Expressing their desire to cooperate with each other to elaborate measuresdesigned to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks of plutonium andto reduce them in the future;

Taking into account the intent of the Government of the Russian Federationto take out of operation three presently operating reactors that produceplutonium and that provide heat and electricity to regions where they arelocated, and to create alternative sources of heat and electricity;

Taking into account the shutdown by the United States of America of all ofits plutonium production reactors as of 1989;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. All reactors listed in Annex I to this Agreement, which is an integralpart of this Agreement, have ceased operations. These reactors shall notresume operation.

2. All reactors listed in Annex II to this Agreement, which is an integralpart of this Agreement, shall cease by December 31, 2000, their productionof non-reactor-grade plutonium by undergoing modification. After the completion of modifications, these reactors shall permanently cease operation at the end of their normal lifetime, consistent with prudentsafety considerations.

Article II

1. The U.S. Party shall provide, subject to the availability of appropriated funds for this purpose, and subject to the Agreement betweenthe Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministryof the Russian FederatiOn for Atomic Energy Concerning the Modification ofthe Operating Seversk (Tomsk Region) and Zhelezoogorsk (Krasnoyarsk Region) Plutonium Production Reactors, which will be governed as specifiedin Article I, paragraph 4, of that agreement and overseen as specified inArticle VI of that agreement, step-by-step funding for cooperativeimplementation of the reactor modifications specified in Article I,paragraph 2, of this Agreement.

2. Provision of funds as described in paragraph 1 of this Article will bebased on the achievement of cooperation project milestones to be agreedbetween the U.S. Party and the Russian Party. In the event that the Russian Party should fail to achieve an agreed cooperation project milestone or the U.S. Party should fail to provide an agreed level ofassistance, including funding, to support an agreed cooperation projectmilestone, either Party may request consultations to determine how best toachieve the objectives of this Agreement under those circumstances. Theseconsultations shall begin within 30 days of such a request. If after 180days from the beginning of consultations, the Parties do not reachagreement, each Party shall have the right to suspend, until such agreement is achieved, implementation of this Agreement by sending theother Party, through diplomatic channels, appropriate written notification. The consultations specified in this paragraph shall continueuntil agreement is reached or, if this is not possible, until the termination of this Agreement, using the procedures provided for in Article XI, paragraph 4, of this Agreement.

Article III

For the purposes of this Agreement, the cessation of plutonium productionspecified in Article I, paragraph 2, will require the cessation of production by the reactors listed in Annex II to this Agreement of spent fuel containing plutonium whose combined Pu-240 plus Pu-238 isotopicconcentration is less than 20 percent of total Pu, averaged over the totalfuel discharged in any one batch. Once each reactor listed in Annex II tothis Agreement is modified, it will utilize an alternative type of fuelincluding uranium derived from dismantled nuclear weapons.

Article IV

The plutonium produced after entry into force of this Agreement in thereactors identified in Annex II to this Agreement, and any high-enricheduranium recovered from spent fuel discharged from the modified reactors,shall not be used in nuclear weapons.

Article V

Procedures necessary to assure compliance with the obligations providedfor in Articles I, III, and IV of this Agreement are contained in AnnexIII, which is an integral part of this Agreement.

Article VI

1. In order to prevent access to it by people and organizations notparticipating in the implementation of this Agreement, informationtransmitted under this Agreement may be considered as sensitive by theParties. Such information must be clearly designated and marked. The Partytransmitting the information shall designate information as sensitive inaccordance with its internal laws and regulations. The Party receiving theinformation shall handle this information as sensitive.

2. Sensitive information shall be handled in accordance with the laws andregulations of the Party receiving the information, and this informationshall not be disclosed or transmitted to a third Party not participatingin implementation of this Agreement without the clearly expressed consentof the Party transmitting the information. According to the regulations ofthe United States, such information shall be treated as foreign governmentinformation provided in confidence and shall be protected appropriately.According to the regulations of the Russian Federation, such informationshall be treated as official information with limited distribution andshall be protected appropriately.

3. The Parties shall assure effective protection of and allocation ofrights to intellectual property transmitted or created under thisAgreement, as set forth in this Article and in Annex IV to this Agreement,which forms an integral part of this Agreement.

4. Information transmitted under this Agreement must be used solely forthepurposes established by this Agreement in accordance with the laws, regulations, and mutual interests of the States represented by theParties.

5. The number of people having access to sensitive information must belimited to the number necessary to implement this Agreement and otherprograms associated with this Agreement.

Article VII

In order to ensure the possibility of taking the reactors listed in AnnexII to this Agreement out of operation, the Russian Party shall undertaketo create alternative sources of thermal and electrical energy to replacethese reactors by the time of their final shutdown. To assist this effort,the U.S. Party will encourage private sector participation in the creationof replacement sources of energy. The U.S. Party does not guarantee theparticipation of the private sector in these activities, and its degree ofsuccess in this effort shall not alter in any way the obligationsundertaken by the Parties in this Agreement.

Article VIII

The Parties shall designate Executive Agents to implement this Agreementand its Annexes and Subsidiary Arrangements as follows: for the U.S. Party, the Executive Agents shall be the Department of Defense for implementation of Article II and the Department of Energy for theimplementation of the remainder of the Agreement and its Annexes andSubsidiary Arrangements; for the Russian Party, the Executive Agent shallbe the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy. Afterconsultation with the other Party, either Party shall have the right tochange its Executive Agent upon 30 days' written notice to the other Party.

Article IX

To ensure achievement of the objectives and implementation of thisAgreement, the Parties hereby establish a Joint Implementation andCompliance Commission (JICC), which shall convene no later than 21 daysfollowing the request of either Party, unless otherwise agreed. The tasksof the JICC shall include the following:

• To review implementation of this Agreement, to include resolution, bymutual agreement, of any implementation issues;
• To consider questions concerning implementation and effectiveness ofmonitoring procedures;
• To resolve any disputes that may arise regarding compliance with theprovisions of this Agreement or its Annexes or Subsidiary Arrangements;and
• To discuss and, if necessary, prepare recommendations concerning anyamendments to this Agreement or its Annexes or Subsidiary Arrangements, aswell as proposals for resolving any disputes that cannot be resolved inthe JICC.

In the event of conflict between the provisions of this Agreement and anyAnnexes or Subsidiary Arrangements to this Agreement, the provisions ofthis Agreement shall prevail.

Article XI

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature on the same dateasthe implementing agreement specified in Article II, paragraph 1, of thisAgreement.

2. This Agreement may be amended by agreement between the Parties. Anysuchamendment shall enter into force upon signature.

3. Each of the Subsidiary Arrangements shall be considered to be an integral part of their respective Annex to this Agreement under the condition, however, that they can be changed and added to by agreementbetween the sides represented by their Executive Agents as they aredescribed according to Article VIII of this Agreement.

4. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party by sending written notice through diplomatic channels of its intent to terminate this Agreement, in which case this Agreement terminateS after one year from thedate of sending this notification. Termination of this Agreement shall notaffect the following:

• The provisions of Article VI shall continue in effect; and
• The obligations provided for in Article IV of this Agreement, and theassociated compliance procedures, shall continue in effect with respect toplutonium produced at the reactors listed in Annex II to this Agreementbetween entry into force of this Agreement and the date of its termination. The procedures specified in Annex III of this Agreement ceaseto be applicable to this plutonium when the plutonium is being used forneeds that are not inconsistent with the objectives of this Agreement, asdetailed in Annex III.

Lists of Shutdown Plutonium Production Reactors

In The Russian Federation

1. Ozersk
   • A Reactor
   • IR-AI Reactor
   • AV-1 Reactor
   • AV-2 Reactor
   • AV-3 Reactor
2. Zheleznogorsk
   • AD Reactor
   • ADE-1 Reactor
3. Seversk
   • I-1 Reactor
   • I-2 Reactor
   • ADE-3 Reactor

1. Hanford
   • B, C, D, DR, F, H, KE, KW, and N Reactors
2. Savannah River
   • K, L, P, R, and C Reactors

Lists of currently Operating Plutonium Production Reactors

In The Russian Federation

1. Zheleznogorsk
   • ADE-2 Reactor
2. Seversk
   • ADE-4 Reactor
   • ADE-S Reactor

None


Annex III Concerning Compliance Procedures To The Agreement Between TheGovernment Of The United States Of America And The Government Of TheRussian Federation Concerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium ProductionReactors

Article I
Purpose and Scope

In order to achieve the objectives of the Agreement, the Parties undertaketo permit monitoring, in accordance with the terms of this Annex and itsSubsidiary Arrangements of:

• the reactors identified in Annexes I and II to this Agreement, toensure that once shut down they remain in a non-operating status(Subsidiary Arrangements A-1 and A2);
• an agreed amount of plutonium produced in the reactors identified inAnnex II to this Agreement prior to their modification, to ensure suchplutonium (hereinafter referred to as "subject plutonium") is not used innuclear weapons (Subsidiary Arrangement B); and
• the reactors identified in Annex II to this Agreement, to ensure.that,once modified as specified in Article I, paragraph 2 of this Agreement(hereinafter referred to as being "modified"), they operate only in theagreed modified mode (Subsidiary Arrangement C).

1. Each Party shall have the right to send monitors to the relevantfacilities of the other Party where activities subject to the Agreementare being conducted, including reactors listed in Annexes I and II to thisAgreement, storage facilities, and other facilities containing subjectplutonium of the other Party, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangementsto this Annex. Each Party shall.be obligated to accept and facilitate suchvisits.

2. The monitored Party shall provide monitors with agreed personalprotective equipment, which shall remain with the organization in themonitored country responsible for radiation protection of personnel.However, the monitoring Party may use its own agreed personal protectionequipment if the monitoring Party so chooses, and such equipment should beappropriatelY coordinated between the Executive Agents or within theframework of the JICC.

The Administration of the monitored facility shall provide visitingmonitors with personal protective equipment and individual dosimeters tobe used at the facility. In addition, each monitor shall have the right touse at the monitored facilitieS two thermoluminescent integrating dosimeters supplied by the monitoring country. Dosimeters furnished by themonitored facility and the monitoring country shall be worn by each monitor while working at the facility and given to the responsible facility person at the end of the working day. Upon completion of eachmonitor's visit, the responsible person at the facility shall select oneof the two monitor-supplied dosimeters that had been used by each monitor.The selected dosimeter shall be tagged and sealed by both sides andretained at the facility as a confirmation device if questions ariseconcerning monitor exposure levels. Within 90 days following the monitor'sdeparture from the facility, each side shall have the right to contact theother side for a joint reading of the confirmation dosimeter. The seconddosimeter supplied by the monitoring side shall be retained by eachmonitor when departing from the facility. The monitoring side shallprovide to the facility Administration necessary information on thereading and calibration methods of the dosimeters supplied by themonitoring Party. Upon request of monitors, the facility administrationshall provide data on the radioactive environment in the working areas.

3. The following procedures shall apply to the designation of monitors:

(a) Each Party shall provide the other Party with an annual list, consisting of no more than 100 monitoring personnel, who may carry outmonitoring activities in accordance with this Annex and its subsidiaryArrangements. The initial list shall be provided no later than 60 calendardays after this Annex comes into force and shall be effective for oneyear, unless otherwise agreed. Subsequent annual lists may be submitted upto 120 calendar days prior to the expiration date of the list currently ineffect. Only monitors from these lists can be selected for monitoringactivities.

If a Party determines that a monitor is unacceptable who has been includedon the initial or annual list of monitoring personnel or on a list ofproposed changes submitted under subparagraph 3.b of this Article, theobjecting Party shall notify the other Party of the objection no laterthan 60 calendar days after the submission of the list. Such monitorsshall be deemed to have been removed from the list of monitoring personnelunless otherwise agreed.

(b) Each Party shall have the right to add or substitute monitoringpersonnel by written notification at any time within the numericallimitations of subparagraph 3.a of this Article.

(c) Each list of monitoring personnel shall contain: the full name; day,month and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth;passport number; gender; and citizenship and place of employment.

(d) No later than 30 calendar days prior to entry into the country, themonitoring Party shall provide to the embassy of the monitored Party thepassports and visa applications of the personnel included in thenotification.

(e) No more than 15 calendar days following receipt of the passports andvisa applications, the embassy of the monitored Party shall return thosepassports to the monitoring Party with visas and all necessary documentsthat shall allow, for at least a 12-month period, entry to and exit fromthe territory of the monitored Party to carry out functions under thisAnnex.

4. (a) All monitors shall respect the laws of the hosting Party, observetechnical safety rules, and internal practices existing at the monitoredfacilities, as well as refrain from interfering into the internal affairsof the monitored Party or the technical operations of the monitored facilities. All types of monitoring activities on technological andmeasurement equipment affecting the safety of the monitored facilitiesshall be conducted by the personnel of the monitored facilities, unlessotherwise agreed.

(b) If the monitored Party determines that a monitor on the monitoredParty's territory has violated the provisions of its national legislation,this Annex, or its Subsidiary Arrangements, the monitored Party shallnotify the other Party. The monitor who is the subject of thedetermination shall be removed from the list of monitoring personnel, anddepart from the monitored country, as soon as possible unless otherwiseagreed.

5. (a) The monitored Party has the right to assign its own personnel tofacilitate the performance of the monitoring activities or participate inor observe, as appropriate, all monitoring activities performed by themonitors, as well as other activities related to the SubsidiaryArrangements.

(b) Assignment of such personnel by the monitored Party shall not therebydelay or otherwise impede monitorS in the exercise of their functions.

6. Monitors shall enjoy unescorted and unrestricted freedom of movement inareas not requiring special permission for entry by the public, as definedby the laws of the monitored Party. Monitors do not have the right to bepresent in areas requiring special permission for entry by the public, asdefined by the laws of the monitored Party, without appropriate permissionfrom the monitored Party and without escorts of the monitored Party.Escorting shall not take place in the office spaces or the residence ofmonitoring personnel. If during a monitoring trip, monitoring personnel reside within areas requiring escorts, escorts shall be provided and paidby the monitored Party and shall be available at any time on an emergencybasis and, if requested, daily between the hours of 0700 and 2400.

7. Monitors shall have the right to maintain voice, facsimile, and datacommunication with their embassy and home country at all times by means ofthe telephone systems of the monitored Party. In addition, monitors shallalso have the right to maintain other forms of communication at the costof the monitoring Party, provided that the monitors obtain the necessarycommunications permits in accordance with the national communicationsregulations of the monitored Party.

8. (a) Monitors shall provide the monitored Party, if requested, with aduplicate copy of all data they obtain during a visit to the relevantfacilities before departing the facilities. Prior to departing thesefacilities, monitors shall provide the monitored Party a copy of anyconclusions that have been drawn during the visit. For the conclusions,monitors shall use exclusively the information obtained by them inaccordance with agreed procedures defined by, or to be developed pursuantto, Annex III and its Subsidiary Arrangements. Subsequently, each Partyshall inform the other Party within an agreed period of time ofthe conclusions it has drawn from the data its monitors have obtained.

(b) Unless otherwise agreed, for example, to preserve data or save costs,video or other electromagnetically recorded information must be kept andstored on-site using agreed procedures, such as under dual U.S. andRussian seals. Procedures for transfer of such types of informatiOn shallbe developed within the JICC.

9. The U.S. Party and the Russian Party shall provide at each of their relevant facilities all required conditions and services for facilitatingthe monitoring activities specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements,including office space, transportation the assistance of facilitypersonnel, escorts, liquid nitrogen (if required), and a reliable electrical supply to ensure the continuous operation of monitoringsystems. For the~se services, the monitoring Party shall pay the monitoredParty a total of 150 USD per monitor for each day on which monitoringactivities are conducted at the relevant facilities.

10. Each Party shall be responsible for its own costs related tomonitoringactivities it performs, including the cost of travel and lodging associated with monitoring visits and the cost of its own monitoringequipment. If either Party will incur expenses as a result of a specificrequest, by the other Party, for assistance beyond that required by thisAnnex and its Subsidiary Arrangements, the Parties shall consult todetermine the allocation of these expenses.

The Parties will conduct negotiations concerning the provision of assistance by the United States of America for the purposes of (a)modernization and provision of equipment for Russian storage facilitiesfor plutonium produced in the reactors listed in Annex II to thisAgreement, in order to improve the safety and effectiveness ofaccountability and control, and (b) provision of appropriate containersfor the storage of plutonium that is subject to monitoring. Nothing inthis sub-paragraph may be deemed to restrict, delay or extinguish any ofthe rights or obligations of the Parties under this Agreement and itsassociated documents.

11. Monitors of each Party shall have the right to request clarificationsif ambiguities arise during monitoring activity. If possible, themonitored Party shall provide the monitor, during the inspection, withsuch clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguities. Ifeither Party believes an ambiguity is not resolved,or if the monitorsdetermine that the cooperation of the monitored Party was inadequate, orif the monitored Party determines that the monitors abused their rights,the Parties shall promptly hold consultations where they shall seek toagree on measures to resolve the ambiguity. Such consultations shall beheld, unless otherwise agreed, within the Joint Implementation andCompliance Commission (JICC), as described in Article IX of the Agreement.

Article III
General Provisions and Resolution of Ambiguities

1. The monitoring arrangements provided for in this Annex and itsSubsidiary Arrangements shall be implemented in such a manner as to:

(a) be consistent with accepted industry management practices required forthe economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities;

(b) take account of technological developments that may be relevant toactivities described in the Subsidiary Arrangements, with a view toimproving the costeffectiveness of these activities.

2. The Parties shall make all administrative arrangements necessary tocarry out their obligations in order to implement the Agreement, thisAnnex, and its Subsidiary Arrangements, and shall take the necessary stepsto ensure that monitors can effectively discharge their functions.

3. Each Party shall facilitate the entry and exit of personnel of theotherParty into and out of its territory, and the importation into, andexportation from, its territory of materials and equipment for the purposeof carrying out activities in accordance with the Agreement, this Annex,and its Subsidiary Arrangements. Each Party shall treat with due respectthe personnel of the other Party present on its territory in connectionwith activities in accordance with the Agreement, this Annex, and itsSubsidiary Arrangements, and shall take all appropriate steps to preventany attack on the person, freedom and dignity of such personnel.

Article IV
Administrative Provisions

1. The monitoring Party shall provide to the monitored Party anotificationof intent to conduct each monitoring visit at least 60 days prior to eachsuch visit. This notification shall include:

(a) the planned date and estimated time of arrival, the point of entry,andthe destination facility;

(b) the names of the monitors, drawn from the list of monitors providedpursuant to Article II, paragraph 3, of this Annex, and the name of themonitoring team leader;

(c) a list of all equipment that will accompany the monitoring team; and

(d) a detailed description of the monitoring activities to be conductedduring the visit.

The monitored Party, not later than 15 days after receipt of suchnotification shall confirm to the requesting Party whether the dates forthe visit are acceptable, and if not acceptable, shall at the same timepropose alternate dates that are not more than 30 calendar days after theoriginally requested dates, except in emergency situations, in which casethe Parties shall consult within the JICC. In either case, the monitoredparty shall take all necessary steps required to facilitate the visit,including the issuance of permits required for monitors to carry out theiractivities.

2. The duration of the regular monitoring visits shall not exceed thosedurations specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, but may be extended byagreement of the Parties.

3. On each monitoring visit, monitoring teams may perform monitoringactivities in accordance with the relevant Subsidiary Arrangements andwith the requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article. Such visits andactivities should be coordinated with a view to reducing the costs andtime required to accomplish the objectives of the Subsidiary Arrangements.

4. The monitoring Party shall have the right to conduct special visits.Detailed procedures related to the implementation of such visits shall beagreed upon by the JICC within six months of entry into force of theAgreement, unless otherwise agreed by the JICC. These visits shall notbe counted against the agreed number of regular monitoring visits, unlessotherwise agreed.

5. (a) Monitors shall not engage in any professional or commercialactivityother than monitoring activities, including for personal profit, in theterritory of the monitored Party. Monitors shall be obligated to respectthe laws and regulations of the monitored Party and are also obligated notto interfere in the internal affairs of the monitored Party.

(b) Monitors shall not disclose sensitive information to unauthorizedParties in violation of Article VI of the Agreement. They shall remainbound by this responsibility even after their participation in monitoringvisits ceases.

6. The monitored Party shall, for the purpose of eliminating delay,facilitate the passage through customs of baggage, supplies, equipment, oragreed calibration standards, if so required, for use by the monitors. Themanagement of the monitored facility shall assist monitors, if requested,in obtaining travel tickets, making hotel reservations, and arranging formeals and, as needed, emergency medical and dental care. The monitoredParty shall provide transportation from the nearest commercial airport tothe facilities to be visited at agreed cost to the monitoring Party.

7. Both Parties shall allow monitors to bring into the territory of themonitored Party:

(a) articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles theimport or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantineregulations; and

(b) equipment, supplies, and agreed calibration standards, if so required,intended for use in the conduct of monitoring activities.

8. (a) All monitoring equipment and means of personal protection to beusedby the monitoring Party must be certified in accordance with the laws andregulations of the monitored Party, and samples of such equipment, alongwith their specifications and all technical documentation, must beprovided in advance of use to the monitored Party. The monitored Partyshall assist in the certification of all equipment necessary to conductauthorized monitoring activities.

(b) Equipment imported into the territory of the monitored Party underthisAnnex and its Subsidiary Arrangements will be agreed by the Parties to berelevant to monitoring activities. The monitoring Party, 30 days beforeusing equipment or materials designed for implementing monitoringactivities, shall present them to the monitored Party.

(c)If such equipment does not conform to the requirements insub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, it may not be used for the monitoringactivities, and shall be shipped back to the monitoring Party, ifrequested.

(d) All imported monitoring equipment shall remain on site, unlessotherwise agreed.

9. The shipping within the territory of the monitored Party of equipment,supplies, or agreed calibration standards, if required, containingradioactive materials, shall be conducted by the monitored facility inaccordance with national legislation of the monitored Party and International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines and recommendations.

10. Nothing herein affects the rights and obligations of the Parties underother agreements between the two Parties

11. This Annex may be amended by the written agreement of the Parties.Changes to Subsidiary Arrangements shall not constitute amendments to thisAnnex. This Annex and its Subsidiary Arrangements shall remain in force,in accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Agreement.


Subsidiary Arrangement A-1 To Annex III: For Shutdown PlutoniumProduction Reactors In The United States Of America

Article I

This Arrangement concerns the obligation in Article I, paragraph 1, of theAgreement that all reactors listed in Annex I shall not resume operation.This Arrangement applies to shutdown plutonium production reactors in theUnited States of America, B, C, D, DR, F, H, KE, KW, and N at Hanford andK, L, P, R, and C at Savannah River.

Article II

1. Joint Russian-U.S. groups of experts shall visit each of the reactorslisted in Article I in order to determine their technologica1 status andsend their joint conclusion to the Joint Implementation and ComplianceCommission (JICC). This conclusion shall include recommendations on eachsuch reactor concerning monitoring procedures to confirm that thesereactors do not resume their operation.

If any of the reactors in Article I have already begun decommissioning bythe time of entry-into-force of the Agreement (EIF), then monitoringmeasures for these reactors may be established at a reduced level ifagreed by the JICCo If any of these reactors are agreed by the JICC to beirreversibly dismantled at the time of EIF, then no monitoring measures orfurther data exchanges would be required for these reactors under theAgreement. If appropriate, the Parties may agree to such reductions inmonitoring procedures by exchange of diplomatic notes prior to EIF.

2. The U.S. Party shall report data necessary for monitoring of theplutonium production reactors B, C, D, DR, F, H, KE, KW, and N at Hanfordand K, L, P, R, and C at Savannah River and shall allow for monitoring atthese reactors as specified below, in order to ensure that these reactorsremain in a non-operating status.

3. Russian monitors shall have the right to conduct a monitoring visit toeach shutdown reactor once a year. In the first year of monitoring at eachreactor, time spent by monitors at that reactor shall be no longer than 5days, and the total monitoring effort at the reactor shall not be more than 30 person-days. Thereafter, time spent by monitors shall be no longerthan 4 days per year at each monitored reactor site (Hanford and SavannahRiver, respectively) and the total monitoring effort at each site shall not be more than 16 person-days.

4. In the event that the U.S. Party decides to further decommission ordismantle a reactor facility being monitored under this SubsidiaryArrangement, it shall notify the Russian Party and the Parties shalldevelop agreed procedures to assure that the activity does not return thereactor facility to operational status. If the Parties agree that thedismantling is irreversible, the reactor shall no longer be subject tomonitoring under this Agreement.

Article III

1. Within 30 days of entry-into-force of the Agreement the U.S. Partyshallprovide for each of the reactors listed in Article II:

(a) Information on the status of the reactor core, the cooling ponds, andthe provisions for externally supplied electrical power;

(b) design information on systems, utilities, and access areas necessaryfor the operation of each reactor, in the amount necessary for monitoring,as agreed upon by both Parties.

2. The Russian Party shall have the right to verify at each of the reactorsites information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Articleby the U.S. Party.

Article IV

1. Using agreed procedures, personnel of the monitored facilities, uponrequest by and under supervision of Russian monitors, shall install atagreed locations seals or any other agreed monitoring equipment on systemsand equipment and agreed access areas that would be necessary for theoperation of the reactor, in a manner that will assure the infeasibilityof putting the reactor into operation without breaking seals or beingdetected by the other monitoring equipment. These seals or othermonitoring equipment shall not prevent personnel at the reactors fromconducting necessary maintenance or technological work.

2. Except in emergency conditions, Russian monitors shall have the rightto be present whenever seals applied under this Article are broken orother monitoring equipment is prevented from performing its intendedfunction. In the event that a seal is broken or other monitoring equipmentis prevented from performing its intended function when Russian monitorsare not present, the U.S. Party shall promptly notify the Russian Partyand allow within 30 days after the event, the opportUnitY to conduct aspecial monitoring visit to the particular reactor and reinstall seals orother monitoring equipment using agreed procedures.

Article V

Specific monitoring equipment for this Subsidiary Arrangement and detailedprocedures for operating this equipment will be agreed by the JICC.


Subsidiary Arrangement A-2 To Annex III: For Shutdown PlutoniumProduction Reactors In The Russian Federation

Article I

This Arrangement concerns the obligation in Article I, paragraph 1, of theAgreement that all reactors listed in Annex I shall not resume operation.This Arrangement applies to shutdown plutonium production reactors in theRussian FederatiOn, A, JR-AI, AV-1, AV-2, and AV-3 at Ozersk, AD and ADE-1at Zhelezoogorsk, and I-1, I-2, and ADE-3 at Seversk. This Arrangementshall also apply to the ADE-2 reactor at Zheleznogorsk and the ADE-4 andADE-5 reactors at Seversk when these reactors permanently ceaseoperations.

Article II

1. Joint U.S.-Russian groups of experts shall visit each of the reactorslisted in Article I in order to determine their technological status andsend their joint conclusion to the Joint Implementation and ComplianceCommission (JICC). This conclusion shall include recommendations oneach such reactor concerning monitoring procedures to confirm that thesereactors do not resume their operation.

If any of the reactors in Article I have already begun decommissioning bythe time of entry-into-force of the Agreement (EIF), then monitoringmeasures for these reactors may be established at a reduced level ifagreed by the JICC. If any of these reactors are agreed by the JICC to beirreversibly dismantled at the time of EIF, then no monitoring measures orfurther data exchanges would be required for these reactors under theAgreement. If appropriate, the Parties may agree to such reductions inmonitoring procedures by exchange of diplomatic notes prior to EIF.

2. The Russian Party shall report data necessary for monitoring of theplutonium production reactors A, JR-AI, AV-1, AV-2, and AV-3 at Ozersk, ADand ADE-1 at Zheleznogorsk, and I-1, I-2, and ADE-3 at Seversk and shallallow for monitoring at-these reactors as specified below, in order toensure that these reactors remain in a non-operating status.

3. U.S. monitors shall have the right to conduct a monitoring visit toeachshutdown reactor once a year. In the first year of monitoring at eachreactor, time spent by monitors at that reactor shall be no longer than 5days, and the total monitoring effort at the reactor shall not be morethan 30 person-days. Thereafter, time spent by monitorS shall be no longerthan 4 days per year at each monitored reactor site (ozersk,Zheleznogorsk, and Seversk, respectively), and the total monitoring effortat each site shall not be more than 16 person-days.

4. In the event that the Russian Party decides to further decommission ordismantle a reactor facility being monitored under this subsidiaryArrangement, it shall notify the U.S. Party, and the Parties shall developagreed procedures to assure that the activity does not return the reactorfacility to operational status. If the Parties agree that the dismantlingis irreversible, the reactor shall no longer be subject to monitoringunder this Agreement.

Article III

1. Within 30 days of entry-into-force of the Agreement the Russian Partyshall provide for each of the reactors listed in Article II:

(a) information on the status of the reactor core, the cooling ponds, andthe provisions for externally supplied electrical power;

(b) design information on systems, utilities, and access areas necessaryfor the operation of each reactor, in the amount necessary for monitoring,as agreed upon by both Parties.

2. The U.S. Party shall have the right to verify at each of the reactorsites information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Articleby the Russian Party.

Article IV

1. Using agreed procedures, personnel of the monitored facilities, uponrequest by and under supervision of U.S. monitors, shall install at agreedlocations seals or any other agreed monitoring equipment on systems andequipment and agreed access areas that would be necessary for the operation of the reactor, in a manner that will assure the infeasibilityof putting the reactor into operation without breaking seals or beingdetected by the other monitoring equipment. These seals or othermonitoring equipment shall not prevent personnel at the reactors fromconducting necessary maintenance or technological work.

2. Except in emergencY conditions, U.S. monitors shall have the right tobepresent whenever seals applied under this Article are broken or othermonitoring equipment is prevented from performing its intended function.In the event that a seal is broken or other monitoring equipment iprevented from performing its intended function when U.S. monitors are notpresent, the Russian Party shall promptly notify the U.S. Party and allowwithin 30 days after the event, the opportunity to conduct a specialmonitoring visit to the particular reactor and reinstall seals or othermonitoring equipment using agreed procedures.

Article V

Specific monitoring equipment for this Subsidiary Arrangement and detailedprocedures for operating this equipment will be agreed by the JICC.


Subsidiary Arrangement B To Annex III: For Storage Facilities In TheRussian Federation Containing Plutonium Produced By The OperatingPlutonium Production Reactors

Article I

This Arrangement concerns the obligation in Article IV of the Agreementthat plutonium produced after entry into force of the Agreement in thereactors identified in Annex II shall not be used in nuclear weapons. ThisArrangement applies to the plutonium storage facility at Seversk and theplutonium storage facility at Zheleznogorsk and any other storagelocations where subject plutonium is located.

Article II

1. (a) Within 30 days after entry into force of the Agreement, or as soonas any batch of material has been separated, whichever is later, theRussian Party shall place into storage at Seversk, Zheleznogorsk, or both,or any other storage location, and make available for monitoring underthis Arrangement, all plutonium separated after January 1, 1997, fromspent fuel produced by the reactors in Annex II after January 1, 1995. TheRussian Party shall identify these storage facilities and declare, within30 days after entry into force of the Agreement, and every six monthsthereafter, the mass of subject plutonium stored in each, as well as thedate(s) that this material was separated.

(b) Subject plutonium shall be in the form of plutonium oxide, whose ratioof Pu-240 to total Pu, and of Am-241 to Pu-241, as determined by agreedmethods, shall not exceed agreed thresholds, i.e., it is to correspond toplutonium that comes from low-burnup fuel and has been newly produced,hereinafter referred to as "monitored plutonium".

(c) At the end of each 6-month period referred to in subparagraph (a), theRussian Party shall submit for monitoring at Seversk or at Zheleznogorsk,or both, or any other storage location, and make declarations asinsubparagraph (a) on, all newly produced and separated plutonium fromeach of these reactors. This additional subject plutonium shall meet thesesame specifications.

(d) Monitoring of the ratios of Pu-240 to total Pu, and of Am-241 toPu-241, or of any other agreed isotopic ratios, shall be based on adetermination of whether these meet agreed threshold values. The acceptability of this type of measurement to determine the presence ofmonitOred plutonium is limited to this Annex and this Agreement and shallnot prejudice any other current or future agreements.

(e) For each reactor in Annex II, the 6-month submissions and declarationsdescribed in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) above shall continue at leastuntil core modification is complete and the reactor is restarted with thenew type of core. However, if spent fuel produced by any such reactor,before it is modified, has not yet been reprocessed at that time, the6-month submissions shall continue until all such spent fuel from thatreactor has been reprocessed and its plutonium has been placed undermonitoring in the storage facility. The cumulative total amount of suchplutonium, as estimated, will be between 405 and 9 metric tons when it hasall been reprocessed.

2. The Russian Party shall report data and allow monitoring of subjectplutonium stored at the plutonium storage facilities at Seversk orZhelezoogorsk, or both, or any other storage location subject to theAgreement, as specified in Article I of this Subsidiary Arrangement, usingagreed procedures, in order to provide assurance that:

(a) the amount of plutonium within storage containers submitted formonitoring is as declared;

(b) the plutonium is monitored plutonium, as defined by Article II,paragraph l(b) of this Subsidiary Arrangement; and

(c) the containers storing plutonium remain in the storage locations asdeclared.

Article III

1. Within 30 days of entry into force of the Agreement, the Russian Partyshall provide detailed design information on all plutonium storagefacilities specified in Article

This design information shall include:

• physical layout of the storage facility(s);
• arrangement of containers within the facility(s);
• a description of the plutonium storage containers, including dimensions;
• plutonium-storage-container maintenance and access requirements; and
• any other agreed information.

3. U.S. monitors shall have the right to conduct monitoring visits twiceper year to each plutonium storage facility listed in Article I. Duringthese periodic monitoring visits, the Russian Party shall declareinformation on the contents of the plutonium containers that containsubject plutonium at storage facilities listed in Article I. For eachcontainer in which plutonium is stored, these declarations shall include:

• container identification;
• mass of plutonium;
• location of the container;
• date on which the plutonium oxide was produced; and
• serial numbers and integrity of the seals applied.

5. (a) U.S. and Russian technical experts shall agree, as soon aspossible,on methods and technology, and appropriate procedures of measurements,including appropriate use of calibration standards, based on a "yes/no"principle, in order to:

(i) determine the value of the ratio of Pu-240 mass to total Pu mass,compared to an agreed upon threshold, and the value of the ratio of Am-241to Pu-241, compared to an agreed upon threshold, or any other agreedmethods, which shall confirm that the subject plutonium in storagefacilities referred to in Article I is monitored plutonium, as defined byArticle II, paragraph l(b) of this Subsidiary Arrangement; and

(ii) to confirm that the mass of plutonium in a closed container is as declared.

None of these methods, alone or in combination, shall reveal sensitiveinformation to the monitoring Party.

(b) If so agreed, the Russian Party shall provide agreed calibratiOnstandards and any other agreed necessary materials on agreed terms.

6. The Russian Party shall-provide a suitable area for the conduct ofmeasurementS at each plutonium storage facility. This area shall havestable and reliable electrical power. The Russian Party shall supplyliquid nitrogen in the amounts necessary for operations.

7. U.S. monitoring teams under this Subsidiary Arrangement shall consistofup to 10 individuals. In the first year of monitoring at each storagefacility, each monitoring visit shall last up to 10 days. Thereafter, eachmonitoring visit shall last up to 6 days.

Article IV

Containers holding subject plutonium shall be marked by the monitoredParty with U.S.-supplied identifying tags and tamper-indicating seals.U.S. monitors shall be allowed to observe the application of these tagsand seals. The Russian Party shall notify the U.S. Party if any of theseseals or other monitoring equipment subsequently is broken ornon-functioning. Using agreed procedures, the Russian Party shall installunder observation by U.S. monitors U.S.supplied monitoring equipment inagreed locations. U.S. monitors shall be granted access as necessary toobserve thenaintenance on this equipment and to observe the removal orreplacement of the film (or other recording media), for processing theresults of the monitoring activity on-site, or storing the collectedinformation using agreed procedures on-site.

Article V

1. The following additional procedures will apply for any subjectplutoniumthat the Russian Party chooses to remove from its original or subsequentstorage facility for transformati.on into mixed uranium-plutonium oxidefuel (MOX) for declared peaceful use in reactors.

2. For any plutonium meeting the conditions in paragraph of this Article,U.S. monitors shall have the right to verify upon arrival at the fuelfabrication facility (the "MOX plant") the unique identifiers and/or sealspreviously applied by the U.S. Party to the plutonium storage containerswhile the material was in storage facilities.

3. Under this Arrangement, U.S. monitoring rights for this plutonium shallcease once U.S. monitors have confirmed receipt of this material at theMOX fabrication facility, as described in paragraph 2. Beyond this, theplutonium would be subject to international verification measures in placeat the MOX facility under any other applicable agreements.

Article VI

Specific monitoring equipment for this Subsidiary Arrangement and detailedprocedures for operating this equipment will be agreed by the JICC.


Subsidiary Arrangement C To Annex III: For The Supply Of Fresh Fuel,For Fresh Fuel Charging, And For Spent Fuel Discharging And Spent FuelStorage Areas Related To The Modified Reactors In The RussianFederation

Article I

1. This Arrangement concerns the following obligations: in Article I,paragraph 2, of the Agreement, that all reactors listed in Annex II shallcease by December 31, 2000, their production of non-reactor-gradeplutonium by undergoing modification; in Article III of the Agreementthat this modification will require the cessation of production by thereactors listed in Annex II of spent fuel containing plutonium whosecombined Pu-240 plus Pu-238 isotopic concentration is less than 20 percentof total Pu, averaged over the total fuel discharged in any one batch; inArticle III that once each such reactor is modified, it will utilize analternative type of fuel including uranium derived from dismantled nuclearweapons; and in Article IV that the plutonium produced after entry intoforce of the Agreement in the reactors identified in Annex II, and anyhigh-enriched uranium recovered from spent fuel discharged from themodified reactors, shall not be used in nuclear weapons. Measurements andmonitoring activities described below are designed to enhance confidencein the above-mentioned obligations.

2. This Arrangement applies to fresh fuel charging, and to spent-fueldischarge and spent-fuel storage areas of the reactors ADE-2 atZheleznogorsk and ADE-4 and ADE-5 at Seversk (the "reactors"). It willcontinue to apply to fresh fuel charging and to each spent fuel dischargearea until the reactor is permanently shut down, and to each spent-fuelstorage area as long as the Agreement is in force.

Article II

1. The Russian Party shall report data and allow for monitoring, asspecified below, for fuel loaded into and discharged from each of thereactors to ensure that such fuel and operations are consistent with theterms of the Agreement.

2. U.S. monitors shall have the right to be present and observe theinstallation of monitoring equipment, as specified below, at eachdischarge area or other appropriate area, to confirm that fuel is notdischarged early.

3. U.S. monitors shall have the right to conduct monitoring at each ofthese reactors, as specified below, to confirm the composition of fuel tobe loaded into the reactors, and to have visual access, after the reactoris modified, to the spent fuel discharged in the spent fuel poo1s.

Article III

1. At least 6 months prior to the first possible core loading of enrichedfuel (fuel containing enriched uranium) into each reactor, the U.S.Party shall have the right to begin the installation, using agreedprocedures at agreed locations, of a sensor or monitoring system and adata recorder. This equipment shall monitor the spent fuel discharge orother similarly appropriate area. The Parties shall take appropriate stepsto facilitate the inclusion of this equipment into the design of themodified reactor. This equipment shall be installed so as to be ready tooperate reliably in its intended mode at least 10 days prior to the startof operation of each modified reactor.

2. Beginning at least 10 days prior to the first core loading of enrichedfuel in each reactor, the Russian Party shall provide reliable electricalsupply to support the startup and continuous operation of these monitoringsystems.

3. U.S. monitors shall be granted access at the time of monitoring-equipment startup and periodically thereafter, as specifiedbelow, to maintain this equipment and to analyze the data it has recorded,using agreed procedures.

4. Except in emergency situations, the Russian Party shall do nothing tointerfere with the continuous operation or the intended monitoringfunction of these systems. In the event that the Russian Party becomesaware, by agreed means based on external indications, of an interruptionin operation of the monitoring equipment, it shall notify the U.S. Partywithout delay of the time and, if known, the cause of the interruption,and allow up to 3 U.S. monitors access to the monitoring equipment as soonas possible, and not later than 20 days after the interruption, for theexclusive purpose of correcting the problem.

5. Before discharging any fuel from the modified reactors into sections ofthe spent fuel pools that have contained spent fuel discharged from thereactors prior to their modification, the Russian Party shall move allsuch spent fuel out of these sections.

6. Given the understanding that the Russian Party currently has nospecificplans regarding the reprocessing of the modified-reactor spent fuel, theRussian Party agrees that, before removing such fuel from the spent fuelpools, except in an emergency, it will first declare to the U.S. Party thereason for the removal, the amount of spent fuel to be removed, itsdestination, and the intended use of any uranium recovered from thatmaterial, if known. If the intended use is not known, the Russian Partyshall declare to the U.S. Party this intention once it is known.Subsequently, the Russian Party shall declare to the U.S. Party the actualuse of that uranium once it has been utilized in a peaceful nuclearactivity. Any emergency removal of the spent fuel will require a similardeclaration to the U.S. Party, including, as soon as possible but notlater than 15 days afterward, the date of and reason for the emergencyremoval and the new location or destination of the spent fuel.

7. In any case, at either side's request, the sides shall meet within theJICC as described in Article IX of the Agreement to consult over questionsarising from such declarations or removals.

Article IV

1. The Russian Party shall notify the U.S. Party of the date at least 60days in advance of each planned loading of fuel into each reactor,beginning with the first core loading of enriched fuel.

2. The Russian Party shall provide the U.S. Party annually withconsolidated information on the total mass of high enriched uranium thatwas used for fuel shipped to the modified reactors that year, and thefraction of that total mass of high enriched uranium that was derived fromdismantled nuclear weapons.

3. U.S. monitors shall have the right to observe and make measurements onsuch fuel at each reactor beginning 3 days prior to the start of itsloading and continuing until loading is complete. Measurements shallconsist of agreed procedures for weighing an agreed number of individualfresh fuel elements, randomly selected by the U.S. monitors from among thecollection of all fuel to be loaded into the reactor for each coreloading. If any of the sampled fuel elements is found not to comply withagreed technical specifications, it shall be placed under U.S. seal andpermanently removed from the collection to be loaded into the reactor, andthe sides shall immediately consult within the JICC to determine necessaryactions.

4. The U.S. Party shall provide the equipment it requires for makingmeasurements described in paragraph 3 of this Article, and may leave itunder tamper-indicating seals at suitable storage locations at eachreactor site.

5. Monitoring visits may occur up to 3 times per year per individualreactor, including visits during refueling. U.S. monitoring visits notcoinciding with refueling may consist of teams of up to 4 individuals andare for the purpose as appropriate, of carrying out monitoring activitiesdescribed in Article II, paragraph 3, Article III, paragraph 3, andArticle V of this Subsidiary Arrangement. When refueling is taking place,U.S. monitoring teams may consist of up to 6 individuals of whom no morethan 2 monitors may be present in the reactor fueling hall at any time.Monitoring visits not coinciding with refueling shall last up to 2 daysper individual reactor. Monitoring visits coinciding with refueling shalllast as specified in paragraph 3 of this Article.

Article V

1. Each time fuel is discharged from the reactors, the Russian Party shallprovide the following information:

A. Predicted quantity of plutonium contained in the discharged fuel.

B. Average exposure of the fuel at discharge in megawatt-days and theexpected Pu-240 isotopic concentration and Pu-238 isotopic concentrationof the discharged fuel.

C. A list of all channels that are discharged ahead of schedule.

D. Mass and enrichment of the uranium that was initially contained in thedischarged fuel, and the number of channels from which it is discharged.

E. Number of days between the discharged fuel's end of irradiation in thereactor and its removal from the reactor facility, if applicable.

2. If, for example, due to an unplanned discharge or extraordinarycircumstances, any amount of discharged fuel from a modified reactor isexpected to have its combined Pu-238 plus Pu-240 isotopic concentrationless than 20% of total plutonium, averaged over the total fuel discharged,the Russian Party shall provide within 10 days a written explanation ofthe reason for such a discharge and, at U.S discretion, the Parties shallpromptly arrange for consultation within the JICC to clarify the situationand to determine any remedial steps or additional monitoringactivities that may be required.

Article VI

Specific monitoring equipment for this Subsidiary Arrangeme-nt anddetailed procedures for operating this equipment will be agreed by theJICC.


Annex IV To The Agreement Between The Government Of The United StatesOf America And The Government Oe The Russian Federation ConcerningCooperation Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors

Intellectual Property

In accordance with Article VI of the Agreement between the Government ofthe United States of America and the Government of the Russian FederationConcerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors(hereinafter called the Agreement):

It is not assumed that significant items of intellectual property, withthe exception of copyrights, will be created or transmitted in the courseof work under the Agreement. However, items of intellectual property thatare created or transmitted under the Agreement shall be handled inaccordance with the provisions of this Annex, which is an integral part ofthe Agreement;

The Parties shall assure adequate and effective protection of intellectualproperty created or transmitted in accordance with the Agreement and shallassure the appropriate implementation of measures associated with thisprotection;

The Parties agree to inform each other promptly of all items ofintellectual property created as a result of work done under theAgreement.

I. Scope

1. This Annex shall apply to all joint activity done in accordance withtheAgreement unless otherwise specifically agreed by the Parties or theirExecutive Agents.

2. In the Agreement the term "intellectual property" has the meaningdefined in Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World IntellectualProperty Organization, done at Stockholm on 14 July 1967.

3. This Annex defines the principles governing legal relationships betweenthe Parties in the field of protection and use of items of intellectualproperty as well as underlying procedures for allocating intellectualproperty rights. Each Party shall take all necessary measures to assurethat the other Party receives all rights stipulated under the Agreement tothe possession, use, and transfer of intellectual property by drawing upthe appropriate legal documents if necessary, stipulating the transfer ofintellectual property rights from a participant in the Agreement to itsParty. This Annex shall not alter or replace the legal relationships inthe field of intellectual property between a Party and its participants,which are defined by the laws and practice of that Party.

4. Disputes relating to intellectual property associated with theAgreementmust be resolved by negotiations between the Parties or their ExecutiveAgents. In the event a dispute cannot be resolved by negotiations, bymutual agreement of the Parties the dispute may be given to an arbitrationagency for resolution on the basis of the Agreement and in accordance withthe provisions of international law and procedures to which both Partiesshall agree in writing.

5. Termination or expiration of the Agreement shall notterminate the rights and obligations arising from this Annex.

6. The conditions of this Annex and their interpretation in the area oflegal protection, use of intellectual property, and the allocation ofrights shall not extend to and must not be used in the preparation andinterpretation of other agreements that are not private agreements(contracts,collaborations) under the Agreement.

II. Allocation of Rights

1. Each party shall be granted nonexclusive, irrevocable, royalty-freelicense in all countries of the world to the translation, reproduction,and public distribution of scientific and technical articles, papers,reports, and books produced as a result of joint work under the Agreement.In all publicly distributed copies of copyrignted materials covered by theAgreement the names of the authors must be mentioned unless the authorsexplicitly express the desire to remain anonymous.

2. If in the process of preparing private agreements (contracts,collaborations) for specific work under the Agreement it becomes evidentthat intellectual property will be created or transferred during thiswork, the Parties must stipulate the allocation of right5 to the ownershipand transfer of such intellectual property in the text of that privateagreement. If in the process of concluding a private agreement forspecific work the Parties cannot agree on the allocation of rights tointellectual property that may be created during the work, intellectualproperty may not be a subject of that private agreement (contract,collaboration).

3. Each Party must take all necessary measures so that intellectualproperty created outside the Agreement and transmitted to the other Partyfor use under the Agreement is transmitted in accordance with the laws ofthe transmitting Party.