"Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military issues,particularly when the debate is based on press reports that are skewedto stress the importance of the story at the expense of objective perspectiveand the facts. Iran does represent a potential threat to U.S. interests,but it has not had a major conventional arms build-up or received destabilizingtransfers of advanced conventional weapons. The violations of U.S. andRussian agreements have been minor, have had little military meaning, andbeen more technical than substantive." (Anthony Cordesman, Iranian ArmsTransfers: The Facts, Center for Strategic and International Studies.)

We are appearing today to say what the administration has done overthe past seven years to address what we agree is a serious national securityproblem: Iran's quest to acquire advanced conventional and nuclear weaponsas well as the means to deliver them. But, we also want to address directlythe allegations we have heard about violations of laws and agreements purportedlykept secret from Congress. We will address what we can in this statement,but we are sure you understand that unauthorized disclosure of classifiedinformation does not mean it has been declassified. We still have an obligationto protect classified national security information. We are prepared toaddress detailed questions in closed session.

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the means to deliverthem, as well as advanced conventional weapons, has been a top foreignpolicy and national security objective throughout this and previous administrations.Most Western nuclear and arms exporters were by early 1995 in broad agreementon these matters, but Russia was clearly central to success. How to keepthe collapse of the Soviet Union from opening up a huge opportunity forIran to acquire these items by purchase or theft was one of the most complexand challenging problems the administration confronted as it took office.

We needed to address three separate challenges. First, we had to ensurethat political and economic collapse did not open the gates to the lossof control of Russia's expertise, equipment, and technology. Second, wehad to ensure Russia had the legal and enforcement tools to control itscapabilities. But most of all we needed to convince the Russian governmentthat serious and firm constraints on what it exported, and to whom, werecritical to Russia's own national and security interests.

The Soviet Union had been a primary exporter of conventional arms andnuclear technology, but the end of the Cold War deprived it of its foreignmarkets, and domestic military requirements were shrinking at the sametime. In 1991 and 1992, Russia began to pursue the Iranian conventionalarms and nuclear market in earnest. In 1991 Russia concluded a large, multi-yearconventional arms contract. In 1992 it concluded a nuclear cooperationagreement with Iran. It is these two agreements -- which predate the Clintonadministration -- that the administration had to contain and reverse. Atthe same time, Iran began to try to exploit the economic chaos and a lackof effective regulation to end-run the Russian government even when itdid want to block particular transactions.

To achieve these three critical objectives, the administration has pursueda complex and long-term strategy. We put innovative assistance programsin place to control technology and prevent the "brain drain" of Russianscientists and their expertise to other states. We used diplomacy to buildconsensus on the importance of restraint in exports and effective controlsto implement policy. We provided training and advice on sound export controls.Most important of all, we engaged all levels of the Russian governmentrepeatedly and relentlessly to persuade them to walk back from arrangementswith Tehran that were threatening not only to our security, but in theend to Russia's own interests. Where necessary, we used the threat of sanctions,and on occasion we imposed sanctions. This is not a strategy of immediategratification.

It has been a long and difficult effort, but it has produced significantsuccesses.

We have substantially constrained the types and quantities of conventionalmilitary equipment Iran is able to obtain. And we have slowed Iran's acquisitionof WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and delivery systems. Let me giveyou a one sentence summary of what we achieved: Russia promised that itwould not conclude new contracts for conventional weapons to Iran and itagreed not to provide to Iran most of the nuclear technology -- includingall the most dangerous types of that technology -- that it was proposingto sell. One measure of our success in restraining Russian export behaviormight be the many complaints from Russians directly, and in the Russianpress, that Russia has lost billions of dollars of conventional arms salesto Iran, and hundreds of millions of dollars of sensitive nuclear technologysales, due specifically to our efforts. We know that these understandingswere a good deal for the U.S., in part because of the Russian media commentatorsand politicians who argue that they are not in Russia's interests.

We will discuss in detail the efforts we made on the conventional andnuclear front, but first we want to address head on the accusations thathave been circulating. The first accusation is that we kept these actionssecret from you and the public. That is incorrect. Our actions both inthe conventional field and the nuclear field in 1995 were discussed publiclyat the May Moscow summit in extensive detail, as was the fact that theVice President and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin would resolve thedetails. That understanding between the Vice President and Russian PrimeMinister Chernomyrdin on conventional arms was announced publicly in afact sheet, also widely distributed, immediately after the June 1995 Gore-ChernomyrdinCommission meeting. The understandings the Vice President reached in 1995on both nuclear and conventional matters were briefed to Congress. Of course,certain sensitive documents were classified, and were closely held in theExecutive Branch. This is the common practice for all administrations onvery sensitive diplomatic negotiations, but the thrust of those documentshas been conveyed to both Congress and the American people.

The second accusation is that we reached a deal with Moscow to evadeour own law. This is not true. We agreed to provide assurances that wewould take "appropriate steps" to avoid penalties on transfers in the pipeline,but only after careful review to ensure that they did not in fact triggermandatory sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act or otherpotentially applicable laws. We will be prepared to discuss this in considerabledetail, but it is important to state in this open session that the conclusionof non-sanctionability was reached only after careful review and detailedanalysis by the State Department, the intelligence community, the DefenseDepartment, and senior levels of the Joint Staff.

Some have cited a sentence in a recently leaked classified letter ofthe Secretary of State as being inconsistent with this statement. The factis that Secretary Albright's letter was intended to deliver a stern warningthat failure to abide by the restrictions embodied in the Aide Memoireregarding arms sales to Iran could have serious consequences, includingthe possibility of sanctions. Her letter did not go into the nuances ofU.S. sanctions law. We can address this issue in detail in closed session.

The third accusation is that understandings we reached with the Russiansshould have been formally submitted to Congress under the Case Act because,it is alleged, they are legally binding. We did discuss with Russia whetherto negotiate an agreement that would be binding under international law,and after consulting agreed instead to address these matters in an understanding,a political promise by Russia documented first in a public joint statement.This understanding was elaborated in more detail in the Aide Memoire. Underthis understanding, Russia has not concluded new contracts for new weapons.It has not even delivered all the weapons it said it would. It has certainlyforegone billions in sales.

While important elements of our diplomatic efforts have required confidentiality,key to our success has been the fact that we have engaged Russia's leadershipat the most senior levels to make authoritative and public statements.Key commitments were made in joint statements or press conferences afterSummits between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1994 and 1995. AdditionalRussian commitments were articulated in public at the conclusion of meetingsbetween Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

While the substance of these understandings has been public since 1995,some details were kept confidential. Confidentiality is crucial to manydiplomatic negotiations. The diplomatic process on conventional arms transfershas fortunately not come to a halt because of recent leaks. But playingthis out in the press can only have a chilling effect on our ability tocontinue the process, and could seriously undermine the U.S. national securityinterests that are at stake in these discussions.

Conventional Weapons

The understanding that the U.S. reached with Russia in 1995 to limitthe sale of conventional weapons to Iran was an important gain for U.S.security, as well as for our friends and allies. The collapse of the SovietUnion in 1991 led to the rapid opening of new markets for conventionalarms. Russia was quick to sign a contract with Iran for the sale of a broadrange of conventional arms. This administration inherited the situationof an expanding arms relationship between Russia and Iran. The questionwas how to constrain it.

The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act urged the President to"urgently seek the agreement of other nations" to constrain arms salesto Iran and Iraq. We did just that, securing important commitments fromall countries that joined the Wassenaar Arrangement. They agreed not tosupply arms and related technologies to "countries of concern," understoodto include Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

Our ability to hold these other major supplier states to these commitmentshas always depended on maintaining a united front. If one key supplierwere to resume sales to Iran, it could be difficult to persuade othersto continue foregoing these highly lucrative sales. It was with this inmind that we sought the commitment of Russia to curtail arms sales to Iran.

During their September 1994 Summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton reachedan understanding that Russia would not undertake new contracts or otheragreements to transfer conventional arms to Iran, but that existing contractscould be fulfilled. President Yeltsin announced this understanding publicly.This matter was again on the agenda for the May 1995 Summit, and the subjectof public discussion even before the Summit. In a pre-Summit press briefing,Secretary of State (Warren) Christopher expressed hope that Russia wouldjoin the new multilateral regime to control exports of conventional weaponsand related dual-use technologies, stating that "the only thing that standsbetween Russia joining ... is working out the arrangements with respectto their sales to Iran, those negotiations are going forward." Secretaryof Defense (William) Perry, when asked about whether Russia's arms salesto Iran were a reason for alarm, spoke first of the submarines, notingthat two had been delivered and one remained to be delivered, and thenspoke to the more general issue:

We do not see cause for concern on the level and the nature of conventionalarms being transferred. We would prefer they not be transferred, but we're-- quite satisfied with the agreement not to continue transfer. The Russianshave a very, very substantial capability in conventional arms and conventionalarms technology. And it would give us a very substantial problem if theywere to make a free transfer of those to the Iranians. So I'd like to focuson the positive side of that, which is their agreement to cut that offafter those present contracts.

The May 1995 Summit resolved the outstanding issues, and a Joint Statementdated May 10, 1995, reaffirmed that Russia would "undertake no new contractsor other agreements to transfer arms to Iran. This commitment is comprehensiveand covers both arms and associated items." The Joint Statement also reaffirmedU.S. support for Russia's participation as a founding member in a new internationalexport control regime for the control of arms and sensitive dual-use goodsand technologies. It was also announced that same day that the Presidentshad asked Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin "to recordthe details in an agreement no later than their meeting in June." The AideMemoire recording those understandings was signed the following month.

The U.S. had little direct leverage; we were essentially asking Russiato forego billions of dollars in arms sales in exchange for membershipin a multilateral group that would only further constrain their arms sales.But we worked with the leverage that we did have, and through the doggeddetermination of our senior officials, Russia agreed to close out its existingcontracts within a few years and agreed not to sign new contracts for thesale of arms to Iran. Had not the U.S. secured this commitment, Russiawould have been free to provide Iran with advanced conventional arms, andgreater overall quantities of conventional arms. It would have been ableto sell Iran items such as surface-to-air missiles, items we know thatthe Iranians sought to acquire. Instead we were able to get Russia to commitnot to sign any new arms contracts with Iran, thus precluding the saleof weapons that could provide great threats to U.S. forces, to our alliesincluding Israel, and to stability in the region.

Of course we would have preferred to have stopped the sale of all conventionalarms to Iran. But this deal precluded the most advanced conventional weaponsfrom reaching Iran -- the very weapons that would have provided the greatestrisks to U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies (and the veryweapons targeted by the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act).

Much has been made in the press recently about whether the arms coveredunder the contract signed in 1991 would adversely affect U.S. security.There have also been accusations that the 1995 understanding was not consistentwith, or even violated, U.S. sanctions laws, and in particular, that acommitment was made to ignore U.S. sanctions law. A further accusationis that the understandings reached are legally binding obligations, andthat all this was kept from Congress. Let me address each of these allegationsin turn.

Was U.S. Security or Regional Stability Jeopardized?

As a key part of the process to resolve the issues addressed in theJoint Statement and the Aide Memoire, we insisted on an exchange of informationon these pre-existing contracts. The impact of all of the arms transferredor to be transferred, including the Kilo submarine, was reviewed by seniormilitary and defense officials, including senior levels of the Joint Staff.It was their judgment that transfers under those pre-existing contractswould not provide Iran with new military capabilities, alter the regionalmilitary balance, or compromise the ability of the U.S. and our alliesto protect our mutual security interests. They judged that the declaredpipeline contained no destabilizing types of advanced conventional weapons.This judgment extended to the third Kilo-class submarine that Russia deliveredin 1996. Our military judged that while the submarine represented an addedthreat to U.S. forces in the Gulf, it was judged to be manageable. As Dr.Perry noted publicly at the time, it was far better to obtain the commitmentfrom Russia to forego future sales of advanced conventional weapons ordestabilizing quantities of other types of military equipment.

Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House InternationalRelations Committee were informed about the understanding in 1995. Then-DeputyAssistant Secretary Robert Einhorn revisited this issue in open testimonyJune 5, 1997 before this Committee, noting that "Russia informed us thatone Kilo-class submarine was expected to be delivered to Iran" and thattanks were also to be delivered under the pre-existing contracts. "Priorto concluding the 1995 agreement we made certain that the contracts inthe pipeline did not involve any new weapons systems and would not alterthe regional balance or compromise the ability of the U.S. and our alliesto protect our mutual interests."

Frankly, these were hard calls -- but we made an informed decision withthe best advice available, and with the involvement of our senior military.We judged that we could best protect our security interests by constrainingfuture sales of Russian advanced conventional weapons, rather than notentering into the agreement and watching Russia proceed with sales of themost threatening weapons.

Were Sanctions Laws Ignored?

The 1995 understanding was fully consistent with U.S. law. The transferscovered under the Aide Memoire were not sanctionable.

The applicability of U.S. sanctions laws was explicitly addressed withinthe Executive Branch before we completed the 1995 understanding. Aftera review of the facts, and with specific input from and concurrence ofthe Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we concluded thatsanctions under the Iran-Iraq act would not be triggered because the itemsdid not meet the definition of "advanced conventional weapons" under theAct, as explained above, nor would the types and quantities of arms tobe transferred be destabilizing to the region. These conclusions are supportedby the terms of the Act and its legislative history.

In addition, before we concluded the Aide Memoire, State (Department)Legal Counsel reviewed other applicable statutes that govern transfersof lethal military equipment to Iran, and determined that these statutesdid not apply to the arms transfers identified under the agreement becausethe contracts had been entered into before the effective date specifiedin the legislation.

Some have alleged that the U.S. has not applied the sanctions laws toRussian transfers of conventional arms to Iran. That is not true, and indeedthe Committee has been previously informed of this in writing. We can reviewthis for you in detail in a classified setting.

Furthermore, the Aide Memoire does not commit the U.S. not to enforcethe sanctions laws, as has been erroneously suggested. The Aide Memoirenotes that the United States is prepared to take appropriate steps to avoidany penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under domestic law withrespect to the completion of the transfers disclosed in the Annex for solong as the Russian Federation acts in accordance with these commitments.

The phrase "appropriate steps" in a non-legally binding document clearlywould not compel the Executive Branch to ignore domestic law. It was draftedthis way specifically to allow us to enforce the law, bearing in mind theExecutive Branch in fact had legal means available to "avoid penalties"-- the waiver provisions in both of the potentially applicable statutes.As noted above, we have never had to take any steps pursuant to this pledge,for after reviewing the list of transfers that would be grand- fathered,we determined (before signing the Aide Memoire) that then existing sanctionslaws would not be triggered by the transfers.

Secretary Albright's January letter to (Russian) Foreign Minister Ivanovis entirely consistent with the purposes of the Aide Memoire and the Iran-IraqAct. Secretary Albright delivered a stern warning that failure to abideby the restrictions embodied in the Aide Memoire regarding arms sales toIran could have serious consequences, including the possibility of sanctions.In that letter, we were still seeking clarifications from the Russiansregarding the numbers and types of transfers that they wished to continuebeyond the December 31, 1999, deadline. At the time of the letter, thoseclarifications had not yet been received. Because it was essential thatthe U.S. obtain this information, we felt that it was appropriate to stressthe maximum consequences they might face, depending on further disclosuresabout Russian export activity. A variety of discretionary sanctions wereavailable to us under legal authorities other than the Iran-Iraq Arms NonproliferationAct and the lethal military equipment laws, (e.g., cutting off licensesunder the Arms Export Control Act).

We felt this approach would be most effective in persuading the Russiansto provide the needed information. And, indeed, this approach succeededin obtaining a reaffirmation of the Russian commitment to limit the scopeof the conventional weapons transfers to those items covered by the AideMemoire.

It has always been the case that the transfers subject to the Aide Memoiredo not trigger U.S. sanctions laws. That was our conclusion in 1995, andit has never changed.

Any transfers that are outside of the scope of the Aide Memoire couldof course trigger the sanctions laws, including the Iran-Iraq Arms NonproliferationAct and the lethal military equipment laws. We continue to monitor thisclosely, and we will apply the law to Russia, as we have in the past, ifRussia completes transactions that trigger sanctions.

Did We Make Legally-Binding Commitments?

As indicated in public statements from that period, we were preparedin 1994 to enter into a formal agreement providing legally binding commitments.After consulting with Russia on how to reflect our discussions, we insteadchose to proceed with political statements and understandings. Insistingon a formal legal approach would not have furthered our purpose to stopRussia from signing new arms contracts with Iran, nor would it have preventedRussia from making sales that were significant threats to U.S. interestsand U.S. security.

The 1995 Summit statements were clearly political undertakings madeby each side. The 1995 Aide Memoire recorded details of those politicalundertakings.

Contrary to speculation in the press, a document is not legally bindingsolely because it deals with an important matter and there are commitmentsmade by both sides. The two sides must intend for the document to be legallybinding. That was not the case here -- as amply demonstrated in the textand the negotiating record.

Was Congress Informed of these Understandings?

At no time did we attempt to keep the substance or existence of theseunderstandings hidden from Congress. They were the subject of White Housepress conferences both before and after the 1995 Summit, and the subjectof a Joint Statement from the Summit.

We also briefed Congress on these understandings and accomplishments.The House International Relations Committee staff was briefed in July 1995.Certain interested House Members, including Chairman (Ben) Gilman, werebriefed in August 1995. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has noted,it was briefed in mid-1995. And the understandings were recounted in openpublic testimony before Senate committees several times, including twicein 1997.

Nuclear Technology and Cooperation

The Executive Branch's policy on blocking nuclear cooperation with Iranis essentially unchanged since 1985. We have opposed the transfer of nucleartechnology to Iran even under international safeguards, because of ourconcerns about its nuclear weapon ambitions. Iran has lacked the technicalwherewithal to succeed in producing nuclear weapons. Key to constrainingIran's nuclear ambition is to deny it foreign technology. Since 1992, thegreatest challenge to that policy has been from Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Russia's massive nuclear industryof its entire foreign market and a significant fraction of its previousdomestic market. Economic imperatives drove Russia to market its nucleartechnology in places where it did not face Western competition. As a resultof the successful informal international embargo on nuclear transfers toIran that we had crafted, Iran was such a market.

Based on an agreement concluded in 1992, the Russians and Iranians announcedin 1994 and early 1995 their intentions to finish a power reactor originallystarted by the Germans in Bushehr. We were and still are opposed to thisreactor, not because we believe such a light-water power reactor underInternational Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards itself poses a serious proliferationthreat, but because of our concern that the Bushehr project would be usedby Iran as a cover for maintaining wide-ranging contacts with Russian nuclearentities and for engaging in more sensitive forms of cooperation with moredirect applicability to a nuclear weapons program.

This agreement between Russia and Iran also contained provisions foradditional power reactors, as well as other technology far more significantfor Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. We know that elements of the Russiangovernment were considering the transfer of centrifuge enrichment technologythat would permit production of highly enriched uranium, and a researchreactor of sufficient power to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Weknew there were plans to supply other key nuclear technologies. Altogether,this package of items would have greatly advanced Iran's ability to producenuclear weapons usable material.

The Clinton administration embarked on a high-level diplomatic campaignto halt this project. Following a series of exchanges between the Presidentand President Yeltsin, the Russians agreed to scale back their cooperationwith Iran very significantly in 1995. The results of that effort were reportedin The Nonproliferation Primer -- A Majority Report of the Subcommitteeon International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the SenateCommittee on Governmental Services:

"Although Moscow was unwilling to cancel the Bushehr project, in 1995the Administration did persuade President Yeltsin to limit the scope ofRussian nuclear assistance. Yeltsin approved the sale of nuclear reactors,but ordered Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy to drop plans to provideequipment and advice to Iran's effort to mine uranium ore and process itto use as reactor fuel -- assistance that would have given Iran an independentsource of fissile material for nuclear weapons. (p. 18)"

In fact, President Yeltsin agreed not to supply Iran with any technologythat would put at risk the international nonproliferation regime. Thisincluded the supply of uranium enrichment technology or the supply of reactorssuited for the production of plutonium. The culmination of this difficultdiplomatic campaign was the letter from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin toVice President Gore. That letter codified the limits Russia would imposeon itself in cooperating with Iran. Much of the substance was briefed tothe press before and especially after the May 1995 Moscow Summit. Thatsubstance has been described to Congress through open testimony and a seriesof classified briefings.

It did not give us everything we wanted, but it did eliminate thoseaspects of cooperation with Iran that presented a clear and present dangerto our national security. Without the limits the Russian government didimpose, Iran today would have received hundreds of millions of dollarsworth of sensitive nuclear technology and would be well on the way to masteringthe nuclear fuel cycle.

That is what the Chernomyrdin letter is. Now, let me say what it isnot.

It is not a secret agreement hidden from Congress. The text of the letterwas and is classified, just as have been many other confidential exchangesundertaken by this and past administrations. This was a highly sensitivediplomatic negotiation and publicity could well have brought it down. Theletter is still classified. We cannot discuss its contents in detail inan open session.

We want to be clear on a critical point. Confidentiality is crucialto many diplomatic negotiations. The diplomatic process on these mattersfortunately has not come to a halt because of recent leaks. But playingthis out in the press can only have a chilling effect on our ability tocontinue the process, and could seriously undermine the U.S. national securityinterests that are at stake in these discussions.

There is in fact a sentence in a letter -- quoted in the press -- thatindicates the Russians did not want us to brief Congress. That sentencehad no effect. We informed the Russians before the letter was sent thatwe would brief Congress, and we informed the Russians immediately uponits receipt that we would brief the matter to Congress. The Russians acceptedthis. We agreed that we would do this in a confidential manner as we dofor many sensitive negotiations. Briefings were offered to key Senate andHouse Members in the spring of 1996. Representatives of the National SecurityCouncil, the Office of the Vice President and the Department of State didthe briefings. Subsequently, we have updated this Committee and otherson the state-of-play of our efforts, both in open testimony and in classifiedbriefings.

The administration did not give up its opposition to the Bushehr reactor.We still oppose it. Our actions in persuading other countries not to participatein the project have slowed it down. But only a decision by the Russiangovernment could stop it. The Russian government has not been preparedto give up the reactor project, at least in part because of its big pricetag.

The administration has not turned a blind eye to Russian activities.Recently Russian entities -- some of them associated with the Ministryof Atomic Energy -- have pursued cooperation with Iran that is not consistentwith the Chernomyrdin assurances. We sanctioned two Russian entities inJanuary of 1999 as a result. We have also been unstinting in our day-to-daydiplomacy with the Russians to block any transfers. The administrationhas made a major effort over the past few months to bring Russian behaviorback into line with the assurance. We cannot report complete success, butlast month the Russians did suspend the activities of an institute in St.Petersburg that planned to transfer equipment related to a sophisticatedmeans of uranium enrichment.

I do not want to downplay the current problems we are facing on thenuclear front, but they are considerably less than what we would be facingtoday without the Chernomyrdin assurance. Faced with the choice of pursuingthis at times frustrating diplomatic effort and the alternative of unconstrainedRussian assistance to Iran, we would choose the former.

I want to conclude my remarks on a personal note. I have served as anonproliferation expert for Secretaries of State and administrations ofboth parties for nearly 20 years. The arrangements discussed here todayare manifestly in the interests of the United States and of the effortto halt nuclear proliferation. But, they have powerful opponents in Moscow.A partisan brawl that drags legitimately classified material into the newspapersas photo insets can only benefit Iran. If these arrangements are not inplace, Iran will be in position to acquire new reactors and a wide arrayof sensitive nuclear technology. That will not be in the interest of futureadministrations of either party or of the American people.

In Conclusion

Impeding Iran's WMD and missile delivery systems will remain at thetop of the U.S. national security agenda. Ensuring that Iran does not acquiredestabilizing types and quantities of advanced conventional weapons isalso critical.

Russia is key to both those objectives. We have no alternative but tocontinue an active strategy of seeking to thwart Iranian efforts to procurethe material and technologies they need for their non-conventional programs.That means engaging Russia directly and actively; working with them tostrengthen resolve; assisting them in strengthening export control lawsand regulations; and helping to make the implementation of those policies,laws, and regulations more effective. This is a step-by-step, incrementalprocess. There is no silver bullet, it is a problem that must be workedat many levels, from many directions, and worked continuously.

By any reasonable standard, our policies have been effective. Sincethe signing of the Aide Memoire, Russia has not concluded new agreementsto export arms to Iran, it has not exported advanced conventional armsto Iran, and in fact it has not even to date completed shipments underthe original 1991 agreement. Iran's efforts to acquire the types and quantitiesof arms that would threaten regional stability have been thwarted.

On the nuclear and missile programs, we see a similar story. We havesucceeded in slowing and complicating Iran's programs and driving up theircosts. We have closed off many of the world's best sources of advancedtechnology to Iranian procurement efforts, and forced Iran to rely on technologiesless sophisticated and reliable than would otherwise be the case. And critically,we have bought additional time. As Assistant Secretary for NonproliferationRobert Einhorn testified before this Committee just last month (September):despite the gains Iran has made, we do not consider it inevitable thatIran will acquire nuclear weapons deliverable by long-range missiles.

But avoiding that highly destabilizing outcome, or the threat of advancedconventional weapons in the region, will require continued leadership bythe United States and the concerted efforts of the international community,including the active commitment and cooperation of Russia. We have madeimportant steps. This will continue to be a key national security priorityfor this administration, and we will leave a vastly different situationthan would have been the case had we failed to limit Russia's nuclear andconventional arms exports to Iran.