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RANSAC Nuclear News, March 10, 2003 Compiled by Michael Roston A. Cooperative Threat Reduction
 A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Letter to the Editor: Russian Nuke Reduction The argument that Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs are faltering [op-ed, March 4] does not withstand scrutiny. In one decade, for less than is being spent this year on missile defense, CTR has eliminated 6,032 nuclear warheads, 495 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 438 ICBM silos, 103 bombers, 510 nuclear air-to-surface missiles, 369 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 408 SLBM launchers, 25 ballistic missile submarines, and 194 nuclear test tunnels or holes. Has some CTR money not achieved its intended results? Absolutely. That is why we support congressional oversight of the program. The United States faces a range of threats from stateless terrorists and rogue nations. We have a new relationship with Russia and an opportunity to improve global security. But Russia maintains the world's largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and materials. This is not lost on the likes of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. For less than one-half of 1 percent of what the United States spends on defense, we can help eliminate the risk of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons falling into the wrong hands. So it is in our direct security interests to invest more, not less, in preventing rogue leaders and terrorists from gaining access to Russia's weapons, weapons materials and weapons know-how. return to menu B. Russia-U.S. 1. The perils of arms control 'lite' Last May, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a treaty that mandates deep cuts in both countries' strategic nuclear arsenals. Last week, the U.S. Senate ratified the accord. While any nuclear arms reductions are to be welcomed, this document is troubling. It is only the outline of a treaty and its effect may prove just as light. Arms control "lite" could undermine the entire arms-control regime by undermining its legitimacy. Arms control has to be real, verifiable and irreversible if it is to be meaningful. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty obliges the United States and Russia to slash their nuclear arsenals to between 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads in a decade. On paper, that is an impressive accomplishment; the U.S. currently has about 6,000 warheads, Russia 5,500. The cuts reduce the arsenals to their lowest level in half a century. Although there were hopes that both countries' legislatures would take up the agreement simultaneously, the Russian Duma has yet to consider it. After U.S. Senate ratification, it goes to Mr. Bush, who is expected to sign the treaty. There are hopes that Russian legislators will pass it in a few weeks or, at the latest, in time for the U.S.-Russia summit that is scheduled for May. There are concerns, however, that the fallout from a possible U.S. attack on Iraq could slow ratification in Russia. In addition to the deep cuts, the treaty is unlike other strategic arms accords in another important respect. The actual document is merely three pages long, unlike the thousand-page treaties of the past. Although when Mr. Bush took office he promised to implement deep cuts in the U.S. arsenal, he had not wanted a formal treaty at all. He was (and continues to be) deeply skeptical of arms control agreements, believing that they tie the U.S. without binding other signatories that cannot be trusted. As the Iraqi case demonstrates, they spark endless debate about verification without necessarily achieving their main purpose. Nevertheless, Mr. Putin insisted on a formal agreement, and Mr. Bush conceded the point. Still, there is even less to this accord than meets the eye. The agreement does not require either country to destroy warheads or the missiles and bombers that carry them. Nonoperational weapons can be kept in storage and redeployed at fairly short notice. The Natural Resources Defense Council, an American nonprofit organization, estimates that the U.S. could keep 2,100 nuclear weapons on "active reserve," which means they would be ready for relatively quick redeployment, 4,900 weapons that would take longer to reactivate, and there would be components for another 5,000 weapons. Worse still, there are no verification mechanisms to confirm that even the initial reductions occur. Deactivating weapons is not the same as destroying them. Not only can they be redeployed quickly, as the NRDC suggests, but maintaining the components of the arsenals requires that they be safeguarded. That is a very real problem in Russia. Moscow was quick to agree to the strategic arms reductions because Russia could not afford the vast arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union. Securing those nuclear weapons will be no less expensive. The Group of Seven has already spent billions of dollars in an effort to destroy Russian nuclear materials, but that is a mere drop in the bucket. As the world grows increasingly concerned about the danger of terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction, the decision to forgo destruction of such weapons seems short-sighted and dangerous. This agreement raises questions about the utility of arms control generally. The failure to make these reductions verifiable and irreversible will give other nations the freedom to question their own commitment to arms control. If the two leading nuclear powers can commit to "paper" reductions, other governments are likely to do the same. They will demand the right to deactivate rather than destroy their own arsenals, just as the U.S. and Russia have done. At the same time, the reluctance to destroy weapons will make it harder to make the case for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation more generally. Not only do the nuclear powers continue to argue for "international apartheid" on this question, but they are not even willing to reduce, much less eliminate, their arsenals as demanded by the initial Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty bargain. This is a dangerous and counterproductive precedent, the glaring inequality of which becomes even more obvious as the United Nations tries to cope with the prospect of nuclear proliferation in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, as well as with the established cases of India and Pakistan. return to menu 2. Senator Margelov Welcomes Ratification by the USA of Strategic Offensive Potentials Reduction Treaty Chairman of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian parliament) international affairs committee Mikhail Margelov welcomed the unanimous ratification of the Moscow strategic offensive potentials reduction treaty by the US Senate. "The signing of this treaty in spring of 2002 played an important role in establishing new relations between Russia and the USA," said Margelov. "I am confident that when this document passes a corresponding procedure in the State Duma (the lower house of parliament) it will be supported by my colleagues in the Federation Council," he pointed out. "The treaty, undoubtedly, lowers the ceiling of deterrence between our countries, preserving for Russia and the USA the freedom of choosing the directions of building their nuclear forces," Margelov stated. This is precisely why we welcomed its signing. We hope that under the agreements reached during the signing of the treaty, our countries will continue working to elaborate an effective monitoring of offensive weapons reductions. "As for the statements by some of our US colleagues to the effect that the ratification of the treaty will influence the position of Russia with respect to Iraq, this is ruled out, Mikhail Margelov stressed. The issues of bilateral disarmament are not connected with the Iraqi problem in any way. This problem should be solved within the framework of the UN Security Council, he concluded. return to menu 3. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Hopes Russian Parliament Will Ratify SOR Treaty Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Georgy Mamedov hopes that the ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive reductions (SOR) will take place in the Russian parliament, too, he told journalists at a briefing Friday. "I hope that the deputies will make a correct choice by backing this treaty", the Deputy Minister said. According to him, now the government of Russia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "are completing active preparations for the work with the Federal Assembly to ratify the strategic offensive reductions treaty". Asked by RIA Novosti who will persuade the Russian parliamentarians to ratify this document, Mamedov said that, in accordance with the instructions given by the president of the Russian Federation, this will be done by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence - Igor Ivanov and Sergei Ivanov. Answering the question about the agreement between the presidents of Russia and the USA to synchronize the process of the ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive reductions, Mamedov pointed out that Russia is living in conditions of democracy. "We have division of the branches of power, and executive power cannot dictate its terms to legislative power", he noted. Georgy Mamedov explained that the accord on synchronization meant that the presidents of Russia and the USA would act in a certain direction so that the two countries' parliaments would ratify this treaty. "I hope that we will very soon convince the State Duma to back the SOR treaty". Mamedov recalled that, speaking of the synchronization, both the U.S. and Russian presidents made a reservation to the effect that they would try to ratify the treaty simultaneously as far as the situation in the parliaments would allow them to do so. return to menu 4. Ratification of SOR Treaty Cannot be Regarded as US Gift to Russia The US Senate's ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions cannot be regarded as Washington's gift to Moscow, Russia's deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov told a press briefing. "Speaking about a gift is simply absurd," he said. Mamedov stressed that the ratification and the actions Russia and the US take in the framework of the United Nations Security Council to settle the Iraqi crisis are not connected in any way. "There is only one connection: there is a problem of non-proliferating weapons of mass destruction, which is mentioned in Resolution No. 1441, and it must be solved," he noted. He also said ratification of the Treaty would help solve this task in respect of Iraq as well as in respect of other countries. return to menu 5. Moscow Welcomes Unanimous Decision of U.S. Senate to Ratify Russian-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms In Moscow, they welcome the unanimous decision of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Russian-U.S. treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms, the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, received by RIA Novosti, says. It is stressed in the statement that the Moscow Treaty, signed by the presidents of Russia and the USA on May 24, 2002, "became a frontier-marking agreement in the field of real and radical nuclear disarmament, a weighty practical expression of new relations of strategic partnership" between Moscow and Washington. Moscow stresses that in the present-day complicated international situation, the Treaty serves as an example of a legal, political solution of the most complex and acute problems of security on the ways of interaction and collective efforts of the great powers in the interests of the entire world community. The statement by the Foreign Ministry of Russia expresses confidence that after the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Federal Assembly of Russia and its coming into force, it will become an important factor for strategic stability and global security in international relations of the 21st century. At its Thursday meeting the Senate of the U.S. Congress unanimously ratified the Russian-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive arms signed by the presidents of Russia and the USA in Moscow in May 2002. As many as 95 Senators participated in the voting, and all of them voted for ratifying this document. The treaty, signed in the course of the visit of the U.S. president to Moscow, envisages reduction of nuclear arsenals of either side to the level of 1,700-2,200 warheads by the end of 2012. return to menu 6. Senate ratifies U.S.-Russia arms treaty In a powerful bipartisan endorsement for improved relations with Russia, the Senate unanimously approved a treaty that would cut active U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear warheads by two-thirds. Senate Republicans said the Moscow Treaty will make the world safer by taking missile levels to their lowest point in 50 years. Democrats were skeptical the treaty would make Americans safer, but recognized that it has at least a strong symbolic value in demonstrating unified political support for friendship and cooperation with Russia. That message had added importance as President George W. Bush tries to persuade Russia not to veto a U.N. resolution authorizing force to disarm Iraq. The 95-0 vote Thursday "is truly remarkable," said Sen. Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "This is bound to leave both Russians and Americans to consider the value of the relationship." The treaty calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads by 2012 - down from about 6,000 for the United States and 5,500 for Russia. It was signed by Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin last May. It reflects how the United States sees the nuclear threat as coming less from a clash of superpowers and more from smaller countries, such as North Korea, which is believed to have one or two plutonium bombs. North Korea has stepped up its nuclear program and could develop several more weapons within months. That shift was evident last year when Russia offered only moderate opposition to the United States' withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It could also be seen in Bush's proposal for a limited missile defense system that might eventually offer protection from a few North Korean missiles, but would be overwhelmed by a larger-scale attack. The pact also shows the evolution of arms treaties. Cold-War era agreements required years of negotiations, resulting in thousands of pages of documents and often bitter - and sometimes unsuccessful - ratification fights in the Senate. The new treaty, by comparison, is a three-page document that was quickly worked out by U.S. and Russian negotiators ahead last May's summit. Ratification is expected in the Russian state Duma within weeks. No further action is needed in Congress, because the Constitution gives the Senate sole authority over foreign treaties. Many Democrats said the treaty would do little to strengthen U.S. security because it allows the weapons to be stored instead of destroyed. "Once this treaty is fully implemented, the United States will still have approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons. There will just be more weapons in storage," said Sen. Jack Reed. "And similarly, Russians could have approximately 5,500 nuclear weapons, but they will be non-operational." Other Democratic concerns were that the treaty had no timetable for reducing weapons before the 2012 deadline. They also said the treaty lacks verification procedures and makes it too easy for either side to withdraw. Sen. John Kerry, a declared Democratic presidential candidate, called it "as flimsy a treaty as the United States Senate ever considered" and "little more than a series of missed opportunities." He and Sen. Carl Levin, the top Democrat on Armed Services, offered amendments that sought to strengthen Senate oversight of the treaty, but both were defeated on largely partisan votes. Both he and Kerry ultimately supported the treaty. return to menu 7. Russia welcomes arms treaty ratification The Russian Foreign Ministry on Friday welcomed the U.S. Senate's ratification of the latest bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty, saying the agreement reflected a new era of cooperation, but prominent lawmakers warned that Russian passage could be complicated by a war against Iraq. The Moscow Treaty is a "substantial practical expression of the new relations of strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United States," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement. U.S. President George W. Bush was initially reluctant to codify the arms reductions, but he later acceded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence on a legally binding treaty, and the two leaders signed the agreement in Moscow in May. The U.S. concession was seen as a diplomatic victory for Moscow. Ratification of the treaty has been a top priority for Moscow before the next U.S.-Russian presidential summit, again in May. It came up for a Senate vote as the United States was pressing Russia not to use its U.N. Security Council veto to block a resolution authorizing a war against Iraq - but did not appear to budge Moscow from its stand against a military solution to the crisis. The pact, unanimously approved by the U.S. Senate on Thursday, calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads by 2012 - down from about 6,000 for the United States and 5,500 for Russia. It brings the missile levels to the lowest point in 50 years. Ratification by Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma, is expected within weeks. Two senior Russian lawmakers said Friday that they don't foresee any obstacles to the treaty's ratification, but expressed concern that if the United States does decide to take unilateral action against Iraq, the Duma debate could become complicated. Lawmakers "sentiments will of course depend on the situation around Iraq," Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Duma's International Committee, was quoted as telling the Interfax news agency. "I hope there will be no direct connection." He said lawmakers must remember that the treaty "touches on our immediate bilateral relations and deals with agreements about strategic deterrence." Ret. Gen. Andrei Nikolayev, head of the defense affairs committee in the Duma, also was quoted as telling Interfax that he doesn't see "any obstacles" to ratification, but added that "some difficulties might arise if the United States begins a military operation against Iraq." The Foreign Ministry, predicting Russian ratification, said that "in the current difficult international environment, the agreement serves as an example of a legal and political resolution of the most complicated and critical problems of security through bilateral and collective efforts (taken) by the great powers in the interests of the entire world community." return to menu 8. Duma official on Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty In the near future Russia may ratify the Russian-US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which was ratified by the US Senate on March 6, 2003, State Duma Deputy Chairman Vladimir Lukin told RBC. A special commission has been working on this issue for a long time, he admitted. The Russian President has already submitted it to the State Duma for ratification, he added. Lukin welcomed the ratification of this treaty by the US Senate, however, he noted that it might have been done in order to smooth Russia's position on Iraq. At the same time he stressed that it was a good and important decision of the USA. The ratification meets Russia's interests, it does not contradict the national interests of the USA and promotes the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the world, the deputy thinks. return to menu 9. Senate Backs U.S.-Russian Nuclear Pact: Deployments to Be Cut by Two-Thirds The Senate yesterday unanimously approved a treaty to slash U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons deployments by two-thirds over the next decade, another milestone in the disarming of two powers that once threatened each other with horrific attacks. The vote was 95 to 0. The treaty, signed last year in Moscow by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin and awaiting approval by the Russian parliament, calls on each nation to reduce deployments of strategic, or long-range, weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the year 2012 -- their lowest level since the 1950s. The pact does not require the actual destruction of the weapons, leading some senators, especially Democrats, to question whether stockpiled Russian weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue countries. Bush has hailed the Moscow Treaty as strengthening ties between the former Cold War rivals. The administration pushed for swift approval at a time when it is seeking to persuade Russia not to block a new United Nations resolution paving the way for military action against Iraq. "As important as the substance is, it is the form -- the trust between the United States and Russia -- that shines through," said Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.). It may not be perfect, but it is "an important step toward a safer world," said Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.). Over the years, the Senate has approved a series of arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union, although its record on international weapons pacts is mixed. Most recently, it approved a chemical weapons ban but rejected a treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing. Most of the two-day Senate debate over the three-page pact, which omitted many of the details and complexities that characterized far longer Cold War-era agreements, centered on what was not in it rather than what was. While Democrats said they supported the treaty as a step forward in U.S.-Russian relations, they said it lacks verification requirements, enforcement provisions, mechanisms for weapons destruction or timetables for interim deadlines. At the end of the process, both countries will have no fewer weapons at their disposal than they have now, said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "I guess it's fine to have an agreement for the sake of agreement, but for what value?" he asked. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said he was concerned that Russia lacks the financial resources to protect its mothballed stockpiles of nuclear weapons, exposing them to possible theft or clandestine sale to hostile individuals or nations. He called for greater funding of the Nunn-Lugar program of assistance for the destruction of Russian weapons of mass destruction. Later, Biden joined Minority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (S.D.), Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.) and other Democrats in proposing a separate resolution assailing the administration's actions on weapons proliferation and outlining proposals of their own. The resolution, which did not come to a vote, urged the administration to start building an anti-proliferation coalition, to engage North Korea to deter it from pursuing its nuclear weapons program, to increase funding for nuclear security programs and to put more resources into homeland security. In one of the few votes on amendments, which Senate leaders had discouraged, a proposal to require Senate notification before the United States could withdraw from the treaty was rejected, 44 to 50. Another to require annual intelligence reports on compliance was defeated, 45 to 50. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said Bush should act shortly after the pact is ratified to reduce the high-alert status of U.S. nuclear arsenals and urge Putin to follow suit. Recalling a 1995 incident in which the Russian military initially interpreted the launch of a U.S. weather rocket as a possible nuclear attack, she said the high-alert status means weapons are ready to be launched at a moment's notice, and are thus vulnerable to mistakes or sabotage. return to menu 10. Russia hails U.S. nuclear deal Russia has praised the U.S. Senate's ratification of a treaty limiting strategic weapons. But in a statement seemingly aimed at the Iraq crisis Moscow said Friday the ratification was an example of how international issues can be solved politically. Russia and the U.S. have been head-to-head over how to deal with Iraq and Moscow this week, standing alongside France said both countries would, as permanent U.N. Security Council members, use all possible means to block a resolution that could trigger war. And in a Thursday phone call Russian President Vladimir Putin told President Bush Moscow would press ahead with attempts to find a peaceful solution. Despite the disagreement over Iraq, Moscow said it was also working to win ratification of the strategic weapons treaty in parliament. "In the present complex international environment, the Russian American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions serves as an example of a legal, political solution for the most complex and acute problems of security by coordinated and collective efforts of the great powers in the interests of the entire world," a Russian Foreign Ministry statement said. The U.S. Senate Thursday unanimously ratified the treaty which would reduce the number of offensive strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 for each country over the next decade -- down about two-thirds from their peak levels. The treaty was signed by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin last May. Senior Bush administration officials have said the treaty will enable the United States and Russia to enter into a new strategic relationship and to move away from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Bush administration has maintained that the 1972 treaty is an antiquated Cold War agreement that does not allow for modern contingencies, such as allowing the U.S. to pursue a missile defense system. Critics of the treaty have noted that it requires storage, rather than destruction, of many of the weapons, creating scenarios that could make theft of a nuclear warhead possible. return to menu 11. Senate Approves U.S.-Russian Treaty to Cut Some Nuclear Weapons The Senate on Thursday unanimously ratified a treaty that requires the United States and Russia to cut their arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons by about two-thirds over the next decade. Since signing the treaty in Moscow in May, President Bush has presented it as a landmark of a new and friendlier era between the United States and Russia. With Russia holding a veto at the U.N. Security Council, the vote sends a signal of support to Moscow at a crucial moment in the debate over a possible war in Iraq. Under the pact, the two nations will reduce their strategic forces from the more than 5,000 weapons each now deploys to from 1,500 to 2,200. It does not call for destruction of the weapons or for special monitoring or procedures ensuring that each country keeps its commitment. Bush administration officials say the lack of rules shows the United States considers Russia a trustworthy partner, like Britain. They insist the treaty will lead to major cuts, noting the United States has already decided to cut its forces, because it no longer needs such a huge nuclear deterrent; and that the Russians, lacking money for maintenance, will do the same. The treaty is "evidence that the U.S.-Russian relationship has turned the corner," said Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) said the treaty "encompassed the most dramatic reductions in nuclear [arms] ever envisioned" by the two Cold War adversaries. But arms control advocates, including many Senate Democrats, contended that the lack of safeguards makes the pact a sort of gentleman's agreement that may not lead to large reductions. They point out that the Pentagon has already said it will move many nuclear weapons into storage, rather than destroy them, to preserve its flexibility to increase the deployed arsenal if a new threat emerges. Democrats considered introducing amendments to prod the administration to take further steps to reduce the nuclear arsenals of both countries. Many sought to increase reporting requirements to make clear whether the arsenals were being cut, and some sought additional consultation with Congress. But in the end, several amendments were withdrawn or not introduced, as Democrats concluded it was better to vote for what they considered a weak treaty rather than go on record as opposing a measure aimed at reducing the nuclear threat. John D. Isaacs, president of Council for a Livable World, an arms-control group, said he was disappointed that Democrats did not introduce more of the amendments they were considering that sought to push the administration toward a more aggressive arms-control policy. Isaacs said he believed the Democrats' half-hearted fight reflected, in part, Washington's preoccupation with Iraq. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he had "many reservations" about the treaty, and believed that it marked only a small step forward. Yet, he said, "the reason I'm for this treaty is, failure to ratify [it] I believe would be read as bad faith." Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), a declared presidential candidate, called it "as flimsy a treaty as the United States Senate ever considered" and "little more than a series of missed opportunities." He said it may expose the United States to greater dangers by increasing the amount of Russian fissionable material put in storage, where it is "a tempting target for thieves or terrorists." The Russian Duma, which must also consider the treaty, is expected to approve it in the next several weeks. If that step is taken, the document will be completed in time for the next U.S.-Russian summit, which is scheduled for May in Moscow. No further action is needed in the U.S. Congress, because the Constitution gives the Senate sole authority over foreign treaties. Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Assn., said the treaty's flaws mean it will be necessary for the administration, and those that follow it, to take more action to ensure that weapons are destroyed. "This should be seen as another beginning, and not the end of the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction effort," he said. return to menu C. Russia-Japan 1. Extraordinary Russian-Japanese Consultations On Strategic Stability To Be Held In Tokyo March 12 In accordance with the agreement reached, on March 12 Tokyo is to host extraordinary Russo-Japanese consultations on strategic stability, the Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department told RIA Novosti on Monday. The Foreign Ministry noted that as major issues discussed would be the ones concerning disarmament and nonproliferation, including the realization of the G8 Global partnership program. The sides will also consider the crisis situations around Iraq and the Korean peninsula. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov and his Japanese counterpart Hitoshi Tanaka will head the Russian and Japanese delegations at the talks. return to menu D. Russia-Iran 1. Moscow denies supporting Iran's arms programs Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov has dismissed allegations that Iran's programs to build weapons of mass destruction are supported from Russia. "I believe [the assertions were made] on the level of suspicion or fabrication. We have not obtained evidence of this kind," Losyukov told Interfax in an interview. "We are keeping track of this. If someone has any evidence, we would be glad to accept it. If we received it, we would take appropriate steps in line with out international commitments," he said. Russia will continue cooperating with Iran in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, he said. "We do not plan to make changes in our cooperation. We believe the program is transparent and if there are doubts, they should be resolved in the framework of existing mechanisms," he said. Asked about U.S. concerns over Russian-Iranian nuclear ties, Losyukov relied that "the United States expressed concern on several occasions and still has concerns. However, Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. If the IAEA has questions for Iran, they can be resolved in the framework of this cooperation." return to menu 2. Russia, Iran Sign Nuclear-Fuel Contract. The Russian company TVEL has signed a contract with Iran on the delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran's still-unfinished Bushehr nuclear-power plant, Interfax reported on 6 March. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev said during a visit at an unspecified date to Tehran that Atomstroieksport will load the first shipment of some 40 tons of fuel later this year, after which TVEL will supply the fuel and Tekhsnabeksport will remove spent nuclear fuel from Iran. The first unit of the Bushehr nuclear-power plant is planned to open in 2004. Meanwhile, President Mohammad Khatami during a 6 March ceremony commemorating martyrs from Kan va Soloqan said unnamed nuclear powers had used "any excuse to stop us" from acquiring nuclear technology, but today "the offspring of this land have acquired this technology," Iranian state radio reported. SF return to menu 3. Iran to pursue nuclear energy partnership with Russia Dismissing U.S. concerns, Iran's ambassador to Russia said Friday that his country intends to expand its nuclear cooperation with Russia, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. Iran "allocates a sizable place to the peaceful atom in the country's energy program" and attaches particular significance to Russia's role in plans to expand its nuclear energy program, Ambassador Gholamreza Shafei said, according to the ITAR-Tass report. U.S. officials have strongly opposed Russia's construction of Iran's only nuclear power plant because of concern the cooperation could help Iran develop nuclear weapons. The plant at the southern port of Bushehr is to be completed later this year. The ambassador said the concerns were unfounded adding that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency had confirmed Iran is sticking to its commitments. return to menu E. Announcements 1. President Bush Commends Senate for Action on Moscow Treaty I Commend the Senate's Action to Give Its Consent to Ratification of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions that President Putin and I signed on May 24, 2002, in Moscow, Russia. I also thank Senator Lugar and Senator Biden for their leadership in successfully negotiating a unanimous, bipartisan vote in support of the Moscow Treaty. This historic agreement will reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia to their lowest levels in decades. The treaty will benefit both our peoples and contribute to a more secure world. The Moscow Treaty helps lay to rest the legacies of Cold War competition and suspicion, and marks a fundamentally new era in relations between the United States and Russia. The strategic offensive reductions codified and made binding under international law in this Treaty are essential steps toward achieving greater political, economic, and security cooperation between our two countries. Shortly after assuming office, I pledged to the American people my commitment to achieve a credible strategic deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. Under the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia will both reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012 -- nearly two-thirds below current levels. At my direction, the United States has already embarked upon its reductions by starting to deactivate the Peacekeeper missiles located at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming; and, by taking the first steps to remove four sea-launched ballistic missile submarines from strategic service. I am hopeful that the Russian Duma and Federation Council will soon give their approval to ratification, so that President Putin and I can exchange instruments of ratification and the Moscow Treaty can enter into force. return to menu 2. U.S. Senate Unanimously Approves Moscow Treaty The U.S. Senate March 6 unanimously approved the Moscow Treaty, which will reduce U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear warheads by two-thirds by the year 2012. The treaty, which is formally known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, requires the two countries to reduce their deployed nuclear arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200, down from 6,000 warheads for the United States and 5,500 for Russia. The Russian parliament has yet to ratify the Treaty that was signed by Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin last May in Moscow. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican, hailed the 95-0 vote as "truly remarkable," adding that it represents an important step toward a safer world. The new treaty is a three-page document that was quickly worked out by U.S. and Russian negotiators ahead of the May 2002 Bush-Putin summit. Ratification is expected in the Russian state Duma within weeks. No further action is need in the U.S. Congress, because the Constitution vests the Senate sole authority over foreign treaties. "As important as the substance is, it is the form -- the trust between the United States and Russia -- that shines through," said Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, a Republican of Tennessee. The Moscow Treaty also calls for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to remain in force, expiring in 2009 unless both parties agree to an extension. It also creates a bilateral implementation commission to meet no less than twice each year to discuss "transparency" and other issues that might arise. The new Treaty will remain in force until December 31, 2012 when either nation may withdraw upon three months notice. Finally, it requires the Treaty to be registered with the United Nations. return to menu 3. Statement By Russia's Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Concerning US Senate Ratification of Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty Moscow welcomes the unanimous decision by US Senate to ratify the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Signed on May 24, 2002, by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush, the Moscow Treaty has become a landmark agreement in the field of real and radical nuclear disarmament and a weighty practical expression of the new relations of strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In the current not easy international situation the Treaty serves as an example of a legal, political solution of the most complex and acute security problems through the cooperation and collective efforts of great powers in the interests of the entire world community. The Russian side is confident that after the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Federal Assembly of Russia and its entry into force it will become an important factor of strategic stability and global security in the international relations of the 21st century. return to menu 4. U.S.-Russia Relations: Opportunities and Challenges in 2003 Thank you very much for that kind introduction, and thanks to Lena Nemirovskaya for inviting me to speak here today. I've spoken to seminars of the Moscow School of Political Studies in the past, but doing so in Perm is a first for me. It's a special honor to participate in connection with the tenth anniversary of this wonderful school. The last time I spoke to an MSPS seminar, in June of last year, I talked about the new challenges that all countries in the world, including yours and mine, must face in the 21st century. In the course of doing this, I also spoke about U.S.-Russia relations and how they had changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2003. Today, I'd like to update my thoughts about the new world that has been evolving over the past couple of years, and of our bilateral relationship and its important place in that world - and, of course, leave plenty of time for discussion afterward. We are all still trying to understand and adjust to the new security environment that has emerged for all of us in a world increasingly characterized by a plague of terrorist attacks. One of the reasons that Russia and the United States have grown closer to one another over the past couple of years is that our two countries have been among the first really to grasp, in the most concrete terms, how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War. Presidents Putin and Bush have both been leaders, especially, in understanding how the nature of the threat to civilized countries everywhere has changed. Our countries understand that Russian, American and European security today is endangered far less by fleets, armies and missiles from other great powers than by biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the hands of a failing state, a dictatorship, or a band of embittered terrorists. And no one country can deal with these threats alone, because terrorist ideas, terrorist money, terrorist weapons and terrorists themselves travel across borders. Today more than ever, national security depends on how well we help protect one another, not how well we protect ourselves. International Cooperation in Response to 9/11 September 11, 2001 was a ghastly day in U.S. and world history, but perhaps some good can come out of those terrible events. We can use this opportunity to create new international partnerships and to strengthen existing alliances - not just to win the war against terrorism, but also to meet other transnational challenges that imperil global security. Every responsible nation in the world stands to benefit from greater attention to defending the rule of law, recognized standards for human dignity and the international system of nation-states. America's global network of allies and partners quickly adapted to the crisis demands of the post-9/11 security environment. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, NATO for the first time invoked its self-defense mechanisms. In fact, NATO forces drawn from European nations flew patrols over American skies in the days and months after the attack. The G-8 nations, including Russia, moved to secure global networks of commerce and communication, including the stationing of customs inspectors in each other's ports. Just as important, however, was the development of new partnerships in the war against terror and the deepening of old ones. President Putin's brave and instantaneous response to 9/11 accelerated an already existing trend of U.S.-Russia cooperation in several fields, not just security. Partnership is a fundamental principle of President Bush's National Security Strategy released last September. On nearly every page the document underscores - as I wish to emphasize it again here � the necessity of cooperating with other nations, institutions and organizations. International cooperation is an indispensable ingredient in our view of national security, whether the goal is fighting terrorism, promoting regional stability, expanding trade or dealing with transnational challenges such as weapons of mass destruction, infectious disease, and international crime. A basic responsibility for any government - whether it be American, Russian, French or German - is to protect its people. The top strategic priority of the United States, therefore, is to shield the American populace from the threat of terrorism. As recent horrific incidents - at a nightclub in Bali, a hotel in Kenya, a theater in Moscow and a government building in Grozny - have demonstrated, terrorism continues to be a grim reality around the world. And, as I stressed earlier, we must remember that terrorists do not respect international borders. Our response, therefore, must be global. While the United States will always reserve the right to act alone if needed to protect the lives of Americans, our security is enhanced when other countries choose to play a constructive, pro-active role in responding to international terrorism and other global threats. The current coalition against terrorism is unprecedented in scale and scope. The United States and Russia have joined with dozens of other nations to counter the threat of terrorism using all the tools available to us - intelligence, financial institutions, law enforcement and military operations. A mix of ad hoc arrangements and more formal alliances has led to a sustained campaign against Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Afghanistan, and around the world, over the past 17 months. This is not to mention the collapse of the Taliban regime, which had supported a network of terror. And, as a result, the security of all, not just of the United States, has increased. Russia has profited from the collapse of a well-organized and aggressive threat to its south. The same is true for the Central Asian republics. We have a good way to go before we can say that the terrorist threat to Russia's south is truly dead, but think about how sharply it has diminished, and at how little cost to Russia itself. The Afghanistan campaign has truly been a win-win situation. Post-9/11 Russian Cooperation with NATO and U.S. But victory against the Taliban could not have come so quickly in Afghanistan, nor a democratic government installed there so successfully, without the important logistical, intelligence and humanitarian assistance that Russia provided. And today our two countries continue to work together to combat the continuing threat of Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Central Asia and around the world, thereby serving the common security interests of the United States, Russia and all nations that value stability, human dignity and freedom. The new NATO-Russia Council set up last year is another good example of how much the security environment has changed, and it underscores Russia's importance to meeting today's challenges. The NRC is off to an impressive start. Russia held a joint civil-emergency exercise with NATO Allies and Partners last fall in Noginsk and hosted a NATO-Russia seminar in Moscow two months ago on the military's role in combating terrorism. NATO and Russian military authorities in Brussels have completed joint assessments of the threat posed by Al Qaeda to our troops in the Balkans and to civil aviation, and they have begun an assessment of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As important as terrorism is to our cooperation in Brussels, it's not the only thing we work on together. Earlier this month, Russia and NATO signed an agreement on joint submarine search-and-rescue operations, in the hope of avoiding future submarine disasters such as the Kursk tragedy. This is the first in what we hope will be a series of military agreements between Russia and NATO that will help achieve our shared goal of a secure, stable and peaceful Europe. U.S.-Russia Partnership Let me now turn to the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship. At the end of last year, Foreign Minister Ivanov described Russia's growing partnership with the United States as the single most important achievement of Russian foreign policy in 2002. Let me add that our common recognition that we face a new security environment today provides our two countries with the opportunity to develop an even closer relationship. The most recent proof of this is the unanimous approval on February 5 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of a resolution that will lead to the final ratification of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. The Moscow Treaty that President Bush and President Putin signed at their summit meeting last May was a watershed in our relations. It reflects a recognition that our security no longer depends on micromanaging the numbers and types of warheads and delivery systems that each side has, but on working together against the new threats of the 21st century. "Yes," we both said in signing the new treaty, "by all means let's cut the numbers of missiles and deployed warheads we aim at one another - who needs them all?" "But," we also said, "let's not waste years arguing over the details when we have so much other important work to do together - let's draw up our agreement on a couple of pages, sign it, then get on with our other work together." And, in fact, the Treaty of Moscow may turn out to be less important than the second agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow last May - their joint declaration on the New Strategic Relationship. That document sets forth an action plan for joint work in dealing with new security challenges. It commits us to work together against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking and organized crime. It creates a framework for transparency and cooperation on missile defense - reflecting the fact that we each face growing threats from countries that are acquiring the technology for long-range missiles that could be armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The joint declaration also calls for expanding trade, investment and people-to-people links between our countries. I believe it is possible that historians will look back on the joint declaration as the marking the start of a long-term security partnership - perhaps an alliance - between our two countries, one grounded on common interests and a shared commitment to the values of democracy, economic liberty and the rule of law. Challenges to the Relationship in 2003 2002 was a very good year for U.S.-Russian relations, but we cannot rest on our laurels. Indeed, the year 2003 will present a whole series of challenges to the relationship that we will have to handle with care if we are to achieve the optimistic future I just described. I can hardly talk to you today about the challenges we face without discussing Iraq. (And why do I have the feeling that some of you will have questions for me later about this subject?) This is an area where our two countries don't share the same approach; at least, not yet. Nevertheless, our goals are the same: Saddam Hussein must be made to disarm. But Russia feels that inspections should go on in order to determine whether Saddam in fact has weapons of mass destruction. We look at the question differently. Saddam does have weapons of mass destruction. We know that he had, for example, thousands of tons of VX nerve gas and thousands of liters of deadly anthrax and other toxins when the previous UN inspectors departed in 1998. Now he claims not to have them any more. Well, what happened to them? Saddam says Iraq has destroyed them, but just didn't bother to make any record of the destruction. Why would anybody believe this? The Iraqis generally keep quite detailed records, but they just "forgot" to note down that they destroyed large quantities of nerve gas and biological agents? Saddam has lied and deceived for years about his programs to build weapons of mass destruction - it's the UN that says this, not just the U.S. His track record of lies is clear and well documented. But somehow we're supposed to believe him now that he says that he got rid of these horrible weapons? Why? Here's our approach: We all know that Saddam had these weapons. And, if reality, we all know that he almost certainly still has them. He must account for them - either declare that he has them so they can be destroyed, or give evidence that they've been destroyed. If he fails to do either, he must face "serious consequences." That's what UNSCR 1441 says. It gave him one last chance, after 12 years, to comply with the terms of the bargain that ended the Gulf War in 1991. And the sad but clear fact is that Saddam has already failed to comply. He has missed his last chance. So we - the international community, but especially the members of the Security Council - are fast approaching the moment of truth. We understand that Russia wishes to avoid military action and to keep the issue firmly within the UN Security Council. But Russia, I believe, also shares our interest in demanding that Saddam fulfill his obligations to disarm. We understand that the authority of the Security Council is important to Russia, as a permanent member of that council. But what kind of authority will the Council have if it can be defied by every dictator with enough nerve? And we all have to keep firmly in mind that the Security Council is not some shining ideal bestowed on the world by heaven. It is a practical device created by nations for the purpose of solving real-world security problems. If it turns its face from these problems because they are too hard to solve, or because the solutions make us uncomfortable, then the Council won't maintain its authority, it will lose it. Russia and others have rightly called on the United States and Great Britain to allow the Security Council to resolve the Iraq crisis. We readily agreed to do so. Now we, in our turn, are calling on the Security Council to accept its responsibility and insist on Iraqi compliance, and not just talk about it. I hope the Council makes the right decision, for its own sake and for that of all our countries. Well, difficult diplomacy lies ahead. But whatever happens, I don't think the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia will be strained to the breaking point. As I stated earlier, whatever the differences in our approach to the problem of Iraq, we have the same underlying goal. We also understand that Russia has important interests in Iraq, including economic interests, and we will take them into account. But more important, both our countries realize that our bilateral partnership in the war against terrorism is too important for us to jeopardize. Usama bin Laden drew us closer together; surely Saddam Hussein cannot drive us apart. Iraq dominates the news these days, but let's step back from today's headlines to look at some of the other major challenges that Russia and the United States have to face together: Russia continues to export nuclear technology to Iran. We believe this is dangerous to Russia's own long-term interests. It's clear that Russia intends to complete the reactor at Bushehr. But Russia needs to fully contain the proliferation risks from that reactor. Insisting that Iran return spent fuel to Russia is a start, but it's not enough. Iran is making no secret of the fact that it is seeking control over the entire nuclear-fuel cycle. Why? If it just wants to generate electricity, why does it need the ability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel? What does it intend to do with the main product of reprocessing, plutonium, except make bombs? We would also like to see Russia crack down more effectively on other transfers to Iran of technology and expertise for WMD and ballistic missiles. If the situation doesn't get better, it will get worse. On the other hand, serious change for the better could unlock profitable cooperation in the nuclear and aerospace fields, including work on space projects that are now blocked by the Iran Non-proliferation Act passed by the U.S. Congress three years ago. North Korea is an area where Russia could play a major, positive role in bringing Pyongyang to its senses. The question, however, is whether Moscow (and Beijing) will put maximum pressure on the North Koreans before it's too late. Pyongyang is defying not just the United States, but all signatories of the NPT and all members of the IAEA, including Russia. What's more, a nuclear-armed North Korea would increase tension on Russia's own eastern border, and could easily set off an arms race in Northeastern Asia. Such instability and tension could only damage Russia's interests. Suffice it to say that the North Korean nuclear program is far from simply a bilateral U.S.-North Korean matter. It simply isn't enough to say "well, you Americans caused the problem and you have to sit down with the North Koreans and fix it." This kind of approach doesn't fit the facts and it doesn't fit Russia's role as a power in Asia. In 2003, we should expand our bilateral security relationship. This will be a challenge. The Russian military has historically been reluctant to engage with the United States in serious military-to-military cooperation. And yet, how can we face together the common threats of the 21st century if our militaries can't cooperate effectively? Our dialogue on missile defense cooperation remains handicapped by Russian military concerns that we seek to steal technology rather than collaborate against real threats. Both our sides need to overcome inhibitions to substantial MD cooperation, including in the areas of joint early warning, and even joint development of MD architecture and systems. Missile defense cooperation and enhanced military-to-military cooperation should be among the top priorities for strengthening the NATO-Russia relationship as well. How Russia handles its relations with its neighbors will also affect the bilateral U.S.-Russia relationship. We hope to see continued Russian efforts to normalize its ties with Georgia and promote settlements to decade-old disputes like Abkhazia and Transnistria. We also need to work together to support democratization in Belarus and other former Soviet republics. Those were some of the challenges facing us in the political and security spheres. I also see several challenges on the economic and trade side: Talks on Russian accession to the WTO have accelerated in recent months and Russia is continuing to move essential legislation through the Duma. Russia has also launched a long-overdue crackdown on Intellectual Property Rights violations, especially rampant CD/DVD piracy. But it is still not clear whether Russia is prepared to make the compromises necessary on market access to meet the U.S. and EU halfway - especially in key areas such as financial services, telecommunications and civil aviation. Meeting the WTO standard in these areas will threaten some powerful interests - a tough challenge for the Duma and for President Putin in an election year. But the benefits for Russia of joining the WTO would be enormous: greater access for exports to other markets; increased foreign investment in Russia, and the protection that comes from participation in a rules-based international trading system. Russia also needs to take steps at home to improve the climate for U.S. and other foreign investment. Even in the most promising area, energy, Russia has yet to complete the Production-Sharing Agreement legislation that is the sine qua non for the multi-billion dollar investments it needs to develop its remote offshore and Arctic reserves. And looking beyond the energy sector, Russia still has to do more to protect investor rights and uphold the sanctity of contracts. Although some major corporations have made investments over the past year (Ford, GM, Pepsico), doubts about the rule of law and rampant bureaucratic red tape continue to deter many small and medium-sized American companies from investing in the Russian market. And there's the ever-present danger of another chicken war! The recent announcement of import quotas into Russia was not helpful, and further manipulation of veterinary standards to restrict poultry trade would be even worse. The United States has to deliver some things, too. For example, we need to graduate Russia once and for all from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Administration is working energetically with the Congress to make this happen. But perhaps the biggest challenges to the relationship will come from how Russia handles some major domestic challenges. The durability of the U.S.-Russian partnership will turn on whether Russia remains on the path of democratization - or, put another way, whether Americans see Russia as a country committed to the same values as themselves. The endless war in Chechnya is not only causing a horrific human toll, but it corrodes Russian democracy. Of course, terrorists must be dealt with firmly. The United States has just designated three groups involved in the attack on the Dubrovka Theater as foreign terrorist organizations in order to help cut off external support for terrorism in Chechnya. But not all Chechens are terrorists. Continued human rights violations by Russian forces against the civilian population will not only set back chances for a political solution, but also weaken the foundation for U.S.-Russian cooperation. (They also undermine the prestige and effectiveness of the Russian military itself.) We're glad that President Putin has launched a political process to resolve the Chechen crisis. We hope that the March 23 referendum on a new Chechen constitution turns out to be a step forward in that process. But we are apprehensive, too, about whether a referendum can really be held in a region where physical security is so poor. We wonder how meaningful can be a vote on a new constitution when so few people have access to information about what they'll be voting on. I can't help believe that additional steps will be needed, aimed at attracting the support and participation of the civilian population while marginalizing those unwilling to renounce violence and terror. What other internal factors do I see as affecting our partnership'? The conduct of the upcoming federal elections, the fate of the independent media, the treatment of the Catholic Church and other religious groups, measures to rein in skinheads and other extremists - all these will be bellwethers of the future of Russian democracy and factors affecting the U.S.-Russian relationship. The future health of Russian civil society will also hinge on whether Russia faces up to the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis and growing problems of human trafficking. On this latter issue, I'm glad to see that an anti-trafficking law has just been introduced into the State Duma. In conclusion, I think that the pace and direction of economic reform and the strategic direction of Russia's external policy demonstrate a strong commitment on President Putin's part to make Russia a stronger and more stable international partner for the United States and other countries - to its own benefit and to that of the rest of the world as well. U.S.-Russian relations are increasingly guided by common interests, and the scope of our cooperation is expanding in ways that would have been inconceivable ten years ago. Even on difficult issues like Iraq, our differences are more over tactics than over fundamental goals. Common interests represent one pillar of the new U.S.-Russian relationship, but it is a commitment to the same values that will give our new partnership the quality of a long-lasting strategic alliance - the kind of ties that we have with our partners in NATO, the EU, Japan and Australia. In this respect, the trends in Russia's internal, democratic development are favorable, but the overall picture is still mixed. The institutions of civil society are taking shape, but the roots are sometimes still shallow, and the habits and practices of decades under communism still lie too close to the surface. Institutions like the Moscow School of Political Studies, however, make me very optimistic about the future. Seminars like this one are important "schools of democracy" that strengthen the pillar of common values on which the U.S.-Russia partnership also rests. It is people like you who will shape Russia's future and the ones who will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations achieve their full potential. The road ahead may be a bumpy and uncertain one. But I'm confident that we are moving forward and that the journey is well worth the effort. Thank you. return to menu F. Links of Interest 1. Senate Approves Flawed Nuclear Treaty return to menu 2. Statement from the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign on Senate Approval of the Treaty of Moscow return to menu 3. Senate Approves Weak Moscow Treaty: Number of Nuclear Weapons Likely to Remain the Same return to menu 4. Statement: The Moscow Treaty return to menu 5. International vs. Domestic Nuclear Safeguards: The Need for Clarity in the Debate over Effectiveness return to menu 6. Good News for Non-Proliferation? The Changing Relationship Between Russia, NATO and the NPT return to menu 7. Preventing a Crisis in U.S.-Russian Relations Over Moscow's Nuclear Technology Exports DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. If you would like to be removed from our mailing list or if you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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