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RANSAC Nuclear News, March 12, 2003 Compiled by Michael Roston A. Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown and Conversion
 A. Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown and Conversion 1. Russia and US sign reactor shutdown deal Russia and the United States have signed agreements to shut down three Russian reactors producing nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. The documents were signed by Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev and US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in Vienna on Wednesday, the press service of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry told RBC. Under the accords, the ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors in Seversk near Tomsk in western Siberia will be closed by December 31, 2005, and the ADE-2 reactor in Zheleznogorsk in eastern Siberia will be shut down by December 31, 2006. Russia is obliged not to use plutonium produced by these reactors in nuclear weapons production, as well as enriched uranium extracted from spent fuel of the shutdown reactors. Russia will provide information about the plutonium-producing reactors and carry out the necessary monitoring. It will also allow inspections of the reactors to verify that they are not operable. For its part, the United States will finance the construction of alternative fossil-fuel power plants to replace the reactors. In February 2003, the Russian government has approved a revised US-Russian agreement on cooperation in atomic energy, including on plutonium-producing reactors. return to menu 2. Russian, US Atomic Ministries Expand Co-Operation Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev has given a high assessment to the agreement signed on Wednesday, concerning US financial assistance in mothballing three Russian nuclear reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium, he said in an interview with a RIA Novosti correspondent in Vienna. The agreement was signed in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna by Alexander Rumyantsev and his US counterpart Spencer Abraham during the International conference on safety of radioactive sources held by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, under the aegis of the Russian and US governments. The agreement concerns industrial reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium, which Russia has long wanted to stop, but has had no funds, Rumyantsev pointed out. Now the USA has allocated the necessary sum as part of technical assistance, and the project will be carried out within an optimal time. The fulfilling of this agreement will become an important aspect for intensifying and expanding co-operation between Moscow and Washington in such a sensitive area of economy as atomic energy, the Russian Minister believes. return to menu 3. US, Russia sign deal to close reactors The United States and Russia signed agreements on Wednesday reviving an on-again, off-again deal to shut down the last three Russian reactors producing nuclear weapons-grade plutonium. Under terms of the accords, the United States will spend an estimated US$500 million on two new fossil-fuel power plants to replace the reactors, which provide heat and electricity to Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. The Siberian cities once were secret, "closed" locations of the Soviet military establishment. The agreements "set the stage for another important advancement in our cooperative nonproliferation efforts," U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said. The signing "demonstrated to the entire world that Russia and America are friends and partners," said his Russian counterpart, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev. They signed the documents at Vienna's Hofburg Congress Hall, on the sidelines of a three-day global conference, co-sponsored by their governments, on another nonproliferation concern, the potential for development of terrorist "dirty bombs" - conventional, non-nuclear bombs packed with radioactive materials. A U.S.-Russian deal under which Washington was to help phase out the plutonium reactors was first signed in 1997, and was celebrated as a historic event in the costly U.S. campaign to ensure that Moscow safeguarded and reduced its vast nuclear stockpile. The United States halted its own weapons production of plutonium in the late 1980s, as a result of a series of U.S.-Soviet arms control treaties. The Russians, who have shut down 10 other plutonium-producing plants, continued operating the two at Seversk and one at Zheleznogorsk because they were vital to the power supplies of the cities, formerly known as Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26. They continued reprocessing the spent uranium fuel from the power plants into plutonium not to make bombs, but because indefinite storage of the spent fuel would have been prohibitively expensive. The 1997 deal foundered, however, because its original goal of modifying the reactors proved impractical, and because of Russian financing problems and disputes over American audits on use of U.S. funds. The Russians also have been slow to move because the plan would dislocate thousands of people employed by the combined reactor-reprocessing operations. The original plan envisioned conversion by 2001. Now, under Wednesday's agreements, the Seversk shutdown is to take place by 2008, and the shutdown at Zheleznogorsk by 2011. The governments hope displaced staff will be re-employed under the "Nuclear Cities" program, a U.S.-financed effort to develop jobs elsewhere in Russia for workers from the former "closed cities." The three plants are the source of 1,500 kilograms (3,300 pounds) of plutonium a year, roughly enough to make one nuclear bomb per day. return to menu B. Russia-Iran 1. Iran puts nuclear reactor on show to counter weapons programme claims: Reporters given some access, but doors to uranium plants remain closed Iran said yesterday it had nothing to hide about its nuclear programme, allowing journalists an unprecedented visit to a nuclear reactor in the southern port of Bushehr. But government officials would not allow cameras inside the reactor and have yet to permit reporters to see uranium enrichment plants elsewhere in Iran. "We're showing our willingness to be transparent to the world," Assadollah Sabori, vice-president of Iran's atomic energy agency, told a news conference. Built with the help of Russian engineers, the Bushehr reactor has been strictly off-limits to journalists until now but the government appeared eager to counter allegations from Washington that it is moving ahead with a nuclear weapons programme. Mr Sabori complained that US lobbying was preventing Iran from obtaining technical assistance for a programme that he said is dedicated entirely to peaceful purposes. He also denied a report in Time magazine that Tehran had violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by introducing uranium gas into centrifuges at a uranium enrichment plant in the town of Natanz, 25 miles south-east of Kashan. Since Iran announced last month that it had discovered uranium ore and intended to retain spent fuel, US officials have expressed growing concern that the country is making strides towards developing nuclear weapons. "It's hard to get a view into exactly what their motivations are, but very clearly they are pursuing nuclear weapons," US national security spokesman Sean McCormack said on Monday. Guarded by anti-aircraft guns and watchtowers, the nuclear power plant has been under construction for nearly 30 years and was bombed by Saddam Hussein's air force during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. One German-designed reactor, which pre-dates the revolution that overthrew the US-backed monarchy in 1979, still sits half-finished. A second reactor with a Russian design is close to completion, one of several planned by the Iranian government. Although Iran has vast oil and gas reserves, government officials say nuclear power is required in the long term to meet the country's growing energy needs. The reactor site, on the Gulf coast, is humming with construction activity, with signs in Russian and Farsi guiding the 4,000 workers around the huge concrete dome. Moscow agreed to help Iran build the Bushehr reactor but promised to return all spent fuel to Russia to allay US fears that it would be diverted to weapons production. The first shipment of enriched uranium from Russia is due to arrive in May, officials said yesterday. Iran's surprise admission last month that it would manage the entire fuel cycle, including spent fuel, revived Western suspicions and appeared to undermine the Russian agreement. Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, who visited Tehran yesterday, defended the Islamic republic's nuclear programme. "Iran has no plans to produce nuclear military projects. This is a fundamental truth," he said. However, Russia's atomic energy minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, said yesterday that although Moscow was helping Iran develop nuclear power, it could not judge whether Iran was secretly developing nuclear weapons as the US alleges. He appeared to be backtracking from a previous assertion that Iran was incapable of building nuclear weapons after Washington rejected on Monday Tehran's claims that its nuclear aims were peaceful and said Tehran was "clearly pursuing" atomic weapons. "While Russia is helping Iran build its nuclear power plant, it's not being informed by Iran of all the other projects that are currently under way," Mr Rumyantsev told Reuters after yesterday's news conference. Mr Sabori told reporters in Bushehr that cooperation between Iran and Russia on nuclear power would continue and that spent fuel would be handled responsibly. Although a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, Iran has so far refused to agree to an additional protocol to allow UN inspectors to visit declared and undeclared sites. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Iran last month and its head, Mohamed El Baradei, said Iran was cooperative but should sign up to the more intrusive inspection regime. return to menu 2. Iran gears up to tap its first nuclear plant Technicians work full steam at a site near this southern port city to catch up with a tight schedule to bring Iran's first nuclear energy plant into operation -- most probably during the first half of 2004. Main gadgets have been ferried from Russia to a barren coast, a stone's throw away from the Persian Gulf. They have been assembled and installed, but the system needs one key component to go into motion: nuclear fuel. The Deputy head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), Assadollah Sabouri, told representatives of Iranian and foreign media Tuesday during the first such tour of the site that the fuel consignment will arrive in the plant in May. �The fuel needed for the Bushehr Nuclear Plant has been produced in 180 fuel factories in Russia and packed and prepared for shipment in 90 cassettes," he said as he outlined the reconstruction phases. "The fuel is due to be kept in a safe storehouse after shipment, before the plant starts operation by fuelling," Sabouri added. The spent fuel will be returned to Russia according to an agreement, signed between the two countries. Iran wants the plant as part of its bid to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity to cope with the rising energy demand in the 65-million-nation in the next 20 years, while its gas and oil reserves are becoming overstretched. Washington suspects Tehran's ambitions, arguing that "Iran's costly pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle only makes sense if it's in support of a nuclear weapons program'. US says Iran's nuclear programs, while the country sits on some of the biggest oil and gas reserves of the world, is questionable. Sabouri, however, dismissed US' qualms. "America, which has some of the biggest oil resources of the world, currently has 104 active atomic plants and Russia, despite having rich gas reserves, is operating 30 atomic plants. "Before the Islamic Revolution (in 1979), the then government had a plan to generate 23,000 megawatts of power by atomic plants, at a time when the country consumed only 3,000 megawattes of electricity. This compares with the peak consumption of 30,000 MW of power at present, while Iran plans to produce only 6,000 MW of electricity by this method," he added. Meanwhile, given that Iran's use of fossilized fuel equals its exports, there is no other way than developing nuclear plants, Sabouri said. The construction of the Bushehr plant started in 1975 by Germany's Siemens, but the company pulled out of the contract following the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Russia resumed building the plant in 1995 after clinching an 800-million-dollar deal with the Islamic Republic. The two countries are carrying feasibility studies to build the second reactor either in Bushehr or somewhere else, Sabouri said. "Since the past one year, we have been considering three options to construct a new unit in Bushehr or complete a half-built unit or start a new plant at a new site. We predict to make a decision to this effect around July," the official added. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is making technical assistance to the construction of the Bushehr plant, he said as reiterated Tehran's earlier announcements that the country did not seek to build nuclear weapons. "The IAEA has set up three closed-circuit cameras at the 'reactive' building of the plant which directly relay all the operations carried out (at the site) to its headquarters in Vienna. "Besides this, so far more than 60 experts of the IAEA have inspected the nuclear energy facilities of the Islamic Republic but have not reported even one case of violation," Sabouri added. At present, more than 1,100 Russian experts and 3,000 Iranians work on the Bushehr plant, he said, adding some 750 Iranian experts will operate it once it comes on stream. Iran has also plans for a nuclear fuel cycle, which was announced by President Mohammad Khatami last month for the first time as he revealed that the country had started excavating uranium ore from a mine, 200 km from the central city of Yazd, to produce fuel for its nuclear plants. The announcement came shortly after US officials were cited late last year as alleging that American satellites had spotted two sites in Arak and Natanz which suggested they could be used for making nuclear weapons. The IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, visited the Islamic Republic later and travelled to the under-construction nuclear energy facility in the central city of Natanz. ElBaradei also met with several Iranian officials, including President Khatami, in which he stressed Iran's right to the civilian use of nuclear power. return to menu 3. Russia Can't Say if Iran Is Building Nukes Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said Tuesday that although Moscow was helping Iran develop nuclear power, it could not say whether Tehran was secretly developing nuclear arms as the United States claims. Rumyantsev appeared to be backtracking from a previous assertion that Iran was incapable of building nuclear weapons. Russia has been helping Iran build the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the country's first such facility. Iran said Tuesday that it is almost complete. "While Russia is helping Iran build its nuclear power plant, it's not being informed by Iran of all the other projects that are currently under way," Rumyantsev said in an interview. This comment was very different from Rumyantsev's Feb. 21 statement that "Iran does not have the capacity to build nuclear weapons." Tehran says the 1,000-megawatt Bushehr plant is part of efforts to supply enough electricity to its 66 million people. Iran has approved a plan to produce 6,000 megawatts of power through nuclear energy by 2020. The United States says that officials from the United Nations' nuclear agency learned during a trip to Iran last month that Tehran's nuclear program was far more advanced than previously thought. Rumyantsev said he was interested in getting hold of a report from the UN nuclear inspectors on the details of Iran's program. In addition to the Bushehr plant, Iran is developing several other nuclear facilities, one of them a uranium-enrichment plant that Washington says could be used for weapons-grade material for nuclear weapons as well as fuel for power generation. Rumyantsev said Russia was not aware of Iran developing dual-use nuclear facilities that could be used secretly for making weapons or weapons-grade material. "We have no information about the existence of such dual-use technology because we are only involved in the first phase of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr," he said. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, told a news conference that Iran's uranium enrichment plant was "sophisticated." He declined to comment directly on U.S. accusations that he was attempting to resolve the problem of Iran's nuclear ambitions behind the scenes before going public. ElBaradei is expected to make a report Monday to the IAEA board of governors about Iran, although it is unclear what he will say. Meanwhile, Iranian officials said Tuesday that Russia has installed all the major components needed for the Bushehr plant to operate. "Over 70 percent of the work has been accomplished," Assadollah Sabori, deputy head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said at a news conference in Bushehr. "The main thing left is shipping nuclear fuel from Russia, which is expected to take place in May," he said. Sabori said 1,100 Russians and more than 3,000 Iranians are working at the plant's first unit. He said Iran has agreed to return the spent nuclear fuel back to Russia but that some formalities remained before the agreement is officially signed by Iran. (Reuters, AP) return to menu 4. Iran, Russia start talks to build second nuclear plant: press Iran and Russia have started preliminary talks to build the second nuclear plant in southern Bushehr in order to generate a further 1,000 megawatts of electricity, press Tuesday cited manager of the plant Nasser Sharif-Loo, as saying. The first plant will come on stream late in the next Iranian year which ends on March 21, with 1,000 megawatts of power entering the nationwide grid, the Persian daily Iran quoted him as saying. Sharif-Loo said most of the construction work on the plant's buildings had completed and the Iranian and Russian technicians were presently installing peripheral equipment. "At present, most of the equipment has been ferried into the country and is being installed according to the schedule by more than 1,000 Russian experts," he said, the paper added. The construction of the Bushehr plant started in 1975 by Germany's Siemens, but the company pulled out of the contract following the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Russia resumed building the plant in 1995 after clinching an 800-million-dollar deal with the Islamic Republic. Nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has sparked fears in Washington which claims the Islamic Republic could use the plant for producing nuclear weapons. Iran has strongly dismissed these allegations, stressing that work on the plant is totally transparent. The country has also opened the building site to regular inspections of the UN nuclear experts who have asserted the civilian intentions of the facilities. On Tuesday, a group of foreign reporters reportedly toured the plant for the first time in a sign that Iran was firmly determined to dispel US insinuations. "The Bushehr nuclear plant is totally under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and so far no violation has been registered by the agency," the daily Iran cited Sharif-Loo as saying. Iran wants the plants to generate 6,000 megawatts of power in the next 20 years to cope with the rising demand for energy in the country while its hydrocarbon reserves become overstretched. President Mohammad Khatami has stressed. Iranian leaders have also praised the country's achievements in the area of the nuclear energy know-how and stressed on Tehran's commitment to shun weapons of mass destruction. "The construction of the Bushehr atomic plant has helped a large number of Iranian experts become familiar with this technology. However, achieving all the technology used in the nuclear industry is definitely impossible by building one plant," Sharif-Loo said, the paper added. He said 750 Iranian experts, who had received necessary training in Russia, will take over from Russians to operate the plant once it come on stream. President Mohammad Khatami last month announced for the first time that Iran had started excavating uranium ore from a mine, 200 km from the central city of Yazd, to produce fuel for its nuclear plants. In Washington, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was cited as alleging that 'Iran's ambitious and costly pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle only makes sense if it's in support of a nuclear weapons program'. Tehran denounced those allegations as 'groundless' and reiterated its readiness for 'dialogue with eligible organizations to remove any ambiguity'. return to menu 5. Ivanov says Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran will continue Visiting Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov here Tuesday stressed that Moscow will continue its nuclear energy cooperation with the Islamic Republic in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "In my talks with the Iranian side, the issue of maintaining this cooperation was discussed," he said in a joint news conference with Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. Kharrazi dismissed US allegations that the Islamic Republic sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction and stressed Iran's commitment to UN resolutions on the peaceful use of the atomic energy. "America seeks to find a pretext against Iran. Thus, it is making baseless allegations on Iran's use of this energy. "Iran's all activities in the nuclear energy sector is under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and this agency's experts will soon permanently settle in Iran," he added. Nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has sparked fears in Washington which claims the Islamic Republic could use the plant for producing nuclear weapons. Iran has strongly dismissed these allegations, stressing that work on the plant is totally transparent. The country has also opened the building site to regular inspections of the UN nuclear experts who have confirmed the civilian intentions of the facilities. On Tuesday, a group of foreign reporters reportedly toured the plant for the first time in a sign that Iran was firmly determined to dispel US insinuations. Iran wants to generate 6,000 megawatts of power from the plants in the next 20 years to cope with the rising demand for energy in the country while its hydrocarbon reserves become overstretched, President Mohammad Khatami has stressed. "Iran currently produces four million barrels of oil (per day), of which two million barrels are consumed at the domestic market. Thus, it is natural that Iran must have cheaper energy in order to present the output for domestic use at the international market," Kharrazi said. return to menu C. Announcements 1. U.S. and Russia Agree to Plan to Shutdown Three Remaining Russian Plutonium Production Reactors: Energy Secretary Abraham Says Agreement Is An "Important Achievement In U.S. - Russia Nonproliferation Program" U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev signed agreements today that will facilitate the shutdown of three Russian nuclear reactors, that currently produce weapons-grade plutonium. These reactors, which are the last three reactors in Russia that produce plutonium for military purposes, also provide necessary heat and electricity to two Russian "closed cities" in the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Under the agreements, the United States will provide support to the Russian Federation for provision of replacement fossil energy plants. "This is an important step in advancing our nonproliferation programs between the United States and Russia," Abraham said. "Replacing these reactors with fossil fuel energy is critical in eliminating the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and closing these facilities. Russia and the United States have enjoyed a good relationship. Minister Rumyantsev is an able partner and I appreciate his effective leadership." The Implementing Agreement details the rights and responsibilities of each country regarding U.S. assistance for the construction and refurbishment of the fossil fuel plants. In Seversk, an existing fossil fuel plant will be modernized. In Zheleznogorsk, the construction of a new facility will be required. The Russian Federation will be responsible for the shutdown and decommissioning of the three existing nuclear reactors. The new agreement will allow for the implementation of the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program, which is a cooperative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. The three reactors are located in the cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk in Siberia. The reactors have approximately 15 years of remaining life and, as a group, could generate an additional 25 metric tons of plutonium, the equivalent of approximately one additional nuclear weapon per day. The three reactors will continue to operate until the fossil-replacement plants are completed and begin operations. Recently, Abraham announced that the Bush Administration has requested $1.3 billion for nuclear nonproliferation program spending in its fiscal year 2004 budget submission to Congress. This is a 30 percent increase over the 2003 budget request. "During the last two years, this Administration has been aggressive on many fronts in its pursuit of effective nonproliferation - unilaterally, bilaterally with Russia, multilaterally with the G-8 and internationally with the International Atomic Energy Agency," Abraham said. return to menu 2. On Russian-Japanese Consultations Regarding Strategic Stability On March 12 extraordinary Russian-Japanese consultations on strategic stability took place in Tokyo. The Russian delegation was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian G8 Political Director Georgy Mamedov, and the Japanese delegation was led by Deputy Foreign Minister and Japanese G8 Political Director Hitoshi Tanaka. The focus of the consultations was on discussing the main acute problems of the prevailing tense situation in the world, above all the Iraqi and Korean crises. There was noted the necessity of primarily using politico-diplomatic means to resolve them, with due consideration for the central role of the United Nations. The sides discussed the possibilities of traditional cooperation between Moscow and Tokyo in order to solve the existing problems and to prevent a split in the international community and especially a weakening of the antiterrorist coalition. Mamedov informed the Japanese side of the course of the ratification of the Russian-American SOR Treaty, as well as of the progress in the dialogue between Russia and the US on the interconnected issues of strategic offensive and defensive arms and of the strengthening of strategic stability. A thorough exchange of views on a broad range of pressing military-political problems of security, disarmament and nonproliferation also took place. There was underscored the importance of joint, not unilateral actions, specifically within the G8 framework, including the Global Partnership against proliferation themes, in the UN and at the Conference on Disarmament, in order to keep and strengthen the international legal base for the system of arms control as an important factor in the prevention of military scenarios in the world. The Russian side particularly stressed the problems of the speediest possible prohibition of the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space and of keeping the moratorium on nuclear tests, as well as the proposal by Russia and other countries for the establishment of non-destabilizing regional missile defense systems, which should rest on a broad non-bloc basis with the participation of all interested member states of the UN. The sides agreed that a diplomatic, mutual and not force-based, strengthening of international nonproliferation regimes is particularly important now, taking into consideration new challenges to international security in the context of fresh bursts of global terrorism and the unsettled nature of serious regional conflicts. In this connection it was agreed to build up diplomatic cooperation between Russia and Japan, both via bilateral channels and in the UN, the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva and other international forums. Special attention should be paid to preparation of the meeting of G8 leaders in Evian, and before this - in St. Petersburg. The next - ordinary - Russian-Japanese consultations on strategic stability are scheduled to be held in Moscow. return to menu 3. Joint Russian-Iranian Statement (excerpted) [...] In discussing questions of economic cooperation there were highlighted the successful completion of the work of the OAO Gazprom within the framework of the international consortium on the project for the development of the second and third stages of the Southern Pars Gas Field, the implementation in accordance with the agreed schedule of the project for the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the measures for developing the International North-South Transport Corridor, and the mutual interest of the sides in the joint implementation of the project for the creation of an Iranian Zohreh national satellite communications system for civilian applications based on a geostationary satellite. There was stressed the necessity to build up efforts for the further development of trade-and-economic relations, especially in such fields as prospecting for and the extraction and transportation of energy carriers, energy construction, civil aviation and aircraft manufacturing, peaceful uses of outer space, transport and telecommunications, and banking and insurance activities. A weighty contribution to this work, in the mutual conviction of the sides, is to be made by the holding on March 16-18, this year, in Teheran of the 4th meeting of the Permanent Russian-Iranian Commission on Trade-and-Economic Cooperation, which is to consider and approve the draft of a long-term program of such cooperation for the next decade. [...] During discussion of regional and international problems, there were confirmed the identity or similarity of the approaches of Russia and Iran to key issues in world politics, and their mutual adherence to the ideas of a multipolar world pattern and the dialogue among civilizations, of the central UN role in international affairs, of the supremacy of international law in resolving crisis situations, of strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and IAEA safeguards regime, as well as other regimes for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of the prevention of an arms race in space. The sides noted that international terrorism, extremism, separatism, organized crime, and illicit arms and drug trafficking present one of the gravest threats to international peace, security and stability. The sides also emphasized that terrorism is not linked to any particular culture, religion or people. Russia and Iran unconditionally reject and condemn any acts of terrorism regardless of their motivation, wherever and by whosoever committed. Counteraction against terrorism requires the participation of all members of the international community, the elaboration of common approaches and the investigation of all the cases of terrorism, including its root causes. In this connection the sides noted the decisive role of the United Nations. The sides reject any unilateral, selective steps against terrorism and a double approach towards it. Bringing groundless accusations against others under the pretext of combating terrorism is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other rules of international law. The sides spoke in favor of the intensification of efforts for the preparation in the UN of the Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism. The sides gave a positive assessment to the creation of a mechanism of regular Russian-Iranian inter-MFA consultations on antiterrorist problems. [...] return to menu 4. Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Trubnikov Meets with Speaker of the Senate of the Canadian Parliament Dan Hays (excerpted) [...] In considering questions of bilateral relations special attention was devoted to the establishment of favorable conditions for the further development of the political dialogue and stimulation of trade and economic ties. Bilateral aspects of the implementation of the Global Partnership agreement against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction were touched upon in concrete terms. [...] return to menu 5. On Swiss Participation in the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia Moscow has received with great satisfaction news of the fact that on March 3 the Council of States (upper house of the Swiss parliament) unanimously voted to allocate 17 million Swiss franks in aid for Russia in the destruction of chemical weapons. The decision of the Government of Switzerland had also been backed by the lower house - the National Council - in December 2002. This step of the Swiss Government is of the utmost importance, taking into consideration the fact that the destruction of Russia's chemical arsenals is a costly program. For the same reason cooperation in the destruction of chemical weapons was designated by the President of the Russian Federation as one of the priorities of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Swiss experts have already established good contacts with the specialists of the Russian Munitions Agency, which will make it possible to soon develop an appropriate bilateral agreement on cooperation in the area of chemical disarmament and to embark on the implementation of concrete projects. return to menu 6. On the Course of the Implementation of the Global Partnership Agreement Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction A regular meeting of G8 senior officials was held in Paris on March 5 to discuss ways for implementing the Global Partnership (GP) agreement against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, reached at the summit of leaders of G8 member states in June 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada. Acting as coordinator for these talks is France, holding the G8 Presidency this year, which regards GP as one of its foreign policy priorities. The Russian delegation placed at the center of discussions the question of intensifying work on the translation of the Kananaskis political accords into specific bilateral projects in the priority areas for Russia - destruction of chemical weapons and the disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines. The partners submitted preliminary estimates of their capacities for realization of the Russian proposals, the lists of which had been transmitted to them at the senior officials' previous meeting in January 2003. There was particularly stressed the importance of launching practical work in this sphere even by the upcoming (June 2003) summit of G8 leaders in the French city of Evian. In this regard, the greatest advance in project development had been achieved jointly with Germany and Japan. In the course of the meeting, participants also discussed the measures of a legal and organizational-technical character that need to be taken by all the participants for enhancing the effectiveness of gratuitous foreign assistance in the implementation of disarmament programs in Russia. In this context much attention was devoted to the situation with the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program for Russia agreement, capable of providing the basis for the elaboration of similar international documents for the implementation of GP programs. The prospects for widening the circle of participants in GP programs, in particular through the enlistment of new donor states sharing its principles and purposes, were also examined. return to menu 7. Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov Remarks and Answers to Questions at Press Conference for Russian and Foreign Media, Moscow, March 7, 2003 (excerpted) Georgy Mamedov: I would like to set forth the position of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) Treaty, which has been stated time and again, from last year on. We consider the SOR Treaty an extremely important document of real and drastic nuclear disarmament, a factor of stability and predictability. The Treaty represents the new quality of Russian-American relations, which are partner relations, despite the differences existing between us. Faced with the tense international situation that has evolved for a variety of reasons, of which you are well aware, the international community particularly needs factors of stability and predictability. It is exactly this kind of factor that the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty is now becoming. The Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are completing their very active preparatory work with the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for ratification of the Treaty. We hope that this ratification will occur in the very nearest future, and the Russian deputies, just as did the US senators, will make the right choice and support this important Treaty. Question: Could you explain just what the synchronization of the ratification of the SOR Treaty is supposed to mean? Georgy Mamedov: First of all, we are living in the conditions of democracy. There is a separation of powers in our country. Executive authority cannot dictate its will to legislative authority. Therefore, when the presidents agree on something, this means that they will act in a certain direction in order to persuade their legislators. We hope to soon persuade the State Duma to support the SOR Treaty. That's what the synchronization is all about. Our American colleagues, declaring their wish to ratify the Treaty in the nearest future, always made a reservation in respect of the necessity to persuade the US Senate. [...] Question: If contrary to all the efforts the United States does begin a military operation against Iraq, what will be the actions of Russia? Georgy Mamedov: I do not want to give a hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question. I reckon that all can well imagine how we can react. This is not the first difference that has arisen between us. Enough to recall the situation of 1998 around Iraq, and the situation around Yugoslavia. There should be no laying stress on how we will criticize each other if we fail to agree on what we are to do today. It is necessary, while diverging in the assessments of certain situations and the causes of regional crises, to preserve general movement towards partnership, towards unity in the antiterrorist coalition and to work for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By the way, the SOR Treaty, ratified yesterday by the US Senate, is an act of fulfillment of the obligations of Russia and the US under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Perhaps, not all know that the NPT contains a special article which obliges a nuclear state to reduce its arsenals. A whole array of countries, dissatisfied with this Treaty, which would like also to have WMDs, refer to the fact that the nuclear powers, in particular, Russia and the US, do not fulfill their obligations. Now the ratification of the SOR Treaty is also a fulfillment of the obligations. I simply want to tell you that there are very serious strategic tasks on which the security of Russia, the US and other countries depends. It is necessary always to bear them in mind, even when we are speaking of differences. Those differences should not be dramatized, should not be brought to the fore. In recent years the tendency has become strengthened for improvement of Russian-American relations and for the building of a strategic partnership, of which the SOR Treaty is evidence. We had serious differences and conflicts; armed force was used; but it is important to grasp that there is a common aim which cannot be sacrificed and made hostage to even the most serious differences. Herein lies the position of the Russian leadership. Today in their telephone conversation the Russian and US Presidents said time and again how important it is to preserve the positive basis of the Russian-American partnership, even in the conditions of the differences over Iraq. [...] Question: They are saying in the United States that the hasty ratification of the SOR Treaty by the Senate is a payment for a softening of Russia's stand in the UN Security Council on the problem of Iraq. Georgy Mamedov: This is absolutely not the case. Exactly during the ratification in the US Senate they were saying that these are different questions. They are linked in only one respect - that there is a regional problem of the proliferation of WMDs and this is, in particular, cited by UNSCR 1441 and other resolutions on Iraq. It has to be solved. Therefore the ratification of the SOR Treaty eases the solution of the task of the nonproliferation of WMDs in the world, including with regard to Iraq. But to say that a present has been made to us is stupid. It's enough to listen to the speeches of the US President on strategic affairs or the statements by the US Secretary of State at the hearings on the SOR Treaty in the Senate. They spoke very thoroughly and eloquently why the US needs this Treaty. At the same time in our Federal Assembly too people will probably be found who will be trying to argue that we do not need this Treaty, that this is a concession to the US. As a person who is constantly working with the Federal Assembly on these questions, I can tell you that such a point of view also exists. Question: Does the danger of a split in the UN Security Council exist should the US take unilateral action against Iraq? What is Russia's position in this connection? Georgy Mamedov: The position of Moscow is the same as that of the United States in this particular matter. It is necessary to preserve unity on the Council. We give a very high assessment to the G8 mechanism. Today I met with the French ambassador to Moscow, we spoke of the G8 summit which will be held at the beginning of June, maybe at the height of certain events in the Gulf. Russia, the US and France all consider that right now it is necessary to preserve unity on the Security Council, but if some problems do arise, then to restore this unity as soon as possible. Because of an inoperative Security Council we can lose very many guidelines and levers for dealing with the vital problems of war and peace. Preserving unity is not only in the interests of Russia, France and the US, but in the common interests of the member countries of the United Nations. All are therefore interested in this. If the positions diverge nevertheless, as was the case more than once in the past, it is necessary to restore unity as soon as possible. We, anyway, will be seeking that, proceeding from the key role of the UN in present-day international relations. Question: Whose job will it be to persuade the State Duma of the Federal Assembly to ratify the SOR Treaty? Georgy Mamedov: On President Vladimir Putin's instruction, Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov will present the Treaty. [...] return to menu 8. Interview of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov with Pervy Kanal and NTV Television Companies, Moscow, March 7, 2003 (excerpted) Georgy Mamedov: I would like to inform you that a very important event took place on March 6. The US Senate, after several months of quite intense discussions and the elections to the US Congress, with the little guidance of select committees, ratified unanimously the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) Treaty. Now we are completing the preparatory work for the submission of this Treaty to the vote in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia. We are counting on success. We hope to convince our deputies of the same thing as the American legislators are convinced, namely that the Treaty is a very important instrument of international nuclear disarmament. It, first of all, reflects the new quality of the Russian-American partnership. In today's very complicated international situation, where it is necessary to preserve the unity of the great powers, including the great nuclear powers, it is the ratification of this Treaty that can become an important factor of cooperation, of unity and of commonality, including in approach to such an important problem as the nonproliferation of WMDs. It will be recalled that in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty there is a very important obligation of the nuclear powers, above all Russia and the US, to reduce their nuclear arsenals. That is, we are thus strengthening the nonproliferation regime, and this has the most direct relationship to many crises which have today come to the fore: be it the situation around Iraq or around the Korean peninsula. We welcome the US Senate's decision to ratify the SOR Treaty and will persistently work to get the Treaty ratified in the nearest future by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Question: What is Russia's position on the British proposal that a clear date should be fixed when it would be possible to take a vote in the UNSC on a new resolution on Iraq? Georgy Mamedov: This proposal is now being studied, and no one so far will tell you Russia's final position. That has been directly entrusted to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is now in New York and is engaged in talks on all these questions. I can tell you about our general approach. You know that we have publicly declared, and I don't mind repeating once more, that a new resolution, in our opinion, is not required. Perhaps the UN Security Council's resolution 1441 is not being implemented as fast and as completely as one would like, but the progress is evident. Any new proposal, including the proposal of the UK, we will evaluate from the point of view of why it has been put forward. If it is simply another form of "blessing" military action, then we will come out against. As Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov has said, and he reflects the position of the Russian leadership, Russia can use all the means of persuading the partners, up to and including the application in the UNSC of its veto. If, however, this proposal or other initiatives are opening the way out of the present extremely complicated situation to a political solution on the basis of UNSCR 1441, we will, naturally, support them. The question is elsewhere. Is this a cover for the early start of military action or - indeed, a political solution based on the resolution 1441 of the Security Council of the United Nations. Question: Is it possible that the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly will not ratify the SOR Treaty in connection with the exacerbation of the situation around Iraq? Georgy Mamedov: We cited these documents at many hearings and meetings in the State Duma. Personally I am confident that this Treaty will gain a sufficient number of votes. Moreover, it seems to me, the tense situation in the world and around Iraq may in the most paradoxical manner influence this. It will not make difficult, but rather ease the passage of the Treaty in the State Duma. The Russian deputies care for the national security of Russia, and security, especially when tensions run high, depends on the predictability of the international situation. We do not have unlimited funds to spend them on our armed forces, including on strategic nuclear arms. It is therefore in our interests, especially considering the tense international situation, to have certain rules of conduct in the strategic field. We consider the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty a mistake. But we are striving to return our strategic relations to a legal field. The SOR Treaty gives that possibility. In particular, it contains a reference to the START-1 Treaty, which in the most detailed manner writes down the methods of control over arms, their destruction, verification and so on. Thus, the new Treaty, when we have ratified it, will prolong life for the obligations under the START-1 Treaty, equally binding Russia and the US. I reckon that the Treaty will be ratified and the situation around Iraq will not influence this. return to menu 9. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov Meets with French Ambassador to Moscow Claude Blanchemaison On March 7 Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian G8 Political Director, received French Ambassador to Moscow Claude Blanchemaison at his request. During the talk, the sides paid the main attention to the most pressing international problems, which can become the subject of discussion at the upcoming G8 summit in Evian, in the first place the crisis situation around Iraq, the tense situation around the Korean peninsula, and the intensification of cooperation under the Global Partnership Against Proliferation program. A mutual high assessment was given to the level of political cooperation between Russia and France on key problems of today, including major areas of strengthening strategic stability in the interest of building an enduring multipolar world. In this connection Mamedov and Blanchemaison highly assessed the unanimous approval just now of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by the US Senate and expressed the confidence that the early reciprocal ratification of the Treaty by the Federal Assembly of Russia and its entry into force will constitute an important element of the rectification of the present tense international situation on the basis of international law and cooperation among the great nuclear powers. return to menu 10. Remarks at the IAEA Conference - on the Security of Radioactive Sources Good morning. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here to address this Conference, both as its President, and on behalf of my Government. I want to begin by thanking Director General El Baradei for his gracious welcome, and for all the work he and his staff, including Abel Gonzalez, put in to make this Conference possible. I also want to express my appreciation to the Russian Federation, co-sponsor with the United States of the Conference, and in particular to Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev. Thanks also to Minister Ferrero-Waldner for welcoming us all to the wonderful City of Vienna. And thanks to all of you here today for attending this important Conference. We are gathered here to deal with an important issue: the terrible threat posed by those who would turn beneficial radioactive sources into deadly weapons. The technical term for these weapons - Radiological Dispersal Devices or RDDs - has not come into general use. I seldom see it in a headline, or hear it in a newscast. But increasingly the public knows about these weapons, and they are deeply concerned. They call RDDs, "dirty bombs." It is our critically important job to deny terrorists the radioactive sources they need to construct such weapons. The threat requires a determined and comprehensive international response. Our governments must act, individually and collectively, to identify all the high-risk radioactive sources that are being used and that have been abandoned. We must educate our officials and the general populace, raising awareness of the existence of these dangerous radioactive sources and the consequences of their misuse. And we must account for and tightly secure these sources wherever they may be. Radioactive sources can be found all over the world, and terrorists are seeking to acquire them. The threat they represent to people of every nation is very real. This threat has been a particular concern to the United States since the September 11 attacks. On that day, we learned that terrorists will strike anywhere, at any time. They will employ technology never intended for use as weapons, to murder thousands of innocent and unsuspecting people in the most shocking and ruthless way. We know now that there is no weapon they will not use, and no weapon they are not seeking to acquire. There is nothing they would like better than to cause the panic that the detonation of a radiological dispersal device would create. We know from experience with accidental releases of radiological sources that they can cause widespread panic, economic hardship, and significant health concerns. Remember Brazil, in 1987. Urban scavengers found a medical teletherapy machine left in an abandoned building. They removed the radioactive source from its shielding, ruptured it, and distributed the beautiful blue, glowing powder they found inside to their friends, neighbors and relatives. The powder was Cesium 137. Four people died. More than 110,000 people were monitored for radiation exposure at the city's sports stadium. Scores of buildings were evacuated and some were even demolished. Cleanup costs were enormous. The incident generated about 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Actual fatalities were relatively light in the Brazil incident, but panic was widespread. I can only imagine how much worse the situation would have been had terrorists dispersed the toxic material rather than innocent, uninformed people. That's why our work is so important. It is our responsibility to determine how to prevent such an attack in the first place, and how we should respond if, despite our best efforts, such an attack were to occur. All countries should act in their own self-interest by taking the steps needed to better secure high-risk radioactive sources. I came here to Vienna for the IAEA's 45th General Conference just six days after September 11. At that time, I called on IAEA's Member States to confront the new terrorist threat. The IAEA Secretariat proposed, and the Board of Governors approved, a new Nuclear Security Fund to help its member states to protect against nuclear terrorism. The action plan covers a broad range of activities to help states put in place the legal, regulatory, and technical elements needed to reduce the risk of misuse of nuclear and other radioactive material. Thus far, the United States has contributed $8.7 million to the IAEA program. I encourage all Member States to contribute to this fund. Last September, at the 46th IAEA General Conference, I discussed why Radiological Dispersal Devices presented a growing and disconcerting threat of a new kind. In my remarks then, I proposed that this conference be convened. My reason for suggesting the conference was in no small measure because RDDs are different from what we are accustomed to in our more traditional nuclear non-proliferation work. We are used to policing a defined number of nuclear facilities. Our job has been to focus on that small number of countries bent on violating the nuclear non-proliferation norm and acquiring fissile materials for nuclear weapons. But the radiological materials that could be used in an RDD exist in a variety of forms in virtually every country in the world. And they are often loosely monitored and secured, if at all. The use of radioactive sources is widespread. They have many beneficial industrial, agricultural, research and medical applications. In the medical field alone, roughly one hundred radioisotopes are used in various nuclear medical research, diagnosis, sterilization, and teletherapy applications. Millions of cancer patients have had their lives prolonged due to radiotherapy treatments, and patients of all kinds have benefited from bacteria-free, sterile medical equipment made possible by irradiation technology. Many more lives have been saved thanks to the smoke alarms and emergency exit signs that are now common in homes, schools and offices. Scientific research using radioactive materials takes place in laboratories all over the world. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, or RTGs, have been used for remote power application. Industrial gauges containing radioactive sources are commonplace. Radiation is used to increase the size and improve the health of crops, and remote beacons stand sentinel for years thanks to radiation's energy. Despite the wide use of radioactive sources, only a small portion of them poses a real threat as potential ingredients in a RDD. I called for this Conference last September in order to raise awareness of those radiological materials that have the greatest potential to result in exposure, contamination, and mass disruption. Your presence here - almost 600 participants from well over 100 countries - is reassuring proof of how seriously we all take the RDD threat. I have said on many occasions - before the IAEA and elsewhere - that taking measures to control dangerous and vulnerable radioactive sources is not just the responsibility of a few nations, but all nations. Each of us must act to create a seamless web of protection and control of high-risk radioactive sources to prevent their malicious use. Each of us must take on this significant responsibility. In the United States, we are evaluating potential vulnerabilities in our control of these materials in order to strengthen our regulatory infrastructure to better account for them, to track their use and disposition, and to ensure appropriate protection during import and export. We are also working to ensure that those using these radioactive sources are authorized to do so and are using them for legitimate purposes. In determining what additional protective measures might be needed, we are using a graded approach that takes into account potential hazards and protective measures already in place. These actions will ensure that the sources of greatest concern do not fall out of regulatory control and become orphaned in the future. In short, we are taking action to lessen the threat of radioactive sources being misused in a RDD. I would like to ask everyone gathered here today, the government representatives and officials in a position to take bold and decisive action, to do the same. Collectively, we can all make a difference. Collectively, we can all reduce the threat of RDDs worldwide. We can all work at home and through IAEA to get the job done. The United States believes that to solve the problems we will discuss today, we must attack them in all their dimensions. That's why I am pleased to announce today a new initiative that I hope will become international in scale. The Radiological Security Partnership is a three-pronged approach to addressing the potential threats from under-secured, high-risk radioactive sources. The first prong is helping countries accelerate and expand national initiatives to keep track of and better secure national inventories of high-risk radioactive sources. In this regard, our new partnership includes a new initiative to provide well over $1 million in technical assistance and equipment to IAEA Member States to facilitate effective tracking of high-risk sources. We are ready to assist other interested countries to speed the needed improvements, and we want to begin immediately. Second, countries need to draw on international resources that can give practical advice and assistance in bringing these sources under control. The United States is currently working with Russia and the IAEA to identify and secure high-risk radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union, and we believe the time has come to broaden that kind of cooperation. To do so, I am pleased to announce a new United States initiative to expand this "Tripartite" model to other countries in need of assistance. It is my hope that this model, which is working so well in the former Soviet Union, will become global in scale. The United States will focus our resources where the need is greatest. Our emphasis will be on developing countries. We are prepared to work with other countries to locate, consolidate, secure, and dispose of high-risk, orphan radiological sources by developing a system of national and regional repositories to consolidate and securely store these sources. The international efforts to choke off the illicit traffic in these sources must also be given highest priority. As I mentioned earlier, the United States is committed to establishing detection choke points at suspected smuggling routes, in order to better detect illicit traffic in radioactive sources. I recently initiated a new Department of Energy project to improve our ability to detect nuclear materials or weapons en route to the United States. As the third prong of our plan, I will now expand this project by focusing on other major transit and shipping hubs, which will improve our efforts to interdict and prevent illicit trafficking in high-risk radioactive sources globally. I am also pleased to announce that next week members of the United States Department of Energy will participate with the IAEA in important consultations that will set technical specifications for border monitoring equipment. This equipment - which in some cases can be as simple and small as the radiation pager I'm holding in my hand -- can play a key role in the effectiveness of this critical initiative. By working together on all these dimensions of the threat, we have a chance to make rapid and significant progress toward our shared objective of reducing the potential threats from the highest risk sources. The Radiological Security Partnership is a United States priority. To demonstrate our commitment, the United States plans to contribute $3 million over the next year to support the Partnership. In particular, this money will support our efforts to work with developing countries to secure high-risk sources in their countries. Later this morning, Mr. David Huizenga of the United States Department of Energy will discuss elements of our strategy in greater detail, and all that the United States government is doing to execute it. Having outlined what my government has done and is willing to do, I want to applaud the work that has already been done by the IAEA and other member states. While this may be the largest conference held on the security of radioactive sources, it is not the first. I am thinking particularly of the 1998 conference in Dijon, which was one of the first to deal with the security aspects of radiological sources. The IAEA Member States are developing a revised Code of Conduct to guide their efforts to better account for under-secured radioactive sources. I understand the drafting work on the code is just about completed, and I applaud the member states for making the Herculean effort this task required. I urge all Member States to review the Code before it comes to the Board of Governors for approval. The United States strongly endorses this process. The IAEA is taking important steps to categorize radioactive sources so the international community better understands which sources pose the greatest security risks. It is also carrying out its model project to help member states improve their national infrastructures and regulatory systems of control. The Agency is taking concrete steps in Moldova and elsewhere to secure at-risk radiological sources, and helping countries establish effective systems for tracking and inventorying these sources. We have already demonstrated our ability to address these problems. For example, the Republic of Georgia, in cooperation with the IAEA, undertook the dangerous task of recovering RTGs that had been left unprotected in the countryside. Thanks to the commitment of the Georgians, the IAEA, and even my own agency, we secured the RTGs in record time. The Georgians, in cooperation with the United States Department of Energy, were also able to upgrade the security of the facility where the RTGs were stored. I have outlined a number of steps that the United States is taking, and I have noted steps that the IAEA has initiated that can truly benefit the international community's ability to get a handle on these problems. I know many of you have also taken important steps, and we will all benefit from your knowledge and experience as we each strive to establish "best practices and procedures" and come to grips with the challenges presented by radiological sources. That is why this Conference is important - it will help all of us to establish a framework for addressing these issues, and taking the critical next steps to protect our citizens and provide for our security. We have a great deal of work to do over the next three days, and a tremendous amount of information to share. We will be hearing from experts from around the world, and we will hear from those who have had to deal with radioactive source problems firsthand. It is my hope and expectation that, as a result of our intensive and wide ranging discussions, we will reach a consensus on steps that can be taken to ensure that the IAEA and other resources are made available to all nations. When we leave this Conference, we will have a few essential steps to take to begin to ensure the security of our nations' - and the world's - radioactive sources: We must all identify the high-risk radioactive sources in our countries and ensure that they are under secure and regulated control. We must determine the criteria we will use to identify the radioactive sources that provide the greatest threat to security, so that nations can establish effective regulatory infrastructures. We must assess the security of our borders, and further improve our ability to prevent the illicit transit of radiological sources. And we must know realistically just how prepared we are to respond, in the case of an actual emergency involving these sources. There is much work ahead for all of us. And this Conference is the place to start. I hope that historians will someday write that our deliberations signaled a turning point - that on March 11, 2003, we began to forge an international consensus on the need to deal urgently and decisively with the most dangerous and vulnerable radioactive source threats. Thank you very much. We look forward to a successful Conference. return to menu 11. International Cooperation in the Field of Safe and Secure Use of Ionizing Radiation The urgency of the issue to be discussed in the framework of the Conference is obvious. Despite of the fact, that the history of the development and use of the radioisotope products is a little over 50 years of age, the range of its contemporary use is quite diverse. It covers industry and power production, metallurgy and geology, mining and environment, meteorology and agriculture, chemical and oil and gas industry. I would like also to mention separately one more field of use of the isotope products, which is medicine. Wide use of radioactive substances and other ionization sources for diagnostics, medical treatment and research purposes is justified by intensive development of laboratory and instrumental research methods in medicine. Radioisotope methods are widely used in diagnostics and therapy. They are most efficient in evaluating structural and functional changes of different organs. Thus, the list of radiopharmaceuticals used in medicine is getting longer every day. It is obvious, that the range and field of use of different radionuclide sources in contemporary life are expanding. They are: radionuclide sources of electric power (radioisotope thermoelectric generators, or RITEGs); autonomous power supply of various equipment in remote and difficult to reach areas (radio - and light beacons, meteorological stations); radiation technological units (RTU) for sterilization of medical products, processing of agricultural products and industrial and domestic waste; equipment for actinotherapy, as well as different devices for the control of technological processes (measurement of density, level and thickness); devices for non-destructive control (gamma-defect detectors) and for analyzing the substance content. It goes without saying that the issue of safe and secure management of this kind of products throughout their life cycle, beginning from manufacturing and up to disposing, remains one of the key issues. Russia, as one of the major manufacturers and consumers, as well as exporter and importer of ionizing radiation sources, always took great care of all the safety and security aspects of managing that kind of products. The same is true about the former USSR. It arises from developed legal base, including legal action against illegal purchase, storage, use, transfer or destruction of radioactive materials. The licensing of activities in the field of radioactive substances' management stands in the way of uncontrolled proliferation of radioactive substances and radiation sources. Binding the license holder, among other things, to hand over and dispose of radioactive substances, which are of no further use; accountability and control, safe storage and physical protection of radiation sources, etc. At the same time, discussing the issue of safe and secure use of isotope products in the "global" sense, we must admit the obvious: this is an issue of urgency due to a number of reasons. One of them is the threat posed by different terrorist organizations in the world, disintegration of the former Soviet territory, that led to the loss of control over sources, and in some cases to the loss of sources as such. For example, unsanctioned opening of RITEGs by local populace in Kazakhstan and Georgia to obtain non-ferrous metals. For some, the dose that they have been exposed to turned out to be too high. Besides, after the break away of the USSR, the new integral government control systems for the location and transportation of radioactive, nuclear materials in separate independent states had to be re-developed afresh, which caused a variety of unprecedented criminal offences, including those with radioactive sources. Growing terrorism also led the world community to re-evaluate the threat of using biological, chemical and radiological materials by different terrorist organizations, religious extremists and criminals. As a direct result, a trilateral initiative (Russia -USA-IAEA) to increase the level of safety and security of radioactive sources was established. Its purpose is to develop appropriate control over used sources, as well as search for, removal and conversion of orphaned sources into safe condition on the territory of the CIS countries in the first place. The level of risk, in terms of the use of radioactive materials, can be estimated preliminary by the threats of radiological terrorist acts and thefts of such materials. However, at present there is no proof and reliable data on illegal trafficking of radioactive materials, as well as of the cases of "radioactive" blackmail. According to the IAEA information, since 1993 201 cases of radioactive sources illegal sales have been registered, including those, used in medicine and industry. The world is concerned and wishes to protect itself. Understanding this requires consolidation of efforts in the field of international cooperation we are discussing today. The strategy of joint counteraction of radiological terrorist attempts, obviously, needs to be based on systematic analysis of all the aspects of safe use of radioactive sources, as well as critical review of the accumulated by the world community experience in non-proliferation. All this can be and must be taken into account when setting up international and national safety systems for the use of radioactive sources and effective radiological terrorism response systems. Illegal trafficking of ionizing radiation sources can pose a threat to national security, population health and global environment. All this requires us to expand collaboration and strengthen international cooperation with regards to transborder traffic of radioactive materials and operation of high radiation hazardous units, exchange of information between states and international organizations, up-date of antiterrorist laws. As for national systems, those are to be based, in the first place, on the adherence to and respect for international Agreements and Conventions, as well as national legislature. Radioactive materials management must include accountability, licensing and issuing of special permits for activities involving radiation sources; control over export-import operations; involvement of law enforcement agencies, intelligence and border control. A number of states are facing an urgent issue of creating a legal basis that would regulate the use, localizing and disposal of radioactive sources. Safe use of sources and guarantee of their safety can be secured exclusively by legal and technical documentation, including International Conventions and precise instructions to the consumers on registration of the sources and their further management. The IAEA accumulated positive experience in consolidating international efforts and supporting development of legal instruments on different aspects of the use of nuclear energy in peaceful purposes. Ta king it into account, the Agency's key role in assisting member-states with regards to setting up national infrastructures on the management of potentially hazardous radioactive sources is incontestable. Appropriate attention must be focused on the development of a set of measures to eliminate consequences of possible terrorist acts with the use of devices based on radioactive sources. I believe that the response system being developed must minimize not only direct radiological consequences, but also indirect psychological, medical, social and economic consequences. Our tragic experience of large-scale accident illustrates the fact, that the society is extremely sensitive to any radiation risks and is prone to various phobias, radiophobia in the first place. Phobias are caused by lack of knowledge or plain ignorance. Ignorance is caused by lack of curiosity and laziness. Hardly anyone among non-professionals will go to a library to read contemporary literature on radiology. It is much easier to read a biased newspaper article. Psychology specialists believe that phobias are contagious, and that it is possible, by manipulating, to make a negative impact on the health of a lot of people. And here I would like to touch upon another important issue, directly linked to the issue of safe and secure use of ionizing radiation sources. The attitude to radiation is characterized by vigilance due to real danger, and much depends on information supply and awareness. To cultivate the threat of radiological terrorism may also have a negative impact on the scale of irradiation sources use. When the population gets minimal information, but plenty of rumors, and as a result, superstitions, then, on the one hand, we get radiophobia, and on the other, irresponsible behavior. What we need, is a large-scale civilized informational system for the society on all the range of issues on safe use of ionizing irradiation sources, that precludes a possibility of their unauthorized use. The way to do this is traditional: in the first place it is mass media, i.e. press, radio and TV, introduction of specialized educational programs in schools and colleges; "round tables" with participation of community representatives, scientists, industry people, etc. This issue must be addressed by way of involving international organizations, such as IAEA, World Health Organization, as well as national institutions like Academy of Sciences. Our idea of the scale and possible consequences of radiological terrorism defines the prioritie s and efforts that are undertaken today for the purpose of increased safety in using radionuclide sources in the Russian Federation. The first steps in this direction are being taken in the framework of the acting Agreements between DOE USA and MinAtom of Russia. I believe that it will be no mistake to express my confidence in this Conference, organized by the IAEA, US and Russian Governments and a number of international organizations. I am sure that it is just a beginning of a fruitful international cooperation in this field as well as a strong impulse for everyone. return to menu D. Links of Interest 1. International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources 2. Iran�s Uranium-Enrichment Program in Natanz return to menu 3. Senate Approves Treaty of Moscow return to menu 4. Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Challenges DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. If you would like to be removed from our mailing list or if you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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