I also want to say something about the distinguished people participatingin this conference. Many of you have given all orvirtually all of your careers to the cause of global security, and a largenumber of you have focused particularly on seekingways to prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction. This isdemanding and often frustrating work -- whetheryou are a government official, a scholar, or an activist. You have chosento do good, sometimes at the expense of doing well.But as you understand, and I believe the public appreciates, this work isvitally important to the future of our world, to thesafety of our citizens. On behalf of President Clinton and our entirenational security team, I want to thank you very much forall your efforts.

I would note that since virtually everyone in the room deserves thisthanks, there is no one to clap for you. That',s why wesometimes speak before broader audiences. In great venues like thebasketball arena at Ohio State University.

Every year, the nonproliferation community eagerly awaits the Carnegienonproliferation conference, an opportunity to takestock, and renew commitment to the cause. Renewing our commitment tocurbing weapons of mass destruction is ever moreimportant this year, as the conference title, "Repairing the Regime,"suggests. 1998 was a troubling year -- a year of livingdangerously. There was some significant progress, but several problemstook a turn for the worse, and perilous new trendshave emerged. All of you here know well what the key developments were:

In May, India, and then Pakistan, conducted nuclear tests that blew the lidoff South Asia's long-simmering nuclear rivalry.These explosions threaten to trigger a full-fledged nuclear and missilerace in the region. Also ominous was some of the early rhetoric surrounding the blasts -- suggesting thatmany politicians and citizens in India and Pakistanbelieved that a nuclear weapons capability provided instant great powerstatus.

In July, Iran's test of the Shahab-3 missile -- its version of the NorthKorean No Dong -- extended Teheran's capability totarget U.S. friends and allies in the Middle East, as well as our forces inthe region. Combined with Iran's continued pursuit ofnuclear weapons, this missile development threatens the stability of theregion -- as if the stability of that region needed anyfurther threatening.

In August, North Korea tested its Taepo-Dong missile over Japan. This test,and the revelation that North Korea isconstructing a suspicious underground site, have raised questions aboutNorth Korean compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework, which aimed at bringing stability and discouraging proliferationon the Korean Peninsula. If the agreementunravels, we could quickly return to an environment like the 1993-94crisis, with increased risk of war and North Koreanresumption of plutonium production.

By August, Russia's economic crisis heightened the challenge for Russia tocontrol the leakage of sensitive weapons-relatedmaterials and technology beyond its borders. Weapons scientists andinstitutes face increased financial pressures to sell theirwares to whomever is in the market, including rogue states.

Finally, in December Saddam Hussein once again broke his commitments tocooperate with U.N. inspectors, ignoring ourwarnings. The United States, together with our British allies, respondedwith military force. We attacked Iraq's program todevelop and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his capacity tothreaten its neighbors. But we have not eliminated thedanger, and our resolve to curb the threat Saddam poses will not diminish.

In addition to these specific developments, two broad and dangerous trendshave emerged.

First, as the President has repeatedly warned, the risk is increasing thatterrorists will acquire and seek to use chemical orbiological weapons as weapons of terror.

Second, ballistic missile proliferation has intensified, as demonstrated bythe Iranian and North Korean missile tests andadvances in the missile programs of India and Pakistan. While thetechnology to develop intercontinental range missiles remainsout of reach for a large number of countries, shorter-range missilecapabilities "based on liquid-fueled SCUD technology" arewidely available. The Missile Technology Control Regime helps to limit thespread of missile technology, but several keysuppliers, such as North Korea, are outside the MTCR. Unfortunately, inregions like the Middle East and South Asia, ballisticmissiles are increasingly seen as essential to national status andsecurity, and political dynamics weigh against agreements tolimit these missiles.

Not all the news on non-proliferation was bad last year. There were severalencouraging developments. Brazil ratified theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -- as did 17 other nations -- andjoined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, completing aremarkable process that has almost eliminated the threat of nuclearproliferation in Latin America. The multinationalConference on Disarmament, based in Geneva, agreed to arrangements to beginnegotiations on a global Fissile MaterialCutoff Treaty, which would halt the production of additional material fornuclear weapons. China agreed in June to seriouslystudy joining the MTCR. At home, our Congress passed critical legislationto implement the Chemical Weapons Convention,which the Senate ratified in 1997.

Also encouraging was the global reaction to the nuclear tests by India andPakistan: They were condemned in nearly everycorner of the world. Here was an issue where the U.S., China and Russiafound a common voice. Where nuclear powersagreed with many nations of the developing world. Far from demonstratingthe death of international norms againstproliferation, the international reaction to the tests showed theresilience of these norms.

But these positive signs were overshadowed by the mounting challenges. Weneed your commitment, the public',scommitment, our Congress's commitment, the commitment of responsiblenations more than ever to build a safer future. Let meoutline America's policy initiatives for preventing and addressingproliferation as we reach a new century.

The United States will redouble existing efforts and seek new approachesand solutions -- this year and beyond -- on multiplefronts.

First, we will move aggressively to strengthen the non-proliferationregime, by which I mean international consensus and theinternational agreements and structures aimed at curbing weapons of massdestruction and ballistic missiles. Bolstering thisregime is critical if we are to give nations greater confidence that theycan forego or limit weapons of mass destruction andballistic missiles without finding themselves at a disadvantage againstrivals brandishing such weapons. The regime is alsoessential for isolating nations outside the regime and pressuring them torestrain their programs and eventually to join.

With respect to strengthening the regime, let me say that President Clintonwill make one of his top priorities for 1999 obtainingadvice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the UnitedStates Senate.

The President has called the CTBT the "longest-sought, hardest-fought prizein the history of arms control." It bans all nuclearexplosive tests. We should pause and contemplate this development: 151nations have signed an accord to never, or neveragain, test a nuclear device. We must not let this extraordinaryopportunity slip away.

By its terms, the CTBT cannot enter into force until the United States andother key designated nations ratify it. If we fail toratify, we will undercut our own efforts to curb further nuclear armsdevelopment, particularly in South Asia, where India andPakistan each have announced an intention to adhere to the CTBT by thiscoming September. That is the right choice for thosecountries, one we have been urging for some time. Senate action on the CTBTbefore September will greatly strengthen ourhand in persuading India and Pakistan to fulfill their pledges.

The Treaty is in America's national interest. Four former chairmen of theJoint Chiefs of Staff -- Shalikashvili, Powell, Crowe,and Jones -- plus all six current members of the JCS -- agree on that. Thedirectors of our three national nuclear weapons labsand numerous outside experts have said we can maintain a reliable deterrentwithout nuclear explosive testing. Polls show that75 to 80 percent of all Americans support the Treaty. Indeed, publicsupport has been strong for more than 40 years, eversince President Eisenhower first proposed a test ban treaty.

The Treaty will constrain the development of more advanced nuclear weaponsby the nuclear powers -- and limit thepossibilities for other states to acquire such weapons. It will alsoenhance our ability to detect and deter suspicious activities byother nations. As the experts assembled here well know, with or without aCTBT, we must monitor such activities. The Treatygives us new tools to pursue this vital mission: a global network ofsensors to supplement our national intelligence capabilitiesand the right to request short-notice, on-site inspections in othercountries.

If the Senate rejected or failed to act on the Test Ban Treaty, we wouldthrow open the door to regional nuclear arms racesand a much more dangerous world. Ratification will take a serious effortfrom all of us. But it would be a terrible tragedy if ourSenate failed to ratify the CTBT this year.

In addition to the CTBT, we want to make rapid progress on the treaty Imentioned earlier to ban further production of fissilematerials. Last fall, we called on all countries that have tested nucleardevices to adhere to a voluntary production moratorium.In fact, the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China have all stoppedproducing fissile material, and we hope they, along withIndia and Pakistan, will formally join this moratorium while we seek atreaty through the Conference on Disarmament.

We will also work to strengthen other components of the nuclearnonproliferation regime, including the safeguards applied bythe International Atomic Energy Agency. And we will implement theinitiative Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin announced inRussia to dispose safely of 50 tons of plutonium each that is no longerneeded by our military programs -- enough to makeliterally thousands of nuclear weapons.

Another strong catalyst for convincing nations to forego nuclear weaponswould be continued progress in the START process-- the effort by the United States and Russia to reduce our nucleararsenals. We hope the Russian Duma will promptly ratifySTART II, which will clearly benefit Russia's security, as well as ours.And we remain committed to concluding a START IIITreaty for even deeper cuts based on the agreement reached by PresidentsClinton and Yeltsin at Helsinki in 1997.

Our commitment to strengthening the global nonproliferation regime extends,of course, beyond nuclear weapons. I am proudthat this Administration obtained ratification of the Chemical WeaponsConvention. This year, we will continue to pursueaggressively another key priority, announced by the President in lastyear's State of the Union address: strengthening our abilityto determine whether nations are complying with the Biological WeaponsConvention. We will push to obtain internationalagreement this year on compliance and inspection measures, making it muchmore difficult for nations to cheat and therebyincreasing our safety from the threat of biological weapons. UnderSecretary of State John Holum, who is leading ourdiplomatic efforts, will be in Geneva next week to explore ideas forpushing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The chemical and biological conventions are vital not only to preventingstates from acquiring weapons of mass destruction butalso, in combination with law enforcement and intelligence, to keepingthese weapons away from terrorists. Yes, theconventions are focused on the obligations of states, not substate actors.But virtually every state on our State Department's listof terrorism sponsors has weapons of mass destruction programs. Aspotential suppliers of such weapons to terrorists, there isno more worrisome source than these state sponsors. Under a strongnonproliferation regime, states that fail to join or complywith the conventions will be isolated, cut off from weapons materials, andthus hindered from assisting terrorists with WMDactivities.

Our second set of priorities focuses on the most pressing regionalproliferation challenges.

With respect to South Asia, we have pressed for a strong internationalresponse to deter India and Pakistan from additionaltesting. Secretary Albright and Deputy Secretary Talbott have engaged inintense diplomatic efforts to move India and Pakistanaway from nuclear confrontation. In 1999, we will further intensify ourdiplomacy and encourage Indo-Pakistani dialogue inpursuit of concrete results: adherence to the CTBT, establishment of strongexport controls, and restraint on fissile materialsproduction and ballistic missile development and deployment. I hope that bythe end of the year sufficient progress will havebeen made to enable the President to travel to the subcontinent to hail amore stable and secure South Asia.

Dealing with North Korea -- the most isolated nation in the world -- is adelicate balancing act that requires a judicious mix ofdeterrence, diplomacy, and aggressive non-proliferation efforts. Topreserve the Agreed Framework, we must work towardarrangements with the North to resolve our concerns about the undergroundactivity. We must intensify our efforts to dissuadeand deter the North from conducting additional long-range missile tests andcontinuing its missile technology exports. We areworking closely with our allies the Republic of Korea and Japan, and withChina, to achieve these goals. We are alsoconducting an overall review of U.S. policy, with the help of formerDefense Secretary Bill Perry, to develop a sustainablelong-term strategy towards North Korea beyond the Agreed Framework.

As we work with China on common nonproliferation goals, we will continue toexpress our hope that it will join the MissileTechnology Control Regime -- and do so this year.

On Iraq, the Administration will use all means -- including, if necessary,additional military force -- to obtain Saddam'scompliance with Iraq's commitments regarding weapons of mass destructionand with the relevant Security Council resolutions.We will adhere to our position that disarmament under these resolutions isthe only pathway to sanctions relief. And wecontinue to believe that UNSCOM is the appropriate entity to verify andmonitor Iraq's disarmament. It is up to Saddam todecide whether he wants sanctions relief by giving up his weapons of massdestruction. In the meantime, we will be ready toact again if we see Iraq rebuilding a WMD capability.

We will also continue to offer humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people,and, most importantly, work toward the day whenIraq has a government that respects its people and lives in peace with itsneighbors. It is clear that real disarmament in Iraq willcome only when there is a new government in Baghdad.

As to Russia, we will continue to work aggressively with the Russianleadership to halt Russian entities' cooperation with Iran'smissile and nuclear weapons programs. This issue has been at the top of ouragenda with the Russian government. Wecontinue to urge Russia to enforce and strengthen its export controls andtake actions against Russian entities that violate thosecontrols, selling out Russia's own nonproliferation and security interestsfor their own financial gain.

We will continue to take action against these entities ourselves. In thatregard, I want to announce that today the United Statesis imposing economic penalties against three additional Russian entities --the Moscow Aviation Institute, MendeleyevUniversity, and NIKIET, or the Scientific Research and Design Institute ofPower Technology -- for providing sensitive missileor nuclear assistance to Iran. Last July we took action against sevenothers. Let me be very clear: The Administration hasauthority to act against entities that violate internationalnonproliferation standards, and we will use this authority to protect oursecurity.

In the end, though, the most effective shield against proliferation fromRussia is not U.S. penalties, but a Russian export controlsystem that is designed to work and does so. Only Russia can police its ownborders, factories and technology institutes. Thatis why President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed at last year's Moscowsummit to create seven export control workinggroups to improve Russia's capacity to stop the flow of sensitivetechnology and equipment. It is also why we are funding theInternational Science and Technology Center in Moscow and other initiativesto help thousands of weapons scientists applytheir skills to civilian purposes. It is why we are funding the NuclearCities Initiative, announced by Energy SecretaryRichardson last September, to help Russia convert its nuclear weaponsproduction facilities to peaceful uses.

We currently are considering enhancement of existing threat reductionprograms -- to work together with Russia to secure anddispose of dangerous materials, convert WMD resources to peaceful use,tighten export controls, and help ensure that Russianscientists are engaged in work other than proliferation activity. We hopeto be able to say more on this in the near future.

Our third set of priorities recognizes that, despite our efforts tostrengthen the international regime and resolve regional issues,we cannot prevent all forms of proliferation in all cases -- and thatweapons of mass destruction already are out there, in thehands of dangerous actors. So we must devote sufficient resources todevelop defensive capabilities to protect the UnitedStates and our allies in the event these weapons are used.

To deal with the spread of ballistic missile technology in key regions, wehave stepped up our Theater Missile Defenseprograms, including with Israel and Japan. We are also committed to thedevelopment of a limited National Missile Defensesystem that could, if we decide, be deployed to counter the emergingballistic missile threat from rogue nations. In the nextbudget we present to Congress, we will propose to include funds --approximately $7 billion over the next six years -- thatwould be necessary if we later decide to deploy a limited National MissileDefense system. Let me be clear: We remainstrongly committed to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- acornerstone of our security -- and we would seek agreementwith the other Treaty parties if any missile defense activitiesnecessitated modifying the ABM Treaty.

To be ready to protect our citizens from the threat of terrorist use ofchemical and biological weapons, we have launched arobust program under our new National Coordinator for Security,Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. We havecreated a National Office of Domestic Preparedness to train and equip fire,police and medical personnel across the country todeal with chemical, biological and nuclear emergencies. We are readyingNational Guard units in every region to meet thischallenge. We have begun the work necessary to improve our public healthsurveillance system -- so that if a biological weapon is released, we can detect it and save lives. We havebegun the effort to create the first-ever civilianstockpile of needed medicines. We have increased funding for research anddevelopment on medications. And I am confidentthat in the budget the President will submit next month, we will deepen ourefforts on the public health front. We also hope tomake progress at the NATO summit here in April to better equip our Allianceto deal with this growing threat.

All of these efforts -- strengthening the nonproliferation regime,addressing regional threats, and bolstering defenses -- areabsolutely essential. And the Clinton Administration is committed to making1999 a year of progress and achievement on eachfront.

The President's continuing focus on these matters -- in talks with worldleaders, meetings with experts, policy sessions with hisnational security team, and speeches to the public -- makes plain that theUnited States will not shrink from the fight againstweapons of mass destruction. By your presence here, you show that you havenot given up on this most important of causes.Together, let us do all we can so that the next time we assemble we canfind renewed cause for hope -- hope for a safer futurefor all peoples.