"The alternative to strategic pessimisn is not so much optimism, whichassumes a happy ending, as it is realism about the complexity of thechallenges and the uncertainty Russia faces," Talbott told aconference on "Russia at the End of the 2Oth Century" sponsored byStanford University's School of Humanities and Sciences.

"The policy that flows from realism is one of strategic patience andpersistence. That means continuing engagement. Even thoughinternational macroeconomic support of the kind that we providethrough the IMF [International Monetary Fund] must wait until theRussian government shows itself willing and able to make the difficultstructural adjustments necessary for recovery and growth, we will stayengaged."

By remaining engaged with Russia on a number of critical fronts --banking, energy, food, exchanges, and cooperative threat reduction --in the months ahead, Talbott said, "we will be demonstrating to theRussia government and the Russian people our determination not to giveup on them, even -- perhaps even especially -- in a time of troubles."

Following is text of Talbott's speech at Stanford University, asprepared for delivery:

(Begin text)

Gogol's Troika: The Case For Strategic Patience In A Time OfTroubles

An address by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, at aconference on "Russia at the End of the 2Oth Century," School ofHumanities and Sciences

Stanford University
Palo Alto, California
November 6, 1998

Thank you, Bill [former Secretary of Defense Perry], for thatintroduction and for the chance to work with you for four years. Isuspect that everyone here appreciates the crucial role that youplayed in managing U.S.-Russian relations. Just to cite one example:it is because of Bill Perry's statesmanship that Russian officers andtroops are keeping the peace in Bosnia today side-by-side with theforces of NATO.

There are lots of other friends and colleagues here, but I want tosingle out the mastermind and master of ceremonies of this conference,Grisha Freidin, who has been my friend and mentor for more than 25years.

The topic that Professor Freidin has assigned to all of us for ourhomework, "Russia at the End of the 20th Century," is especially onthe minds of President Clinton and Secretary Albright these days.That's for reasons that are obvious from the newspaper headlines.

But Russia is always on our minds, and that's for reasons that arereflected in history and literature. In the final passage of "DeadSouls," Nikolai Gogol compared his homeland to a troika, hurtlingacross the snowy steppe, while other nations "gaze askance" andwonder, along with Gogol himself, where this wild ride is headed. Acentury and a half later, quite a few Russians think the answer is:straight off the edge of a cliff.

I'm here with a different answer. Is Russia a troika-wreck waiting tohappen? Maybe, but not necessarily. More than other countries,Russia's future is in doubt, but that is not new. That was part ofGogol's point. Gloom and doom are no more justified now than waseuphoria a few short years ago. Yes, much of what is happening inRussia is obscure; yes, some of it is ominous. But this much is clear:the drama of Russia's transformation is not over; its ending isneither imminent nor foreordained; and the stakes, for us, are huge.

As the Russians seek to work their way out of their current crisis,they will be making decisions that determine what sort of relationshipthey can have with the outside world for decades to come. Russia'schoices will have a lot to do with what kind of world Americans livein, how safe we are, and how much we have to spend on our safety.Therefore, under two Administrations -- President Clinton's and whatI'll call here "the Rice Administration" -- the U.S. has beencommitted to encourage and assist Russia in its evolution towardbecoming a normal, modern, prosperous, democratic state at peace withitself and its neighbors, a full member and beneficiary of anincreasingly interdependent world community.

For the last decade or so, despite the zigs and zags, Russia has beenmoving in that direction. The question of the last several months iswhether Russia has, in some fundamental way, shifted course, headingat break-neck speed back to the future, or over the precipice.

That question arises because of the crisis, largely though not whollyself- inflicted, that has befallen the economy. Less than a year ago,Russia seemed to be poised for an economic take-off. But then internalweaknesses combined with outrageous fortune, especially the worldwidefall in commodity prices, to stampede the government into thedevaluation of the ruble and a partial default on many of its debts.In a matter of a few weeks this past summer, Russians saw much oftheir savings evaporate, many of their banks go belly-up, the bottomfall out of their fledgling stock market, goods disappear from stores,and a burgeoning middle class sent reeling.

Even before Black Monday, August 17, and the crash that followed, themood had already changed dramatically in ways that are captured byseveral of the papers that have been presented at this conference. Forexample, what Peter Holquist calls "Soviet exceptionalism" had longsince given way, first, to post-Soviet relief, then topost-post-Soviet letdown -- to reform fatigue on the part of the eliteand to a backlash against reform on the part of the citizenry.

Another participant in the conference, Natalya Ivanova, has referredto the late `8Os and the `9Os as smutnye (dark and troubled) years.They were also, of course, chudyesnye (a time of miracles). They werethe years when Russia won for itself unprecedented economic andpolitical freedom and when Russia liberated its former satellites andfellow inmates in the prison house of nations. But Dr. Ivanova isright about the perceptions, disappointments and anxieties of manyRussians today.

Language itself has been turned on its head. As the `9Os unfolded,"reform" and "market" went from being part of the vocabulary oftriumph and hope to being, in the ears of many Russians, almostfour-letter words. The noun "kapitalizm" came increasingly to bemodified with the adjective "dilyt" (savage). Accordingly, "the West"went from being an object of emulation to a target of resentment. Inthe meantime, another word, "left" has come back into fashion. TheCommunist Party of the Russian Federation and its parliamentary allieshave called for a "return" to a compassionate, paternalistic andpervasive state that looks out for workers, soldiers and pensioners.

The composition of Russia's new government, led by Prime MinisterPrimakov, is representative of this mood and of these trends. It haslargely rejected what its officials call the "Western" way of managingtheir economy; they are groping for a "Russian" way instead.

Oksana Bulgakowa's paper explains what the Russian way means inarchitecture: phantasmagoric kickoffs of Stalinist monuments, czaristpalaces and pre-Christian temples, appealing to nostalgia for asupposedly simpler, nobler past. But what does the Russian way mean ineconomics? Part of the answer is paying wages and pensions andreviving the industrial sector, which are sensible, indeedindispensable goals. Our concern is that, in trying to reach thosegoals, the Primakov team is prepared to abandon a stable currency, aviable exchange rate and a sound monetary policy. It is operating withneither a realistic budget nor a credible system for collecting taxes.That means Russia is at the mercy of the printing press, cranking outrubles to meet payrolls and keep bankrupt enterprises afloat.

The point here is that the economic rules that the custodians of theRussian economy are threatening to defy are not so much "Western" asthey are a matter of simple arithmetic. Since the numbers don't addup, the intended remedies only aggravate the disease. Inflation isalmost 50% higher than it was a year ago; many Russian banks areunable to meet the repayment obligations on their outstanding loans;billions of dollars in capital have fled the country since August.

There is another consequence, too: It has become all but impossiblefor the International Monetary Fund to weigh in with macroeconomicstabilization funds that might help in arresting and reversing theslide. Money from outside will do no good if it is inflated away or ifit pauses only briefly in Russia before ending up in Swiss bankaccounts and Riviera real estate.

Without external support, it is likely that the Russian governmentwill face three disagreeable choices: 1) crank the printing presseseven faster, 2) plunge deeper into default, or 3) stop paying wagesand pensions and conducting basic government functions. Whatevercombination of these measures the government adopts, Russia's economicsituation is likely to deteriorate further.

Economic decline carries with it the danger of political drift,turmoil, and even crackup.

Why is Russia in this situation? Part of the answer is the drag ofrecent history. Russia's 74-year experiment with Communism is like ablack hole; the Soviet system imploded eight years ago, yet this deadstar, even though it emits no light, still exerts a powerfulgravitational pull that threatens to suck Russia backward and inward.

But that is by no means all that is happening in Russia today.Political and economic culture are not immutable; they're not likeastrophysics; the dynamics by which they operate can change -- andchange for the better. Over time, the tug of the Soviet experiencewill weaken.

That process will take a generation or more, not least because part ofthe process is, precisely, generational. There is an irony here:because the disintegration of the Soviet system was remarkablypeaceful, many of those who had been vested in, and responsible for,the old order are now shaping the new one. That's the bad news,reflected in the dismal economic statistics. The good news is in theactuarial tables. The young have certain advantages over the old inthe struggle for over future.

Another factor shaping and guiding Russia is globalization. Thatcountry today is part of the world to an extent and in a way that itnever was in the past. Russia's susceptibility to the Asian contagionhas been a reminder of the downside of globalization. But there is anupside too: counteracting the old temptations of autarky andregression are new and powerful forces pulling Russia outward andforward, toward integration, not just integration with the globalmarketplace but also with what Manuel Castells and Emma Kiselyovadescribe, in their paper, as the global "network society." Literallyand figuratively, Russia is now plugged into the rest of the world,through cellular telephones, fax machines, modems and PC's.

This trend has been under way for some time. In the `70s and `80s,Russia was Exhibit A for the proposition that George Orwell'snightmare vision for 1984 was wrong: the communications revolutionweakened Big Brother rather than strengthening him. The quantum leapin the number of Russians who travel abroad and surf the Internet mayyet turn out to be what Professor Castells and Dr. Kiselyovi call "thedynamic core" of Russian modernization and thus constitute a hedgeagainst the old Big Brother's ever making a comeback.

Because it has occurred against this backdrop, democratization hastaken hold surprisingly quickly and proved remarkably durable. ThePrimakov government came into being because President Yeltsin and theParliament played by the rules of a post-Soviet constitution that wasapproved by popular referendum. That is not, to put it mildly, the wayRussian politics worked in the past. Russians of almost all stripesseem to cherish their new freedom and responsibility to vote freely,fairly and often; many are suspicious of grand schemes that feature anall-powerful state as the panacea to their problems.

Still, it is too early to proclaim Russian democratizationirreversible. The longer the economic meltdown continues and the moreserious it becomes, the harder it will be for Russia to sustain andconsolidate the various institutions and habits of what might becalled political normalcy: constitutionalism, give-and-takecompromises, constituency politics, coalition building, all of whichneed for their sustenance an atmosphere of pluralism, vigorous publicdebate and open media.

Therefore the principal point of suspense today is whether the newcooperation between the executive and legislative branches will prove,over time, conducive to mote rationality and common sense in theeconomic sphere.

By the same token, depending on how far and for how long the pendulumswings to the left, Russian foreign and defense policies could alsocome under the sway of nationalism in its more contentious,self-delusional and self-isolating form call it post-Sovietexceptionalism. As Russia asserts its own special needs and distancesitself from the West on the economic front, we may be in forheightened tensions over security and diplomatic issues.

But, friends and colleagues, so far that has not happened. The UnitedStates and Russia today are still cooperating far more than we arecompeting; we are still agreeing more than we are disagreeing. Andwhere we disagree, we are, by and large, managing our disagreements.

Whether that continuity can be sustained will depend in part onwhether Prime Minister Primakov and Foreign Minister Ivanov let thepolicy preferences of a dyspeptic Duma and an often combative elitegreatly influence the work of that Stalin-gothic skyscraper thathouses the Foreign Ministry on Smolenskaya Square, where Mr. Primakovhimself worked until September 11.

The pressure is likely to mount. The mood in the Duma is bilious. Manyparliamentary deputies depict the unresolved issues between the U.S.and Russia in terms of concessions that we Americans are supposedlytrying to extract from them or as favors we are asking them to do forus.

Nothing could further from the truth. Virtually every issue between uscan be boiled down to a matter of mutual interest and mutual benefit.Russia needs an effective non-proliferation regime since Russiancities would be vulnerable if its most dangerous technology ends up inthe wrong hands. Russia needs strategic arms reduction since it cannotafford to maintain its arsenal at Cold War levels. And Russiadefinitely needs a collaborative relationship with Europe, includingwith NATO and the European Union.

Peter Holquist's paper describes how the Soviet experience deepenedRussia's sense of not really belonging to Europe. Post-Soviet Russiahas already gone a long way toward joining the European mainstream. Itis now a member of the G-8; the Council of Europe, the Arctic Council,the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Permanent Joint Council createdby the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Contact Group on the Balkans.

To its credit and benefit and to ours as well -- Russia has gone frombeing a spoiler to a joiner.

However, whether this trend in Russian foreign policy continues isalso a matter of some suspense. How Russia defines its role in theworld and its relations with other states will depend crucially on howit defines itself and its own statehood.

My friend and former colleague Chip Blacker led a discussion on thistopic earlier today. On that panel, Sergei Koruinov raised what insome ways is "vopros voprosov," the question of questions: what isRussia's national identity? Gogol was grappling with the same questionin "Dead Souls." The quandary has become even more acute and vexingsince the end of the Soviet period of Russian history, when manyRussians felt that their Motherland was, virtually overnight, deprivedof its name, its flag, nearly half of its territory, its definingideology, its governing structure and its protective alliance.

So what is the idea of Russia today? As Sergei makes clear, it'seasier to answer that question in the negative than in the positive."The new Russia," he says, "is not the Soviet Union; nor is she theold Russian empire." Rather, "Russia's new borders, possibilities,culture, civilization, inner development have all contributed tomaking Russia a new state."

Yes, but what kind of a new state? I gather Chip & Company reached aconsensus around another negative answer: whatever Russia becomes, itwill never again be a monolith, in which political power flows rigidlyfrom the top down and from the center outward. I agree. Thatparticular Humpty-Dumpty can't be put together again. Russia today isa crazy-quilt of regions with wildly different economic and politicalstructures. Some parts of the country are, at least relativelyspeaking, oases of liberalization. For example, Novgorod, NizimyNovgorod, Samara, Leningrad and Sverdlovsk oblasts. Others remainJurassic-like theme parks of Soviet-era policies and personalities. Towit: Kursk, Krasnodar, Belgorod, Pskov, Volgograd. A few are simplyweird, like Kalmykia, where President Ilyuzhimov reigns as a kind ofWizard of Oz. Emil Pain's paper describes regionalization run amok inhis Scenario 4.

The new Russia, like its predecessor the Soviet Republic, calls itselfa Federation. But the term "federation" is like "reform" and "market":Russia has yet to define what it means. Grisha Freidin could help.Indeed, he has helped: in 1990, he translated into Russian anddistributed, under the imprint Chaliaze publications, this little bluebook: "The Federalist Papers." It offers a home truth that is simple,that is global, and that is more valid at the end of the 20th centurythan it was when Hamilton, Madison and Jay were writing their essaysat the end of the 18th: a successful state especially one thatstretches the length of Eurasia -- must make its diversity a source ofstrength; it must foster governance on a scale that allows citizens tofeel connected to decisions that affect their lives.

American diplomacy recognizes the devolution of power downward fromthe top and outward from Moscow. Our ambassador in Moscow, JimCollins, and his colleagues make a point of fanning out around thecountry, working with grass-roots organizations, developing relationswith Russia's governors and mayors (more than 100 of whom are 35 oryounger). We'll do everything we can, despite budgetary stringencies,to make the most of our three regional outposts -- theconsulate-generals in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinberg, and Vladivostok.

Mr. Primakov is also reaching out to the regions. In his speech to theDuma the day he was confirmed as Prime Minister, he said that hispriority was "yedinstvo" -- the unity of Russia -- thus clearlyimplying that the matter is in some doubt, even in some jeopardy. Formany Russians, angst about their future is compounded by suspicionabout the U.S.'s strategic intentions. The Russian press has carriednumerous articles suggesting that under the guise of "partnership,"the U.S. is pursuing a hidden agenda not only to keep Russia weak butto bring about its fragmentation.

Once again, nothing could be further from the truth. The U.S. supportsa unitary Russian state, within its current borders. The violentbreakup of Russia would be immensely dangerous and destabilizing. WhenCzechoslovakia split in two in 1992, it was called the velvet divorce.But multiple divorces among, and perhaps within, the 89 regionalentities of Russia would almost certainly not be velvet. The horrorthat has unfolded over the past several years in the Balkans might bereplayed across eleven time zones, with 30,000 nuclear weapons in themix.

This afternoon Emil Pain argued that that apocalyptic danger hasreceded. We must certainly hope so. The ability of Mr. Primakov andhis successors to preserve unity will depend in no small measure ontwo issues. One is how they handle the economy in general and theruble in particular. A nation's currency is a key manifestation andunderpinning of its sovereignty -- and its unity. This century hasalready shown that hyperinflation can destroy states, or turn theminto monsters.

The other defining issue for Russia's "gosudarstvennost" -- thecoherence and viability of its sense of its own statehood -- is howits leaders, now and in the future, handle relations with theirimmediate neighbors. As has often been the case when empires dissolve,the ethnographic map -- in this case, of "post-Soviet space" -- doesnot coincide with the new political one. Many members of the Russianelite feel the loss of empire like a phantom pain in a lost limb, notleast because the dissolution of the USSR stranded twenty-five millionfellow ethnic Russians on the far side of what became, eight yearsago, international borders. Those Russians now outside of Russiarightfully want to be full citizens of their newly sovereignhomelands. Any grievances they have, legitimate or otherwise, playinto the hands of ultra-nationalists back in Russia. That is one ofmany reasons why we have advocated the adoption of citizenship laws inthe Baltic states that meet international norms of inclusive,multi-ethnic democracy.

By and large, Russia has kept irredentist impulses largely in check.Not long after the breakup of the USSR, President Yeltsin made anhistoric decision: he affirmed the old interrepublic borders as thenew international ones. He has, at several key points, repudiated themore bellicose claims of his noisier opponents.

But just because Russia has been relatively restrained to date doesnot mean it will be so forever. Mr. Pain warns in his paper that thethreat to Russia's future, and indeed to its integrity as a state,comes not from secessionism on the part of its own ethnic minorities-- Chechens, Tatars, Yakuts, Chukchis, Kalmyks, Ingush, Ossetians,Mordovians -- but from what he calls "maniacal great-powerchauvinism...xenophobia and national close-mindedness" on the part ofsome forces within the Russian majority. He is referring to Russianswho would like to make expansionist or annexationist common cause withRussian minorities in the so called "near abroad." He singles outCrimea, northern Kazakhstan and Transnistria, in Moldova, as the flashpoints.

Georgia might be added to the list, not because of the Russianminority there (which is small), but because of a temptation on thepart of some in Russia to fish for geopolitical advantage in thetroubled waters of Georgian ethnic disputes and political vendettas.The short-sightedness of this sort of mischief-making is a lessonRussia should already have learned. In 1993, Russia fanned the flamesof the Abkhazian secessionist movement, only to find that sparks fromthat conflict jumped from the Southern Caucasus to the NorthernCaucasus, contributing to what became the conflagration in Chechnya.

On the positive side of the ledger, in the last couple of years Russiahas begun cooperating more with the United Nations and theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the quest forpeaceful settlements in the various civil wars, secessionist strugglesand ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Still, anxieties among Russia's neighbors about how Moscow will handleits relations with them have only grown in the last several months,now that some of the more nationalistic elements in the Duma havebecome partners-in-power with the executive branch. There is moreskepticism than ever among the non- Russian member states of theCommonwealth of Independent States about the future of thatorganization. Whether it survives and prospers will depend in largemeasure on whether it evolves in a way that vindicates the name. Ifits largest member tries to make "commonwealth" into a euphemism for asphere of influence or an infringement on the independence of itsneighbors -- then the CIS will deserve to join that other set ofinitials, USSR, on the ash heap if history.

U.S. policy will continue to focus not just on Russia but on itsneighbors as well. We want to see all the new independent states ofthe former Soviet Union survive, and thrive, to become "old"independent states, just as we want to see Russia's own fullintegration into what might be called the global commonwealth ofgenuinely independent, mutually respectful states.

A final point -- not so much about Russia as about the American viewof Russia. Part of Russia's problem is, as Gogol put it, that the restof the world "gazes askance" at what is happening there. The image ofRussia in the mind of America is increasingly ugly. It has become acliche of Hollywood to depict Russia not just as a fallen state but asa criminal one. Here are just a few examples: "Crimson Tide," "TheJackal," "The Saint," "Goldeneye," "The Peacemaker," "Air Force One,""Ronin," even "Blues Brothers 2000." In every one, Central Casting hasprovided as villains Russian mafiosi, renegade generals and formerKGBniks, usually trafficking in loose nukes and dirty money.

This image of feral Russia on the silver screen is mirrored inadventure comic books, on op-ed pages, in fire-and-brimstonestatements on the floor of Congress and at conferences of academicsand think-tank experts. According to a new conventional wisdom,"smutnoye vremya" -- the Time of Troubles -- is Russia's naturalstate; the phenomenon we have witnessed over the last dozen years --what many Russians, rightly celebrated as Russia's winning for itselfeconomic and political freedom and liberating its former satellitesand fellow inmates in the prison house of nations -- now looks like afalse spring in the midst of the endless Russian winter. Russians, itis often implied, are destined to live in a Hobbesian state of nature,exiled by the twin curses of history and geography from the civilsociety envisioned by John Locke; a predisposition to authoritarianrule at home and aggressive behavior abroad is encoded in their genes.

This kind of strategic pessimism, if it were to be the basis of U.S.policy, would lead, at a minimum, to disengagement with Russia -- atime-out, a pull- back, a heavy dose of benign neglect. The Russiansare so cranky and confused, it is suggested, that perhaps we shouldgive them a breathing space -- a "peredyshka" -- even if they use itto drive Gogol's troika right off the edge of that cliff.

Some serious commentators and political figures go a step further,suggesting that it is time to dust off that old bumper sticker thatsummarized U.S. policy toward Russia for nearly five decades:containment. I've even heard the word "quarantine" suggested as themost prudent way to deal with what ails Russia.

This bleak view of Russia's future is, at a minimum, premature. It mayturn out to be dead wrong. Or, perversely, we could make it come true,since if we write Russia off and brace ourselves for a new Cold War,our pessimism could become self-fulfilling. Russia will make its ownchoices and often its own mistakes, but it will make both in no smallmeasure in response to us.

The alternative to strategic pessimism is not so much optimism, whichassumes a happy ending, as it is realism about the complexity of thechallenges and the uncertainty Russia faces. That is a mindset thatassumes nothing, that does not prejudge the future, that is ready foranything, not just the worst. The policy that flows from realism isone of strategic patience and persistence. That means continuingengagement. Even though international macroeconomic support of thekind that we provide through the IMF must wait until the Russiangovernment shows itself willing and able to make the difficultstructural adjustments necessary for recovery and growth, we will stayengaged in four key areas:

-- THE BANKING SECTOR. The silver lining of the collapse of thebanking system is that it has created an opportunity to create realbanks that do real business, rather than just engage in speculationand arbitrage.

-- THE ENERGY SECTOR. Russia will need close to $ 15 billion a yearinvested in its energy sector for each of the next seven or eightyears just to get back to 1988 production levels. Western energycompanies want in. But they will not invest in long-term projectsunless the tax regime is clear, property rights are secure and theycan take disputes to international arbitration. Russia knows the lawsit needs to pass. And now is the time when Russian oil companies needto make clear to their legislators that foreign investment is notselling the patrimony but preserving it from destruction.

-- FOOD. Russia's bad luck over the past year included the worst grainharvest in 45 years. Despite large stocks from last year, it could useup all current food supplies by the end of the winter. The far northand the east will be hard hit, as will vulnerable groups in big citieswho cannot afford to pay high prices. We have told the Russians thatwe are willing to help, and we are discussing the options. The keyfactor in whether we go forward is whether the Russians have a clearstrategy for distribution and accountability, and we getincontrovertible assurances exempting any food assistance we providefrom customs and taxes.

-- EXCHANGES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. These arepeople-to-people programs designed to broaden the base of support inRussia for open society and rule of law. We will keep using some ofthe money available to us under the FREEDOM Support Act to bring localpoliticians, entrepreneurs and NGO representatives to the U.S. onexchanges, and to strengthen regional development. We will alsocontinue to encourage Russia's participation in the global networksociety through programs like our Internet Access and TrainingProgram, which connects libraries, universities and schools acrossRussia with each other and with counterpart institutions around theworld.

-- COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION. The U.S. is safer today because ofthe investment we have made in our own security through initiativeslike the Nunn-Lugar program, which helps Russia dismantle its mostlethal weapons in accord with treaties like START I and the ChemicalWeapons Convention. We will continue to work with the Russians to helpthem meet the financial costs of compliance with internationalarms-control and non-proliferation agreements.

By remaining engaged with Russia on all of these critical fronts inthe months ahead, we will be demonstrating to the Russian governmentand the Russian people our determination not to give up on them, even-- perhaps even especially in a time of troubles; we will keepplugging away at the task of supporting the many passengers in Gogol'stroika who long to live in what they call "a civilized country." Theiraspirations and their eventual answer to the question of questions mayyet coincide with our own longterm interests.

That outcome is far from a certainty, but it is not an impossibledream either. Rather it is a possibility that we must, for our sake aswell as theirs, do everything we can to keep alive.