Bill Language

DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROVISIONS

TITLE III--ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subtitle B--Russian and Ukrainian Business Management Education

SEC. 421. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this subtitle is to establish a training program inRussia and Ukraine for nationals of those countries to obtain skills inbusiness administration, accounting, and marketing, with special emphasison instruction in business ethics and in the basic terminology, techniques,and practices of those disciplines, to achieve international standardsof quality, transparency, and competitiveness.

SEC. 422. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:

(1) Distance learning: The term `distance learning' means training throughcomputers, interactive videos, teleconferencing, and videoconferencingbetween and among students and teachers.
(2) Eligible enterprise: The term `eligible enterprise' means--

(A) in the case of Russia--

(i) a business concern operating in Russia that employs Russiannationals in Russia; or
(ii) a private enterprise that is being formed or operated by formerofficers of the Russian armed forces in Russia; and

(B) in the case of Ukraine--

(i) a business concern operating in Ukraine that employs Ukrainiannationals in Ukraine; or
(ii) a private enterprise that is being formed or operated by formerofficers of the Ukrainian armed forces in Ukraine.

(A) Russia in the case of any eligible enterprise operatingin Russia that receives technical assistance under the program; or
(B) Ukraine in the case of any eligible enterprise operating in Ukrainethat receives technical assistance under the program.

SEC. 423. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAINING PROGRAM AND INTERNSHIPS.
(a) Training Program:

(1) In general: The President is authorized to establish aprogram of technical assistance to provide the training described in section421 to eligible enterprises.
(2) Implementation: Training shall be carried out by United Statesnationals having expertise in business administration, accounting, andmarketing or by eligible nationals who have been trained under the program.Such training may be carried out--

(A) in the offices of eligible enterprises, at business schoolsor institutes, or at other locations in the program country, includingfacilities of the armed forces of the program country, educational institutions,or in the offices of trade or industry associations, with special considerationgiven to locations where similar training opportunities are limited ornonexistent; or
(B) by `distance learning' programs originating in the United Statesor in European branches of United States institutions.

SEC. 424. APPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
(a) Procedures:

(1) In general: Each eligible enterprise that desires to receivetraining for its employees and managers under this subtitle shall submitan application to the clearinghouse under subsection (c), at such time,in such manner, and accompanied by such additional information as may reasonablybe required.
(2) Joint applications: A consortium of eligible enterprises may filea joint application under the provisions of paragraph (1).

(1) is for an individual or individuals employed in an eligibleenterprise or enterprises applying under the program;
(2) describes the level of training for which assistance under thissubtitle is sought;
(3) provides evidence that the eligible enterprise meets the generalpolicies adopted for the administration of this subtitle;
(4) provides assurances that the eligible enterprise will pay a shareof the costs of the training, which share may include in-kind contributions;and
(5) provides such additional assurances as are determined to be essentialto ensure compliance with the requirements of this subtitle.

SEC. 425. RESTRICTIONS NOT APPLICABLE.
Prohibitions on the use of foreign assistance funds for assistancefor the Russian Federation or for Ukraine shall not apply with respectto the funds made available to carry out this subtitle.

SEC. 426. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General: There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000for the fiscal year 2000 and $10,000,000 for the fiscal year 2001 to carryout this subtitle.
(b) Availability of Funds: Amounts appropriated under subsection (a)are authorized to remain available until expended.
 

DIVISION B--ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVISIONS

SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the `Arms Control, Nonproliferation,and Security Assistance Act of 1999'.

TITLE XI--ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION

SEC. 1101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the `Arms Control and Nonproliferation Actof 1999'.

SEC. 1102. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:

(1) Appropriate committees of congress: The term `appropriate committeesof Congress' means the Committee on International Relations and the PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and theCommittee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligenceof the Senate.
(2) Assistant secretary: The term `Assistant Secretary' means the positionof Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance designatedunder section 1112.
(3) Executive agency: The term `Executive agency' has the meaning giventhe term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.
(4) Intelligence community: The term `intelligence community' has themeaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(5) START treaty or treaty: The term `START Treaty' or `Treaty' meansthe Treaty With the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reductionand Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, including all agreed statements,annexes, protocols, and memoranda, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991.
(6) START ii treaty: The term `START II Treaty' means the Treaty Betweenthe United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reductionand Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and related protocols and memorandumof understanding, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993.

Subtitle A--Arms Control

CHAPTER 1--EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 1111. KEY VERIFICATION ASSETS FUND.
(a) In General: The Secretary of State is authorized to transfer fundsavailable to the Department of State under this section to the Departmentof Defense, the Department of Energy, or any agency, entity, or componentof the intelligence community, as needed, for retaining, researching, developing,or acquiring technologies or programs relating to the verification of armscontrol, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments.
(b) Prohibition on Reprogramming: Notwithstanding any other provisionof law, funds made available to carry out this section may not be usedfor any purpose other than the purposes specified in subsection (a).
(c) Funding: Of the total amount of funds authorized to be appropriatedto the Department of State by this Act for the fiscal years 2000 and 2001,$5,000,000 is authorized to be available for each such fiscal year to carryout subsection (a).
(d) Designation of Fund: Amounts made available under subsection (c)may be referred to as the `Key Verification Assets Fund'.

SEC. 1112. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE.
(a) Designation of Position: The Secretary of State shall designateone of the Assistant Secretaries of State authorized by section 1(c)(1)of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)(1))as the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance. TheAssistant Secretary shall report to the Under Secretary of State for ArmsControl and International Security.
(b) Directive Governing the Assistant Secretary of State:

(1) In general: Not later than 30 days after the date of enactmentof this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue a directive governing theposition of the Assistant Secretary.
(2) Elements of the directive: The directive issued under paragraph(1) shall set forth, consistent with this section--

(A) the duties of the Assistant Secretary;
(B) the relationships between the Assistant Secretary and other officialsof the Department of State;
(C) any delegation of authority from the Secretary of State to theAssistant Secretary; and
(D) such matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(1) In general: The Assistant Secretary shall have as his principalresponsibility the overall supervision (including oversight of policy andresources) within the Department of State of all matters relating to verificationand compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmamentagreements or commitments.
(2) Participation of the assistant secretary:

(A) Primary role: Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and(C), the Assistant Secretary, or his designee, shall participate in allinteragency groups or organizations within the executive branch of Governmentthat assess, analyze, or review United States planned or ongoing policies,programs, or actions that have a direct bearing on verification or compliancematters, including interagency intelligence committees concerned with thedevelopment or exploitation of measurement or signals intelligence or othernational technical means of verification.
(B) Requirement for designation: Subparagraph (A) shall not apply togroups or organizations on which the Secretary of State or the Undersecretaryof State for Arms Control and International Security sits, unless suchofficial designates the Assistant Secretary to attend in his stead.
(C) National security limitation:

(i) Waiver by president: The President may waive the provisionsof subparagraph (A) if inclusion of the Assistant Secretary would not bein the national security interests of the United States.
(ii) Waiver by others: With respect to an interagency group or organization,or meeting thereof, working with exceptionally sensitive information containedin compartments under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence,the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of Energy, such Director orSecretary, as the case may be, may waive the provision of subparagraph(A) if inclusion of the Assistant Secretary would not be in the nationalsecurity interests of the United States.
(iii) Transmission of waiver to congress: Any waiver of participationunder clause (i) or (ii) shall be transmitted in writing to the appropriatecommittees of Congress.

(3) Relationship to the intelligence community: The Assistant Secretaryshall be the principal policy community representative to the intelligencecommunity on verification and compliance matters.
(4) Reporting responsibilities: The Assistant Secretary shall haveresponsibility within the Department of State for--

(A) all reports required pursuant to section 306 of the ArmsControl and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577);
(B) so much of the report required under paragraphs (4) through (6)of section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)(4)through (6)) as relates to verification or compliance matters; and
(C) other reports being prepared by the Department of State as of thedate of enactment of this Act relating to arms control, nonproliferation,or disarmament verification or compliance matters.

SEC. 1113. ENHANCED ANNUAL (`PELL') REPORT.
(a) Annual Report: Section 403(a) of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (4)--

(A) by inserting `or commitments, including the Missile TechnologyControl Regime,' after `agreements' the first time it appears;
(B) by inserting `or commitments' after `agreements' the second timeit appears;
(C) by inserting `or commitment' after `agreement'; and
(D) by striking `and' at the end;

`(6) a specific identification, to the maximum extent practicable inunclassified form, of each and every question that exists with respectto compliance by other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, anddisarmament agreements with the United States.'.

(b) Additional Requirement: Section 403 of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct (22 U.S.C. 2593a) is amended by adding at the end the following:

`(d) Each report required by this section shall include a discussionof each significant issue described in subsection (a)(6) that was containedin a previous report issued under this section during 1995, or after December31, 1995, until the question or concern has been resolved and such resolutionhas been reported in detail to the appropriate committees of Congress (asdefined in section 1102(1) of the Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, andSecurity Assistance Act of 1999).'.

SEC. 1114. REPORT ON START AND START II TREATIES MONITORING ISSUES.
(a) Report: Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment ofthis Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriatecommittees of Congress a detailed report in classified form. Such reportshall include the following:

(1) A comprehensive identification of all monitoring activitiesassociated with the START Treaty and the START II Treaty.
(2) The specific intelligence community assets and capabilities, includinganalytical capabilities, that the Senate was informed, prior to the Senategiving its advice and consent to ratification of the treaties, would benecessary to accomplish those activities.
(3) An identification of the extent to which those assets and capabilitieshave, or have not, been attained or retained, and the corresponding effectthis has had upon United States monitoring confidence levels.
(4) An assessment of any Russian activities relating to the START Treatywhich have had an impact upon the ability of the United States to monitorRussian adherence to the Treaty.

SEC. 1115. STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION.
(a) Verification of Compliance: Section 306(a) of the Arms Controland Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577(a)) is amended in the matter precedingparagraph (1) by striking `adequately'.
(b) Assessments Upon Request: Section 306 of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct (22 U.S.C. 2577) is amended--

(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d) as subsections(c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

`(b) Assessments Upon Request: Upon the request of the chairman or rankingminority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate orthe Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives,in case of an arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament proposal presentedto a foreign country by the United States or presented to the United Statesby a foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to theCommittee on the degree to which elements of the proposal are capable ofbeing verified.'.

SEC. 1116. CONTRIBUTION TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SEISMOLOGY.
The United States Government shall, to the maximum extent practicable,make available to the public in real time, or as quickly as possible, allraw seismological data provided to the United States Government by anyinternational organization that is directly responsible for seismologicalmonitoring.

SEC. 1118. REQUIREMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL OF SUMMARIES.
Whenever a United States delegation engaging in negotiations on armscontrol, nonproliferation, or disarmament submits to the Secretary of Statea summary of the activities of the delegation or the status of those negotiations,a copy of each such summary shall be further transmitted by the Secretaryof State to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to theCommittee on International Relations of the House of Representatives promptly.
 

Subtitle B--Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safety, and Related Matters

SEC. 1131. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.
Section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C.3282(c)) is amended to read as follows:

`(c)(1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Departmentof Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Commission, and, with regardto subparagraph (B), the Director of Central Intelligence, shall keep theCommittees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs of the Senateand the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representativesfully and currently informed with respect to--
`(A) their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of thisAct and to otherwise prevent proliferation, including the proliferationof nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery;and
`(B) the current activities of foreign nations which are of significancefrom the proliferation standpoint.
`(2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to paragraph(1)(B), the phrase `fully and currently informed' means the transmittalof credible information not later than 60 days after becoming aware ofthe activity concerned.'.

SEC. 1132. EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES FOR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS.
(a) Prohibition: Except as provided in subsection (b), no assistancemay be provided by the United States Government to any person who is involvedin the research, development, design, testing, or evaluation of chemicalor biological weapons for offensive purposes.
(b) Exception: The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall notapply to any activity conducted pursuant to title V of the National SecurityAct of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).

SEC. 1133. DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL.
(a) Report on Reduction of the Stockpile: Not later than 120 days aftersigning an agreement between the United States and Russia for the dispositionof excess weapons plutonium, the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrenceof the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relationsand the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and to the Committeeon International Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Houseof Representatives a report--

(1) detailing plans for United States implementation of suchagreement;
(2) identifying, in classified form, the number of United States warhead`pits' of each type deemed `excess' for the purpose of dismantlement ordisposition; and
(3) describing any implications this may have for the Stockpile Stewardshipand Management Program.

(1) arrangements for the establishment of that facility willfurther United States nuclear nonproliferation objectives and will outweighthe proliferation risks inherent in the use of mixed oxide fuel elements;
(2) a guaranty has been given by Russia that no fuel elements produced,fabricated, reprocessed, or assembled at such facility, and no sensitivenuclear technology related to such facility, will be exported or suppliedby Russia to any country in the event that the United States objects tosuch export or supply; and
(3) a guaranty has been given by Russia that the facility and all nuclearmaterials and equipment therein, and any fuel elements or special nuclearmaterial produced, fabricated, reprocessed, or assembled at that facility,including fuel elements exported or supplied by Russia to a third party,will be subject to international monitoring and transparency sufficientto ensure that special nuclear material is not diverted.

(1) Produced: The terms `produce' and `produced' have the samemeaning that such terms are given under section 11 u. of the Atomic EnergyAct of 1954.
(2) Production facility: The term `production facility' has the samemeaning that such term is given under section 11 v. of the Atomic EnergyAct of 1954.
(3) Special nuclear material: The term `special nuclear material' hasthe meaning that such term is given under section 11 aa. Of the AtomicEnergy Act of 1954.

SEC. 1134. PROVISION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION TO CONGRESS.
(a) Requirement to Provide Information: The head of each departmentand agency described in section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationAct of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3282(c)) shall promptly provide information to thechairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relationsof the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the Houseof Representatives in meeting the requirements of subsection (c) or (d)of section 602 of such Act.
(b) Issuance of Directives: Not later than February 1, 2000, the Secretaryof State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretaryof Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of theNuclear Regulatory Commission shall issue directives, which shall provideaccess to information, including information contained in special accessprograms, to implement their responsibilities under subsections (c) and(d) of section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C.3282(c) and (d)). Copies of such directives shall be forwarded promptlyto the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee onInternational Relations of the House of Representatives upon the issuanceof the directives.

SEC. 1135. AMENDED NUCLEAR EXPORT REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 1523 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 112 Stat. 2180; 42 U.S.C. 2155note) is amended--
(1) by striking `Congress' and inserting `the Committee on ForeignRelations of the Senate and
the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives';and
(2) by adding at the end the following:

`(c) Content of Notification: The notification required pursuant tothis section shall include--
`(1) a detailed description of the articles or services to be exportedor reexported, including a brief description of the capabilities of anyarticle to be exported or reexported;
`(2) an estimate of the number of officers and employees of the UnitedStates Government and of United States Government civilian contract personnelexpected to be required in such country to carry out the proposed exportor reexport;
`(3) the name of each licensee expected to provide the article or serviceproposed to be sold and a description from the licensee of any offset agreementsproposed to be entered into in connection with such sale (if known on thedate of transmittal of such statement);
`(4) the projected delivery dates of the articles or services to beexported or reexported; and
`(5) the extent to which the recipient country in the previous twoyears has engaged in any of the actions specified in subparagraph (A),(B), or (C) of section 129(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

SEC. 1136. ADHERENCE TO THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.
(a) Clarification of Requirement for Control: Section 74 of the ArmsExport Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c) is amended--
(1) by inserting `(a) In General: ' before `For purposes of'; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:

`(b) International Understanding Defined: For purposes of subsection(a)(3), as it relates to any international understanding concluded withthe United States after January 1, 2000, the term `international understanding'means -
`(1) any specific agreement by a country not to export, transfer, orotherwise engage in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology thatcontributes to the acquisition, design, development, or production of missilesin a country that is not an MTCR adherent and would be, if it were UnitedStates-origin equipment or technology, subject to the jurisdiction of theUnited States under this Act; or
`(2) any specific understanding by a country that, notwithstandingsection 73(b) of this Act, the United States retains the right to takethe actions under section 73(a)(2) of this Act in the case of any exportor transfer of any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes to theacquisition, design, development, or production of missiles in a countrythat is not an MTCR adherent and would be, if it were United States-originequipment or technology, subject to the jurisdiction of the United Statesunder this Act.'.

(b) Clarification of Applicability: Section 73(b) of the Arms ExportControl Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(b)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and(B), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs 2 ems to the right;
(2) by striking `Subsection (a)' and inserting the following:

`(1) In general: Except as provided in paragraph (2), subsection (a)';and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

`(2) Limitation: Notwithstanding paragraph (1), subsection (a) shallapply to an entity subordinate to a government that engages in exportsor transfers described in section 498A(b)(3)(A) of the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)(3)(A)).'.

(c) Enforcement Actions: Section 73(c) of the Arms Export Control Act(22 U.S.C. 2797b(c)) is amended by inserting before the period at the endthe following: `, and if the President certifies to the Committee on ForeignRelations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations ofthe House of Representatives that--

`(1) for any judicial or other enforcement action taken by the MTCRadherent, such action has--
`(A) been comprehensive; and
`(B) been performed to the satisfaction of the United States; and
`(2) with respect to any finding of innocence of wrongdoing, the UnitedStates is satisfied with the basis for such finding'.

(d) Policy Report: Section 73A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.2797b-1) is amended--
(1) by striking `Following any action' and inserting the following:

`(a) Policy Report: Following any action'; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

`(b) Intelligence Assessment Report: At such times that a report istransmitted pursuant to subsection (a), the Director of Central Intelligenceshall promptly prepare and submit to the Congress a separate report containingany
credible information indicating that the country described in subsection(a) has engaged in any activity identified under subparagraph (A), (B),or (C) of section 73(a)(1) within the previous two years.'.

(e) MTCR Defined: The term `MTCR' means the Missile Technology ControlRegime, as defined in section 74(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22U.S.C. 2797c(a)(2)).

SEC. 1137. AUTHORITY RELATING TO MTCR ADHERENTS.
Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797 et seq.) isamended by inserting after section 73A the following new section:

`SEC. 73B. AUTHORITY RELATING TO MTCR ADHERENTS.
`Notwithstanding section 73(b), the President may take the actionsunder section 73(a)(2) under the circumstances described in section 74(b)(2).'.

SEC. 1138. TRANSFER OF FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTERS INTHE FORMER SOVIET UNION.
(a) Authorization: For fiscal year 2001 and subsequent fiscal years,funds made available under `Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,and Related Programs' accounts in annual foreign operations appropriationsActs are authorized to be available for science and technology centersin the independent states of the former Soviet Union assisted under section503(a)(5) of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5853(a)(5)) or section1412(b)(5) of the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (titleXIV of Public Law 102-484; 22 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.), including the use ofthose and other funds by any Federal agency having expertise and programsrelated to the activities carried out by those centers, including the Departmentsof Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human Services and the EnvironmentalProtection Agency.
(b) Availability of Funds: Amounts made available under any provisionof law for the activities described in subsection (a) shall be availableuntil expended and may be used notwithstanding any other provision of law.

SEC. 1139. RESEARCH AND EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES BY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYCENTERS.
(a) In General: Support for science and technology centers in the independentstates of the former Soviet Union, as authorized by section 503(a)(5) ofthe FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5853(a)(5)) and section 1412(b) of theFormer Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 (title XIV of Public Law102-484, 22 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.), is authorized for activities describedin subsection (b) to support the redirection of former Soviet weapons scientists,especially those with expertise in weapons of mass destruction (nuclear,radiological, chemical, biological), missile and other delivery systems,and other advanced technologies with military applications.
(b) Activities Supported: Activities supported under subsection (a)include--

(1) any research activity involving the participation of formerSoviet weapons scientists and civilian scientists and engineers, if theparticipation of the weapons scientists predominates; and
(2) any program of international exchanges that would provide formerSoviet weapons scientists exposure to, and the opportunity to develop relationswith, research and industry partners.

Report Language:

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT RELATED TO H.R. 3427

THE ADMIRAL JAMES W. NANCE AND MEG DONOVAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 2000-2001
 

RUSSIAN AND UKRANIAN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT EDUCATION

Sections 421-426 authorize $10,000,000 to provide training programsin Russia and Ukraine for their nationals to obtain skills in businessadministration, accounting, and marketing, with special emphasis on instructionin business ethics and in the basic terminology, techniques, and practicesof those disciplines in order to achieve international standards of quality,transparency, and competitiveness.
 

Division B--Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Security Assistance

ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION

ARMS CONTROL

KEY VERIFICATION ASSETS FUND

Section 1111 gives an important new funding flexibility to the Departmentof State. The Senate proposal has been modified to authorize up to $5,000,000to be made available, for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, to a `Key VerificationAssets Fund.' This fund is expected to be used for the research, development,and acquisition of verification technologies. However, because only a limitedamount of funds is available, the Fund is directed to be generally usedonly as `seed money' for the Department to capitalize upon projects undertakenby other agencies.

Funds made available also may be used to retain verification assets.The Fund therefore can serve as a tool of the policy community in thoseinstances when policy objectives diverge from intelligence community priorities.Again, because resources are limited, this Fund should not be used forthe long-term retention of assets, but rather as an emergency, `stop-gap'funding source to keep critical verification assets afloat until a moreappropriate source of funds can be identified.

In light of recent events, the Secretary of State needs to have discretionaryfunds available to prevent verification technologies and programs fromfalling by the wayside. The experience with the WC-135 aircraft (whichis used to collect debris from nuclear tests) is a case in point. Thisplane is one of a kind, yet the Air Force tried to cancel this irreplaceableasset. Cancellation was narrowly avoided, and sufficient resources werescraped together to keep the plane flying for the near term, although longer-termcommitment to the program by both the executive branch and Congress isstill very much in doubt.

Had resources been available under this account, the Secretary of Statecould have applied funds to keep the plane operating temporarily. Indeed,resources under the account may yet be needed. The Executive is urged toensure that the Cobra Dane radar is retained.

Finally, while the authority to transfer funds made available to the`Key Verification Assets Fund' resides with the Secretary, it is intendedthat the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance assumeresponsibility for the identification of technologies or programs to befunded and manage those programs once State Department funds are applied.Funds, if appropriated, may not be reprogrammed from this account.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Section 1112 establishes a bureau within the Department of State tobe headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance,as proposed by the Senate. The Department of State has not provided forsuch a Bureau as a successor to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency'sBureau for Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support (IVI), despitethe fact that this Bureau was the only entity within the United StatesGovernment in which the principal function was the verification and enforcementof arms control treaties and commitments.

The reorganization plan implemented by the Department of State to accomplishthe merger with ACDA scattered IVI's staff, leaving in its stead a SpecialAssistant to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Securityand a Deputy Assistant Secretary within a larger bureau, neither of whomis confirmed by the Senate. This is a demotion of verification and compliancefunctions, as the principal advocate for arms control verification nowhas a position of far less stature than his counterparts within the StateDepartment regional bureaus, and elsewhere in the executive branch.

It is essential that the verification and compliance aspects of armscontrol and nonproliferation agreements are given a voice at the most seniorpolicy-making levels. A true commitment to vigorous enforcement of armscontrol and nonproliferation agreements and sanctions cannot be maintainedby submerging compliance analysis within other bureaus.

The need for an Assistant Secretary--and a Bureau--for Verificationand Compliance is supported by former ACDA Directors Ron Lehman and EugeneRostow, as well as several other key Reagan, Bush, and former Clinton Administrationofficials. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate IntelligenceCommittee have expressed support for such a step.

Accordingly, this division establishes the position of Assistant Secretaryof State for Verification and Compliance (V&C) and identifies the principalauthorities and responsibilities of the position. Specifically, section1112 provides that the Assistant Secretary for V&C has primary responsibilityfor all verification and compliance issues associated with arms control,nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments. As such, itis intended that the Assistant Secretary to have overall oversight of policyand resources relating to verification and compliance regarding not onlyvarious treaties, but also executive agreements and commitments, includingthose falling within the purview of regional bureaus (when such agreementsor commitments pertain to arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament).

Section 1112 ensures that--with some specific exceptions--the AssistantSecretary shall serve as the principal State Department participant inall executive branch interagency groups, including intelligence groups,concerned with verification or compliance matters. Further, this sectionstipulates that the Assistant Secretary for V&C, rather than any otherofficial within the Department of State or elsewhere, shall be consideredthe principal liaison to the intelligence community on verification andcompliance issues.

Finally, section 1112 identifies those reports, or portions thereof,for which the Assistant Secretary for V&C is to have primary responsibility.There is an inevitable tension between the enforcement of arms control,nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and the implications thatsuch enforcement has for various countries--and therefore the implicationsthat the policies pursued by the Assistant Secretary for V&C will havefor the policies pursued by other Bureaus. Therefore, these reports shouldbe submitted to Congress as prepared by the Assistant Secretary to themaximum extent possible, with any concerns of other Bureaus or State Departmentofficials presented in annexes to such reports.

ENHANCED ANNUAL (`PELL') REPORT

Section 1113 expands the reporting requirement contained in section403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to include an assessment ofthe adherence of other nations to commitments such as the Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR). Compliance with commitments such as the MTCR (whichis central to U.S. nonproliferation efforts) is no less important thancompliance with arms control measures, and should be assessed in the samereport, according to the same standards.

Section 1113 further amends section 403 of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct by requiring that each report specifically identify, to the maximumextent practicable in unclassified form, each and every compliance questionthat arises. Although the need to protect sensitive intelligence informationand information on diplomatic initiatives is understood, the argument thatthe confidentiality clause of the START Treaty, in and of itself, barspublic identification of violations of that treaty is rejected by mostMembers. Previous reports included specific unclassified discussions ofcompliance.

Additionally, section 1113 requires that compliance questions be carriedin each successive report until the situation of concern has been resolvedand the conclusion reported to the Congress. In this way, violations willnot be allowed to go unresolved or be forgotten.

REPORT ON START AND START II TREATIES MONITORING ISSUES

Section 1114 requires an assessment of the capabilities of the intelligencecommunity to monitor compliance with the START and START II Treaties. Specifically,the report requires an assessment of all monitoring activities, the intelligencecommunity assets and capabilities that the Senate was informed would benecessary to accomplish those activities, and the status of those assets.In addition, the report must contain an assessment of all Russian activitiesrelating to the START Treaty which have an impact on the United States'ability to monitor Russian compliance with that Treaty. This section alsoallows the Director of Central Intelligence to provide exceptionally sensitive,compartmented information separately to the Intelligence Committees. TheIntelligence Committees, in turn, have an obligation to make the committeesof jurisdiction aware of the pertinent aspects of such information.

STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION

Section 1115 amends section 306(a) of the Arms Export Control Act toprovide the chairman and ranking minority member of the Foreign RelationsCommittee of the Senate and International Relations Committee of the Houseof Representatives with the ability to request verifiability assessmentsof proposals made to, and by, the United States. The Assistant Secretaryof State for Verification and Compliance is intended to be responsiblefor such assessments in accordance with the authorities under section 1112.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SEISMOLOGY

Section 1116 relates to seismic monitoring of underground events suchas nuclear tests and earthquakes. The scientists who work in the fieldof seismology provide an invaluable service around the world. Their closemonitoring of data helps mankind to anticipate earthquakes, tsunamis andother natural disasters. The field of seismology also is critical to UnitedStates monitoring of the nuclear weapons test programs of foreign nations.Section 1116 ensures that the non-governmental U.S. seismological communityis given immediate access to all unclassified seismological data providedto the United States Government by any international organization in whichthe United States participates that is directly responsible for seismologicalmonitoring. If the United States is going to invest funds in such organizations,it should ensure that its participation benefits the nation's universities,science centers, and seismological community. Section 1116 is not intendedto require, however, that the United States make public seismological datathat a country might submit to an international organization, but thatis not part of a network managed or sponsored by such organization.

REQUIREMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL OF SUMMARIES

Section 1118 requires that the committees of jurisdiction receive thevarious arms control summaries that are routinely prepared by United Statesdelegations overseas. Such summaries are expected to be transmitted promptlyto the committees.
 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, SAFETY, AND RELATED MATTERS

CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES

Section 1131 revises and expands the obligation of executive branchagencies to keep the Committee `fully and currently' informed of nonproliferationissues. Several agencies have had this obligation for decades, includingthe Departments of Commerce, Energy, Defense, and State. However, it isa matter of concern that few have been fulfilling their obligations ina timely manner.

Section 1131 extends part of the reporting obligation contained in section602 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 to the Director of CentralIntelligence, makes clear that all proliferation matters are to be covered,and requires disclosure of sensitive matters relating to proliferationactivities of foreign nations to the Foreign Relations Committee of theSenate and International Relations Committee of the House within 60 daysof the executive branch agency in question becoming aware of such activity.

EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES FOR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Section 1132 the allocation of any United States Government funds toany individual who is involved in offensive chemical or biological warfareprograms. Such activities would violate the Chemical Weapons Conventionor the Biological Weapons Convention. This prohibition does not extendto those individuals working on legitimate chemical or biological defenseprograms.

DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL

Section 1133 requires the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrenceof the Secretary of Defense, to identify for Congress the number of nuclearweapons pits of each type that it intends to dismantle pursuant to an excessplutonium disposition agreement with Russia. It is not clear to the Executivebranch has identified the sources for a self-declared fifty metric tonsof `excess' plutonium. Nor are the implications clear of such a programfor maintenance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program of the Departmentof Energy.

Additionally, section 1133 seeks advance notice from the executive branchthat when the agreement to establish a mixed oxide fuel fabrication orproduction facility in Russia is submitted to the Congress under section123 of the Atomic Energy Act, the Secretary of State will be expected tocertify that the proposed establishment of a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel plantin Russia will not become a major proliferation concern for future Administrations.Section 1133 seeks to guard against such nonproliferation concerns by insistingthat clear guarantees be given to the United States by Russia that it willnot supply fuel assemblies containing weapons-grade plutonium or sensitivetechnology related to the MOX facility to any country of concern to theUnited States. This is essential given the nuclear-supply relationshipthat Russia has with countries such as Iran and India. Further, section1133 expects Russia to agree that the MOX facility will be subject to asufficient level of international safeguards to ensure that special nuclearmaterial (e.g. weapons-grade plutonium) is not diverted.

PROVISION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

Section 1134 makes clear that no executive branch agency may legallywithhold information that it is required to submit pursuant to section602 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. It also requires the issuanceof directives by these agencies to ensure that all required information,including information contained in Special Access Programs, is providedto the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and International RelationsCommittee of the House of Representatives in a timely fashion, as requiredby law.

AMENDED NUCLEAR EXPORT REPORTING REQUIREMENT

Section 1135 clarifies the type of information that the appropriatecommittees expect to receive in connection with Congressional notificationsof nuclear-related exports for commercial power generation. This provisionis not intended in any way to establish an arms sale or reprogramming notificationprocess. It is expected, however, that the Executive branch begin fulfillingits legal obligation to make the requisite nuclear export notificationsto the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the InternationalRelations Committee of the House.

ADHERENCE TO THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

Section 1136 amends section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),relating to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to clarify themeaning of several terms and to revise the report that is required to Congressunder this section of the AECA. Most notably, section 1136 makes clearthat a country will enjoy substantial protection from the MTCR sanctionslaw only if it specifically agrees not to transfer any missile-relatedequipment or technology that would be subject to U.S. jurisdiction underthe AECA (if it were U.S.-origin equipment or technology). Any countrythat has not agreed to take this step--perhaps having only agreed to controlproduction equipment, for instance--should be aware that it still may besanctioned under the AECA even if it concludes a bilateral understandingwith the United States.

Section 1136 also requires the Director of Central Intelligence to submita detailed itemization of all credible information indicating that a countrywhich has just concluded an MTCR-agreement with the United States has transferred,or conspired to transfer, equipment or technology in violation of the MTCRsanctions law in the previous two years.

AUTHORITY RELATING TO MTCR ADHERENTS

Section 1137 is a conforming amendment necessitated by the provisionsof section 1136(a). It provides the President with the authority to invokeMTCR sanctions against a proliferating entity if such person has not concludeda comprehensive agreement with the United States as defined by section74(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.

TRANSFER OF FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTERS IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION

Section 1138 authorizes the use of funds made available under the `Nonproliferation,Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs' accounts, beginning in fiscalyear 2001, for science and technology centers in the former Soviet Union.It was decided that the application of this authority would be delayeduntil 2001 in order to provide the Department of State sufficient timeto adjust its foreign operations budget to incorporate this programmatictransfer. The NADR account is more appropriate for science and technologycenter programs since those activities are, in essence, nonproliferationprograms.

RESEARCH AND EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES BY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTERS

Section 1139 clarifies that section 503(a)(5) of the FREEDOM SupportAct of 1992 authorizes the use of funds to support research activity involvingthe participation of civilian scientists and engineers, provided that theparticipation of former Soviet weapons scientists predominates. Section1139 also makes clear that funding of international exchanges is permittedin order to facilitate the commercial exposure of former weapons scientists.This new flexibility is important to enable the science and technologycenters to continue performing their important defense conversion and nonproliferationfunctions.
 

HOUSE REPORT – 106-122 (H.R. 2415)

Bill language

SEC. 205. CONTINUATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
 

(d) REPORTS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA- Section 2705(d)of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (as enactedby division G of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental AppropriationsAct, 1999; Public Law 105-277) is amended by striking `and January 1, 2000,'and inserting `January 1, 2000, January 1, 2001, and January 1, 2002,'.

SEC. 404. NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES.

The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 isamended by adding after section 1011 the following new sections:

`NATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES

`SEC. 1012. In coordination with other appropriate executive branchofficials, the Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps to preventforeign espionage agents from participating in educational and culturalexchange programs under this Act.

`PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

`SEC. 1013. The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate stepsto ensure that no individual, who is employed by or attached to an officeor department involved with the research, development, or production ofmissiles or weapons of mass destruction, from a country identified by theCentral Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the National SecurityAgency, or the Department of Energy, as a country involved in the proliferationof missiles or weapons of mass destruction is a participant in any programof educational or cultural exchange under this Act. Appropriate steps underthis section shall include prior consultation with the Federal agenciesdesignated in the first sentence with respect to all prospective participantsin such programs with respect to whom there is a reasonable basis to believethat such prospective participant may be employed by or attached to anoffice or department identified under the first sentence.'.
 

SENATE REPORT – 106-43 (S. 886)

Bill language

SEC. 104. UNITED STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL
PROGRAMS.

(a) IN GENERAL- The following amounts are authorized to be appropriatedto carry out educational and cultural
exchange programs under the United States Information and EducationalExchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Actof 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, the North/South Center Actof 1991, and the National Endowment for Democracy Act, and to carry outother authorities in law consistent with such purposes:

(b) EXCHANGES WITH RUSSIA-

(1) MUSKIE FELLOWSHIPS- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriatedunder subsection (a)(1)(B), $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2000and 2001 shall be available only to carry out the Edmund S. Muskie FellowshipProgram under section 227 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FiscalYears 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C. 2452 note) with the Russian Federation.
(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR EXCHANGES WITHRUSSIA-It is the sense of the Congress that educational and professionalexchanges with the Russian Federation have proven to be an effective mechanismfor enhancing democratization in that country and that, therefore, Congressshould significantly increase the financial resources allocated for thoseprograms.

(1) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriatedunder subsection (a)(1)(B), not
less than $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2000, and not less than $2,000,000for fiscal year 2001, shall be made
available to provide scholarships for doctoral graduate study in thesocial sciences to nationals of the independent
states of the former Soviet Union under the Edmund S. Muskie FellowshipProgram authorized by section 227 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993(22 U.S.C. 2452 note).
(2) REQUIREMENTS-

(A) NON-FEDERAL SUPPORT- Not less than 20 percent of the costsof each student's doctoral study
supported under paragraph (1) shall be provided from non-Federal sources.
(B) HOME COUNTRY RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT-

(i) AGREEMENT FOR SERVICE IN HOME COUNTRY- Before an individualmay receive
scholarship assistance under paragraph (1), the individual shall enterinto a written agreement with
the Department of State under which the individual agrees that aftercompleting all degree
requirements, or terminating his or her studies, whichever occurs first,the individual will return to the
country of the individual's nationality, or country of last habitualresidence, within the independent
states of the former Soviet Union (as defined in section 3 of the FREEDOMSupport Act (22
U.S.C. 5801)), to reside and remain physically present there for anaggregate of at least one year for
each year of study supported under paragraph (1).
(ii) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE- Any
individual who has entered into an agreement under clause (i) and whohas not completed the period
of home country residence and presence required by that agreement shallbe ineligible for a visa and
inadmissible to the United States.

TITLE VI--ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the `Arms Control, Nonproliferation, andNational Security Act of 1999'.

SEC. 602. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) ASSISTANT SECRETARY- The term `Assistant Secretary' means the positionof Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance designatedunder section 612.
(2) CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY- The term `Convention on Nuclear Safety'means the Convention on Nuclear Safety, done at Vienna on September 20,1994 (Senate Treaty Document 104-6).
(3) EXECUTIVE AGENCY- The term `Executive agency' has the meaning giventhe term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.
(4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- The term `intelligence community' has themeaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(5) START TREATY OR TREATY- The term `START Treaty' or `Treaty' meansthe Treaty With the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reductionand Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, including all agreed statements,annexes, protocols, and memoranda, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991.
(6) START II TREATY- The term `START II Treaty' means the Treaty Betweenthe United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reductionand Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and related
protocols and memorandum of understanding, signed at Moscow on January3, 1993.
(7) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS- The term `appropriate committeesof Congress' means the Committee on International Relations and the PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and theCommittee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligenceof the Senate.

                                       Subtitle A--Arms Control

CHAPTER 1--EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 611. KEY VERIFICATION ASSETS FUND.

(a) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State is authorized to transfer fundsavailable to the Department of State under this section to the Departmentof Defense, Department of Energy, or any agency, entity, or other componentof the intelligence community, as needed, for retaining, researching, developing,or acquiring technologies or programs relating to the verification of armscontrol, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements or commitments.
(b) PROHIBITION ON REPROGRAMMING- Notwithstanding any other provisionof law, funds made available to carry out this section may not be usedfor any purpose other than the purposes specified in subsection (a).
(c) FUNDING- Of the total amount of funds authorized to be appropriatedto the Department of State by this Act for the fiscal years 2000 and 2001,$5,000,000 is authorized to be available for each such fiscal year to carryout subsection (a).
(d) DESIGNATION OF FUND- Amounts made available under subsection (c)may be referred to as the `Key Verification Assets Fund'.

SEC. 612. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE.

(a) DESIGNATION OF POSITION- The Secretary of State shall designateone of the Assistant Secretaries of State authorized by section 1(c)(1)of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)(1))as the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance. TheAssistant Secretary shall report to the Under Secretary of State for ArmsControl and International Security.
(b) DIRECTIVE GOVERNING THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 30 days after the date of enactmentof this Act, the Secretary of State shall
issue a directive governing the position of Assistant Secretary.
(2) ELEMENTS OF THE DIRECTIVE- The directive issued under paragraph(1) shall set forth, consistent with
this section--

(A) the duties of the Assistant Secretary;
(B) the relationships between the Assistant Secretary and other officialsof the Department of State;
(C) any delegation of authority from the Secretary of State to theAssistant Secretary; and
(D) such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(1) IN GENERAL- The Assistant Secretary shall have as his principalresponsibility the overall supervision (including oversight of policy andresources) within the Department of State of all matters relating to verification
and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, anddisarmament agreements or commitments.
(2) PARTICIPATION OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY-

(A) PRIMARY ROLE- Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and(C), the Assistant Secretary, or his designee, shall participate in allinteragency groups or organizations within the executive branch of Governmentthat assess, analyze, or review United States planned or ongoing policies,programs, or actions that have a direct bearing on verification or compliancematters, including interagency intelligence committees concerned with thedevelopment or exploitation of measurement or signals intelligence or othernational technical means of verification.
(B) REQUIREMENT FOR DESIGNATION- Subparagraph (A) shall not apply togroups or organizations on which the Secretary of State or the Undersecretaryof State for Arms Control and International Security sits, unless suchofficial designates the Assistant Secretary to attend in his stead.
(C) NATIONAL SECURITY LIMITATION-

(i) The President may waive the provisions of subparagraph(A) if inclusion of the Assistant Secretary would not be in the nationalsecurity interests of the United States.
(ii) With respect to an interagency group or organization, or meetingthereof, working with exceptionally sensitive information contained incompartments under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence,the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of Energy, such Director orSecretary, as the case may be, may waive the provision of subparagraph(A) if inclusion of the Assistant Secretary would not be in the nationalsecurity interests of the United States.
(iii) Any waiver of participation under clause (i) or (ii) shall betransmitted in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress.

(3) RELATIONSHIP TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- The Assistant Secretaryshall be the principal policy community representative to the intelligencecommunity on verification and compliance matters.
(4) REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES- The Assistant Secretary shall haveresponsibility within the Department of State for--

(A) all reports required pursuant to section 37 of the ArmsControl and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577);
(B) so much of the report required under paragraphs (5) through (10)of section 51(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a))as relates to verification or compliance matters; and
(C) other reports being prepared by the Department of State as of thedate of enactment of this Act relating to arms control, nonproliferation,or disarmament verification or compliance matters.

SEC. 613. ENHANCED ANNUAL (`PELL') REPORT.

Section 51(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a))is amended--
(1) by striking `and' at the end of paragraph (6);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and insertinga semicolon;
(3) in paragraph (6), by inserting:

(A) `or commitments, including the Missile Technology ControlRegime,' after `agreements' the first time it
appears;
(B) `or commitments' after `agreements' the second time it appears;and
(C) `or commitment' after `agreement';

SEC. 614. REPORT ON START AND START II TREATIES MONITORING ISSUES.

(a) REPORT- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of thisAct, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a detailed classifiedreport to the appropriate committees of Congress including the following:

(1) A comprehensive identification of all monitoring activitiesassociated with the START and START II treaties.
(2) The specific intelligence community assets and capabilities, includinganalytical capabilities, that the Senate was informed, prior to the Senategiving its advice and consent to ratification of the treaties, would benecessary to accomplish those activities.
(3) An identification of the extent to which those assets and capabilitieshave, or have not, been attained or retained, and the corresponding effectthis has had upon United States monitoring confidence levels.
(4) An assessment of any Russian activities relating to the START Treatywhich have had an impact upon the ability of the United States to monitorRussian adherence to the Treaty.

SEC. 615. STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION.

(a) DEFINITIONS- It is the sense of the Senate that the following termswhen used in publications of the United States Government, or in oral representationsby officials of the United States Government, should have the followingmeanings:

(1) EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE- The term `effectively verifiable'means that the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) are met, as follows:

(A) The Director of Central Intelligence has certified to thePresident that the intelligence community has a high degree of confidence,with respect to a particular treaty or other agreement, in its abilityto detect any militarily significant violation of the treaty or other agreementin a timely fashion, and to detect patterns of marginal violation overtime. In determining the intelligence community's confidence, the Directorshould assume that all measures of concealment could be employed and thatstandard practices could be altered so as to impede monitoring.
(B) The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff have certified to the President that they have a high degreeof confidence, with respect to a particular treaty or other agreement,that the United States will be able to reach a legal and technical determinationregarding any militarily significant violation of the treaty or other agreementin a timely fashion, and to reach such a determination regarding patternsof marginal violation, once detected. In determining the level of confidenceunder this subparagraph, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff should assume that all measures of concealmentcould be employed and that standard practices could be altered so as toimpede monitoring.

(2) MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, has sole responsibilityfor determining with specificity, for purposes of any treaty or other internationalagreement having implications for the national security of the United States,what constitutes a militarily significant violation. In making such a determination,the Chairman should give great weight to his judgment that the violationcould pose a threat to the national security interests of the United States.
(3) TIMELY FASHION DEFINED- In this section, the term `timely fashion'means in sufficient time for the United States to take remedial actionto safeguard the national security.

(1) by striking `adequately';
(2) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d) as subsections (c),(d), and (e); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:
`(b) ASSESSMENTS UPON REQUEST- Upon the request of the chairman orranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senateor the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives,in case of an arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament proposal--
`(1) under consideration for presentation to a foreign country by theUnited States;
`(2) presented to a foreign country by the United States; or
`(3) presented to the United States by a foreign country;
the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on thedegree to which elements of the proposal are capable of being verified.'.

SEC. 616. CONTRIBUTION TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SEISMOLOGY.

The United States Government shall make available to the public in realtime, or as quickly as possible, all raw seismological data provided tothe United States Government by any international organization that isdirectly responsible for seismological monitoring.

SEC. 617. PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES COMPANIES.

The United States National Authority (as designated pursuant to section101 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (as containedin division I of Public Law 105-277)) shall reimburse the Federal Bureauof Investigation for all costs incurred by the Bureau in connection withimplementation of section 303(b)(2)(A) of that Act, except that such reimbursementmay not exceed $1,000,000 in any fiscal year.

SEC. 618. PRESERVATION OF THE START TREATY VERIFICATION REGIME.

(a) FINDINGS- The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the START Treaty states thefollowing: `Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicleinspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballisticmissiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributedto them.'.
(2) Paragraph 1 of Section IX of the Inspections Protocol to the STARTTreaty states that each Party `shall have the right to conduct a totalof ten reentry vehicle inspections each year'.
(3) Paragraph 4 of Section XVIII of the Inspections Protocol to theSTART Treaty states that the Parties `shall, when possible, clarify ambiguitiesregarding factual information contained in the inspection report' thateach inspection team must provide at the end of an inspection, pursuantto paragraph 1 of Section XVIII of that Protocol.
(4) Paragraph 12 of Annex 3 to the Inspections Protocol to the STARTTreaty states that, once a missile has been selected and prepared for reentryvehicle inspection, the inspectors shall be given `a clear, unobstructedview of the front section [of the missile], to ascertain that the frontsection contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributedto missiles of that type'.
(5) Paragraph 13 of Annex 3 to the Inspections Protocol to the STARTTreaty states the following: `If a member of the in-country escort declaresthat an object contained in the front section is not a reentry vehicle,the inspected Party shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectorsthat this object is not a reentry vehicle.'.
(6) Section II of Annex 8 to the Inspections Protocol to the STARTTreaty provides that radiation detection equipment may be used during reentryvehicle inspections.
(7) Paragraph F.1 of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspections Protocolto the START Treaty states the following: `Radiation detection equipmentshall be used to measure nuclear radiation levels in order to demonstratethat objects declared to be non-nuclear are non-nuclear.'.
(8) While the use of radiation detection equipment may help to determinewhether an object that `a member of the in-country escort declares..isnot a reentry vehicle' is a reentry vehicle with a nuclear warhead, itcannot help to determine whether that object is a reentry vehicle witha non-nuclear warhead.
(9) Article XV of the START Treaty provides for a Joint Complianceand Inspection Commission that shall meet to `resolve questions relatingto compliance with the obligations assumed'.

(1) the United States should assert and, to the maximum extentpossible, exercise the right for reentry vehicle inspectors to obtain aclear, unobstructed view of the front section of a deployed SS-18 ICBMselected for reentry vehicle inspection pursuant to paragraph 6 of ArticleXI of the START Treaty;
(2) the United States should assert and, to the maximum extent possible,obtain Russian compliance with the obligation of the host Party, pursuantto paragraph 13 of Annex 3 to the Inspections Protocol to the START Treaty,to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that an object whichis declared not to be a reentry vehicle is not a reentry vehicle;
(3) if a member of the in-country escort declares that an object containedin the front section of a deployed SS-18 ICBM selected for reentry vehicleinspection pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the START Treaty isnot a reentry vehicle, but the inspected Party does not demonstrate tothe satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a reentry vehicle,the United States inspection team should record this fact in the officialinspection report as an ambiguity and the United States should raise thismatter in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as a concern relatingto compliance of Russia with the obligations assumed under the Treaty;
(4) the United States should not agree to any arrangement whereby theuse of radiation detection equipment in a reentry vehicle inspection, ora combination of the use of such equipment and Russian assurances regardingSS-18 ICBMs, would suffice to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectorsthat an object which is declared not to be a reentry vehicle is not a reentryvehicle; and
(5) the United States should not agree to any arrangement whereby theuse of technical equipment in a reentry vehicle inspection would sufficeto demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that an object whichis declared not to be a reentry vehicle is not a reentry vehicle, unlessthe Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretariesof State, Defense, and Energy, has determined that such equipment can demonstrateto the satisfaction of the inspectors that an object which is declarednot to be a reentry vehicle is not a reentry vehicle.

                            Subtitle B--Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safety, and Related Matters
.
.
SEC. 634. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.

Section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C.3282(c)) is amended to read as follows:

`(c)(1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Departmentof Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Commission, and, with regardto subparagraph (B), the Director of Central Intelligence, shall keep theCommittees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs of the Senateand the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representativesfully and currently informed with respect to--
`(A) their activities to carry out the purposes and policies of thisAct and to otherwise prevent proliferation, including the proliferationof nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery;and
`(B) the current activities of foreign nations which are of significancefrom the proliferation standpoint.
`(2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to subparagraph(B), the phrase `fully and currently informed' means the transmittal ofinformation not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the activityconcerned.'.

SEC. 635. EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES FOR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS.

(a) PROHIBITION- Except as provided in subsection (b), no assistancemay be provided by the United States Government to any person who is involvedin the research, development, design, testing, or evaluation of chemicalor biological weapons for offensive purposes.
(b) EXCEPTION- The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall notapply to any activity conducted to title V of the National Security Actof 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).

SEC. 636. DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL.

(a) REPORT ON REDUCTION OF THE STOCKPILE- Not later than 120 days aftersigning an agreement between the United States and Russia for the dispositionof excess weapons plutonium, the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrenceof the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the Committee onForeign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate andto the Speaker of the House of Representatives--

(1) detailing plans for United States implementation of suchagreement;
(2) identifying the number of United States warhead `pits' of eachtype deemed `excess' for the purpose ofdismantlement or disposition; and
(3) describing any implications this may have for the Stockpile Stewardshipand Management Program.

(1) arrangements for the establishment of that facility willfurther United States nuclear non-proliferation objectives and will outweighthe proliferation risks inherent in the use of mixed oxide fuel elements;
(2) a guaranty has been given by Russia that no fuel elements produced,fabricated, reprocessed, or assembled at such facility, and no sensitivenuclear technology related to such facility, will be exported or suppliedby the Russian Federation to any country in the event that the United Statesobjects to such export or supply; and
(3) a guaranty has been given by Russia that the facility and all nuclearmaterials and equipment therein, and any fuel elements or special nuclearmaterial produced, fabricated, reprocessed, or assembled at that facility,including fuel elements exported or supplied by Russia to a third party,will be subject to international monitoring and transparency sufficientto ensure that special nuclear material is not diverted.

(1) PRODUCED- The terms `produce' and `produced' have the samemeaning that such terms are given under
section 11 u. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
(2) PRODUCTION FACILITY- The term `production facility' has the samemeaning that such term is given
under section 11 v. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
(3) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL- The term `special nuclear material' hasthe meaning that such term is
given under section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

SEC. 644. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION IN NEGOTIATIONSWITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

It is the sense of Congress that, in negotiating a START III Treatywith the Russian Federation, or any other arms control treaty with theRussian Federation making comparable amounts of reductions in United Statesstrategic nuclear forces--
(1) the strategic nuclear forces and nuclear modernization programsof the People's Republic of China and every other nation possessing nuclearweapons should be taken into full consideration in the negotiation of suchtreaty; and
(2) such programs should not undermine the limitations set forth inthe treaty.

TITLE X--RUSSIAN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT EDUCATION

SEC. 1001. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this title is to establish a training program in Russiafor nationals of Russia to obtain skills in business administration, accounting,and marketing, with special emphasis on instruction in business ethicsand in the basic terminology, techniques, and practices of those disciplines,to achieve international standards of quality, transparency, and competitiveness.

SEC. 1002. DEFINITIONS.

(a) BOARD- The term `Board' means the United States-Russia BusinessManagement Training Board established under section 1005(a).
(b) DISTANCE LEARNING- The term `distance learning' means trainingthrough computers, interactive videos, teleconferencing, and videoconferencingbetween and among students and teachers.
(c) ELIGIBLE ENTERPRISE- The term `eligible enterprise' means--

(1) a business concern operating in Russia that employs Russiannationals; and
(2) a private enterprise that is being formed or operated by formerofficers of the Russian armed forces in Russia.

SEC. 1003. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAINING PROGRAM AND INTERNSHIPS.

(a) TRAINING PROGRAM-

(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State, acting through theUnder Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, and taking into accountthe general policies recommended by the United States-Russia Business ManagementTraining Board established under section 1005(a), is authorized to establisha program of technical assistance (in this title referred to as the `program')to provide the training described in section 1001 to eligible enterprises.
(2) IMPLEMENTATION- Training shall be carried out by United Statesnationals having expertise in business administration, accounting, andmarketing or by Russian nationals who have been trained under the programor by those who meet criteria established by the Board. Such training maybe carried out--

(A) in the offices of eligible enterprises, at business schoolsor institutes, or at other locations in Russia, including facilities ofthe armed forces of Russia, educational institutions, or in the officesof trade or industry associations, with special consideration given tolocations where similar training opportunities are limited or nonexistent;or
(B) by `distance learning' programs originating in the United Statesor in European branches of United States institutions.

SEC. 1004. APPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

(a) PROCEDURES-

(1) IN GENERAL- Each eligible enterprise that desires to receivetraining for its employees and managers under
this title shall submit an application to the clearinghouse establishedby subsection (d), at such time, in such manner, and accompanied by suchadditional information as the Secretary may reasonably require.
(2) JOINT APPLICATIONS- A consortium of eligible enterprises may filea joint application under the provisions of paragraph (1).

(1) is for an individual or individuals employed in an eligibleenterprise or enterprises applying under the program;
(2) describes the level of training for which assistance under thistitle is sought;
(3) provides evidence that the eligible enterprise meets the generalpolicies adopted by the Secretary for the administration of this title;
(4) provides assurances that the eligible enterprise will pay a shareof the costs of the training, which share may include in-kind contributions;and
(5) provides such additional assurances as the Secretary determinesto be essential to ensure compliance with the requirements of this title.

SEC. 1005. UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN BUSINESS MANAGEMENT TRAINING BOARD.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT- There is established within the Department of Statea United States-Russian Business Management Training Board.
(b) COMPOSITION- The Board established pursuant to subsection (a) shallbe composed of 12 members as follows:

(1) The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.
(2) The Administrator of the Agency for International Development.
(3) The Secretary of Commerce.
(4) The Secretary of Education.
(5) Six individuals from the private sector having expertise in businessadministration, accounting, and marketing,
who shall be appointed by the Secretary of State, as follows:

(A) Two individuals employed by graduate schools of managementoffering accredited degrees.
(B) Two individuals employed by eligible enterprises.
(C) Two individuals from nongovernmental organizations involved inpromoting free market economy
practices in Russia.

(6) Two nationals of Russia having experience in business administration,accounting, or marketing, who shall be
appointed by the Secretary of State upon the recommendation of theGovernment of Russia, and who shall serve
as nonvoting members.

(1) guidelines for the administration of the program underthis title;
(2) criteria for determining the qualifications of applicants underthe program;
(3) the appointment of panels of business leaders in the United Statesand Russia for the purpose of nominating trainees; and
(4) such other matters with respect to which the Secretary may requestrecommendations.

(1) the Board shall meet not less than 4 times each year; and
(2) the Board shall meet whenever one-third of the voting members requesta meeting in writing, in which event 7 of the voting members shall constitutea quorum.

SEC. 1006. RESTRICTIONS NOT APPLICABLE.

Prohibitions on the use of foreign assistance funds for assistance forthe Russian Federation shall not apply with respect to the funds made availableto carry out this title.

SEC. 1007. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL- There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 foreach of fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to carry out this title.
(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS- Amounts appropriated under subsection (a)are authorized to remain available until expended.

SEC. 1008. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This title shall take effect on October 1, 1999.

Amendments:

MOYNIHAN AMENDMENT NO. 716 (Senate - June 22, 1999)

[Original language modified by amendment:

(b) EXCHANGES WITH RUSSIA-

(1) MUSKIE FELLOWSHIPS- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriatedunder subsection (a)(1)(B), $7,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2000and 2001 shall be available only to carry out the Edmund S. Muskie FellowshipProgram under section 227 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FiscalYears 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C. 2452 note) with the Russian Federation.
(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR EXCHANGES WITHRUSSIA-

Mr. HELMS (for Mr. Moynihan) proposed an amendment to the bill, S. 886,supra; as follows:
On page 12, line 6, strike `$7,000,000' and insert `$5,000,000'.
On page 12, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
(c) Muskie Fellowship Doctoral Graduate Studies for Nationals of theIndependent States of the Former Soviet Union:

(1) Allocation of funds: Of the amounts authorized to be appropriatedunder subsection (a)(1)(B), not less than $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2000,and not less than $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2001, shall be made availableto provide scholarships for doctoral graduate study in the social sciencesto nationals of the independent states of the former Soviet Union underthe Edmund S. Muskie Fellowship Program authorized by section 227 of theForeign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C.2452 note).
(2) Requirements:

(A) Non-federal support: Not less than 20 percent of the costsof each student's doctoral study supported under paragraph
(1) shall be provided from non-Federal sources.
(B) Home country residence requirement:

(i) Agreement for service in home country: Before an individualmay receive scholarship assistance under paragraph (1), the individualshall enter into a written agreement with the Department of State underwhich the individual agrees that after completing all degree requirements,or terminating his or her studies, whichever occurs first, the individualwill return to the country of the individual's nationality, or countryof last habitual residence, within the independent states of the formerSoviet Union (as defined in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C.5801)), to reside and remain physically present there for an aggregateof at least one year for each year of study supported under paragraph (1).
(ii) Denial of entry into the united states for noncompliance: Anyindividual who has entered into an agreement under clause (i) and who hasnot completed the period of home country residence and presence requiredby that agreement shall be ineligible for a visa and inadmissible to theUnited States.

On page 12, line 20, strike `(c)' and insert `(d)'.
 

Senate Committee Report language (before amendments)

BEGINNING
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C. NONPROLIFERATION

Title VI establishes policy and reporting requirements and establishesa new Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, soas to improve the administration of United States arms control, non-proliferationand disarmament policies. Two new State Department funds will enable theDepartment to encourage other agencies to develop arms control verificationtechnologies and humanitarian demining equipment.

Sec. 104. United States Informational, Educational, and Cultural Programs

This section authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and 2001for Fulbright and other educational and cultural exchange programs, theEast-West Center, the North-South Center, and the National Endowment forDemocracy.
The Committee has provided two earmarks within this section. The firstis an earmark of $7 million for the Muskie Fellowship exchanges with Russia.U.S. relations with Russia have deteriorated in recent months. The Committeebelieves that while the United States must not compromise on our fundamentalinterests in areas like arms control, non-proliferation, and the war inYugoslavia, we must continue to look for ways to engage Russia. Russiais simply too important to ignore.

Strengthening already successful educational and technical programswith Russia offers a way to continue mutually beneficial engagement. Oneof the most successful of these programs is named after the former Senatorfrom Maine and former Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie. The bill increasesthe Russian portion of the funding for the Edmund S. Muskie FellowshipProgram from $3.7 million to $7 million over each of the next two fiscalyears. The Muskie Fellowship Program selects outstanding citizens to receivefellowships for graduate-level study and professional development programsin the United States. Candidates are recruited through an open, merit-basedcompetition and may apply in the fields of business administration, economics,law, and public administration. Fellows are placed at U.S. colleges anduniversities in graduate-degree, certificate, and non-degree programs,which last one to two academic years.
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TITLE VI--ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

SUBTITLE A--ARMS CONTROL

CHAPTER 1--EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Sec. 611. Key Verification Assets Fund

This provision makes $5,000,000 available each year from existing fundsfor fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to a `Key Verification Assets Fund.' Thisfund will be used for the research, development, and acquisition of armscontrol, non-proliferation and disarmament verification technologies. Becauseonly limited funding is available, the Fund generally should be used as`seed money' for the Department to encourage other agencies either to developnew technologies or to adapt existing projects to the needs of arms controlverification. Thus, some of the fund might be offered in a competitionamong laboratories serving other departments and agencies.

Funds made available also may be used to retain existing verificationassets. The Fund therefore can serve as a tool of the policy communityin those instances when policy objectives diverge from intelligence communitypriorities. Again, because resources are limited, this Fund should notbe used for the long-term retention of assets, but rather as an emergency,`stop-gap' funding source to keep critical verification assets in operationuntil a more appropriate source of funds can be identified.

The Secretary of State needs discretionary funds to prevent verificationtechnologies and programs from falling by the wayside. In recent years,both the WC-135 aircraft that is used to collect debris from nuclear testsand the Cobra Dane radar that monitors missile tests in the northern Pacificregion have been threatened with loss of funding. The Committee hopes thatwith defense budgets once again on the rise, the Secretary of Defense andthe Director of Central Intelligence will accept more readily the needto monitor the nuclear and missile activities of foreign nations.

While the authority to transfer funds made available to the `Key VerificationAssets Fund' resides with the Secretary, the Committee intends that theAssistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance will assumeresponsibility for the identification of technologies or programs to befunded and manage those programs if that should prove necessary. Fundsmay not be reprogrammed from this account.

Sec. 612. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance

This provision establishes a new bureau in the Department of State headedby an Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance. The reorganizationplan proposed by the Department of State pursuant to the Foreign AffairsReform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-277) unfortunately did notprovide for such a Bureau as a successor to the Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency's Bureau for Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support(IVI), which was the only entity within the United States Government whoseprincipal function was the verification and enforcement of arms controltreaties and commitments.

The Department of State proposed to divide the ACDA bureau's verificationstaff functions between a `Special Advisor' to the Under Secretary forArms Control and International Security and a Deputy Assistant Secretarywithin the larger bureau for arms control, neither of whom would be confirmedby the Senate. This would be a demotion of verification and compliancefunctions, as the principal advocate for arms control verification wouldhave far less stature than officials within the State Department and elsewherein the administration who are responsible for reaching agreements or formaintaining good relations with countries that may violate their arms controlobligations.

This portion of the State Department reorganization plan runs counterto the Senate's stated purpose for ACDA's incorporation within the StateDepartment. As the Committee's report of June 13, 1997, accompanying S.903 made clear, the Committee considers it essential that the verificationand compliance aspects of arms control agreements are given a voice atthe most senior level of the Administration. A true commitment to vigorousenforcement of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and sanctionscannot be maintained by submerging compliance analysis within other bureaus.

In keeping with the bipartisan commitment to verification, several keyReagan, Bush, and former Clinton administration officials, including formerACDA Directors Ron Lehman and Eugene Rostow, have written to the Committeeregarding the need for an Assistant Secretary--and a Bureau--for Verificationand Compliance. In addition, the chairman and vice chairman of the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence have expressed support for these steps.

Accordingly, Section 612 establishes the position of Assistant Secretaryof State for Verification and Compliance and identifies the principal authoritiesand responsibilities of the position. Specifically, Section 612(c)(1) providesthat the Assistant Secretary shall have primary responsibility for allverification and compliance issues associated with arms control, nonproliferation,and disarmament agreements or commitments. As such, the Committee intendsthe Assistant Secretary to have overall oversight of policy and resourcesfor verification and compliance regarding not only various treaties, butalso executive agreements and commitments, including those falling withinthe purview of regional bureaus when such agreements or commitments pertainto arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament.

Section 612(c)(2) ensures that--with some specific exceptions--the AssistantSecretary shall serve as the principal State Department participant inall executive branch interagency groups, including intelligence groups,concerned with verification or compliance matters. The exceptions are casesin which (a) a more senior official represents the Department; or (b) eitherthe President or a cabinet official responsible for safeguarding exceptionallysensitive information determines that inclusion of the Assistant Secretarywould not be in the national security interests of the United States andso notifies the foreign relations and intelligence committees of Congress.Section 612(c)(3) provides that the Assistant Secretary, rather than anyother official within the Department of State or elsewhere, shall be consideredthe principal liaison with the intelligence community on verification andcompliance issues.

Finally, Section 612(c)(4) identifies those reports, or portions thereof,for which the Assistant Secretary is to have primary responsibility. TheCommittee notes the inevitable tension between the enforcement of armscontrol, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and the implicationsthat such enforcement has for U.S. relations with various countries--andtherefore the implications that the policies pursued by the Assistant Secretarywill have upon the policies pursued by other Bureaus. The Committee urgesthat these reports be submitted to Congress as prepared by the AssistantSecretary to the maximum extent possible, with any concerns of other Bureausor State Department officials presented in annexes to such reports.

Sec. 613. Enhanced Annual (`Pell') Report

With the reorganization of the executive branch's foreign affairs apparatus,the Department of State has undertaken responsibility for the preparationof an annual report by the President to Congress detailing the adherenceof other nations to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements.Section 613 expands the reporting requirement contained in Section 51 ofthe Arms Control and Disarmament Act to include an assessment of the adherenceof other nations to commitments such as the Missile Technology ControlRegime (MTCR). Compliance with commitments such as the MTCR (which is centralto United States nonproliferation efforts) is no less important than compliancewith arms control measures, and should be assessed in the same report,according to the same standards.

Section 613 further amends Section 51 of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct by requiring that each report specifically identify, to the maximumextent practicable in unclassified form, each and every compliance questionthat arises. Although the Committee understands the need to protect sensitiveintelligence information and information on diplomatic initiatives, itrejects the argument that the confidentiality clause of the START Treaty,in and of itself, bars public identification of violations of that treaty.Previous reports included specific unclassified discussions of complianceissues, which Congress found most useful. In recent years, however, theunclassified section of the annual `Pell Report' has dwindled. The mostrecent report does not have an unclassified mention of any specific violationunder the START Treaty, for instance. The Committee urges the administrationto include in the current annual report, which is now overdue by threemonths, an unclassified section assessing specific compliance questions.

Additionally, Section 613 requires that compliance questions be carriedin each successive report until the situation of concern has been resolvedand the conclusion reported to the Congress. In this way, such issues willnot be allowed to go unresolved or be forgotten.

Sec. 614. Report on START and START II Treaty Monitoring Issues

The Senate gave its advice and consent to both the START treaty andthe START II treaty on the basis of several commitments from the executivebranch regarding planned capabilities to monitor those treaties. Section614 requires an assessment by the Director of Central Intelligence of theextent to which those capabilities have, or have not, materialized as promised.

Specifically, the report shall include an assessment of all monitoringactivities, intelligence community assets and capabilities deemed necessaryto accomplish those activities, and the status of those assets. In addition,section 614 requires an assessment of any Russian activities which havean impact on the United States' ability to monitor Russian compliance.This section also allows the Director of Central Intelligence to provideextremely sensitive, compartmented information separately to the intelligencecommittees of Congress. The Committee notes that the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence, in turn, has an obligation under section 4(a) of SenateResolution 400, 94th Congress, to `promptly call to the attention of' theForeign Relations Committee `any matter requiring the attention of' thisCommittee.

Sec. 615. Standards for Verification

Terms such as `effective verification' and `militarily significant violation'are used often in reports and testimony regarding arms control and nonproliferationagreements. Section 615 sets forth the Senate's understanding of theseterms, and encourages the executive branch to adhere to the standards embodiedin previous administrations' testimony regarding the meaning of these terms,in order to establish a clear framework in which the terms can be usedand understood.

The definition of `effective verification' was first offered to theCommittee during its consideration of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)Treaty in 1988 by Ambassador Paul Nitze:

What do we mean by effective verification? We mean that we want to besure that, if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in anymilitarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violation intime to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefitof the violation.

The standard for effective verification was reaffirmed and clarifiedby the then-Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, MajorGeneral William Burns, in testimony before the Committee on January 24,1989, on ongoing negotiations for a multilateral chemical weapons ban:

What is effective verification? It is a system by which we can havea high level of assurance that we will be able to detect a violation ofthe terms of the treaty early enough so we can do something about it. Thatis sort of a simple layman's definition, I think, of effective verification.

Then-Secretary of State James Baker further elaborated upon the natureof an effective verification regime when responding to a question fromSenator Pell on the START Treaty in January 1992:

A key criterion in evaluating whether the START agreement is effectivelyverifiable is whether, if the other side attempts to move beyond the limitsof the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detectsuch a violation well before it became a threat to national security sothat we are able to respond. Additionally, the verification regime shouldenable us to detect patterns of marginal violations that do not presentimmediate risk to U.S. security.

As can be seen from these statements, `effective verification' consistsof: (1) a `high level of assurance' in the United States' ability to detect(2) a `militarily significant' violation in (3) a `timely fashion.' Moreover,an effective verification regime should, according to Secretary of StateBaker's testimony, provide detection of patterns of marginal violation.These, then, are the elements of the standard of effective verificationput forward since the 1980's during Senate consideration of arms controltreaties.

This is the standard reaffirmed by this provision. In addition, thissection makes clear that it is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffwho determines what would constitute a militarily significant violation.

Section 615 also amends Section 37 of the Arms Control and DisarmamentAct, providing the chairman and ranking minority member of the foreignrelations committees of Congress the authority to request verificationassessments of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament proposalsunder consideration. The Committee anticipates that the Assistant Secretaryof State for Verification and Compliance will be responsible for respondingto such requests in a thorough and timely fashion.

Sec. 616. Contribution to the Advancement of Seismology

Scientists who work in the field of seismology provide an invaluableservice around the world. Their close monitoring of data helps mankindto anticipate earthquakes, tsunamis and other natural disasters. This provisionensures that they are given immediate access to all unclassified seismologicaldata provided to the United States Government by any international organizationthat is directly responsible for seismological monitoring. The Committeeis of the opinion that, if the United States is going to invest funds inthese types of organizations, it should ensure that its participation benefitsthe nation's universities, science centers, and seismological community.Section 616 is not intended to require, however, that the United Statesmake public seismological data that a country might submit to an internationalorganization, but that is not part of a network managed or sponsored bysuch organization.

Sec. 617. Protection of United States Companies.

When the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the ChemicalWeapons Convention, an issue of great concern was the right of internationalinspectors to conduct intrusive inspections of any company in the UnitedStates. To guard against the potential for economic espionage, the Congressrequired that a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)accompany every inspection team. This imposes a financial burden on theFBI. The Committee therefore supports the transfer of up to $1,000,000per year from the Department of State to the FBI to ensure that UnitedStates companies are protected.

For the time being, the Committee is willing to support the transferof such funds to the FBI in order to ensure that an effective program toprotect companies is established and supported within the FBI. Ultimately,however, the Committee intends to work with other committees of Congressto ensure that this program is carried within the Bureau's budget line.

SUBTITLE B--NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, SAFETY, AND RELATED MATTERS

Sec. 634. Congressional Notification of Non-Proliferation Activities

Section 634 revises and expands the obligation of executive branch agenciesto keep the Committee `fully and currently informed' of nonproliferationissues. Several agencies have had this obligation for decades, includingthe Departments of Commerce, Energy, Defense, and State. However, the Committeehas become concerned that few have been fulfilling their obligations ina timely manner.

Section 634 extends part of the reporting obligation contained in Section602(c) of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 to the Director of CentralIntelligence, makes clear that all proliferation matters are to be covered,and requires disclosure to the Committee of sensitive matters relatingto significant proliferation activities of foreign nations within 60 daysof the executive branch agency in question becoming aware of such activity.

Sec. 635. Effective Use of Resources for Non-Proliferation Programs

Section 635 requires the Secretary of Energy to submit a report respondingto a February 1999 study by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) entitled `Nuclear Nonproliferation: ConcernsWith DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed WeaponsScientists.' The GAO found several serious concerns with DOE's Initiativesfor Proliferation Prevention program (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative.

Further, Section 635 prohibits the allocation of funds under the InternationalScience and Technology Center program of the Department of State or theInitiatives for Proliferation Prevention program to any individual whois involved with offensive chemical or biological warfare programs. Suchactivities would violate the Chemical Weapons Convention or the BiologicalWeapons Convention. This prohibition does not extend to those individualsworking on legitimate chemical or biological defense programs that arepermitted under those Conventions.

Sec. 636. Disposition of Weapons-Grade Material

Section 636 requires the Department of Energy to identify for Congressthe number of nuclear weapons `pits' of each type that it intends to dismantlepursuant to an excess plutonium disposition agreement with Russia. It isnot clear to the Committee whether the administration has identified thesources for a self-declared 50 metric tons of `excess' plutonium or thoughtthrough the implications of that selection for maintenance of the UnitedStates nuclear weapon stockpile under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-BanTreaty.

Section 636 also requires the Secretary of State to certify that theproposed establishment of a mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel fabricationplant in Russia will not become a major proliferation headache for futureadministrations. Section 636 seeks to guard against such nonproliferationconcerns by prohibiting the use of funds for the establishment of sucha plant unless Russia provides clear guarantees that it will not supplyfuel assemblies containing weapons-grade plutonium, or sensitive nucleartechnology related to the MOX facility, to any country of concern to theUnited States. This is essential given the nuclear-supply relationshipthat Russia has with countries such as Iran and India. Further, Section636 requires Russia to agree that the MOX facility will be subject to sufficientinternational safeguards to ensure that special nuclear material (e.g.,weapons-grade plutonium) is not diverted.