its spent fuel assemblies enough weapons-grade plutonium to make hundreds of nuclear weapons. DOE MPC&A upgrades were completed in 1999. The previous year, the packaging of the assemblies in 1.5-ton, stainless steel, welded, and evacuated canisters began. The packaging campaign for nearly 3000 assemblies in 477 canisters was completed in June 2001.

To date, including the MPC&A costs, NNSA has invested about $58M dollars at the BN-350. We are currently discussing our role in the dry storage phase of the project with the Government of Kazakhstan. This is a major nonproliferation accomplishment that establishes international safeguards measures and security for transportation and long-term storage of the nuclear materials and makes the world a safer place.

NNSA experts are also working in North Korea to reverse and prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. They are helping secure weapons-grade plutonium contained in spent reactor fuel. They have packaged 8,000 assemblies in canisters and placed them under IAEA monitoring, and maintained packaged spent fuel in a safe condition, appropriate for future shipment.

NNSA supports several projects targeted at reducing the amount of fissile material that could be available to potential proliferators. In the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, for example, NNSA works to reduce international commerce in civil HEU by developing technologies to convert foreign and domestic research and test reactors from HEU to LEU.

NNSA is also active in strengthening regional security and nonproliferation, not only on the Korean peninsula, but throughout East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. We help promote regional security dialogues, and share with key states in these regions the expertise of our national laboratories on technical measures involved in nonproliferation.

The NNSA plays a vital role in providing support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This support covers a broad range of technical areas. Many of you in this room are directly involved in this important work and certainly know the work better then I do, but I will highlight a few examples.

The NNSA has provided technical experts, training and/or equipment to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) for inspections in Iraq.

NNSA is providing technical advice and support to the IAEA for development of strengthened safeguards methods. This technical support and the understanding of the methods developed will be critical as the U.S. prepares to meet our responsibilities for declarations and on-site inspections at DOE facilities while protecting our National Security equities.

Under the "Trilateral Initiative," the NNSA has been working closely with the IAEA and the Russian Federation to develop a verification regime that will enable IAEA verification of U.S. and Russian excess weapons materials while these materials are still in classified forms.

NNSA provides physical protection technical assistance to countries with which DOE has bilateral agreements and to the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) in order to prevent theft, sabotage and nuclear smuggling.

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COOPERATION

Another strategy for enhancing nuclear security is to improve operational safety at and safety systems at nuclear facilities of concern. NNSA is working to reduce safety risks at the 66 operating, Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors in nine countries, through the International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation program. We plan to complete safety upgrades for these reactors by 2006. Three reactors in Russia are to be shut down in 2006 as part of DOD's program to eliminate production of weapons-grade plutonium. They are the oldest operating reactors in Russia and have not received any safety upgrades to date under foreign cooperation. Safety upgrades at these production reactors are among our highest priorities.

We are encouraged by our progress in addressing safety at operating reactors and by the early closure of older reactors as well. The Ukrainian Government shut down Chornobyl's sole operational reactor in December 2000 as planned. Our efforts to support construction of a replacement heat plant at Chornobyl, for decontamination and decommissioning purposes, are also proceeding well. We were also pleased that Kazakhstan made the decision to shut down its BN-350 reactor and we are working with them to safely decontaminate and decommission that reactor. We plan to complete one full-scope, nuclear plant training facility in each of three countries - Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia, and will strive for completion of operational safety improvements at all plants in Russia and Ukraine.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Our Nonproliferation Research and Development program is a one-of-a-kind program that enhances U.S. national security through needs-driven R&D with an emphasis on developing technologies to detect nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation and to monitor for nuclear explosions. NNSA is proud of achieving a significant milestone last year in one of our key R&D programs. The Multispectral Thermal Imager satellite was launched in March 2000. This small research satellite, designed and built by a team of laboratories and industry partners, has already achieved most of its design objectives. It will develop and test remote-sensing concepts and add to our country's ability to monitor nuclear proliferation. The Proliferation Detection and Deterrence program will develop the required technologies to detect nuclear proliferation. Our unchallenged lead responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation technology derives from the expertise and knowledge base resident in our national laboratories and the nuclear weapons complex. This program provides a technology template for the detection of weapons of mass destruction activities.

Our experts are building robust deterrence capabilities that include technical means to detect lost or stolen nuclear devices or fissile materials. Our forensic capability to identify the origin of fissile material associated with a nuclear threat is second to none. In FY 2002, we will continue to develop innovative technologies needed to improve the detection of the early stages of a proliferant nation's nuclear weapons program and the tracking of foreign special nuclear materials.

The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program is designed to provide the United States with the technical capability to detect nuclear explosions. We are working to develop and deploy sensors that allow the United States detect, locate and identify nuclear explosions. In FY 2002, the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program will continue to develop enabling technology, operational hardware and software, and expertise to detect, locate, identify, characterize, and attribute nuclear detonations through both ground-based and satellite-based systems. The ground based systems portion of the program delivered high-sensitivity radio-nuclide detector systems, calibration information needed to implement regional seismic methods, and an infrasound prototype. The satellite-based systems portion of the program delivers an average of three nuclear detonation sensor payloads to the Air Force every year for integration onto Global Positioning Systems and Defense Support Program satellites.

The goal of the Chemical and Biological National Security Program is to develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies and systems that will lead to major improvements in the U.S. capability to prepare for and respond to chemical or biological attacks against civilian populations. We are the primary agency developing non-medical technical solutions for this challenge. Our experts are involved in a broad interagency program to develop sensors that could detect the terrorist use of a biological agent at a large outdoor event, such as the Super bowl or the Olympics. Some of the successes of this program includes the development and live-agent testing of a prototype hand-held chemical and biological toxin detector, completion of DNA sequencing of B. anthracic (which causes anthrax), an extensive field experiment in a major U.S. city to model flow of a simulated airborne agent release, and development and live-agent testing of a decontamination foam effective against all classes of chemical agents as well as high-priority biological agents.

WHERE ARE WE FROM AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?

You can see from the above that NNSA's nonproliferation plate is full of weighty national and international security matters, each with its own challenges and controversies. As I indicated earlier, NNSA itself was birthed amidst such challenges and controversy. Congress legislated the establishment of NNSA largely out of concerns regarding Department of Energy security, and lines of authority, responsibility and accountability. Department personnel at that time were uncertain of their future, and their morale was shot.

While standing up NNSA has proceeded more slowly than we would have liked, I can report now that we are fulfilling our mission every day in our laboratories, production facilities, test site, and the remote areas of the world where we pursue our nonproliferation goals. General Gordon and I have traveled to these locations and am very impressed with the dedication the members of our team bring to their work and our mission, the intelligence they apply to the highly complex scientific problems that confront them, and the technical skills they use to maintain the safety, security and reliability of this nation's aging nuclear weapons stockpile while addressing the risks of proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction.

While hard to quantify, I sense, and I believe my colleagues at our laboratories and other sites would agree, that morale has begun to improve. Our people are starting to feel better about themselves, their work, their institutions, and the direction they see the NNSA moving, especially at the laboratories.

It certainly helped that, last year, our overall budget saw its first real growth in many years. That tangible commitment to our mission on the part of Congress sent a powerful signal to all our people that our mission is important and enduring, and has allowed all of us to really begin to look confidently to the future. With these additional funds, we have begun to make improvements and will continue to do so. These funds will make it easier to attract and retain the all-important next generation of scientists and engineers, continue to build the necessary experimental and computational facilities, and begin to correct for our aging infrastructure at production sites and laboratories.

As we discuss budgets, programs, and projects, it is imperative that we not lose sight of the fact that the success of the NNSA depends on the talented and dedicated people - the technicians, scientists, engineers, administrative staff, guards, maintenance crews, managers, and all the others - who apply their skills to our programs. One case in point in the context of this conference: NNSA's active role in the U.S. nonproliferation interagency community derives, in large measure, from our experts found in the national laboratories. NNSA managers must continue to demand their very best and give them the very best in terms of support and advocacy.

That said, the NNSA is still fragile, and much more remains to be done. We are making aggressive, pro-active management decisions to improve our mission accomplishment and stewardship of the resources provided us by the Congress.

As I have enumerated, there remain many important challenges regarding the management of nuclear material. I have committed through NNSA to see that all our material, whether excess to or required for national security, is handled, stored, or disposed of in the safest, most secure manner possible. I am sure the same could be said for our MINATOM colleagues. The best way to ensure our ability to do this is to have access to the most advanced technology and best ideas of the technical experts. I look to the INMM as the primary professional society for such experts to continue to provide the necessary fora that allow the exchange of ideas that guarantees maintaining the expertise and sustaining the highest possible professional standards in this crucial area. Your meetings and workshops produce papers and discussions that both enhance the science and enable negotiators to address real and important issues. I encourage you to continue to bring together the best talent in the world to address the best practices technology of safeguards, disposition, and monitoring.

CONCLUSION

I think we all agree that we face no greater challenge than preventing weapons of mass destruction or weapons-useable materials from falling into the hands of those who might use them against our citizens. We live in a dangerous world. The NNSA nonproliferation team is working with a sense of urgency to reduce the dangers and, I believe, we are on the right course.

In a number of areas, we've built a basis for mutual confidence with Russian scientists, military officers and plant managers that has permitted us to work together toward common security objectives in ways that probably were not imaginable only a few years ago. Ultimately, we recognize that the resources required to transform and safeguard Russia's weapons establishment are beyond the scope of any conceivable U.S. assistance program. Fundamentally, this transformation has to be a Russian responsibility. But, we can show the way. We can be a catalyst. We can demonstrate what is possible. It is clearly in our national interest to do so.

The NNSA's nonproliferation programs address unique proliferation challenges that arose with the end of the Cold War, but they do so by means of the same types of functional activities we pursue for other nonproliferation challenges. These are all vital functions for core nonproliferation activities, and they are no different in the Russia case than for the rest of the world. NN programs are integrated with each other as well as with other USG agencies. Each program on its own can only do battle with part of the problem, but taken together, they are a comprehensive blanket to smother the flames of potential proliferation that can threaten U.S. national security. If one of the threads is pulled, the whole blanket may unravel.

It is the right idea to bring together the national security missions of the Department of Energy, and to focus on clear goals and plans, sharp lines of authority and responsibility, and a strong vision of the future.. We are making steady, albeit somewhat slow, progress toward the goal of having an efficient and effective organization to lead and manage the national security enterprise that has been entrusted to us. I'm not particularly satisfied with where we are and what we have been able to accomplish thus far, but we are moving forward, and we've made some remarkable progress when measured against the barriers and the bureaucracy that we confront.

I believe the strategic review being conducted by the White House will reinforce that we are on the right course and contributing significantly to our national security. I believe it will also help instruct our comprehensive strategy, identify the most effective efforts on which we will build and the least effective programs that we need to improve.

I will conclude with a final comment on the men and women of NNSA. They have long been the stewards of our nuclear arsenal and are making tremendously important technical and policy contributions to the efforts to control, detect and deter the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. NNSA's unique contributions in this arena result from the caliber of personnel working on these complex, interrelated threat-reduction programs. I am very proud of our people and of the national security and nonproliferation programs to which they devote their efforts.

Thank you.