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RANSAC Nuclear News, April 7, 2003 Compiled by Lauren Arestie A. Cooperative Threat Reduction
 A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Tauscher Criticizes Lack Of Funding For Nonproliferation The $75 billion supplemental spending bill the House passed late Thursday stripped funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs, drawing criticism from Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Alamo. Tauscher's district includes Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, which runs the major Energy Department programs aimed at securing aging nuclear weapons in the former USSR and employing Russian scientists. In requesting the wartime funding, President Bush had asked for the authority to expand the so-called Cooperative Threat Reduction programs beyond Russia. The Senate granted that request and added $55 million to DOE. The House version, which passed 414-12, contained no mention of arms reduction and no money for it. The Senate version passed 93-0. Tauscher offered an amendment to include funding, but withdrew it for technical reasons. She voted for the bill, but said she was disappointed. return to menu 2. House Rejects Bush Cooperative Threat Reduction Request WASHINGTON - The House Appropriations Committee yesterday rejected a White House request for authority to extend U.S. threat reduction efforts to nations outside the former Soviet Union. The request, contained in the Bush administration's $75 billion fiscal 2003 supplemental appropriations request, was not included in the marked-up version of the bill approved by the Republican-controlled committee yesterday. The requested authority would allow the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, to spend up to $50 million in fiscal 2003 and 2004 to secure WMD materials outside the former Soviet Union, including in Iraq. The authority would enable the administration to carry out a plan for securing, perhaps by purchasing, poorly secured enriched uranium and plutonium at sites around the globe. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the expanded authority yesterday, with some modification. It would limit the authority to fiscal 2003, which ends Sept. 30, and adds a 15-day requirement for congressional notification prior to expenditure of funds. In the past, House Republicans have criticized the U.S. threat reduction programs for failing to obtain full Russian cooperation and for expanding their activities beyond their initial mandate. Last year, the House successfully prevented passage of a similar White House authority request. "It means that it will be a conferenced item, unless it is amended on the House floor, with the Senate and Bush administration on one side and the House on the other," said Andy Fisher, press secretary for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). The Senate bill also includes $55 million for Energy Department nonproliferation programs outside the former Soviet Union. return to menu B. Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 1. Editorial: Listen To The Nuclear Chatter As we immerse ourselves in the cacophony of military operations in Iraq, let us not forget to keep an ear cocked for the dangerous nuclear wrangling in the background. Apparently wishing to put a lid on the Korean problem while dealing with Saddam Hussein, the Pentagon last month made a show of flying two dozen nuclear bombers forward to the Pacific island of Guam. The North Koreans responded promptly, shooting an old, nonnuclear missile on a "test flight" into their own coastal waters. They'd done the same two weeks earlier on the news of the US "warning order" telling the bombers to get ready.By twice choosing not to lob a newer weapon over the heads of the Japanese on a trajectory toward the US as they had last year, the North Korean regime seemed to suggest a degree of restraint. This week, they fired yet another missile, perhaps intending a fresh show of defiance. Another nuclear duel is under way in South Asia. After inching back from last year's near-war mobilization, India and Pakistan reheated that confrontation a few days ago with matching "test missiles." Welcome to the world of nuclear signaling. Welcome back, that is. The art of keeping the peace by threatening nuclear obliteration fell into happy disuse when the Soviet Union disappeared. At the time, it seemed the "nukes" themselves would become obsolete. Wrong. So far, the new voices in these "conversations" are few: North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel - the latter notable for keeping mum. But each lives in a region where local threats pull the great powers into the discussion. The trouble is that none of the members of the nuclear club - including the nuclear Goliath, America - has any experience in today's varieties of atomic t�te-�-t�tes. Even among the old hands of the cold war, nuclear signaling was fraught with misunderstanding. Among today's rookie players, one side's nuance could well be gibberish to the other. We have no real understanding of what North Koreans intend with their bluster or how they interpret our gestures. Indeed, we don't know for certain who is in charge in North Korea. We can only be sure that these isolated men, deliberately starving their own people while they parade a huge army, don't think the way we do. The pattern of nuclear proliferation is shifting, and with it the dynamics of deterrence. Formerly we worried about countries like Iraq and Iran making their weapons from scratch. But in the future, we'll deal also with shadowy networks of terrorists who buy their weapons on the underground market. Where does a superpower fly a squadron of bombers if it wants to grab the attention of a covert terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, with scattered cells all over the globe? At heart, nuclear signaling is much more than just writing diplomatic notes on a warhead. By threatening catastrophe, each party hopes to extract a measure of safety from the mutual standoff. That's the theory. But instead of calming the situation, nuclear threats ricocheting among today's players may lead one of the smaller, inexperienced parties to panic and shoot. Regardless of who pulls the trigger or why, a nuclear detonation would be a disaster. A mushroom cloud rising over the dead in any city could thrust civilization into an era of unlimited violence just when bio-weapons are creeping into our mass-killing capabilities. Clearly, humankind must steer in the other direction, toward managing disagreements with less deadly methods. That's long-term. But how ought we handle the real nuclear threats zinging around right now? Piling on more threats isn't the answer. Flying nuclear bombers toward leaders barricaded in a small country may be macho; it's also escalatory and militarily meaningless should they and their warheads be hidden. With the most to lose, Americans might find themselves more deterred by North Korea's handful of nukes than the North Koreans are by America's thousands of nukes. As it is, the bomber gambit probably stiffened the North Koreans. Hearing murmurs from some in Washington that "you're next" after the US invasion of Iraq, the North Koreans may be thinking they need even more warheads to hold off the US. The new White House language of preemptive strike disregards a bit of cold-war wisdom that still applies: Nothing escalates like the prospect of preemption. The cold-war nuclear confrontation didn't become really stable until intense, detailed negotiations gradually capped each side's escalation fears. Mutual understanding led, in turn, to a smaller, more relaxed nuclear posture for both sides. Now a new generation needs to repeat that experience. Like it or not, the nukes are here, and nuclear risks are rising. The urgent task is to devalue them. Until we can substitute an entirely different grammar, we need to encourage all the world's nuclear actors and their at-risk neighbors, large and small, old and new, to understand how each thinks as it sends and receives nuclear signals. Let's start talking about nukes, not with them. return to menu C. Russia-U.S. 1. Condoleeza Rice Holds Talks In Moscow MOSCOW - The US national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, conferred with Russian officials on Monday on a visit intended to mend ties that had frayed badly amid sharp differences over the war in Iraq. Rice smiled as she emerged from a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and told reporters only that they had held "very good discussions." The foreign ministry didn't immediately comment on the agenda, but the Interfax news agency quoted an unidentified diplomat as saying that Sunday's shelling of a convoy evacuating the Russian ambassador and other diplomats from Baghdad was among the subjects discussed. At least four diplomats were injured when the Russian convoy came under attack as it headed out of Baghdad toward the Syrian border on Sunday. It was unclear whether US or Iraqi forces were responsible. Later Monday, Rice headed to a meeting with President Vladimir Putin's Security Council chief, Vladimir Rushailo. She was also scheduled to meet with the Kremlin chief of staff, Alexander Voloshin, and with Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov. US President George W Bush spoke to Rice after she arrived in Moscow on Sunday morning, the White House said. The day before, Bush had spoken with Putin, and the two leaders emphasized the need to continue the two countries' political dialogue despite differences over Iraq, according to the Kremlin press service. Putin strongly condemned the war in Iraq when it was launched, but he tempered his tone in several public statements last week, saying that a US defeat would not be in Russia's interests. He also said Saturday that the Kremlin would urge Russian lawmakers to ratify a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States, which the lower house of parliament had postponed indefinitely last month as a sign of protest ahead of the imminent war. "The message is being sent to Bush: ... don't think badly of us, we can be friends, moreover, we badly want to be friends," the business daily Kommersant commented Monday. Some observers say the change in tone reflects Russia's hope of winning a role in Iraq's postwar reconstruction, as well as its desire to prevent further damage to its ties with the United States. US-Russian relations were bolstered by Putin's strong support for the US war in Afghanistan, but cooled again over Iraq. Amid the worst strain in years, Washington accused Russian companies of shipping military equipment to Iraq, charges that Moscow angrily denied. Russia, in turn, fumed at US spy plane flights over the ex-Soviet republic of Georgia, near its southern border. return to menu 2. Editorial: At a Critical Juncture Although Moscow and Washington clearly differ on Iraq, this disagreement would be much worse if it was allowed to become an obstacle in our overall partnership. Russia and the United States must continue to work together in part because the war in Iraq, whatever its outcome, will not end the war on international terrorism. Nor will the war end global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction, for which our two countries bear unique responsibility as the two largest nuclear powers. History will not forgive us if we allow our disagreement and mutual irritation to undermine our ability to address the profound security challenges of the 21st century. Even the closest of partners have distinct interests and perspectives. In democracies, governments must respect citizens' differing views of world events. Perhaps Russia and the United States could have cooperated more effectively with respect to Iraq if our partnership had been more mature. Whatever the case, we must work with the relationship we have. And if we are to work together effectively, we must draw the appropriate conclusions from current events. By the time our partnership matures, some disagreements will be unavoidable. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to look to the future -- to our long-term collaboration on important issues -- to ensure that our relationship is not disrupted. I can assure Americans that in expressing the Russian position on Iraq, our government and its officials have acted without calling into question continuing cooperation with the United States. While we have made enormous progress in establishing a positive atmosphere between Moscow and Washington over the past two years, we have not yet succeeded in building a solid foundation to guarantee the improvement of our bilateral relationship even through periods of crisis. Understanding at the very top has never been as close or as advanced as in recent years, but this has not been translated quickly enough into the language of practical efforts, whether in bilateral trade, investments, visas or other matters. Yet the past two years have not been for nothing. At a minimum, the strength of our relationship at the highest level has ensured that tension over Iraq will not send Russian-American relations into a slide. I believe that our governments have succeeded in creating an important positive tone that has not existed previously in our relationship. We will not be able to further develop Russian-American relations without learning to trust each other. This is the only way to give practical context to our joint declarations. President Bush has said he trusts President Vladimir Putin, and I know that my president trusts his American counterpart. But we constantly hear claims and accusations, sometimes prosecutorial in tone, about the activities of some Russian companies. Regrettably, these claims and accusations are in most cases not accompanied by concrete information. If the Russian government is asked to trust these statements and to investigate them, they should consist of substantial information, not empty allegations lacking in real detail. This is contentious ground, and we have been stuck in it since the early '90s. It relates to the broader issue of nonproliferation and how to deal with it. We believe that cooperation in this sensitive area should move us beyond problems and not create new ones, and that special closed channels established for this purpose should be used more actively. Moving forward, I believe that we should sit down together and conduct an inventory of the relationship. We need to see where there have been successes and where there have been failures in our cooperation. The most important aim of this exercise should be to determine what we can do together to achieve our common goals. In my view, this process should take place simultaneously on two tracks, involving our governments as well as nongovernmental specialists and experts in each country. On the government track, it should be possible to have a confidential and candid discussion, with regular reports to each leadership. We need to prepare a list of questions and develop a concrete plan of action to move the Russian-American relationship forward. This plan to enhance our relationship could then be approved by our presidents. Such an effort could help create necessary perspective on our relationship and would confirm our cooperation "on the ground" and not only at the highest levels. The Iraq situation demonstrates that there are still some in both our countries who are skeptical of, or even opposed to, strong Russian-American relations. For instance, the very existence of the Jackson-Vanik amendment is a reflection of anti-Russian sentiment in America. But Jackson-Vanik is not a practical problem for us; on the contrary, it is the United States' problem, and it is up to the United States to remove it -- provided that the United States is genuinely interested in developing our cooperation. I find it encouraging that while public opinion polls show that most Russians are concerned about American foreign policy, three-quarters of Russians have positive views about Americans. Still, Americans should understand and accept that many Russians and other Europeans are opposed to the war in Iraq. This view is especially strong among the many millions of Muslims living in Russia. Americans want us to adhere to democratic standards, but at the same time they often pressure the Russian government to ignore public opinion when it is not convenient for the United States. No one has yet labeled us "old Russia." But judging by events, that time may be close. We are not "old Russia" or "new Russia"; we are old and new, and we cannot simply be remade. It is necessary to move away from this kind of discussion, as Russians must move away from talking about America as better or worse than it is. The United States is large and powerful and cannot be brushed aside or ignored. Nor is there any need for this. Russia is deeply interested in moving forward in the relationship with its American partner. I hope that Americans have similar sentiments, because we truly need each other to counter many real challenges and threats. return to menu 3. Editorial: Stop Appeasing Russia Evidence that Russia has sold advanced weapons to Iraq in recent months is a serious accusation against a putative ally of America. But, it should come as no surprise. While posing as a key ally ever since September 11, Vladimir Putin's Russia has covertly, but systematically, counteracted American national interests in the Middle East, as well as in Central and Northeast Asia. The Bush administration has been aware of Russia's actions, but downplayed rather than confronting them to keep relations at a good level. It is now time to re-evaluate Russia's role in American foreign policy and to end a potentially counterproductive policy of appeasement. The recent news is indeed perplexing. Russian companies have been selling Iraq advanced high-tech military equipment, including night goggles and GPS jamming equipment. Iraq's use of the equipment hampers U.S. superiority on the ground, and hence puts American lives at risk. The Russian government was informed in June 2002, but did nothing. For months, its government even claimed the company selling the jamming technology did not exist, though U.S. officials, among other evidence, presented printouts of its official Web page. Russia now alternatively denies the entire affair or claims the deal went through third countries. That the affair involves private companies should not be taken as an excuse. Military industries in Russia are closely tied to the state, and it is inconceivable that such high-level equipment would be exported without government permission or supervision. Likewise, the use of front companies in third countries is an age-old way of avoiding export controls and sanctions. Russian companies and the government hardly thought a country like Yemen would buy this advanced equipment: everyone knew perfectly well where the materiel was headed. Why else would Russian specialists be in Iraq training Saddam's troops to use the weaponry? More serious is that this is only the latest and most incriminating in a long series of Russian actions that run counter to American interests. Russia is also one of the few governments in the world that keeps active and rosy relations with North Korea, providing a certain sense of international legitimacy to the rogue regime of Kim Jong-Il. Russia has been continuing to arm North Korea in spite of the country's steps toward going nuclear and its standoff with Washington, and the Russian foreign minister said there were no plans to cut back on arms sales as late as this January. As if this were not enough, Russia has, practically speaking, supplied Iran with technology to produce nuclear weapons. Besides agreeing in 1995 to build the controversial Bushehr nuclear reactor and supply Iran with low-enriched uranium, Russia has been involved in the recently discovered Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, which experts agree are part of a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the Bush administration suspects Russia has sold Iran uranium enrichment technology, enabling it to produce weapons-grade uranium. Russia is deeply involved in arming the three rogue states defined by President Bush as constituting "the axis of evil." But, Russia's policies don't stop at this. With France in the West and China in the East, Mr. Putin is openly pursuing an agenda of multipolarity, plainly seeking to deprive America of its leading role in world politics. In Central Asia, Russia is stepping up efforts to check America's military presence. Its newly set-up air base in Kyrgyzstan is an example, as are its continuing pressure on U.S. ally, Georgia, and recent moves to annex Abkhazia, a breakaway part of Georgia. How should the U.S. government respond? The first step is to reassess Mr. Putin's sincerity when he claims to be a U.S. ally. Arming rogue states can in no way be compatible with being an American ally. Russia's help in the war on terrorism is important, but cannot come at this price. The second step is to stop the policy of appeasement that successive American administrations have been employing in their approach to Russia. The Clinton administration was most notorious in its Russia-first policy that set American interests back several years in Central Asia and the Caucasus. But, the Bush administration seems to have inherited some of the benevolence toward Russia that its predecessor suffered from. Mr. Putin needs to be confronted with some stern choices. He has to be made to understand that he cannot both arm America's enemies and call himself a U.S. ally. So far, he has believed he can get away with both. In history, Russian leaders have tended to understand clear and unambiguous language best. It's time Mr. Bush gave him some of that: If you want to be America's ally, it's time you acted like one. return to menu D. Strategic Arms Reductions 1. Putin Backs Nuclear Arms Treaty MOSCOW - Russian President Vladimir Putin said Saturday his government will work with the Russian parliament to assure passage of a nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States. The treaty, already ratified by the U.S. Senate is now stuck in the Russian parliament because of objections to the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Putin said "our position and that of the U.S. differ on Iraq and this is creating an unfavorable setting for passage of this treaty. "Russia is interested in the ratification of this document." The Russian president made his comments while visiting the headquarters of Russia's Space Forces. He also said the world community is capable of controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He called for strengthening international law on weapons proliferation and said the more unified the world's position on this issue is, the more effective it will be. Bush phoned Putin Saturday. In their conversations, they discussed Iraq and, according to the Kremlin Press Service, they agreed to continue their intensive political dialog to find a solution that meets the interest of the international community. Russia has consistently stressed that major decisions on post-war Iraq should be made by the United Nations. The two also discussed their upcoming May summit, according to the press service. return to menu 2. In Further Bid To Mend US Ties, Putin Promises To Ratify Nuclear Accord Russian President Vladimir Putin made a fresh effort to mend strained ties with the United States, saying he wanted Russian lawmakers to ratify a major nuclear disarmament treaty signed with Washington last year. "Our position and that of the United States on the Iraqi problem do not coincide. And this of course creates a difficult environment for further work on ratification of this accord. "But Russia wants to see this document ratified. We will work with deputies of the chambers of parliament and I hope that we will move to ratification," Putin said in televised comments on a visit to the Russian Space Forces' headquarters. Russian ratification of the so-called "Moscow treaty" had been scheduled for late last month, but the State Duma lower house of parliament called off the vote in protest at the US-led war in Iraq. The United States has pressed Russia to ratify the disarmament accord in time for President Putin and his US counterpart George W. Bush to formally seal the pact in May. In March, the US Senate ratified the treaty, which provides for a two-thirds reduction of both countries' long-range nuclear warheads from around 6,000 warheads each at present to under 2,200 by 2012. Amid a wave of anti-American feeling in Russia, Russian lawmakers in the Duma have insisted they will only ratify the treaty when the war in Iraq is over. But Putin moved on Thursday to calm the stormy waters in US-Russian ties, saying that he did not want a US failure in Iraq and pledging that the dispute over the Iraqi conflict would not affect cooperation. Russia "is working and will work with the United States" to resolve global problems and crisis situations, Putin said then. Russia has been one of the most outspoken opponents of the US-led war to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and has urged a diplomatic solution to the crisis within the framework of the United Nations. Putin also pledged to cooperate with other countries in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear. Washington has justified its war in Iraq as necessary to strip Baghdad of deadly chemical and biological weapons. Asked if the international community can halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, he said yes: "if we strengthen the system of international law and the non-proliferation system." "This will be more effective if we agree to work together in this sphere," Putin was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. Cash-strapped Russia had long battled for the disarmament treaty, which allows it to mothball its aging nuclear weapons stockpile instead of spending millions to maintain or replace them. return to menu E. Russia-Iran 1. Israeli and Russian Official Hint Bushehr May Be Targeted During Iraqi War (excerpted) Of all the middle-eastern thorns currently vexing the side of the US administration, one, in theory, would seem easy to eradicate, especially under cover of the more intense than expected US-led war to bring down Saddam Hussein. That thorn is the Russian-built, $800m light water reactor in the Iranian port town of Bushehr, located just 300 kilometers across the Persian Gulf from the battlefields in southern Iraq. For the past several years, this reactor has been the lightning rod for US criticisms of Russia's nuclear technology investments in Iran - one of the three states, along with Iraq and North Korea that President George Bush has labelled the "axis of evil." Now, according to some Russian and Israeli officials, it could be an unofficial target that could easily be hit in under fog of the escalating Iraqi conflict. The United States and Israel have long suggested that the reactor, which is being built by Russia, is a smokescreen behind which Iran is acquiring more sensitive nuclear technologies. For its part, Russia had until recently denied that Iran had the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. But a recent visit to Iran by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, revealed a giant uranium enrichment facility near the city of Natanz that, when completed, will operate some 5000 hexafluoride gas enrichment centrifuges. The site was built partially underground and is encased in cement walls that are a meter thick - an apparent fortification against a potential military strike. The Iranians also recently revealed that they are mining their own uranium ore, which in theory gives the Islamic Republic an entirely indigenous capability to produce its own nuclear fuel and weapons. These developments have caused Alexander Rumyantsev, the Russian atomic energy minister, to back-track on his staunch assertions that Iran has no nuclear weapons capability, and two weeks ago he admitted that Moscow really doesn't know what the future of Tehran's nuclear program holds. This ambiguity, however, has not deterred Russia from seeking other nuclear technology deals in Iran, which will likely include the construction of a second reactor at Bushehr. Tehran has meanwhile said it will refuse future visits from the IAEA unless trade sanctions recently levied against it by the Bush Administration are repealed, raising fears that Iran eventually will follow in the foot steps of North Korea and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory. "It has long been clear to us that Iran is taking its nuclear program in a hostile direction," said an Israeli official who declined to be further identified. "With the current build-up of US forces in the region, now, theoretically, would be a golden opportunity to get rid of the problem conclusively." Israel has taken military action against nuclear installations in the countries of its Arab neighbors before: In 1981, Israeli fighter jets bombed and destroyed a nuclear power plant that was being built in the Iraqi town of Osirak. While noting that he hoped the issue could be solved by other means, the Israeli official said that "the 'Osirak option' is still on the table - and not just for Bushehr, but for Natanz and the other sites as well." Among these other sites is a uranium enrichment facility that Tehran has said is a watch factory. According to some in the US intelligence community, Iran may already be enriching uranium at that site, which would be a breach of Tehran's obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Israeli official would not say whether the Osirak option is being discussed in terms of a direct bomb raid on Bushehr and Natanz, or whether an attack would be disguised to look like collateral damage from an errant US missile or some other military accident. Indeed, many of the missiles deployed with US troop in Iraq have the necessary flight range to hit Bushehr from bases in southern Iraq or Kuwait. In the past two weeks of fighting, a handful of these missiles have flown off course, with two landing in Jordan, and another two accidentally firing back in the direction of Kuwait during the opening days of the war. "Obviously, the notion that Bushehr could be hit supposedly 'accidentally' is something we have considered," said an official with Russia's Foreign Ministry, who declined to be further identified. "But if that happened, the United States would have not just Tehran to answer to, but Moscow as well." The Russian Foreign Ministry has been instrumental in laying the legal foundations for Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. According the foreign ministry official, as well as figures provided by Atomic Minister Rumyantsev, there are some 2000 Russian technician working onsite in Bushehr, and an equivalent number of Iranians. Some analysts in Washington and Russia have suggested such an attack would be unwise, and would irrevocably damage Iran's stated neutrality toward the US-Iraq war. But the Russian Foreign Ministry official said that the Pentagon - particularly US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld - is already doing much to erode that neutrality. At the beginning of the week, Rumsfeld lashed out against Syria and Iran, accusing them of supplying Iraqi troops with night vision goggles and other advanced military technologies that are forbidden to Baghdad under UN sanctions imposed after the first Gulf war in 1991. Press reports have also indicated that thousands in Iran and Syria stand ready to join Iraqi forces. In his remarks, Rumsfeld said that supplying Iraq with military aid will be viewed by the United States as "a hostile act" and that Iran and Syria "will be held accountable for their actions." "Apparently, Rumsfeld is not ruling out plans for a wider conflict in the region that could include Syria and Iran," the Russian foreign ministry source said. "In this context, an eventual attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure seems more likely." [...] return to menu F. Russia-North Korea 1. North Korea Plans To Upgrade Missiles With Russian Technology TOKYO - North Korea, locked in a nuclear standoff with the United States, plans to import leading-edge Russian missile and rocket systems via Syria to upgrade its ballistic missiles, a press report said Thursday. The Stalinist state is expected to use the hardware, including the hi-tech tactical missile Iskandar-E and the multiple launch rocket system Smerch, to upgrade the guidance system and other functions of its long-range missiles, the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun said. North Korea and Syria have a secret deal on the trade, possibly based on an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation which was concluded last year, the conservative daily quoted military sources, well informed on Korean affairs, as saying. The science and technology accord was signed when North Korea's number-two Kim Yong-Nam, the head of the Supreme People's Assembly, visited Syria in July last year. At that time, Kim handed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad a personal letter from North Korea's absolute leader Kim Jong-Il, calling for closer ties between the two countries. North Korean missile engineers are already staying in Syria to prepare for the arrival of the Russian hardware, the report said. They are expected to arrange the further shipment of the hardware under cover by sea to North Korea. The Russians have not been informed of the secret transfer deal, the report said. In exchange for the shipment, North Korea will cooperate with Syria's development of ballistic missiles, the report said. North Korea has ballistic Rodong missiles, which can strike almost all of Japan, and longer-range Taepodong missiles. In 1998, Pyongyang sent shockwaves around the world by test-firing a suspected Taepodong-1 missile, part of which flew over Japan's main island of Honshu and into the Pacific. Five years earlier, North Korea launched into the Sea of Japan a Rodong-1 missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers (810 miles) after testing two types of crude Scud missiles. According to South Korean defence ministry data, North Korea is currently testing Taepodong-1 missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles) and is also developing a longer-range Taepodong-2. Some military analysts here have predicted that this year the North would test-fire a Taepodong-2, which could be capable of reaching parts of the continental United States. North Korea has launched at least two short-range land-to-ship missiles off its coasts in recent weeks, as it has angrily alleged that is is being eyed as the next target of a pre-emptive US military attack to snuff out its suspected nuclear arms ambitions. return to menu 2. Russian Experts Support Multilateral Negotiations On North Korean Nuclear Problem MOSCOW - Russian experts support multilateral negotiations on the North Korean nuclear problem. Vadim Tkachenko, chief of the Korean Studies Centre of the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences said at a press conference in RIA Novosti that multilateral negotiations on the issue were "more preferable" now. There is a plan to hold a multilateral conference to focus on direct negotiations between the USA and North Korea. The idea is being considered in Moscow now. It was also discussed with Cho Soon-hyun, the South Korean President's special representative, during his recent visit to Moscow, Tkachenko said. Alexander Vorontsov, chief of the Korean Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said to RIA Novosti that there were obstacles for multilateral negotiations nowadays. First of all, North Korea opposes the multilateral format. "Pyongyang states that the USA poses a threat to North Korea, that's why only Washington can guarantee non-aggression," Vorontsov said. The main thing now is "to hold direct negotiations between the USA and Pyongyang and not to drive North Korea into a corner. It was natural for Moscow to support Pyongyang's variant." Russian experts believe bilateral talks could be a launching pad for multilateral negotiations. Direct talks are "possibly under way now." "I think that US and Korean representatives are at a negotiation table because there are fewer accusations on the part of USA and North Korea today," Tkachenko said. return to menu 3. Russian Expert: Moscow Has No Instruments To Influence North Korean Leader MOSCOW - At present, Moscow has no instruments to influence North Korean Secretary General Kim Jong-il, Vadim Tkachenko, head of the Centre for Korean Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Far Eastern Institute, said at a Thursday press conference devoted to "the Iraq war and prospects of settling the situation in the Korean Peninsula". Vadim Tkachenko recalled that according to the current intergovernmental agreement, Russia could only consult the North Korean party. Russia cannot render direct military support to North Korea as had been envisaged by the former agreement between North Korea and the USSR. "We could influence North Korean policy if we could guarantee security of North Korea," Vadim Tkachenko said. Moreover, the expert stressed, economic co-operation between Russia and North Korea is not that close. According to him, the turnover between the countries amounts to $115 mln annually that makes up 5-6 per cent of North Korea's foreign trade while in South Korea and Japan these figures are four or six times as high. "Even the figures of the U.S. trade with North Korea are higher," Vadim Tkachenko said. According to the expert, to have more influence on the North Korean authorities in settling particular issues, Russia must closely co-operate with North Korea in many political and economic fields. return to menu G. HEU Export Controls 1. Uranium Unease Advocates of nuclear nonproliferation were disturbed by a proposition to lessen restrictions on the export of weapons-grade uranium introduced to the House Energy and Commerce Committee by North Carolina Representative Richard Burr. According to the Associated Press, medical research facilities abroad use uranium to produce medical isotopes, and have been lobbying Congress for some time to relax export restrictions. But in the age of terrorism, nonproliferation activists argue, it makes little sense to ship weapons-grade uranium to over 50 countries. Even low-grade uranium can fall into unintended hands, as Chris Smith and Berween Shoreh reported in the Middle East Times. Furthermore, the AP notes, 1992 legislation that mandated the current restrictions requires that any facilities using high-grade uranium make efforts to eventually switch to low-grade, which can't be used to make bombs. Isotope manufacturers argue that the changeover is more complicated than the 1992 conditions imagined. But nonproliferationists counter that easing exportation restrictions would discourage facilities from changing over, and prolong the unnecessary use of weapons-grade uranium worldwide. At the very least, they say, the proposal is a bizzare contradiction of the White House's aggressive new policies on weapons disposal and homeland security. return to menu H. Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. Moscow to Neutralize Weapons at Storage Sites Prior to Final Disposal The United States and Russia have agreed to a new plan to accelerate the disposal of Russia's chemical weapons stockpiles, Zinovy Pak, head of the Russian Munitions Agency, said yesterday. Under the new plan, signed March 14, Russia will conduct the initial neutralization of chemical weapons agents at their current storage sites, Pak said. This new method is expected to accelerate the chemical demilitarization project by at least three years, he added. Pak also said yesterday that the United Kingdom will oversee the construction of a new chemical weapons detoxification plant in Maradykovo, in the Kirov region. return to menu I. Spent Fuel Reprocessing 1. Minatom's Accounting Commission Concluded MAYAK Activities Satisfactory April 2 PA Mayak hosted the meeting of the Central Accounting Commission of Minatom of Russia chaired by Alexander Rumyantsev, the Minister of RF of Atomic Energy. As Nuclear.Ru was informed by Head of Public Information Group of PA Mayak Yevgeni Ryzhkov, the Accounting Commission appraised the 2002 financial and industrial activities of the enterprise satisfactory. During the PA Mayak visit Minister Rumyantsev visited in-pile isotope productions and the Commission members - First Deputy Minister E. Antipenko, Minister's Advisor V. Vinogradov, Head of fuel cycle department V. Korotkevich, and TVEL President A. Nyago - were shown to the radiochemical plant. The visit ended with a press conference. Summing up PA Mayak operations results, A. Rumyantsev noted that the enterprise had timely and correctly evaluated existing tasks and challenges. He also informed that the relevant departments and structural units had been directed to start working to solve them. These, primarily, include the implementation of the plan of measures to reduce sewage discharges to closed accumulation reservoirs (Techa water pool cascade), modernization of radiochemical plant (RT-1), increase in isotope production, assistance to the enterprise in supplying foreign INF for reprocessing and storage. According to the Minister, INF shipments from Bulgaria are to be resumed this year already. Coming back to the Techa cascade issue, the Minister stressed that the main objective would be strict implementation on the plan of measures submitted to Gosatomnadzor of Russia and which was the basis for Gosatomnadzor of Russia to extend RT-1 operational license. The important tasks facing PA Mayak, as the Minister outlined, include modernization of RT-1 plant, which would allow the enterprise accepting VVER-1000 INF for reprocessing and storage. This would significantly broaden the list of products PA Mayak will be able to accept for subsequent recovery as well as operations effort. According to A. Rumyantsev, there are no any limitations regarding PA Mayak reprocessing of INF (irradiated nuclear fuel) due to the new license. In addition, the Minister noted that the warfare in Iraq had affected and would not affect implementation of the US-Russia cooperation agreements including that concerning construction of the fissile material storage facility (FMSF) at PA Mayak site which commissioning is scheduled for second half of 2003. A. Rumyantsev also informed that the construction of South Urals NPP (SU NPP) would be resumed shortly. The nuclear power plant will relief the electricity supply problems in the region as well as the Techa cascade environmental issues. At this, the Minister stressed that the powerful scientific and technical potential available to the region would ensure safe operation of the NPP. As the Minister said, a decision had been made to construct VVER-1000 reactors instead of BN-800 at SU NPP site. These reactors are in operation at many of Russian NPPs and the construction cost is 1.5 times lower, besides the industry has mastered their manufacturing. The Minister concluded saying that the solution process to all issues addressed by the press conference is continuously supervised by the ministry and the long-term operation of PA Mayak are on the strategic program for Russia's nuclear industry development. return to menu J. Announcements 1. Senate Approves U.S. Role In Nuclear Terrorism Prevention The U.S. Senate unanimously approved last night the U.S. participation in an international effort to help prevent nuclear material and radioactive waste being misused to make dirty bombs. The organizational meeting of treaty members begins on April 6. "We are engaged in Iraq and the war on terror because the minimum standard of victory is preventing individuals, terrorists or states from possessing and using weapons of mass destruction. We proceed in a world awash with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials, stored principally in the United States and Russia, but also Iraq, Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Israel, Great Britain, France, China and perhaps others," Lugar said. "We must pay much more attention to making certain that all weapons and materials of mass destruction are identified, continuously guarded and systematically destroyed. This convention will complement the work the U.S. has done to secure these materials at home and assist the Russians through the Nunn-Lugar program," Lugar said. Since 1991, the $400 million a year Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 6,032 nuclear warheads. It has destroyed 495 ballistic missiles, 432 ballistic missile silos, 103 bombers, 369 submarine-launched missiles, 408 submarine missile launchers, and 25 strategic missile submarines. It has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels. More than 22,000 scientists formerly employed in weapons of mass destruction programs have been employed in cooperative, peaceful endeavors. The Bush Administration has asked for the emergency authority to use Nunn-Lugar elsewhere in the world. That language is included in the Iraq war supplemental appropriations bill being considered now by the Congress. Lugar has also backed legislation to help secure uncontrolled radiological waste and instruments that could be a terrorist source for dirty bomb materials. "The Joint Convention promotes improvements in safety at nuclear fuel and waste management facilities throughout the world by providing a framework for regulatory systems and practices. The Convention also requires Parties to ensure that "disused" sealed sources (i.e., sealed sources that are not longer in use) are controlled in a safe manner, which would prevent their use in radiological dispersion devices, or dirty bombs," Committee Chairman Dick Lugar said. "The Administration has placed a high priority on the ratification of this treaty and has asked for timely consideration. Secretary Abraham wrote to Senator Biden and me last month requesting action on the treaty and pointed out that, through the treaty, 'the United States can lead efforts to increase awareness within the international community of the need to reduce global vulnerabilities from the misuse of spent fuel, radioactive waste, and disused sealed sources and to encourage actions to ensure the safe management of these materials,'" Lugar said. return to menu K. Links of Interest 1. Address to the "Global Partnership Against Threats from WMD" Conference return to menu 2. The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT return to menu 3. Lugar, Hunter Lock Horns on Threat Reduction return to menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. If you would like to be removed from our mailing list or if you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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