I also feel a special interest to be at the Diplomatic Academy. I wrotemy Masters thesis on the profile of the Soviet diplomatic service, so Iam very interested to be at this particular historic building.

I was surprised to learn that I am one of only a very few women everto address this venerable institution, and I trust that if I earn passingmarks from you this morning, I will not be the last.

It has been a decade now since the Cold War ended. That no longer seemslike only yesterday. To the contrary, enough time has passed for the shapeof the post-Cold War world to have become clearer: new realities, new problems,new opportunities. A world ever less defined by being "post"-anything;a new era in its own right.

I was particularly struck by this a few days ago in Davos, where Iparticipatedin the meetings of the World Economic Forum. Here were gathered many ofthe world's leading political, corporate and intellectual figures -- aglobalized international society on display. And, by the way, I heard lotsof Russian being spoken in the corridors.

Foreign and economic policy discussions blended together seamlessly.Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and I actually shared the same platform,talking about each other's issues. This kind of joint public discussionby foreign and finance ministers would have been hard to imagine in pasteras.

And my colleague made a mind-bending prediction -- that two centuriesfrom now, historians will view the Cold War's end as only the second mostimportant event of the late 20th Century. The first, in his view, beingthe explosion of economic growth across borders and around the
world.

To many of the high-tech participants, it seemed that internationalborders hardly mattered. Their cyberspace realm is inherently global, andthe Internet on which they do business is inherently democratic anddecentralized.

This is the kind of world that might even be called "multipolar" – aterm with which you are here in Russia, very familiar, I know. On thismultipolar stage, the actors are advancing not only national goals, butalso corporate, individual, and organizational agendas based on economicand other interests.

Now I've heard it said -- sometimes in Russia -- that the strategy ofthe United States is to establish and enforce a "unipolar" world. But it'shard to pay attention to the trends and forces of globalization withoutobserving the many "poles" that affect the way the world now works.

This is unprecedented. And from the American perspective, it's a positiveand welcome development.

Of course, if advocates of a multipolar world envision a 19th Centuryrather than a 21st Century way of conducting our affairs, then we do havea disagreement. The issue is whether the "poles" that give the world itsstructure are in conflict or work in concert. The latter -- a multipolarworld of diversity and creativity among cultures, nations, and economies-- is the world we believe we can build, one that will enrich our lives,and thrives on habits of peace and creative competition.

In this new world, governments may not be the sole or even the dominantforces in international relations that we once took for granted. And yetthey continue to have special responsibilities. Because many of the positivetrends on which globalization is based -- maintaining the peace; strengtheningdemocratic institutions; preserving an open international economic order-- depend on how well governments meet their responsibilities.

Likewise, some of today's most worrisome international trends are inpart a consequence of the difficulties governments face in finding theright strategies for dealing with them. Our Attorney General, Janet Reno,who visited here in October, has noted that in dealing with internationalorganized crime, we are still heavily reliant on national tools.

Pessimists about this new world argue that many of the positive trendsI mentioned will in fact break down, because states face too many conflictinginterests and too many irreparable rivalries to be able to cooperate evenagainst problems that threaten them jointly.

Now, I do not agree with that defeatist assessment. And I'd like toexplain why I believe we must not -- and ultimately will not – allow itto define the relationship between Russia and the United States.

I'm convinced that America and Russia have enough major interests incommon to surmount our disagreements and work together in dealing withthe biggest dangers and opportunities we face in the new century.

As we look ahead to the first years of this new century, I hope thatthis is the practical approach we will bring to bear on three key setsof issues: nonproliferation; arms control; and regional stability.

As to the first, the convergence of interests is clear. The Cold War'send lessened one great danger, but spawned others. One is that the internationalarms dealers and shady middlemen would seek ways to sell nuclear materials,technology or expertise to dangerous clients.

This has placed enormous pressure on all governments to enact and enforcea strict, modern system of export controls. Russia's new export controlregime -- on paper -- is a solid start. But far more needs to be done toaddress this serious problem -- a commitment at all levels to betterimplementation,better enforcement, better control of exports.

The logic of cooperation here is powerful. For in the parlance of ourmainstream media, both of our countries share an interest in preventingany nukes from becoming "loose nukes."

We both have an interest in preventing the spread of nuclear andballistic-missilecapabilities in the Middle East, and the same is true on the Korean Peninsulaand elsewhere.

We both have an interest in eliminating the deadly stockpiles of chemicalweapons that remain on Russian and U.S. soil.

We both have an interest in an NPT Review Conference this April thatmakes this bedrock treaty a stronger instrument than ever against the spreadof nuclear arms.

We both have an interest in walking India and Pakistan back from thenuclear precipice, and in reinforcing the global norms that were challengedby those countries' nuclear blasts.

We both have an interest in bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treatyinto force, and in maintaining our respective moratoria on testing untilwe do.

And that list could go on; the logic is compelling. Russia and the UnitedStates have a host of powerful reasons to work together to prevent thespread of mass weapons and missiles that can carry them. On many issues,we've done so and if we continue to do so, we will make a major contributionto the security of both countries. But it will be a troubling sign thatwe see the world in very different ways if we don't.

Even the most assiduous nonproliferation efforts will not be perfect.That reality obliges us also to consider how we respond to the emergenceof new weapons capabilities.

Here we must begin by acknowledging that the strategic environment haschanged greatly over the past quarter-century. And we know that technologyrequired to launch longer-range missiles is spreading despite our bestefforts to stop it.

The U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals provide overwhelming deterrenceagainst direct attack by any rational adversary. The problem is how todeal with threats from sources that are neither rational nor interestedin complying with global norms.

And that's why discussion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treatyand America's plans for a National Missile Defense have figured prominentlyin my meetings here.

An American decision on deploying a limited National Missile Defensesystem - and let me stress the word "limited" -- could be made as earlyas this summer. It has not yet been made. But for deployment to occur underthe ABM Treaty, certain changes would be necessary, and we've been discussingthese changes with Congress, our allies and with you.

Not long ago, a Russian defense official declared that your nation hasthe ability to overwhelm the missile defense system we are planning. Andthat's true -- and part of our point.

The changes we are contemplating in the ABM Treaty are modest. Theysimply would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent, and we don'tseek to do so. And because Russia and the United States are vulnerableto the same threats -- even if we sometimes perceive them differently --we are prepared to cooperate with your government on missile defense.

In response, I hope Russia will do more than just say "Nyet." It isin our mutual interest to find a way to preserve the essential deterrentstructure of the ABM Treaty, while responding to the new dangers we bothface.

One reason is the historic opportunity we have today to make furtherreductions in strategic arsenals. Almost three years ago, Presidents Clintonand Yeltsin agreed on the outlines of a START III Treaty that would cutour arsenals by 80 percent from their Cold War peaks. This was one of thesubjects I discussed in this visit to Moscow also.

And I hope we succeed, for such a treaty would be in both our nations'interests. It would make us safer by maintaining parity at lower levels.Moreover, nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain and safeguard. Andwe should find ways openly to destroy and dispose of every one we don'tneed.

This brings me to a third set of problems and interests common to bothour countries: potential instabilities in the Balkans, the Middle East,the Caucasus and Central Asia. In each, the sources are similar: ethnichatred, fanaticism, economic hopelessness and too little democracy. Andthe tensions they spawn create fertile breeding grounds for many formsof organized thuggery -- from trafficking in drugs and guns and women,to outright terrorism.

In avoiding such developments, U.S. and Russian interests clearly coincide.We both have a clear stake in stability in Kosovo; in a Middle East transformedby peace; and in a lasting settlement of the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.In each of these areas, Russia and the United States have worked togetherto seek sound solutions.

Once, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East seemed all but unthinkable,in part because the United States and Russia were adversaries. Almost thirtyyears ago, we came all too close to war in this region. Yesterday, ForeignMinister Ivanov and I co-hosted a Multilateral Steering Group Ministerial.And our cooperation was easy, and we succeeded, because our interests coincide.

In Kosovo, we had very strong disagreements but our nations knew theyhad an interest in ending conflict and ushering in an era of stabilityin the Balkans. And today, our soldiers serve alongside one another togive peace the best possible chance.

On the diplomatic front, our two governments have been working throughthe OSCE Minsk Group to find a lasting solution to the very difficult problemof Nagorno-Karabakh. And with our help, the leaders there have made someprogress.

Now such cooperation illustrates how the United States and Russia canalso work together with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.These sovereign states face the quadruple challenge of protecting theirindependence, creating modern political institutions, building prosperity,and maintaining stability. The fact that many of them border on a regionto the south that has been an exporter of extremism and terror adds tothe challenges they face.

Russia and the United States have much to gain, and nothing to lose,from the success of the strategies that these states have chosen. Thesecountries believe they need access to international markets for their exports,especially energy and natural resources; and they want to be a part ofthe international institutions like the WTO and the OSCE; and they seeknormal, mutually beneficial relations with their neighbors.

In summary, in each of the vital policy areas that I have just discussed,Russia and the United States have common interests. And this means thatthere is a basis for true cooperation in each, even if differences seemat times to occupy center stage.

And that's why our disagreement over Chechnya is so troubling. No onequestions Russia's responsibility and even obligation to combat insurgencyand terror within its borders. But the world increasingly has questioneddoing so at such a high cost in innocent human lives and suffering, andsuch a high cost to Russia's international standing.

These tactics will not set the stage for building a peaceful, prosperousChechnya within the Russian Federation. Only a political resolution ofthe conflict will do that. As long as the fighting continues, it will serveas a magnet for extremism that could one day risk the stability of theentire region.

The Middle East peace process that we've so successfully advanced herein Moscow carries a powerful lesson. A commitment to political solutionsempowers peacemakers. Military operations encourage the extremists.

The Russia that chooses to pursue the political solution is the Russiathat we hope to work with well into the 21st Century. This is a secureRussia with strong political institutions; a rock of stability in Europeand Asia; an engine of prosperity in the global economy; a vibrant andvaried contributor to a multilateral world; and a source of inspirationto all who admire Russia's remarkable culture and history and believe inthe power of human beings to change their individual and collective destinies.

These may seem like dreams. But I am speaking to you of interests. Forit is this Russia which will benefit most in world markets and internationalinstitutions.

And it is this Russia with which the United States can work most effectivelyto meet the many challenges that confront both our nations.

Thank you very much. And in this wonderful setting I look forward tohaving some very good questions and, hopefully, good answers.

QUESTION: I'm (name inaudible) of the Diplomatic Academy. Firstof all, I'd like to thank you for a very deep and solid analysis of diplomaticrelations in the 21st Century, of American foreign policy and Russian-Americanrelations. And, from now on, most definitely I'll be advocating invitingyou here. (inaudible) ...prestigious speakers and professors. I'm so impressed.And my question is not about today, but about a man. His name is (inaudible),Professor (name inaudible). He had an office in our Academy for four years.He trained our diplomats. He conducted seminars and he developed his theory(inaudible) ...of civilizations. And, I'd like to know if you've heardabout this theory which essentially is quite different from what you justsaid in your speech this morning. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you. Well, I know (name inaudible)very well and we actually worked together at the National Security Councilin the Carter Administration, and obviously as fellow professors who haveseen each other in various academic settings, and I have always been impressedby the rigor of his thinking while not always agreeing with his conclusions.I think that while it is possible that if not mitigated there could bea clash of civilizations. Because many of them, the three basically (inaudible)...or operate in a different way while maybe having basically the sameideals, but come at them in a different way. And if there is to be a clashof civilizations we have to avoid it. I think that is my major differencewith him because to me a clash of civilizations would bring all hope fora peaceful 21st Century to nothing. And instead what we're seeing and Ithink my initial comments about globalization would indicate this is an
interaction of the civilizations.

What I found so interesting at Davos, because it's the most recent exampleand it's so visible, were the number of people that were there from thevarious civilizations. And, their desire to be a part of a whole new wayof communicating. I have to admit fully that I don't yet know how to communicatethat way. I think the older you are the less you know. And, especiallyon that subject. But the whole way that we are forced to deal with eachother on issues that are common problems such as drugs, or terror orenvironmentalissues or health requires civilizations to cooperate and not compete. Andthat requires us all to know much more about each civilization rather thanstereotyping and I think that's the problem. The more you talk about aclash of
civilizations, the more likely it is that there will be stereotyping.And just let me take an example of something.

Obviously, people are waiting to see what happens between the UnitedStates and Iran. And what in fact has been happening is that with the electionof President Khatami, we have very closely watched, first of all who electedhim, how they are operating within their society and the kinds of messagesthat are coming to us in strange ways – of interviews that President Khatamigives. We respond by speeches. And we are actually seeking to have an opengovernment-to-government dialogue if in fact they stop supporting terrorism,stop trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and support the MiddleEast peace process. And with the elections in February of the Majlis...(inaudible)...wemay see more. So we are trying very hard to understand that clash ofcivilizationsis unnecessary and counter-productive and less likely, given all thecommunicationsand interaction societies now have.

QUESTION: (In Russian, not translated)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think you've asked a very thoughtful anddifficult question. What it really comes down to, if I can simplify ita little bit into the question of whether the U.S. is practicing culturalhegemonism in some ways, and whether the fact that countries have a particularculture and then others have another culture. And how they influence eachother. I believe that what we're going through internationally now is basicallytwo not only conflicting but self-supporting phenomenon. One is theglobalizationwhich we all know puts us all into the same pot where we have the samekinds of information; we're now given increased technology; the same musiccan be heard all over the world; the same food can be eaten everywhere;and as I drive around Moscow I see as many ads for Western products asI do in New York. And so there is this sense of homogenization. But atthe same time, I think there is a counter-aspect to this which is thatas you are part of a larger whole, you seek your inner identity. And, youlook to see what makes you special, either as Russians or French or Chinese.And so there is a drawing inside and therefore a greater emphasis on individualculture. And taken to its extreme it leads to ethnic strife because whatit means is that your pride in yourself turns into hatred of somebody whois not like you.

I believe that what has to happen here is not a sense that, for instance,the United States is trying to dominate everybody's culture. It is a matterof choice. People are choosing some of the things that we have and thatwe discussed. Basically, because they see that as useful products addedto their lives and it adds to their well-being. And, no one can imposea different culture on somebody else and there is a complete paradox. Youcan't impose democracy. Democracy is something that is chosen. You can'timpose free markets. That is something that is chosen.

I happen to believe that we're moving into a world in which we haveto accept the globalization and understand the importance of what I wouldcall cultural autonomy -- the right of people to obviously reserve everythingthat they have for themselves. But I will use your question basically tomake very clear to Russian listeners that the United States didn't chooseto be the sole superpower. The United States believes that it has certainresponsibilities. We have the largest economy in the world. We try to shareit. And we do not, I don't believe, try to dominate it. What has happenedis that people like a lot of what American has to offer and they take it.But, that doesn't mean that Americans don't respect other people's culturesand in fact, one more point, we have not made it a point, as part of ourdiplomacy to ... (tape ends)

QUESTION: (tape continues) (in Russian, not translated)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: That's a whole vocabulary. I didn't understandin Russian. (laughter)

Let me say that without talking about your specific examples, that Ibelieve, on the contrary, that there is a much greater interest by publicofficials in various aspects of the environment. What is hard is that thereare major differences among the countries about how to treat the environment.And it has to do a lot, I think, with differences between the developedand developing countries. I think the more highly developed countries beingfully aware of the fact that we bear a major part of the responsibilityfor having undermined the sanctity of the environment and having discoveredways that the environment can be protected, are now trying to put in standardsfor environmental protection that the less developed countries believeare threatening their economic development. Because they looked at thepattern that we all followed throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries andbelieve that our use of fuels and various methods of industrializationis what got us where we are. So they want to follow the same route. Sowhen we say through the, for instance, the Climate Control negotiations,that there ought to be different approaches to how different levels ofcarbon dioxide and various other things to do with global warming, thatthey need to be limited, they think we're trying to limit their growth.

President Clinton, I think, speaks with the greatest passion about thefact that when he says to countries, we are not trying to slow your growthand we can show that you can grow your economy by being environmentallyconscious, he wants to make so clear that we're not trying to keep anybodydown. That it is possible to take from our lessons and leap-frog over allthe mistakes that have been made. And I believe, actually, that the ClintonAdministration has been the most environmentally conscious actually probablysince the beginning of the 20th Century when President Roosevelt, TheodoreRoosevelt, was environmentally conscious and President Clinton has justturned over more land for parks than anybody else.

So, I believe by making environment and environmental protection aninternational relations issue and a matter of foreign policy, and not somethingthat only green people do, is very important and we consider environmentaldegradation one of the threats that we deal with at the State Departmentas a foreign policy issue.

QUESTION: (In Russian, not translated)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Obviously, we do. I think that every country.. . it is the responsibility of every country to promote its products.And, we believe that it is important for American businesses to have accessto countries across the board. But, nobody has to buy them. Nobody hasto choose to have them. And I think that we do promote American business.

And another reason we promote American business and I've just been meetingwith American business people, is, I believe, and you can accuse me ofbeing a chauvinist but I believe that American businesses have excellentbusiness practices that they bring with them. They have a particular waythat they treat their workers, they provide health benefits and retirementbenefits. And I think that, and other good business practices in termsof transparencies, American businesses are prohibited from bribery to getcontracts. And so in many ways I consider American businesses a part ofshowing a good side of America. And finally another thing is when Americanbusiness comes into a country and finds that the investment climate is,... frankly it promotes a good investment and business climate within thecountry itself. It adds financial credibility and helps with basicallyputting a country on the map in terms of its financial status.

But, I know that it's interesting, you know, that people, ... this isa matter of choice for people. You don't have to go McDonalds. And I thinkthat as I have understood it people think it's an interesting variety andthey go there. And the basis of what's happening now and I hope will happenfurther in Russia, is that you will be able to do everything that you wantby choice. That is what's happened in the last ten years. If you don'twant to buy American products, don't buy them. But if you want to haveaccess to American products, then you ought to have the right to have accessto them. And not be limited from having them.

I meant to tell you what's very interesting. First of all, I feel oftenfreer to say things because I'm not a born American. I was born inCzechoslovakia.And so I have a sense about America maybe that a born American doesn'thave. And that is that it is a country that is based on the whole issueof individuality and freedom of choice. That is not an imperial power.That has not conquered territory in order to acquire to keep it. That doesnot try to impose democracy that tries to present it as an option.

At this stage, at the 21st Century, there is no question that for avariety of reasons America is a dominant power. It has happened becauseof a term that you all used to use in correlation with (inaudible) ...We are not there in many ways by our own choice. And the thing that theUnited States would like the most, believe me, is to have strong partnersto be able to share the burden of dealing with a world that faces not somuch a clash of civilizations but instability created by a variety of factorsthat impinge upon all of us and with a whole host of new global threatsthat are entirely different. In addition to the environment there are allkinds of cross-border problems such as drugs and terrorism, gun smuggling,a whole series of issues which a country no matter how powerful, cannotdeal with alone.

And so what the United States is seeking, and I as the chief foreignpolicymaker in the United States, am seeking, is partners, not dominance.Partnership. And therefore, we're not frightened by words likemulti-(inaudible).You're shaking your head. Shaking your head. But believe me, I do it. Weare trying to find partners. And we need strong partners who also desirestability. Who believe in the independence of other countries, and whowant to participate in a 21st Century world in which differences are respected,in which borders become less important while territorial integrity is respected;and where we are free to share each other's cultures. And I know we'regoing through kind of a strange period in terms of U.S.-Russian relations,but I hope very much we get through it. Because for me and I've spent myentire life studying Russia, I think that we have an opportunity of suchunparalled proportions to work together on common problems, keep our identityand help move the world into a healthier 21st century.