With my tenure in office winding down, it's time to indulge in a bitof reflection.  I've thought about the arms control and non-proliferationrecord of the past few years, and I think we've accomplished some goodthings.  1) The dismantlement of thousands of strategic nuclear weapons;2) confirming the non-nuclear status of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan;3) the withdrawal from Western Europe of almost all of our tactical nuclearweapons; 4) the successful 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; 5)strengthened IAEA safeguards; 6) the CTBT negotiations; 7) CWC entry intoforce; 8) our on-going efforts to control nuclear weapons and materialin the former Soviet Union, including the plutonium disposition agreement- all  help bring about a more stable international environment.

But by nature I prefer to look forward, not back, and what I see isthat arms control faces some serious challenges.  Many critics weremore than happy to pounce on the Senate's CTBT vote as the "end of armscontrol."  Internationally, some suggest that our National MissileDefense efforts mean the U.S. has lost interest in working with othersto advance arms control, and prefers to go it alone.

But the emerging threat environment is diverse and rife with instabilities. WMD and missile technologies are increasingly accessible and to some, apparentlyirresistible.  In such an environment, arms control will remain vitalto international security and stability.  But it will have to evolvesomewhat - or at least, how we think about arms control will have to evolve. That's what I'd like to discuss a bit today by offering ten observations.

Thoughts, Observations, and Lessons

First, arms control must have as its preeminent objective strengtheningsecurity.

Like the U.K., the U.S. pursues arms control because it promotes oursecurity by limiting threats to our territory, our people, and our interests. We'd like to think that others approach arms control in the same way.

But we know this is not always the case.  Sometimes counties setunrealistic expectations of what can be attained.  Multilateral armscontrol in particular is too often treated by some as a "zero sum" struggleamong competing interests, instead of a "plus sum" endeavor in which allgain security.

Negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention are draggingin part because some non-aligned states insist that in exchange for a strongerBWC, we should be prepared to weaken export controls and the AustraliaGroup.  That's not a good bargain.

No country will negotiate agreements that go beyond its national interest. But if states truly seek the benefits of collective security measures,then they ought at least to try to find the convergence of collective andsovereign interests.

This happened just a few months ago in New York.  The NPT Reviewconference was held in a strained environment.  Yet Conference participantsproduced a final document that commanded consensus.

The skill of the Conference negotiators, Russian START II and CTBT ratificationon the eve of the Conference - all helped bring about this outcome. But the Conference succeeded because NPT parties recognized how profoundlythe Treaty was in their security interests.  No one had an interestin bending it out of shape, for example by misusing the review processto try to pry from the nuclear weapon states speedier disarmament thancircumstances permit.

Second, build coalitions with your friends.

During the CTBT and CWC negotiations, the NPT Review and Extension Conference,and many other times, the U.S. worked closely with the U.K., France andour other allies and friends to find common ground.  Working together,we increase incentives for others to negotiate more seriously.

Sometimes, of course, agreement is too much to hope for, particularlywhen we're also seeking consensus with Russia and China.  As our currentefforts on the BWC attest, it's hard enough to find common ground amongWestern states, or other aggregates of like-minded countries.  Thesovereign right to decide one's own self-interest generally will prevailover mutual security, where those are not one and the same.  But ifwe can't always agree, we need at least to consult and to work closely. The U.S. and U.K. have a strong tradition of doing this, which serves usboth.

Third, reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons should remain the centerpieceof our arms control efforts.

It's tempting to ask: with Russia's economy forcing it to reduce itsnuclear weapons anyway, why bother with nuclear arms control?

The answer is that we don't want to depend on something we earnestlyhope is temporary--Russia's economic distress--for long-term stability. So we should continue to pursue formal, negotiated agreements as the bestvehicle for locking in deep cuts, regardless of the direction of U.S.-Russianrelations or the state of Russia's' economy. And we want effective verification,best achieved through formal agreements.
 
There will be times when opportunities present themselves even whenthe formal START process is proceeding slower than we'd like.  We'vegot to seize those opportunities.  The 1991 and 1992 PresidentialNuclear Initiatives are good examples. Beginning in 1994, we and Russiastopped targeting each other with our nuclear forces.

But at the same time, we seek as much formality and verifiability aswe can, and in a host of new areas - shared early warning, safeguards andcontrols on Russia's nuclear materials and technology, steps to preventRussian nuclear scientists from selling their expertise to the highestbidder, regardless of how unsavory.  Cooperative Threat Reduction,plutonium disposition, the HEU agreement, incentives to curtail WMD andmissile cooperation with Iran -- such programs make up an increasinglybroad, and unmistakably essential, agenda to deal with the arsenals andthe residue of the Cold War.

Fourth, we need to pay greater attention to arms control implementation.

Signing a Treaty is only one step in the long, arduous process of realizingits promise.  It's not until implementation that weapons are actuallylimited or finally taken down. Implementation is where arms control doesits heavy lifting.

As more treaties come into force, implementation will require greaterfinancial, technical, and intelligence resources.  Under CTBT, statesparties must monitor for nuclear explosions conducted anywhere on earth. Under CWC, states need to be sure that none of the parties has produced,stored or used chemical weapons.  To support the NPT, the IAEA musthave an effective safeguards system to deter additional states from acquiringnuclear weapons.  These are immense challenges and significant responsibilities.

In the U.S., our budget requests come under detailed scrutiny by a skepticalCongress.  Arms control is beginning to produce "sticker shock." Nonetheless, just as we must be prepared to spend billions to deter oranswer threats, we should be prepared to spend millions to avoid them.

Fifth, we need to be realistic about verification.

Verification is a sine qua non of real arms control - how we know thatour Treaty partners are keeping their word.

But verification will never be perfect, and we should resist effortsby some to insist on that standard.  Few would suggest that we shouldwithdraw from the Biological Weapons Convention, for example, because itis difficult to ensure compliance; rather, we should improve it. But, given the nature of the technology, even a strengthened complianceregime, with mandatory declarations and on-site challenge inspections,will not give us full confidence that cheaters can be caught.

During last October's CTBT debate, tough questions about verificationwere asked.  Unfortunately, we never really had the opportunity toanswer them.  And of course, some of the answers are quite complex- not that we could detect any violation, but that we were confident thatwe could detect in a timely manner violations that could damage our security.

Each treaty will have its own, uniquely tailored verification regime,and in each case we need to consider a number of questions: How can nationaltechnical means best contribute? Does the treaty regime supply "value added"to our ability to monitor relevant events, which we need to do even withoutthe treaty?  At what point is our security at risk, if a treaty violationoccurs and is not detected?  Does the treaty regime create sufficientprobability of detection, so that a potential violator will be deterredin the first place?

If we can satisfactorily answer these and other such questions, we shouldbe able to support the regime.

Sixth, the hard proliferation cases need special approaches.

Generally speaking, states that join treaty regimes comply with them. But some key states, as recent experience with India and Pakistan tellsus, do not join, and others cheat.

I cannot offer a guaranteed formula for success.  That's why theseare called the "hard cases," to distinguish them from "easy" things likethe test ban, the BWC negotiations, and our efforts with Russia to adaptthe ABM Treaty.  But I am skeptical of "one size fits all" conceptsthat would gather all the problem countries in a room and offer the samebargain to them all - which could, for example, have us either promotinglight water reactors in Iran, or not supporting them for North Korea.

Dealing with these hard cases is best accomplished on a case-by-casebasis.  Concerted strategies need to focus on the specific circumstancesand unique incentives and disincentives that may help to foster a solution.

Seventh, once negotiated, arms control agreements should not be consideredimmune from re-examination.

This is not a new idea.  We agreed, for example, that Europe'ssharply altered political and security landscape warranted adjustmentsto the CFE Treaty, replacing bloc limits with national ceilings and affordingRussia greater flexibility in the disposition of its forces.

Now this issue has reared its head with respect to the ABM Treaty. The spread of missile technology, and the apparent ambitions of some statesfor ICBM capabilities, is creating a new security environment that cannotbe wished away.  Defenses may help address these challenges.

The ABM Treaty should be preserved as a cornerstone of strategic stability. But it will be more viable for the long term if it is also updated to accountfor threats that were not contemplated when it was negotiated nearly 30years ago.  The President's September 1 postponement of an NMD deploymentdecision gave us more time, but the issue will not go away.

Eighth, arms control should seek out and incorporate technological advances.

Science has become an arms control enabler.  The IAEA's StrengthenedSafeguards Protocol makes the case.  Building on technological advancessuch as highly sensitive environmental sampling, the Protocol will givethe Agency more capability, with broadened access, to detect activitiesat undeclared sites.

There is abundant potential to be plumbed.  Remote, unattendedsensors for monitoring; highly sophisticated data fusion and analysis techniques,to help manage and assess mountains of data; more rugged, portable anduser-friendly verification equipment, all may play a role.  I recalla few years ago being impressed by gas chromatograph-mass spectrometersshrunk from laboratory to briefcase size, so they could be taken to suspectedchemical weapon sites.  Now they are as small as cell phones.

Arms control can build on advances in basic sciences: smaller and moreefficient power sources for unattended sensors; expanded interoperabilitybetween systems; comprehensive signature libraries and phenomenology studies.

All this is but the tip of the iceberg, but the point is clear -- weneed to keep strengthening the nexus between arms control and technology. That was the aim of the interagency Nonproliferation and Arms Control TechnologyWorking Group that ACDA pushed to create; I'm pleased that it has carriedover into State.

Ninth, arms control will have to deal with non-governmental organizationsand non-traditional tools.

Governments will need increasingly to account for the views of business,the NGO community, and others.  Businesses are particularly affected,for example, as treaties such as the CWC expand inspection rights. The BWC protocol negotiations are dealing with this issue now.

NGOs have been forceful arms control advocates for many years. But Idon't think the "Ottawa process" is likely to be repeated.  In thatcase, NGOs took the lead in international efforts against anti-personnellandmines, and would accept nothing less than a complete ban.  Asa result, the Convention excludes many of the major producers and usersof landmines.  Absolutes don't fit well with the give-and-take neededto achieve arms control objectives.

But non-traditional tools for achieving traditional arms control objectivescan prove useful.  In some parts of the world, small arms have becomeweapons of mass destruction. Surely, there are creative measures to helpus address instabilities caused by their accumulation.

We want to conclude a Firearms Protocol to the UN Transnational OrganizedCrime Convention, to harmonize global export and import policies and helpstem the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking. We're also providing assistance to ensure the safe storage or destructionof surplus stockpiles of these weapons.  These steps won't solve theproblems, but they'll help.

Finally, a tenth observation, which reflects my own experience but mayhave some resonance with others:  Arms control practitioners needto stay in close touch with legislators and the public.

In the United States, we had assumed that the traditional bipartisanconsensus for arms control was intact.  The CTBT vote showed thatwe have some work to do.  Railing against the Senate is not the answer. They raised legitimate questions.  That is why, aided by former Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, we are tryingto work quietly with Senators on CTBT ratification.  We hope thiseffort will set the stage for resumed Senate consideration at a later date,with a different outcome.

The Senate's new National Security Working Group, which will help establisha better arms control dialog, is also a good step.  Strobe Talbottand I have gone up frequently to describe our discussions with Russiancounterparts on ABM Treaty issues. It's a tough audience. But I'd muchrather we be challenged during negotiations, than almost reflexively opposedduring ratification.

The bottom line is clear: if the U.S. is going to pursue an extensivearms control agenda, we'll have to do better at home.

Conclusion

I remain enthusiastic about the contribution arms control can make tointernational security.  But it does have to - and will -- evolve. As it does, we'll all be more secure and better off for it.

It's a challenge, and one I'm confident that the international communitywill meet.

Again, let me thank you for having me here today, and I hope I've leftenough time for some questions.