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Text of letter from the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) to the U.S. Congress on the future of WMD threat reduction

April 24, 2003

The Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction agenda is now in its 12^th year and during this time, thousands of nuclear warheads, missiles, silos, and other weapon platforms have been eliminated under this effort.  But, the goals of rapidly securing and eliminating other key remnants of the former Soviet Union’s weapon of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal remain largely uncompleted.  The slowing pace of these efforts was recently documented in a new General Accounting Office report.  Continuing on the current course of incremental action could leave key objectives unmet at the end of this decade – after almost 20 years of work.  This would unnecessarily perpetuate serious security vulnerabilities for the U.S. and the world.

Threat reduction is an essential component in addressing 21^st Century WMD threats and its achievements have made America and the world safer.  President Bush’s December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that “maintaining an extensive and efficient set of nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance programs to Russia and other former Soviet states is a high priority.”  But, if threat reduction ultimately is to be successful in meeting its many important objectives, energetic political leadership is needed to expedite, reform, and expand this agenda this year.

Last year’s National Intelligence Council Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces noted that as a result of U.S. efforts to improve nuclear control, “Russia’s nuclear security has been slowly improving over the last several years, but risks remain.”  Two of these risks are easily quantifiable - roughly two-thirds of Russia’s nuclear material still remains inadequately secure, and only a small percentage of its oversized weapons infrastructure has been eliminated.  But many non-nuclear risks remain as well.  The destruction of Russia’s massive stockpile of chemical weapons is only just getting underway, much remains unknown about the true size and scope of the Russian biological weapons complex, and most excess weapons scientists have not been transitioned to sustainable, non-weapons related careers.

The high level of interest in the effectiveness and future of threat reduction is reflected in the large number of new publications and statements that have been issued on this subject in recent months, including those by the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Russian Academy of Science/U.S. National Academies Joint Committee on U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Harvard University’s  Managing the Atom project.  Each of these organizations has made important findings and recommendations that could be usefully employed to improve future threat reduction activities.

Many of the difficulties facing the threat reduction agenda are primarily political and not technical in nature and they can be resolved if there is the demonstrated political will to do so.  Therefore, I would like to highlight some key issues for consideration by the Congress this year.

• Encourage Russia to improve the environment for threat reduction activities by accounting for past WMD program activities, providing access to facilities where security improvements are required, offering financial transparency, and approving the legal protections that are needed to move this agenda forward.  But Congress should not further restrict threat reduction activities because of these issues, as the national security benefits of these programs outweigh the obstacles they face.  The rapid resolution of these problems would benefit from a much more intense political dialogue between the White House and Kremlin than currently exists.  However, if Russia is to be an equal partner in this process it must be primarily responsible for addressing these key issues.

• Provide permanent authority to the President to waive the annual certifications required for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and Freedom Support Act nonproliferation programs.  The President requested this action in the FY 2004 budget request to the Congress.

• Expand and refocus efforts designed to peacefully employ excess weapons scientists and specialists and irreversibly eliminate WMD complex infrastructure.  Excess weapons scientists and workers are a major root cause of the proliferation threat given their expertise and access to weapons and materials.  These efforts need more funding, greater flexibility, and new strategies in order to provide the career-changing opportunities that can further reduce, if not eliminate, the threat these scientists and their facilities pose.

• Fund key programs.  The FY 2004 budget submission cuts some essential nuclear material security programs to pay for new and important initiatives such as accelerating elimination of Russian weapon-grade uranium, providing security upgrades at Russian Strategic Rocket Forces warhead storage sites, and securing radiological materials.  While some of the programs targeted for reduction have funding backlogs, if implementation problems are resolved those backlogged funds could rapidly be spent.  Also, smaller but essential programs, such as research reactor conversion, Second Line of Defense and border security, export control development, and the repatriation of sensitive nuclear reactor fuels to Russia could use funding boosts.

• Create a new global initiative that would eliminate weapon-grade uranium from vulnerable facilities worldwide (similar to projects conducted in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Serbia).  The authority to undertake this effort needs to be clarified and the funding for it provided.

• Encourage the establishment of a senior coordinator or focused coordination team in the U.S. that can prioritize, oversee, and expedite threat reduction activities.  This person or group must be more powerful than current interagency working groups and must have unfettered access to the President and his senior advisors.

• Support the creation of bi-annual, performance-focused meetings between high-level U.S. and Russian political officials to comprehensively evaluate threat reduction progress, receive reports from program managers on advances and impediments in each program, and negotiate solutions to implementation obstacles.  There is no substitute for having both sides in the same room reporting to senior political officials on programmatic progress and problems.

• Integrate cooperative threat reduction activities into the concept of homeland defense and the war on terrorism.  These programs are a first line of defense against WMD threats to the U.S. and its allies and they should be considered a high national security priority, not as foreign aid.  This would also provide a basis for the expansion of threat reduction beyond Russia and the former Soviet states.

• Stress the importance of the G-8 nations meeting their financial obligations under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction initiative and focusing their funding on priority proliferation issues.  The G-8 has promised up to $20 billion for threat reduction over the next decade.  One-half of this amount is projected to be funded by the U.S. but the remainder must be paid by our key allies.  Also, encourage the further involvement of non-G-8 nations and consider supporting an increase in the total funding commitment above $20 billion.

• Continue to hold comprehensive hearings on threat reduction activities and include expert, non-governmental witnesses who can speak broadly but authoritatively on the progress and problems facing the Nunn-Lugar programs, including how threat reduction concepts and authorities can be expanded to include new nations.

The dangers of inaction are acute.  As President Bush has stated, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.  Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.  The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed…We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best…History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.  In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

If terrorists or hostile regimes should gain access to the world’s largest exposed WMD stockpiles because of inertia, distraction, or risk aversion on the part of our political leaders, our security will suffer in spite of other victories in the war on terrorism, and the judgment of history may indeed be harsh.

Sincerely,

Kenneth N. Luongo

Executive Director