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RANSAC Nuclear News, October 17, 2003 Compiled By: Matthew Bouldin A. Announcements
 A. Announcements 1. Supplement to Nuclear News The contents of this issue of the Nuclear News are a supplement to yesterday's coverage, containing the week's various Official Statements and Links of Interest. Return to Menu B. Official Statements 1. CZECHS JOIN WITH UK TO DESTROY RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS The UK has welcomed the contribution of the Czech Republic to a Ministry of Defence-led project helping Russia to destroy its lethal chemical weapons stocks. The Czech Republic will provide around �45,000 towards construction of an electricity substation that will support the chemical weapons (CW) destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, in the Urals. Around four million Russian CW artillery munitions will be destroyed at Shchuch'ye. The electricity supply project follows the UK's first project at Shchuch'ye, which was construction of a water supply for the destruction facility. That project was completed on budget in Spring 2003 at a cost of �2m. The UK has announced it will make available around $100M (c.�60M) over the next ten years to assist Russia with the destruction of its CW stockpile. Adam Ingram, the Armed Forces Minister, said: "I warmly welcome this Czech contribution as a further important step in strengthening international co-operation to destroy chemical weapons. We look forward to working closely with our Czech and Russian colleagues in implementing this assistance. "Such arrangements with other donors are already in place and we would welcome further commitments to help bring the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye into operation at an early date." Notes to editors 1. The UK Government announced in 2000 that it would contribute up to �12m, phased over 3 years, for high priority chemical demilitarisation and biological non- proliferation projects in Russia. 2. Assistance with Russian chemical weapon destruction is a key element of the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The UK has announced that it will contribute up to US$750m over the ten years of the Global Partnership, and that up to US$100m (c.�60m) of this could be made available to assist Russia with the destruction of its chemical weapon (CW) stockpile, on top of the �12m announced in 2000. 3. The UK (which has donated �4-6m), Norway, the EU (each to the tune of some �1.5m), and the Czech Republic (�45,000) are jointly funding procurement of equipment for the electricity substation. The project, including all the funding, is being managed by MOD. The UK's principal contractor, Bechtel Ltd, will implement the project. 4. Destruction of chemical weapons stocks is a key requirement of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), not least because of the risk of proliferation. 5. Some four million CW artillery munitions (about 95% of the Russian stockpile) will be destroyed at Shchuch'ye. Russia destroyed the weapons' explosives by April 2002, as per the terms of the CWC. 6. The UK has close links with the Czech Republic in the area of defence against chemical and biological defence. The Czech Republic is keen to contribute to the destruction of Russian chemical weapons, and their funding of 2m Czech Crowns will be another valuable donation made through the UK assistance programme. 7. Several states are committed to providing support to Russia to help it meet its obligations to destroy its CW stocks, including the US, Germany, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and the European Union. 8. For more information, call Miguel Head in the MOD Press Office on 020 7218 7931 or visit www.mod.uk Return to Menu 2. INTERVIEW GRANTED BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IGOR IVANOV TO RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS FOLLOWING MEETING WITH IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL ELBARADEI, OCTOBER 14, 2003 Foreign Minister Ivanov: IAEA Director General ElBaradei and I thoroughly examined the nuclear problems of Iran and North Korea, and exchanged views on the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. With regards to Iran, we welcome the continuation of dialogue between the IAEA and Iran on nuclear problems. The IAEA Director General is leaving for Iran tomorrow, and we hope that this trip will produce tangible results on the questions which are now being examined. First and foremost, Iran should provide exhaustive information on all its previous programs and answer the related IAEA questions. We also favor Iran joining the Additional IAEA Safeguards Protocol pursuant to the NPT. This, undoubtedly, corresponds to the interests of Iran, as it would increase trust in the nuclear programs being implemented in that country; and Iran suspending uranium enrichment would also be important. All these steps certainly meet the interests of Iran, as they would make these programs more transparent and would relieve the international community's concerns. We hope that as a result of the efforts being exerted both in multilateral formats and at the bilateral level, we shall manage to advance on all these issues. With regards to North Korea, we advocate its resuming cooperation with the IAEA and rejoining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time it is necessary to take into account the lawful security interests of the DPRK as well. We hold that this entire range of questions can and should be settled within the framework of the six-way format of negotiations, the first round of which took place in Beijing. We hope that these talks will be continued very soon. With regards to Iraq, regrettably the matter of weapons of mass destruction in that country is not closed, since by the UN Security Council resolutions UNMOVIC and the IAEA alone have the final say here. All the searches for weapons of mass destruction, unquestionably, have a great significance, but, I repeat it, the last word in accordance with the UN resolutions is still with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. We consider it fundamentally important that this work should be continued by international inspectors, because considering the unstable situation in Iraq, if there are weapons of mass destruction or some elements related to these weapons there, a real threat exists that they might get into terrorist hands. It is our common task, and it is therefore important that UNMOVIC and the IAEA should continue to fulfill the mission which was laid upon them by the UN Security Council. Question: Does the possibility remain that the situation with Iran will not develop according to the Iraqi scenario? Foreign Minister Ivanov: This is what our efforts are directed to, and the IAEA Director General and I today talked about this at great length. I think no one is interested and should not be interested in seeking events in Iran develop according to the Iraqi scenario. We still do not know what is to be done in Iraq. We see how complicated the situation is there, and with each passing day it is becoming even more complicated. A discussion of the UN Security Council draft resolution is currently going on. We hope that, taking into account the amendments Russia has introduced, there opens the possibility of a new resolution being adopted on Iraq in order to assist the search for a political settlement. It's already such a mess in Iraq for Iran too to follow this scenario. Question: A meeting of the delegations of Pristina and Belgrade on Kosovo took place. What is the role of Russia in solving the Kosovo problem? Foreign Minister Ivanov: This direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade began with the active cooperation of the Contact Group, of which Russia is a member. The representative of Russia had participated in the work of the Contact Group. We support practical questions being tackled in the course of this dialogue, such as a safe return of refugees and a number of economic and other matters. With regards to the status of Kosovo, this question at this stage is not being considered but has been postponed to a later period. It had taken a lot of effort to get that dialogue started, and we hope that it will help to relieve tension in this region and solve the questions which are currently acute. In the first place, this is the safe return of refugees. Question: Regarding compensations to the former prisoners of war and persons forcibly driven to Austria. In conversation with Wolfgang Schussel you touched upon this question? Foreign Minister Ivanov: We discussed this question thoroughly with Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel. I would like to take this opportunity and address all the persons who may be entitled to take advantage of the compensations to submit before this year's end the appropriate documents so that they can be examined. I wish to recall that 12,000 such applications were already filed and of them more than 9,000 were granted, and that an amount of more than 18 million euros was paid out. Therefore the agreements regarding compensations to the Russian citizens forcibly taken to Austria in the years of the Second World War are generally being implemented successfully and I repeat that it is very important that in the time left before the year's end all those entitled to such compensations should urgently submit all the necessary documents. Question: How is our cooperation with Iran going to be affected by Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment if this process does not go beyond the bounds of peaceful programs? Foreign Minister Ivanov: It is indeed the right of Iran to conduct uranium enrichment. Yet today, considering the complicated and tense situation around the nuclear problem of Iraq, it is necessary to take steps which would strengthen trust. This, of course, should be a goodwill move on the part of Iran in order to convince the international community that no work really is being conducted and there are no plans of a military character. So that it would be a step towards the strengthening of trust in the programs being carried out in Iran. Today, in the opinion of our specialists, there is no acute need for conducting uranium enrichment. And the suspension which we are talking about should not adversely affect the peaceful nuclear programs that are being implemented in Iran and can be implemented in accordance with all international norms. Question: How may this directly tell on our cooperation with Iran? Foreign Minister Ivanov: It won't tell directly. You know that ours is but one condition - that an agreement should be signed for the return of spent fuel which may and will be supplied to the nuclear plant in Bushehr. Talks on this agreement are being conducted, but it has not yet been signed. Without this agreement, we can't continue the implementation of this project. Return to Menu 3. STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SERGEY V. LAVROV PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE 58TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ITEM �QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELATED MATTERS� (ITEM 56 OF THE AGENDA) OCTOBER 14, 2003 During this session many UN member States and the Secretary-General emphasized the subject of an earliest reform of the United Nations. The Russian Federation has always believed and continues to believe that a strong and efficient Organization is a key instrument for collective regulation of international relations and forming a multi-polar world order on the basis of the UN Charter and rules of international law. This is particularly topical today when the world community is seeking to resolve the task of developing a global strategy of countering new threats and challenges. The reform of the Security Council must be aimed at strengthening the potential of this key organ in the interests of effective fulfillment of its powers under the UN Charter. We are sympathetic to the concern expressed by many delegations over the slow pace of the Security Council reform � one that would add this body a nature more reflective of the current international realities. At the same time, we believe, that given deep differences among States on this issue, the work should progress gradually and quite cautiously. As President Putin stated in his address at the opening of the current session of the General Assembly, the basic guideline in this matter continues to be the achievement of the broadest possible agreement on all the aspects of the Security Council enlargement. We cannot afford a division within the United Nations on this question, which continues to be very important for the interests of many States and the whole Organization. Russia is prepared to continue meticulous work to narrow down differences existing in the States� positions, above all on the key aspect of the future composition of the Security Council. We are open to considering constructive proposals on the categories in which the Council�s membership may be enlarged, on the understanding that the expansion in each category must cover both the developed and developing countries, granting them equal rights and obligations. In this context, the Russian Federation believes that in the event of creating additional seats for the permanent members of the Security Council, Germany, Japan, India, Brazil would be worthy candidates, just as a representative from Africa. This approach will make it possible to ensure adequate balance of interests of its members and affirm the trend for reaching consensus within the Council. We are convinced that the ideas implying diminution of the prerogatives and powers of the current SC permanent members, including the veto right, are counterproductive. The unjustified and artificial criticism of the veto institution only fuels unnecessary emotions and is not conducive to reaching the needed agreement on the reform parameters. As far as giving the veto right to new SC permanent members, this issue should be considered only after agreement has been reached on specific membership of the expanded Security Council. It is essential to preserve the Council�s compact composition because its excessive expansion can have a negative impact on working capacity and efficiency of this body. Proceeding from this consistent position, Russia will continue its constructive participation in the efforts to find effective agreements, supported to the maximum possible extent, concerning the Security Council reform, including within the framework of the GA Open-ended Working Group. The work of this Group should, as before, be conducted on the basis of agreed parameters, including the consensus principle and the package approach. We shall also have to consider those recommendations concerning the Security Council reform, which can be submitted by the Secretary-General as a result of the work of the High-Level Panel of eminent personalities being created by him. We expect that such recommendations shall adequately take into account the existing approaches to resolving this problem, the interests of various groups of States, and the UN as a whole. In any event, the decision on this matter will be up to the General Assembly. In conclusion, let me emphasize that the reform of the Security Council can only be successful on the condition that its result will not be a split or division, but rather a closer unity of the States around this unique organ which, on behalf of all the UN members, bears principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the globe. Russia will continue to help achieve this goal in every possible way. Return to Menu 4. KEYNOTE SPEECH BY U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN DICK LUGAR AT A MEETING OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA BUSINESS COUNCIL I would like to congratulate the U.S.-Russia Business Council on its tenth anniversary. The Council plays a vital role in this most important relationship. You are in a unique position wherein your goals serve the commercial, security and diplomatic interests of both the United States and Russia. I look forward to continuing my relationship with you as we work together to advance U.S.-Russian relations. The U.S.-Russian relationship has, over the last decade, fluctuated from the U.S.-led military interventions in the Balkans, to close cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, to tension in the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. During his first term as President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin has sought to improve relations with the United States. He has been criticized at home for making too many concessions to Washington and getting too little in return. In the U.S., President Bush has been criticized for seeking to emphasize the positive in bilateral relations since the September 11th terrorist attacks and ignoring various Russian transgressions. But in my view, both are seeking to be pragmatic as they look for solutions to long-standing disagreements that continue to vex our respective diplomats and our best intentions. In both capitals, there is an acute desire to deepen U.S.-Russia relations. In pursuit of this goal, Presidents Bush and Putin came to last month's summit at Camp David with a clear objective in mind: to promote substance over rhetoric. Symbolic joint statements were abandoned with concentration placed on establishing an efficient process designed to solve elusive problems. The two Presidents produced a "checklist" of issues ranging from increased military contacts to science and technology cooperation. Each item was tasked to trusted cabinet members for solutions. The process will be monitored by the chief executives to ensure success. The key now is to ensure that in this time of numerous, controversial foreign policy issues that we do not lose focus on the commitments made at the summit. The two countries have taken a number of positive steps in the last few years, such as continuing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, cooperating closely in responding to the threats posed by terrorist organizations and bringing normalcy to day-to-day interactions. But the current challenges in the relationship require continued high-level leadership; these include; Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization, copyright security issues, organized crime and corruption, and perhaps most importantly the threats posed by the continued insecurity of Russian stockpiles of weapons and materials of mass destruction. We must also continue to concentrate on potential threats posed by Russian relations with rogue states such as Iran, Belarus, Burma and the ongoing crisis in Chechnya. The United States and Russia have become cooperative partners in battling global terror. Two years ago, I cautioned against the temptation to simply continue the status quo or to shift to a more limited, restricted view of Russia as a bundle of security problems to be avoided. The September 11th terrorist attacks changed the world, and the U.S. - Russia relationship changed with it. Today, the United States and Russia have become cooperative partners in battling global terror. In Afghanistan, Russia provided extensive intelligence to the U.S.-led coalition and provided substantial assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in the form of heavy weapons and supplies, as well as Russian "technical advisors" on the ground. I am also grateful that Russia supported U.S. military deployments in former Soviet Central Asian states, a critical component of our strategy in Afghanistan. These events have contributed to our chief policy objective vis-a-vis Russia: namely, the continued consolidation of a cooperative, productive relationship based on common security interests. During my trip to Moscow in August, I witnessed first-hand what is possible when our countries set aside their differences to accomplish mutual goals. I am referring to the continuing utility of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In my view, there are no programs as critical to U.S. security as those aimed at containing and dismantling the nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare infrastructure of the former Soviet Union. The legislation I authored with former Senator Sam Nunn continues to produce results. To date, the program has removed 6,182 warheads from their delivery platforms. We have destroyed 518 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 439 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We have eliminated 449 missile silos. We have destroyed 27 strategic nuclear submarines and 119 bombers. We also have initiated efforts to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye, which, when completed, will destroy 1,700 metric tons of nerve agent per year. All of this has been accomplished at a cost of less than two-tenths of one percent of the annual defense budget. Despite these successes there remain areas in need of improvement. Last year the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia was halted for more than six months because of the Administration's decision not to certify that Russia had satisfied six legislatively-mandated conditions. Resumption of assistance was possible only after Congress granted, and the President exercised, limited authority to waive the certification requirements in the interest of national security. This authority, however, will expire at the end of fiscal year 2005. The Administration has rightly requested that Congress make permanent the waiver authority. Unfortunately, Congress has denied this request to date. This bureaucratic logjam is of our own making and must be corrected. I share the policy goals associated with the certification requirements but we must prioritize. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be at the top of the list. On the Russian side, Moscow continues to claim that it never had a biological weapons program and that it has submitted full and accurate chemical weapons stockpile declarations. Unfortunately, accumulated evidence and testimony from Russian participants in these programs suggest otherwise. It is time for Russian officials to come clean; the world knows of Russia's biological weapons program. I have visited more than 10 different facilities and talked with more than a hundred persons involved in the program. We must get over this sense of denial, this unwillingness to face the past. We must move forward with solutions designed to eliminate the threat these weapons still pose to the international community. To appreciate what the United States and Russia are doing through the Nunn-Lugar program, one has to step back and view it from the perspective of history. After decades of tense military confrontation and ideological struggle, we are sending American firms and know-how to our former enemy to dismantle and safeguard their massive stockpile of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Both sides have had to set aside differences to accomplish this cooperation. Historically, no great military power has ever possessed the opportunity to work with another military power in mutual threat reduction on such an awesome and world threatening agenda. While we chart the future of bilateral cooperation, we must also recognize that there are areas wherein U.S.-Russian policy differences could impede relations. Russia's construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran and associated cooperation with Iran's nuclear programs have been the most contentious issues in U.S.-Russia relations since 1995. Russia officially remains committed to the Bushehr project, although recent revelations corroborating U.S. charges of an Iranian nuclear weapons program have sparked a debate in Moscow about the wisdom of Russia's course. I encourage the Bush Administration to continue pressing Russia on this issue, and I support its decision to bring formal charges of an illicit Iranian nuclear weapons program to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Americans should be encouraged that commercial cooperation and investment are expanding. This is good news for members of this audience, many of whom continue to be on the frontlines of American efforts to open Russian markets. But our work is not complete, and we cannot stop until we level the investment playing field. In recent days, these efforts have received an important boost with the announcement of an agreement to ease import quotas on U.S. chicken and steel exports to Russia. I share the hope of many that this important development will lead to the revocation of Jackson-Vanik. Congress must act to permanently end this vestige of the Cold War with the goal of seeking permanent normal trade relations. I am also excited about the progress of the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund, which was capitalized by the U.S. Government to make equity investments in Russian companies. The Fund's record is already impressive, having invested more than $250 million in companies headed by Russian entrepreneurs who have committed themselves to basic principles of good corporate governance, transparency, and best practices. I am hopeful that the fund will emulate its elder siblings in Poland and Hungary by raising parallel pools of private capital and one day returning money to the U.S. Treasury. I recently wrote a letter to the Russian Prime Minister concerning the growing problem of piracy of copyrighted materials. This issue has been an irritant on the U.S. - Russia commercial agenda for some time, and I am disturbed to see that piracy continues. U.S. copyright industries estimate losses of over $1 billion per year in each of the last six years. Reports indicate that the Russian economy is also suffering as a result of copyright piracy, primarily because piracy inhibits foreign investment in Russia. The issue of copyright security was raised at the recent U.S. - Russia summit, and I am hopeful that the U.S. and Russian governments will address the economic threat posed by copyright piracy in a timely and comprehensive manner. We must also continue to work closely with Russian friends to address the increased range and frequency of criminal activity and organized crime in Russia. Russian organized crime syndicates are heavily involved in international arms and drug smuggling and money laundering and they are increasingly seeking to enter legitimate commercial activity. These groups continue to flaunt their ability to evade the rule of law. Our friends in Russia must understand that the problems created by Russian organized crime are having a negative effect on foreign investment and the Russian economy. Continuing instability and violence in Chechnya complicates both the war on global terrorism and our attempts to improve relations with Russia. Terrorism in Chechnya has increased significantly over the last year. While I support Russia's territorial integrity and its right to defend itself against terrorism, I encourage the Russian government to end human rights abuses committed by Russian security forces and bring those suspected of abuse to justice. I also share the Administration's skepticism about the recent election in Chechnya and the likelihood that it will lead to a peaceful settlement. It is difficult for me to reconcile a democratic process in which popular opposition candidates are removed from the ballot utilizing intimidation and highly questionable legal rulings. Chechnya is a difficult test for President Putin and the Kremlin, but they must understand that the world is watching closely. Russia joined with France and Germany in the UN Security Council in opposing U.S. military action against Iraq last February. Now, Russia appears to be taking a less antagonistic position as the UN considers U.S. proposals for international assistance in bolstering security and reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq. It is true that Russia retains a strong interest in winning recognition for tens of billions of dollars of contracts promised by the Saddam Hussein regime to Russian firms, and has significant interest in having a role in Iraq's oil sector. But the Russian Government also recognizes that instability in Iraq and Afghanistan would pose a major threat on Russia's southern flank. Finally, I am concerned about recent trends in U.S. foreign assistance to Russia. This year the Administration submitted a request of $576 million for the Newly Independent States for Fiscal Year 2004. I believe the proposed cut in funding for assistance to Russia and the other states was much too steep. In my committee's Foreign Assistance Authorization bill we recommended a $70 million increase, to total $646 million. I share the hope of a day when U.S. assistance is not needed to fortify democracy, rule of law, and economic progress, but it is clear that that day has not yet come. It is absolutely vital to our security interests that our Foreign Assistance Authorization bill pass the Senate this session. Despite this list of policy challenges, I remain optimistic and confident that the U.S.-Russia relationship will continue to improve. I believe that Presidents Bush and Putin recognize the critical importance of continuing to move the bilateral relationship upward and onward. And I look forward to remaining in a leadership role to help ensure that the bilateral relationship and the Nunn-Lugar program continue to successfully adapt to the changing political and strategic environment. Return to Menu 5. PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH AMBASSADOR R. NICHOLAS BURNS AT THE NATO INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING (excerpted) [...] *QUESTION*: The Russians have said that nuclear weapons are a political weapon, that they don�t reserve the right of pre-eminent use of nuclear weapons. What do you think of that? What does that mean? **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **Well, let me say first of all that the Secretary had a very good bilateral with Sergei Ivanov this morning. They reviewed a lot of the issues that were brought up at Camp David for military-to-military cooperation between the US and Russia. It was a very good discussion of that. Then we had an hour and a half lunch with all the NATO ministers and Minister Ivanov, and then following that, another hour of Minister Ivanov with the nineteen NATO ministers. So Secretary Rumsfeld took part in what was about two and a half hours of discussions � multilateral. And in those discussions, Minister Ivanov made very clear that Russia wants to have a very close relationship with NATO; that Russia is very pleased about the advances we�ve made in the NATO-Russia relationship. He assured us that some of the press stories that came out last week about this new national security strategy document in Moscow were erroneous; that Russia has no negative intentions whatsoever towards NATO. In fact, the reverse. Since we formed the NATO-Russia council a year and a half ago, he thought that progress had been excellent. There is a new Russian Ambassador in Brussels. And so he reassured everyone, Secretary Rumsfeld, Lord Robertson, that there was nothing to these press reports and nothing about which we had to worry. **QUESTION: **But did he say anything specifically about nuclear posture? Did he say that they do not reserve the right to preemptively use these weapons? Did he say that? **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **I did not hear the press conference. **QUESTION: **What he said in there was that he considered the use of nuclear � or the threat of nuclear weapons a political tool, that they do not reserve the right to preemptive use. **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **What he said to the NATO ministers was that the report that Russia was planning preemptive use was erroneous. **QUESTION: **Of nuclear weapons? **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **Yes. **QUESTION: **He did say in the press conference that the preemptive � the right of preemptive action, military action, they reserve that. He distinguished � he said that Russia does not have the same policy as the United States, which is the use, preemptive use of nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons � the United States does say that. Any pre-emption, that is not Russia�s policy. Is that your understanding? **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **I didn�t hear the press conference. **QUESTION: **Is that what he said today? **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **Well, he didn�t mention the United States today in the meetings. He didn�t mention the United States. All he said was that he had seen some Russian press reports and European press reports last week about this Russian strategy document. He wanted to assure us that they were erroneous; that there were no negative Russian intentions whatsoever towards NATO. In fact, not only the body language, but everything he said was in the opposite direction. He wanted to build the relationship and he thought it was very positive. What he heard from all of the NATO leaders, and certainly from Secretary Rumsfeld, was: We want that kind of relationship to really take us as far along the road as possible. **QUESTION: **Did Iran come up at all? **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **In the NATO-Russia meeting, a lot of issues came up. There was a discussion of Afghanistan. There was a discussion of Iraq. There was a brief discussion, mainly from Minister Ivanov, about Iran. And a discussion of Bosnia and Kosovo. So, there was a tour de table about all of the major international operations underway. **QUESTION: **Were you satisfied, though, on Iran, with what he had to say? Because what he said there didn�t sound as though it was a great change. **AMBASSADOR BURNS: **I wouldn�t want to characterize everything that was said on both sides of the question about Iran, but I think you know very well what the US policy is. [...] Return to Menu 6. PRESS BRIEFING BY SERGEY IVANOV, RUSSIAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE (excerpted) Good afternoon dear ladies and gentlemen. I'm very much pleased to see such a confluence of the members of the press corps, to see a lot of familiar faces who represent not only the Russian but also the U.S. media outlets. Today was quite a hectic one and a political one. In the first part of the day, in the morning, I had substantive full(?) bilaterals with Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Robertson, with the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Rumsfeld, and the Defence Minister of Germany, Mr. Struck. We have covered an extensive bunch of questions which are of mutual, reciprocal interest. A meaningful exchange of opinions has been logically continued for three to four hours within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council at 20... comprising the 20 defence ministers. The discussions were held rather constructively and in my eyes, has graphically showed how pressing and important today partnerships are in NATO-Russia co-operation. The outcomes of our joint work with my colleagues from the Alliance countries once again convinced that we not only can but also have to, as simple as that, search for other ways to enhance our co-operation. Exactly the understanding of this premise allows us to gradually fill the spheres of our co-operation with deliverables, a small (inaudible) transfer them from the vein of theoretically discussions into a field of concrete hands-on affairs. I can just cite one example for that. This year in this current year 2003, the plan of joint NATO-Russia activities in terms of the number thereof is double as much as that on previous year. A certain positive shift has also been brought about in the field of co-operation for the creation of the ABM system, as we call it theatre missile defences...missile defences for the theatre of operations within the NATO-Russia Council framework. There have been operative, joint working groups, its mandate is now endorsed, the program for co-operation until the year 2005 and their principal... the guidelines for this co-operation also being discussed not only within NATO-Russia Council, but also bilaterally with the U.S. And on this issue, quite recently during our presidential visit to Camp David, there has been a very substantive discussion as well. Today, at their session, at the meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld, we also started immediate practical pragmatic work flowing out from the instructions and agreements which were given to us by the President, by the chief executives at Camp David. It's not by chance probably in this context that the American side has invited me... to go to a very important city and as the military put it, military facility which represents the NORAD control installation. At the same time, it shows us how such functions, such installations function in the United States of America. I'm very much grateful for that to Mr. Rumsfeld. As you understand, I also saw previously the likes of those facilities in the main upon Russian territory, and as a result of a frank encounter...exchange of experiences and discussions we came to a very simple conclusion which is jokingly it sounds like that, that smart people think the same. [...] Today, priority tasks and problems which are encountered by the armed forces of Russia, all of the security agents, power wielding agencies of Russia are naturally enough the proliferation problem and terrorism, as well as ethnic and religious radicalism, drug trafficking in large scales... on a large scale. Today, I have pointed out the fact that our cross-border service men of the Tajik-Afghan border confiscates on an average per annum about three tonnes of pure heroin. They gauge it up exactly in tonnes, not in grams as people do out in the streets. The police, the law forces do that. We count heroin confiscated in towns and we are pretty well aware of the fact that's just the tip of the iceberg, but that most of the drugs unfortunately makes it out to Europe and to a less extent to the U.S. as well. We also came to a conclusion, to a unified conclusion, that their principal stress should be placed upon the timely identification and neutralization of the root causes of such phenomena as terrorism extremism and not on the ramifications thereof to be eliminated. And in conclusion, I would also like to say that I have raised an issue of the necessities sooner or later to elaborate a unified set of rules to go by, of unified standards from the standpoint of countering the threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and counter-terrorism, I can briefly tell you what I mean. When we say about the Bushehr say, one of the installations in Iran that's a light water reactor unit, that's a nuclear power station, power plant, which has been built by Russia without transcending(?) any international controls or regimes. As we hear accusations, allegations hurled at us that by doing so we promote any nuclear arms program in Iran, we naturally enough cannot accept such an allegation at the same time when pretty well of a number of other objects, installations where such equipment is identified, spotted, which in case of supply of it by Russia and not by other states, including by the developed, industrialized states would cause... would arouse a storm of public outcries and repercussions, indignations, resentment, but in this case, we do not see any outcries or outrage. So in respect to those who have supplied this, if we are to talk about terrorism, unfortunately there are still instances where a number of states, a number of states does not co-operate with us in terms of extradition of... extradition of such persons who are officially by the UN black-listed as international terrorists or of any other persons who are still not recognized as such. But in respect to whose, the Russian Federation, year in, year out, sent out a great quantity of documents corroborating their implication in the past into the terrorist activities upon Russian soil. So far silence is anything, dead silence is what we get in response. So that's why we believe that sooner or later what is required is an establishment of unified standards in terms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and counter-terrorism. So that's about all for this (inaudible)... taking of your questions. Questions and answers Q: That's the RIA Novosti question. You have now outlined in general that the... your colleagues positively taken your explanation... clarifications as to this new open doctrine of Russia, a new one. What questions they pose to you? Could you please clarify what they said? Ivanov: I would like to say from the outset no questions were put to me after my presentation. Everything was quite clear and understandable to all. It was unanimously, practically that all the speakers after my contribution, after my report, all the speakers after me, they pointed out the fact that in the first place they... for the first time see in present day Russian history a possibility to openly expose our views on the development of armed forces and key pivotal issues of international security. This is true that in our political culture previously, something like that was a misnomer and now it's part of our lives, it's a basic fact of life and everybody has taken it quite positively. The earlier mass media outlet aired comments... and those mass media (inaudible) said to be, by me, to be quite unqualified and they did not bother even to read anything which is posted a long time ago on the Internet and published in the open press. They were saying that Russia is... stipulated some kind of preventive nuclear strikes. I was just reading something like that, quoting that from the text naturally enough. There's no stipulation like that in terms of nuclear... preventive nuclear strikes. There's another thing: Russia reserves the right for itself to utilize in a preventive fashion the military force. And I did drive home to my partners in detail why we're... and under which conditions and why, wherefore, this should be done, including in the CIS states. I have explained to my colleagues that the CIS represents to Russia a very important and sensitive sphere of security. In the CIS states, there are dozens of millions of ethnic Russians and just Russian nationals. More often then not, they even live in families...a part of the family live in CIS states or one of them living out in Russia. Naturally enough, they have a good command of Russian are just ethnic Russian just in those states. It's so that de facto some were de jure(?), some were de facto; all of those speak Russian. To these countries, Russia supplies in large quantities energy supplies at prices which drastically differ from those at the international market, so I would like to ask our colleagues to take into consideration their political and military...and political activities, this fact, and nobody was opposing me and everybody was taking that with an understanding. Q: Hi. You... perhaps I'm a bit confused about what you just said. You said Russia does reserve the right to use preventive military force and you seem to suggest and perhaps you said that you do no reserve the right to use pre-emptive nuclear force, perhaps against it. Is that correct? You do not preserve the right to use pre-emptive nuclear forces, is that what you're saying? Ivanov: In fact, you are right, Charlie. In fact, you are right. Russia still regards nuclear weapons as a means of political deterrence. And in no fashion, in no scenario, there's no mention of a possibility to utilize such weapons and to go first about utilisation thereof. As for the military use, we also do not welcome the preventive use of military force, of conventional, non-nuclear, classic... classic... non-nuclear, conventional military force. We also do not welcome something like that, but in the first place, in actuality, such a phenomenon is in place out in the wider world and we're not going to give it up on a voluntary basis. And on that account, we have unequivocally said when we are going to do that if other means, political, diplomatic, economic, are exhausted, and we have no other option, no other way out, and the lives of our citizens, compatriots are jeopardized, so the civil and civic and human rights of such people are also jeopardized, theoretically we do not rule out something like that. And we tell that in open fashion too. We're not shy about saying that. Q: My name is Tom Squitieri with USA Today. Just a follow-up on that question. As you know the United States has a policy of pre-emptiveness strikes that could include the use of a nuclear weapon. I want to make sure I understood what you just said. Russia's policy is not like the United States' policy, it is different. Ivanov: It is. Q: Okay. Therefore, do you believe it is fair for one nation, in this case the United States, to have such a policy and no other nation in the world to have a similar policy? Ivanov: That's a good question. I would prefer Donald Rumsfeld were in the vicinity so that he could respond to this question, for this is a question addressed exactly to him, not to me. We're openly saying what we think, where we stand on this. We have just explained what Russia is ready for, and naturally enough, we have the nuclear policy that is going to be preserved for all times. We are going to upgrade it and develop, we do not conceal this fact, but we regard the nuclear weapons as a political deterrence means to ward off any aggression on our country and our allies. We do not have a lot of allies, but still we have them. Those are in the first place, they're party signatories to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. That's all there is to it as far as our views of the employment of nuclear weapons is... are concerned. As for the other states, I'm sorry, I'm just responsible for the Russian Federation in terms of defence solely. Q: (inaudible), Russian Television channel. If possible, as for the bilaterals you had, what practical steps have you taken? Probably some exercises have been covered you have agreed to, could you please clarify that, thank you. Ivanov: If we are to talk about the meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld today, in the first place, as I've now said, we started a concrete and practical, pragmatic hands-on elaboration of the instructions which were given to us by the presidents back at Camp David, including as bearing upon the issues of co-operation and interaction in the theatre missile... in the missile defences, in the theatre missile defence and to aircraft defences and bilaterally. Such elaboration, such co-operation is possible and we are engaged in this together with NATO. So we are kind of working on two tracks, both purely a Russian-American track and NATO-Russia track. Both ways, we have concrete plans currently set up for more concrete activities. I can't elaborate on these, I'm sorry, I'm not authorized to do that. Naturally enough, we have covered the issues of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation. This is a very serious problem. This is a real world threat and believe me, on a number of avenues, on a number of routes, it's even more serious for the U.S. rather and for Russia. Take into account the geography, Russia is by the way bordering on 17 states as contrasted to the United States which has only two good, trusted, peaceful... peaceable and quiet neighbours, Canada and Mexico. What we have on the ground is the direct opposite. But as they put in Russia, you do not choose your own relatives and neighbours in your life. [...] Q: ...Fox News Channel. Two-part question for you. First of all, do you believe that Iran is trying to make a nuclear bomb? Ivanov: Well, it's not an issue of belief or confidence or personal attitude. The most important, fundamental, crucial thing about this is that the international community, the family of nations could be persuaded through their legal norms of international law, through the agency or procedures of the IAEA, of these, and could get a final, definitive and unambiguous reply to the question you have put now. As it was... as was previously said on these by our president, we should sent to Iran a respectful but an unambiguous message to the effect that it's in the... in the best interest of Iran itself to adhere to all... to accede to all of the documents as published by the IAEA and probably to the additional protocol as well so that it could be proved what we hear from the Iranian quarters to the effect that they have absolutely no plans to develop any nuclear weapons. Q: On the issue of proliferation, what is Russia's stance on stopping that, even by boarding ships on the high seas? Ivanov: Yeah. I know this pretty well. Russia prefers to proceed from around the agreed concerted action to be taken by the international community, international law rules in the first place within the framework of the UN and possibly, as I previously said, in joint agreements as worked out collectively within a framework of different international institutions, for example within the framework of the G8 countries, industrialized states. [...] Return to Menu 7. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, LORD ROBERTSON AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE WORKING SESSION FOR ALLIED AND INVITEE DEFENCE MINISTERS (excerpted) Q: Good morning. I'm Tom Squitieri with USA Today. Nice to see you again today, sir. My question today is a variation of the one I asked you yesterday. Lord Robertson: Always keen to get variations. It's very boring if they're the same, you know. Q: I had the opportunity to look at what the Russians put out last week regarding the use of nuclear weapons in a first pre-emptive strike and it was lot more clearer than we left it yesterday. My question today, sir, is how can NATO ask the Russians not to have such a policy of pre-emptive strikes with nuclear weapons when the United States, a member of NATO, has such a policy? Lord Robertson: Minister Sergey Ivanov addressed that in the meeting I had with him this morning and I fully expect him to expand on it in the meetings that we have with him this afternoon when he said that that is not correct, that NATO... that Russia does not have and does not seek to have a pre-emptive strategy in relation to its nuclear weapons. So, we'll be discussing that in some detail later on today, but I think there must have been some crossed signals here. And I'd rather hear directly from Minister Ivanov rather than from second-hand reports or even from extremely wise, talented, and usually well-informed journalists. Q: Sorry, sir, but my question was, you know, how can NATO ask Russia or any nation not to have that kind of policy when the United States has that policy? Lord Robertson: Well, we have to... it remains to be seen what the Russians are saying at the present moment. We're not involved in a debate here. We discuss common ground. It's known in Russia as obshei panimanya(?) and we seek to expand that common ground as much as we possibly can. And this afternoon, we will be doing so. [...] Q: Paul Ames from the Associated Press. Secretary General, did defence minister Ivanov explain to your satisfaction the statement... or the document from his ministry last week which spoke about NATO as an offensive and anti-Russian organization? And secondly, could I just make sure that I understood correctly what you said earlier about Bosnia, that it'll be at least another 12 months before the EU takes over that mission. Lord Robertson: Well, I didn't see any report where the Russians actually said that NATO was an offensive and anti-Russian organization. There were reports that said that if NATO developed in a certain way, militarily, and developed in a certain way geographically Russia would have to face up to that fact. But in any event whatever the reports say, Minister Sergey Ivanov came along today with a very bulky English translation of the whole document and we expect him this afternoon to highlight what is in that document. But he himself, this morning, personally said that these reports are not accurate. They don't regard NATO as being an offensive organization. They regard NATO as being a partner to Russia at the present time. And one of the things that we were discussing today was the reciprocity and having military liaison missions in NATO and in Moscow. So it doesn't seem to me to be very accurate for anybody in Russia to be saying that NATO was aggressive or offensive or anti-Russian, when we're actually down to that level of detail in terms of military-to-military co-operation. But you know, we're going to have some substantial time today to discuss these matters, and I think Minister Ivanov is having a press conference later on in the afternoon so you can check my version against his version and then you can write a third version. [...] Return to Menu 8. BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON INFORMAL NATO MINISTERIAL (excerpted) [...] Q*:* Is the Secretary going to meet with Ivanov tomorrow? Senior Defense Official*:* Yes. Q*:* Bilateral. And does he, also, hope for, wish for an explanation of this whole nuclear business? That Putin could, you know, possibly use Russian nukes according to the report that came out � or that Russia might be considering or was leaving open the possibility of using the nukes in a terrorist situation or against terrorist states -- preemptive strike?. * * Senior Defense Official*:* I think one of the aspects of our new relationship and our dialogue with the Russians has been to talk about nuclear issues. We talked about them from the standpoint of our own nuclear capabilities. We�ve talked about them in the conduct of negotiations having to do with the Moscow Treaty. We�ve � I�ve briefed, for example, the Russians on our own nuclear posture. Clearly, I think it is one of the aspects of transparency, if you will, that we encourage not only in areas where we have arms treaties or arms reduction treaties, but writ large. I think the Secretary General said today, there are usually numerous reports and leaks and things that come out on the subject. I am very hopeful that tomorrow in the NATO-Russia Council perhaps, or even in the bilats, we may get Sergei Ivanov�s take on this, which I think will be a useful input. But I wouldn�t characterize it as a major part of the discussion tomorrow. I think more of the discussion will focus on issues having to do with on-going operations and issues having to do with defense reform more broadly in Russia. [...] Q*:* Why would the Russians explain their nuclear posture to you all? And if it is identical or similar to the US nuclear posture, is that ok with you guys? In other words, if they say to you, �Our nuclear posture is the same as what the United States has put out. We will do exactly, our posture, our approach to using nuclear weapons is the same as what the United States has said �� Senior Defense Official*:* I would be very surprised if tomorrow we were to get into any level of details on that subject that I would be even able to answer that question. So I think it�s rather hypothetical� Q*:* It is rather hypothetical, but today we just had a hypothetical working � Senior Defense Official*:* No, no. I�m just saying that that�s going to happen. Q*:* But you said you were going to ask him what his take is on the report. Senior Defense Official*:* No, I said it may come up. Q*:* OK. Senior Defense Official*:* I certainly won�t be in a position to answer the question. But I think one of the things that is a central tenet that came out of our nuclear posture was that Russia was no longer an enemy, and that we were not going to be focusing our capabilities and the retention of nuclear capability -- which we still think are an important part, not only of the US capability, but of the Alliance capability -- that we were not going to be focusing that on Russia. We were going be sizing our forces based on contingencies involving Russia, and that the Cold War focus of trying to deal with that problem through long, rigorous, negotiated arms control treaties that were 50 to 100 pages long is something that is no longer necessary. And you look at that in what both President Bush and President were able to achieve under enormously rapid circumstances with a very short simple treaty that I think demonstrates a degree of trust in the relationship that hasn�t been there before. To bring the deploying forces down to very, very low levels over the next decade. So, those are the kinds of things I think are the benefits of the kinds of conversations we�ve had with the Russians on this subject and we hope gain those benefits in other areas of the relationship. [...] Return to Menu 9. PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY DONALD H. RUMSFELD AND NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL LORD ROBERTSON (excerpted) [...] Q: I'm Tom Squitieri with USA Today. Lord Robertson, last week the Russians announced that they were going to consider a new policy on nuclear weapons: that is, including them for the possible preemptive use for terrorist actions and others. About a year ago the Bush administration announced a similar policy in its nuclear posture review. Are you concerned that this would be a trend evolving, and will this issue be among the discussions tomorrow? SEC.-GEN. ROBERTSON: Well, I have no doubt that when Minister Sergei Ivanov comes tomorrow he'll want to expand on the fairly sketchy details which came out of the meeting that President Putin had with his commanders last week. That is what these NATO-Russia meetings are all about. I spoke to Minister Sergei Ivanov at the end of last week about some of these reports, and he was at pains to tell me that he thought some of the reports bore no relation to what the reality was. So tomorrow will be an excellent opportunity for us to go over some of that and to hear more information and perhaps to exchange things as well. We've reached a remarkable level of trust in our relationship with Russia today, and I think that's good news for the world. [...] Return to Menu C. Links 1. GERMANY SIGNS OFF ON �300M TO CLEAN UP SAYDA BAY Return to Menu 2. MNEPR HEADED FOR DUMA RATIFICATION Return to Menu 3. RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE'S NEW POLICY PAPER: THE NUCLEAR ANGLE Return to Menu 4. Energizing the Relationship Return to Menu 5. THE MONITOR - GUARDING THE CROSSROADS: NONPROLIFERATION IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM Return to Menu 6. The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Challenge Too Narrow Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. 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