Speaking at the National Press Club March 3, he said the Department ofEnergy (DOE) is taking "a systematic approach to finding solutions toproliferation challenges," which includes preventing the spread ofweapons of mass destruction, detecting such weapons, reversingproliferation where it has already occurred and "responding toemergencies if these weapons are ever used."

One thrust of DOE's program is to "help Russia secure itsweapons-usable nuclear materials from theft or diversion by terroristsand rogue states," Richardson said. Currently, DOE and its nationallaboratories are working at more than 40 Russian sites to help securenuclear materials and to install modern security and accountingsystems. Because of the critical importance of this issue, PresidentClinton has asked for an additional $4.5 billion over the next fiveyears for urgent Russian national security programs, he noted.

In an innovative attempt to keep Russian scientists "employed inRussia, instead of in Iraq or North Korea," Richardson said, hisDepartment has launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative to developnon-weapons jobs in 10 Russian nuclear cities.

DOE is also helping to thwart nuclear smuggling by stepping uptraining of border enforcement officials and by developing a tiny,hand-held device similar to a beeper to detect radiation.

Richardson said his Department is also working to respond to chemicaland biological threats. "Our DOE labs have just developed aninstrument the size of a suitcase that can detect a biological agentwithin hours by decoding its DNA," he said, adding that his labs areworking on a detector "small enough to fit into the hand of a firemanor a cop that tells within seconds if a chem-bio agent is present" andwhat kind of agent it is, such as anthrax or a plague virus.

Following is the text of Richardson's prepared remarks:

(begin text)

The FBI receives word of a phone threat that radioactive material isaboard an AMTRAK train in Montana and that its passengers are indanger.

Within hours, specialists including the Department of Energy's NuclearEmergency Search Team arrive. Both the eastbound and westbound trainsare diverted to a lonely stretch of track and searched for a potentialkiller.

This is not a plot twist in a Tom Clancy thriller nor a figment of aHollywood screenwriter's imagination.

This incident occurred February 20th, aboard the Empire Builder incentral Montana.

No radioactive material was found. No one was injured. This time.

We have passed 50 years into the atomic age without a nuclearterrorist incident. We have not been so lucky in terms of otherweapons of mass destruction. A few years ago in Tokyo, a fringe groupreleased poison gas in a subway. Dozens were killed, thousandsinjured.

The lightning pace of technology has made chemical, biological andnuclear weapons more accessible than ever before. For the first timein human history, weapons of mass destruction powerful enough to rockthe security of nations do not require national efforts fordevelopment, deployment or use.

President Clinton has declared that the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction -- nuclear, chemical and biological weapons --constitutes a national emergency. Speaking recently at the NationalAcademy of Science, the President called on his cabinet to takeaggressive steps to counter this emerging threat to American securityand prosperity.

Today, I want to discuss the Department of Energy's response to thePresident's call for action. My focus is on the role -- now and in thefuture -- of the Department of Energy and our national laboratories inprotecting the American people from these threats.

The Department of Energy, from its roots in the Manhattan Project, wasand remains the primary agent for maintaining a safe and reliablenuclear deterrent. In this new era, we have the equally challengingjob of drawing down our nuclear complex, keeping nuclear materialsfrom falling into the wrong hands, and containing the knowledge neededto make nuclear weapons.

This challenge is particularly difficult in Russia. Russia's system ofprotecting nuclear materials declined along with the Soviet policestate, and worsens with the decay of their economy. Some seeopportunities to exploit these difficulties -- to illicitly obtainnuclear materials from Russia's production sites, or to purchaseRussian nuclear know-how from the many scientists and engineers facingdesperate economic circumstances.

At DOE we are uniquely positioned to address this nuclear threat. Ourlabs at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos developed the first atomic weapons.The Department is a central federal storehouse of information andexpertise on nuclear weapons at home and abroad.

While the Department's work in nuclear sciences and technology is wellknown, our capabilities in the chemical and biological sciences areless familiar.

The Department's work in the biological sciences began with the studyof radiation's effects on the human body. It continues today withefforts to sequence the human genome. These capabilities, joined withour national security expertise, uniquely position DOE to fightchemical and biological threats.

America's security against nuclear, biological, and chemical dangersnow hinges on creating tomorrow's tools today so we can defeat threatsposed not by a Cold War-era totalitarian superpower but by terrorists,criminals and regimes such as those in Libya, Iraq, Iran and NorthKorea.

The Department of Energy can - and will -- help meet these threats.

The Department of Energy is taking a systematic approach to findingsolutions to proliferation challenges. Our programs cross the spectrumfrom preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, todetecting it where it is emerging, to reversing it where it hasalready occurred, to responding to emergencies if these weapons areever used.

Prevent. Detect. Reverse. Respond. That is our defense-in-depth-concept.

I want to give you some concrete examples of ongoing and futuremeasures to prevent, to detect, to reverse, to respond at each stageof this emerging threat from weapons of mass destruction.

Let me start by describing some of our efforts to prevent the spreadof weapons of mass destruction, or better yet, to prevent them fromcoming into existence in the first place.

Preventing Proliferation

One of the first jobs in our anti-proliferation effort at DOE is tohelp Russia secure its weapons-usable nuclear materials from theft ordiversion by terrorists and rogue states. Nuclear materials such asplutonium and highly enriched uranium are the essential ingredientsfor a nuclear weapon and the hardest to obtain. For the most part,only nations can afford the industrial infrastructure and know-howneeded to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

So far, this reality has checked efforts by terrorist organizations toacquire crucial bomb materials. But imagine what might happen if aterrorist group gets enough plutonium for a bomb without having tomanufacture it. Imagine if such a group could buy plutonium on theblack market, or steal it from a place not properly secured.

It only takes a small quantity of these materials to produce a nuclearbomb -- a piece of plutonium the size of a softball is enough toproduce an explosion several times the size of that in Hiroshima in1945.

That is why it is so important that we keep our nuclear materialshighly secure, and fully accounted for. In Russia, the historic systemof controls over nuclear facilities and materials has weakened, andresources are simply not available to maintain it. We have alsolearned that Russia's nuclear bookkeeping ignored modern systems ofcontrol and accounting and relied instead on police-state securitymeasures.

Today, the Department of Energy and our national laboratories areworking at more than 40 Russian sites to help secure nuclear materialsand to install modern security and accounting systems. Our ability toestablish this crucial program of cooperation -- called the MaterialsProtection, Control, and Accounting Task Force -- succeeded largelybecause of our laboratories. Scientists from DOE labs were able togain access to Russian facilities by working on alaboratory-to-laboratory basis.

As we meet here today, dozens of dedicated DOE experts are at work inRussia installing basic safeguards, standards and procedures toarrange for the long-term protection of these weapons-grade materials.

We are proud of this program. Our Russian counterparts have shown usextraordinary goodwill and cooperation. We are now cooperating atvirtually every single site in Russia that stores or uses plutonium orhighly enriched uranium. To date we have completed security upgradesfor over 30 metric tons of weapons usable nuclear materials. By theend of the year, we expect to bring an additional 20 tons underimproved control. And by the end of 2000, we expect that number todouble for a total of 100 metric tons.

But we harbor no illusions about the complexity of problems in Russia.The current economic crisis makes our efforts even more urgent. Wehave moved quickly to address special needs -- such as providingbasics like winter clothes, warm boots and space heaters to guards atfacilities. It sounds simple, but this modest investment has keptguards at their posts and helped us keep our security work goingthrough this volatile period.

Because of the critical importance of this issue, the President hasrequested an additional $4.5 billion over the next five years forurgent Russian National security programs. The Department anticipatesan increase of $100 million for each of the next five years for ourmaterials security programs, as well as several other Russianprograms.

Included in the President's increased budget request are funds forDOE's program to help prevent Russian weapons scientists and engineersfrom selling their services to those seeking nuclear arms.

I was with the President in Russia last September, and have seen thehardships Russian nuclear workers face each day. As their nuclearcomplex downsizes, tens of thousands of nuclear experts living amongthe nuclear cities face unemployment or underemployment. We areseeking ways for them to channel their energy and expertise into newscientific and economic opportunities, to keep these scientistsemployed in Russia, instead of in Iraq or North Korea.

The danger of Russian nuclear materials or nuclear expertise fallinginto the hands of terrorists or rogue states is a matter of life anddeath for all of us. Just one of the 10 Russian nuclear cities storesmore plutonium than the entire stockpile of France, China and GreatBritain -- combined.

To peacefully fight this threat, the Department has launched theNuclear Cities Initiative. It is designed to develop -- in cooperationwith private industry -- non-weapons jobs in the 10 Russian nuclearcities. Last September, I signed the Nuclear Cities Agreement withRussian Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov. Under this Initiative, weare planning projects such as:

-- establishing commercial software enterprises in the formerly secretnuclear cities of Sarov and Snezhinsk.

-- extending telecom links into these city centers and intoZheleznogorsk, our third focus city during FY 1999

-- and opening business centers in all three cities to spur commercialdevelopment.

As these cities gear up for commercial activities, businessopportunities will be created. But our progress cannot blunt the truthabout the serious challenges we face.

Since 1994, we have employed more than 4,000 scientists at about 170institutes and organizations throughout Russia and other NewlyIndependent States. This initiative has already attracted $38 millionin private investment. The Proliferation Prevention Program issuccessfully keeping Russian weapons scientist at home, instead ofselling their services to terrorists, criminal organizations or outlawstates.

The New York Times in an editorial Friday (February 26) saidWashington should press ahead with its efforts to re-employ Russianweapon scientists in civilian work. It is critical that we continuethese programs.

I agree.

Let me describe one final Russia-related program in the area ofprevention -- our program to counter the smuggling of nuclearmaterials.

Along with our work to account for and protect highly enriched uraniumand plutonium stockpiles, we are stepping up efforts to stop nuclearsmuggling.

Through a program established years ago, the Department routinelyprovides technical and analytical support to the law enforcement,diplomatic, and intelligence communities for assessing black marketnuclear transactions. We believe DOE has the world's mostcomprehensive database of global nuclear materials traffickingincidents and information.

Since the first "sales" case came to our attention in 1978, DOEassessors have worked more than 525 black market cases, from attemptedsales and buys to reported thefts.

While the overwhelming majority of these incidents involve scamsperpetrated by con-artists and opportunists, we must be on guardagainst any appearance of genuine plutonium and highly enricheduranium on the black market and any attempt to buy it by terroristorganizations or states.

DOE labs are already involved in programs to beef up efforts to thwartblack market nuclear smuggling among law enforcement agencies offormer Soviet and Eastern European nations. By next year, more than200 border enforcement officials from 12 of these countries will havecompleted anti-proliferation training under the "Joint InternationalBorder Security Program" with the U.S. Customs Service and theDepartment of Defense. By 2002, we expect to have trained and providedspecialized equipment to officials from all former Soviet and EasternEuropean countries.

Among the innovations our remarkable national laboratories have madein the field of detection is a nuclear materials detection devicesimilar to a beeper. When it goes off, however, it is not your bosschecking in or your spouse asking you to pick up a pizza on the wayhome. This tiny, hand-held device indicates the presence of radiation.It is already in use among law enforcement officers fighting nuclearsmuggling here and in Europe.

Last summer, Bulgarian border officials seized nuclear productionequipment headed for Iran. They credited their success to theirDepartment of Energy-developed training and equipment. Today, portabledetection technologies devised by DOE labs are being used in Poland,Lithuania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Within the next year,systems will be deployed in Bulgaria, Romania, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Hungary.

We are hopeful that nations once behind the Iron Curtain will now forma barrier to any nuclear terror spreading from Central Europe.

President Clinton has frequently stated that we now face no greaterthreat than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As theseweapons spread the danger grows that someday they will be used. Wemust continue our struggle to keep that future from coming to pass.

That is why the Clinton-Gore administration and we at the Departmentare urging the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty thisyear.

Ratification is essential. Without it, we lose one of the mostimportant tools available to us for constraining the development ofmore advanced nuclear weapons, and limiting the spread of nuclearweapons to new states.

Failure to ratify will erode our ability as a nation to lead innon-proliferation matters. We will not be eligible to join with othernations later this year to discuss ways to enforce the Treaty. Thefailure to act would reduce -- not increase -- our national security.

I have told you of ways DOE is working to prevent the spread ofweapons of mass destruction. Now I will tell you what we are doing todetect the development of these weapons of terror at the earliestpossible stage.

Detecting Proliferation

Detecting the proliferation of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities isan increasingly daunting task. A number of countries are seeking toacquire nuclear weapons. These nations and organizations take greatpains to elude detection. For example, we are concerned about anunderground facility at Kumchang-Ni in North Korea that could beintended for use as a nuclear facility.

CIA Director George Tenet said in recent Congressional testimony that,quoting now, "U.S. intelligence is increasing its emphasis andresources on many of these issues, but ... there is a continued andgrowing risk of surprise."

The challenge is to detect and understand the threats posed by weaponsof mass destruction at the earliest stage of development, to guidediplomatic actions and, if necessary, a military response. We mustalso deter the use of such weapons by being able to trace a weapon toits source before its use. Or, God forbid, after its use.

The Department of Energy laboratories are the nation's repository ofexpertise on nuclear weapons design and production. For more than 50years, the nation has tapped this resource in assessing foreignnuclear weapons programs. The labs have also supplied detectiontechnologies to monitor these programs.

Our technology will get even better. Because it must. Rogue countries,terrorists and the suppliers of the nuclear, biological, and chemicaltools of their trade are using increasingly sophisticated means toevade detection. Our methods and technology must outpace this growingthreat.

There is no simple solution to this problem, and DOE alone cannotsolve it. But through advances in technology and analysis techniques,we can make a quantum leap in our ability to detect and understandthese threats. Within the next 12 months, I challenge our labs, incooperation with our interagency partners, to identify technicalbreakthroughs which, if successful, will revolutionize ourproliferation detection capabilities. I am not seeking baby steps butgiant strides. I am seeking ten-fold to hundred-fold improvements inperformance by the year 2005.

Detecting nuclear weapons requires not only better technology, butalso better ways of interpreting the information that is gathered. DOElabs now analyze information about proliferation from a variety ofdifferent sources without systematic coordination with other labs. Ourlabs can provide the best capability in the country for analyzinginformation on nuclear proliferation. To fulfill this potential, theymust work together as a unit. We must form a network to harness thepowerful tools, of knowledge and information available in our nationallaboratories.

Therefore, today I am also directing our national labs to form aNuclear Proliferation Data Exploitation Center. I want them to focustheir expertise in nuclear-related design, production and technologyin a joint effort to develop new tools and methods in the study ofnuclear proliferation. I expect this Center to provide rapid,first-rate scientific support to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Toensure this, I am pulling together an interagency steering group tohelp guide its formation.

Reversing

It is not enough to be able to detect nuclear proliferation as itstarts. We must also continue to reduce the number of our nuclearweapons, and the nuclear materials from which those weapons are made.

The Energy Department is advancing global arms control by carrying outnuclear reductions of historic proportions. We have already dismantledmore than 11,000 nuclear weapons. And if we meet the President's goalof further reductions under the START III framework, we will havedrawn down our deployed arsenal by 80 percent compared to its Cold Warpeak. The next level in strategic arms reductions calls for warheadsthemselves to be eliminated in cooperation with our Russian partners.

The challenge will not end once these weapons are taken apart. In someways it is just beginning. We must dispose of the excess nuclearmaterial harvested from that process, to neutralize it, to keep it outof the hands of nations, groups or individuals with an agenda ofterror and destruction.

And while securing nuclear materials in place itself boosts globalsecurity, our mission in Russia goes beyond that. Excess materials inthe United States and Russia must be disposed of lest they fall intothe wrong hands. Congress, too, recognizes the urgency of thismission, and appropriated $525 million in emergency funding this yearto help speed up our efforts to dispose of plutonium and highlyenriched uranium (HEU).

The U.S. is beginning to blend down its surplus highly enricheduranium for peaceful use in commercial reactor fuel and we are pushingan agreement with Russia to buy 500 metric tons of their HEU. Alreadythrough this agreement, 36 tons of such Russian uranium has beenblended down and delivered to America for use as reactor fuel. Thinkabout it: enough nuclear material for over 2,500 nuclear weapons hasbeen transferred from one former mortal enemy to another.

Disposing of plutonium is much more complicated -- but we're makingprogress. We have reached understandings with Russia on the basics ofa mutual effort to dispose of up to 50 tons of weapons plutonium.Within the next three years we will begin constructing the U.S.facilities needed to achieve this mission. We recognize that Russiacannot address this problem alone. We are working with the G-8countries and others to find ways to support Russia's plutoniumdisposal effort, and are collaborating with Russian scientists tocreate and implement a technology road map for the Russian program.

Responding

Let me turn now to some of the work we are doing to respond to thepossible use of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. You may befamiliar with our long-established program to respond to nuclearemergencies. Today, I want to describe our work to respond to thechemical and biological threat.

Chemical and biological weapons pose a particularly insidious danger.They are relatively easy to produce. They can be deadly in small dosesover large areas. They can be delivered anonymously by simple means.There may be no warning that a population has been exposed to abiological attack until victims turn up in emergency rooms days later.

To respond to this threat we must draw on our best scientific andtechnological expertise. At the Department of Energy we are engagingour laboratories in an aggressive effort to help with this urgentfight by developing the next generation of chemical and biologicaldetection systems.

Right now, detecting the presence of a chem-bio agent can take dayswith equipment that fills a room in a laboratory. Our DOE labs havejust developed an instrument the size of a suitcase that can detect abiological agent within hours by decoding its DNA. This giant leapforward essentially brings our labs into the field.

But we can't stop there. Within three years, I want our labs todevelop biological agent detectors small enough to fit into the handof a fireman or a cop that tells within seconds if a chem-bio agent ispresent. And what kind of agent it is, such as whether it is anthraxor a plague virus.

The fast detection of the release of a dangerous agent could turn amedical nightmare into a manageable problem. With the right detectiontools, health and safety officials can act quickly to treat victimsand protect others from exposure.

There's more: I have challenged our best and brightest in the nationallaboratories to develop, demonstrate and deliver the first phase of abiological detection system -- an integrated network of sensors andanalytical software -- that will help us protect critical assets suchas subway systems, or major events such as a Super Bowl or theOlympics. I've challenged our national laboratories to complete thisimportant system by 2002 -- in time to make it available for use atthe Olympics in Salt Lake City.

This will not be easy. Because of that, we must start immediately. Wehave a unique responsibility to temper this threat and defuse itsdangers. The Department of Energy is committed to fulfilling thisresponsibility. To support this urgent mission, I have requested anincrease in funds of nearly 70 percent for our chem-bio defenseefforts next year -- raising our total request to $32 million in FY2000 for this critical work.

For the second half of this century, human kind has lived under theshadow of nuclear war. That shadow has deepened with the advent ofsophisticated biological and chemical weapons.

At the dawn of the atomic age more than 50 years ago, Americanstatesman Bernard Baruch, spoke of a life-and-death challenge wecontinue to face as we enter a new century:

"Science has torn from nature a secret so vast that our minds cowerfrom the terror it creates ... For each new weapon a defense has beenproduced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequatedefense does not exist. Science, which gave us this dread power, showsthat it can be made a giant help to humanity, but science does notshow us how to prevent its baleful use."

I am here today to say that the Department of Energy and its labs canprovide that help to humanity. I am challenging the Department ofEnergy and our scientific resources to help devise a more adequatedefense to these dreaded new weapons -- the number one threat toAmerica's national security.