Thank you, Joe. Your words are very kind. And Jessica Matthews, thank youfor your support of this important issue.

One of Andrew Carnegie's operating tenets on life was simple: if you enterinto a line of work, continue at it. He saw thatsuccess could be found through focus and determination, and wrote almost acentury ago that, "the great successes of life" -and he meant all successes, not just monetary ones -- "are made byconcentration."

Concentration. Deliberation. Focus. We know that this wise legacy thrivesat the Carnegie Endowment, seeking the honorable- and inestimable -- reward of lasting global peace.

During my tenure in Congress, at the United Nations and, more recently, atthe Department of Energy I have benefitted fromthe experience and insight of many of the people assembled in this room. Ihave learned from this concentration of experienceand talent and vision. It's a honor to address such an important anddedicated group of experts, especially on a subject of sucha critical nature.

It's also reassuring to know that the good work of this conference iscontinuing after the departure of its creator and formerdirector, Sandy Spector. Carnegie's loss has been the Department ofEnergy's gain. It's a pleasure to have Sandy on ourteam.

The start of the new year presents a valuable opportunity for reflection.It's particularly appropriate this year, on the eve of anew millennium, to consider where we are and where we need to go.

President Clinton has frequently stated that no greater threat than theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction confronts usas we enter the next millennium. As a government and a nation, we recognizethat as these weapons spread, the risk rises thatthey may one day be used. President John F. Kennedy alluded to thisdesperate prospect when he announced the Limited TestBan Treaty, warning of a potential time when none could rest, when dangerwould lurk in every corner of the world.

America bears a unique responsibility in tempering this threat and defusingits dangers. Our nation's history, and our uniquegeo-strategic and economic standing, lead the world's eye to America as wecross the threshold of the millennium.

We must renew our national commitment to peace. We must redouble ourefforts to preserve and strengthen the existingnonproliferation regime, while also pursuing new and innovative approachesto ensure our collective security and prosperity.

Earlier today, the President's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger,told you about the Administration's comprehensivearms control and nonproliferation goals. Today, I will focus on mybailiwick: the Department of Energy's unique role in ournational arms control and nonproliferation goals.

DOE Role

This role is indeed unique -- at the leading edge of our nationalcommitment. From our headquarters on Independence Avenueto the Department's national labs to our dozens of field offices, theEnergy Department serves as one of America's centralproviders of safety and security against the threat of weapons of massdestruction.

I initially learned of the many ways Energy Department labs contribute toour security during my time in Congress, when Irepresented the district that is home to the Department's Los AlamosNational Laboratory. From our work supporting globalarms control agreements and the non-proliferation regime, to our extensiveactivities in the former Soviet Union, the EnergyDepartment is working to deliver security for our country.

The CTBT

This morning, Sandy Berger described the Administration's commitment to theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Letme reiterate Mr. Berger's message: We are determined to obtain ratificationof the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year.

Ratification of the Treaty this year is essential. Without this Treaty, wewill lose one of the most important tools available to usfor constraining the development of more advanced nuclear weapons, andlimiting the spread of nuclear weapons to newstates. Failure to ratify also seriously erodes our ability as a nation tolead in nonproliferation matters. Without ratification, weundercut our credibility in persuading India and Pakistan to join us inthis important regime.

And without ratification, we are not eligible to join with other nationslater this year to discuss ways to facilitate the Treaty'sentry into force, if necessary. Moreover, it would run counter to thedesires of most Americans, who want this Treaty to enterinto force. The Senate's failure to act this year would reduce -- notincrease -- our national security.

In 1995, when President Clinton announced his decision to pursue a true,zero-yield CTBT, he stated that U.S. entry into thisTreaty would be conditioned upon the conduct of six specific CTBT"safeguards," including a Science Based StockpileStewardship program.

This program is necessary to ensure a high level of confidence in thesafety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.

At the Department of Energy, we have worked hard to put the StockpileStewardship program in place. And we have come along way since the inception of this program back in 1993. Today, in ourlaboratories, we use computers to answer questionsabout the condition of our weapons that are one thousand times morepowerful than those we used only six years ago.

We have also put in place new processes and equipment at our labs, and willacquire even greater scientific tools over the nextfive years to help ensure the safety and reliability of our deterrent. Inshort, the Department of Energy has created a vibrant androbust Stockpile Stewardship Program, and it is working today.

Because this program has enabled us to maintain confidence in our nucleardeterrent, just last month, Secretary Cohen and Iwere able to sign the third annual certification to the President that thestockpile is safe and reliable, and that nuclear testing isnot required at this time. This certification process, which we conducteach year, consists of a rigorous review by our nation'sbest nuclear experts. The process itself allows us to revalidate ourconfidence in the stockpile - and our continued adherenceto the Treaty - on an annual basis.

I know this program has fueled debate in national security circles. Somewho oppose Treaty ratification argue that we cannotguarantee the credibility of our nuclear deterrent without testing. Othersargue we should wait for the stewardship program tomature fully before ratification. Still others argue we have too robust aStockpile Stewardship Program.

In response to these points, let me be perfectly clear: without a credibleStockpile Stewardship Program, we would not have aCTBT. Maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent is a cornerstoneof our national security strategy. At the EnergyDepartment, we have worked very hard to make this program a reality -- andI am pleased to report that our success to datewill enable us to adhere to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, should theU.S. Senate give its advice and consent toratification.

Now we must look beyond the Department to the Senate to take the next stepin advancing our national security throughapproval of the CTBT.

Arms Control

Working to free the world of nuclear testing is just one way that EnergyDepartment resources reinforce and advance theglobal arms control regime. As the guardians of America's nucleardeterrent, we are also carrying out nuclear reductions ofhistoric proportions, while paving the way for deeper, more securereductions in cooperation with our Russian partners. Wehave already dismantled over 11,000 nuclear weapons. And if we meet thePresident's goal of further reductions under theSTART III framework, we will have reduced our deployed arsenal by 80percent from its cold war peak.

The goal of strategic arms control thus far has been to limit the systemsthat delivered nuclear weapons. In this new era, we willpursue a new stage in strategic reductions where warheads themselves willbe eliminated.

The Energy Department is at the center of this new mission. At thePresident's direction, we have developed a framework forpotential warhead dismantlement monitoring regimes. It has not been easy,but we've made tremendous progress. We lookforward to both Russian ratification of START II and a START III agreementthat will enable further deep reductions in ournuclear arsenal.

As many of you know, the challenge will not end once these weapons aretaken apart. In fact, in achieving our warheadelimination goals we generate the new work of disposing of the excessnuclear material harvested from that process.

Nuclear Materials

It is proverbial wisdom that one shall reap what one has sown -- and we arenow facing a daunting harvest. The nuclearinvestment made by the United States and Russia during the cold warresulted in a massive legacy of nuclear waste and excessmaterials.

In the United States, we enjoy a robust domestic security system that isthe international standard in physical protection.Moreover, we have taken broad steps to provide transparency over our excessnuclear materials and have -- in conjunctionwith Russia -- developed plans for material disposal.

A far different scenario is unfolding in Russia. There, the historic systemof controls over nuclear facilities and materials hasweakened, and resources are simply not available to maintain it. We havealso discovered that Russia's system of accountingwas not consistent with modern systems of control and accounting.

Today, the Department of Energy and our national laboratories are workingat over 50 Russian sites to secure nuclearmaterials and install modern security and accounting systems. This work isbeing carried out by the Department's MaterialsProtection, Control, and Accounting Task Force, in partnership with Russianscientists.

As we meet here today, dozens of men and women are at work in Russia toinstall basic safeguard systems and standards andprocedures that can help provide for the long-term protection of theseweapons-usable materials.

Our optimism for this program has been fueled by the extraordinary goodwilland cooperation that has developed between theDepartment and our Russian counterparts. As a result, we are nowcooperating at virtually every single site in Russia thatstores or uses plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

Still, we recognize the changing complexity of the problems in Russia. Thecurrent economic crisis brings new urgency to ourefforts -- particularly during a winter predicted to be the harshest in 40years. We have moved quickly to address specialproblems -- such as providing basics like winter clothing and space heatersto guards at facilities. This modest investment willkeep our broader security work intact through this volatile period.

And while securing materials in place boosts global security, it is not anend in itself . Excess materials in the United States andRussia present a proliferation problem if these materials are not disposedof. As many of you know, the U.S. is beginning toblend down its surplus HEU for peaceful use in commercial reactor fuel andwe are working very hard to facilitate ouragreement with Russia for the purchase of 500 metric tons of HEU. We hopeto soon bring closure to the recent issues thathave dogged our progress on implementing this important agreement.

Already, this agreement has seen 36 tons of Russian HEU blended down anddelivered to America for use as reactor fuel.Think about it: enough nuclear material for over 1500 nuclear weapons hasbeen transferred from one former intractable foe toanother. Who among us would have predicted this possibility -- even 10years ago?

Plutonium disposition is a much more complicated issue -- but we continueto make progress. While both countries haveidentified 50 tons of plutonium as no longer required for weapons, we stillhave a long road ahead of us before we successfullyconvert our first ton of weapons plutonium to the "spent-fuel" standard.

I know that many here today have hotly debated the option of disposingplutonium by burning it as MOX fuel. The technicalchallenges presented by plutonium disposal led us to adopt the "spent fuel"standard. This will make surplus plutonium asinaccessible and unattractive for retrieval and weapons use as theplutonium remaining in spent fuel from commercial reactors.

But let me clearly state that we remain firmly committed to a policy of nocommercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in theU.S. The use of plutonium in reactors does not make economic sense, and theUnited States remains firm in its commitment tothe once-through fuel cycle. But we are planning to burn plutonium inreactors to gain the nonproliferation benefits of a jointdisposition program with our Russian partners, and I ask for your supportas we work to move this program forward.

At the same time, we recognize that Russia does not have the resources toaddress this problem on their own. We continue towork with the G-8 countries and others to develop a broad-based andrealistic formula to fund the Russian plutoniumdisposition effort.

Russian Nuclear Complex

Many of my comments today have dealt with our unique and rapidly evolvingrelationship with the Russian Federation. TheUnited States remains firmly committed to working with Russia as itdevelops democracy and finds a new place in thecommunity of nations. Our futures remain inexorably linked.

As many of you know, since the end of the cold war, the U.S. has beenengaged in a major downsizing and restructuring ofour nuclear weapons complex. We have produced no new nuclear weapons since1991, and we have cut our workforce bymore than half from our 1990 levels. Russia, too, must now join inrightsizing its nuclear weapons complex, and we areprepared to work with them in facing this challenge together.

Especially today, as Russia faces perilous economic conditions, it isessential that we take steps to help the scientists andengineers behind the Russian nuclear complex find other ways of supportingthemselves. I was with the President in Russia lastSeptember, and have seen the difficult conditions that many Russian nuclearworkers face each day. As their nuclear complexis reconfigured, tens of thousands of nuclear experts living in or near thenuclear cities are going to be underemployed orunemployed. Ways must be found for these people to channel their energy andexpertise into new civil economic opportunities,to remove incentives for these scientists to sell their services towould-be proliferators.

To do just that, the Department has launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative,designed to develop -- in cooperation with privateindustry -- alternative commercial enterprises in the ten Russian nuclearcities. Last September, I was pleased to sign theNuclear Cities Agreement with Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov.Under this Initiative, some of the near-termprojects we are considering include:

• establishing commercial software enterprises in the formerlysecret cities of Sarov and Snezhinsk
• extending telecom linkages into the municipal centers of thesecities and into Zheleznogorsk, our third focus city during FY1999
• and opening business centers in all three cities to facilitatecommercial development.

Special Challenges

Our progress cannot, however, diminish the truth that we face seriouschallenges in our relationship with Russia. And nochallenge is as great as that created by Russian institutes' and labs'cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. On thisissue, we have grave concerns. The flow of information, technology andequipment to Iranian programs threatens to worsenthe situation in the Middle East, undermine critical nonproliferation andexport control norms, and undercut support for ourcooperative programs in Russia.

This morning Sandy Berger announced that the President has again exercisedhis authority to impose penalties on three Russianorganizations engaging in nuclear and missile trade with Iran. Theseactivities go beyond the already troubling Bushehr(BOO-Sheer) reactor project and directly support Iranian efforts to developnuclear weapons.

The President and his cabinet have worked tirelessly to help the Russiangovernment understand our concerns. Our message tothem is simple: money made in business dealings with Iran may cost Russiathe far greater benefits - financial and otherwise -associated with U.S. business and assistance.

The Administration has chosen to announce the penalties here because thepeople in this room enjoy extensive contactsthroughout the Russian governmental and nuclear complex. I believe it isimportant that this message to Russian officials andscientists come through loud and clear: continued contacts and commercewith Iran on nuclear weapon and missile technologyis a threat to the United States, to Russia, and to the world. We welcomerecent steps by Russia to tighten their exportcontrols but more needs to be done. We extend our hand of cooperation tofurther improve these controls. Russia would bewise to take it.

In undertaking all these activities the Clinton Administration is driven byone basic assumption. That the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction fundamentally threatens our global system ofpeace and security, a system built with sweat andlabor over five decades. We must continue to do all we can to convincestates that acquiring such weapons does not improvetheir security, but threatens it and that helping others to acquire suchweapons does not improve international status, but lowersit.

The thaw of the cold war has revealed many opportunities for theadvancement of global peace and prosperity, a goal we allstrive to one day find. But this new season reveals as many challenges tothis same goal. There is much work to be done.Another proverb that comes to mind when I consider the nuclear legacy thatremains before us is "those that sow the wind mayreap the whirlwind." We should heed this warning.

It is our job to ensure our harvests are ones of a peaceful bounty. Were hewith us today, Andrew Carnegie would demandwe do this job well and do it right by the people -- not just of America,but of the world. "The great successes of life are madeby concentration," Mr. Carnegie wrote at the beginning of this century. Onthe issue of global peace, it is a lesson for us, too.