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RANSAC Nuclear News, December 5, 2003 Compiled By: Matthew Bouldin A. HEU Purchase Agreement
 A. HEU Purchase Agreement 1. GNSS-Tenex: Situation Aggravates The conflict between Russian JSC Tekhsnabexport (Tenex) and Globe Nuclear Services & Supply (GNSS) has aggravating, Platts agency reports. December 2 some US companies met with the US Department of State officials to express concerns over the conflict affecting natural uranium supplies. In particular, it was said at the meeting that the conflict was "serious" and the USG should press the Russian Government to find the way out. Meanwhile, the US district court postponed till the next week the hearings regarding GNSS claim to issue a preliminary injunction to Tenex's decision terminating the HEU feed deliveries to GNSS. Vladimir Smirnov, Tenex's director general, is reportedly to arrive at Washington DC Dec. 3 while Tenex raised the possibility in a court filing of settlement talks. The GNSS claim proceedings parallel with another case started in the Swedish arbitration court in November. GNSS says it may take up to 18 months. Tenex, as reported, stated on October 31 on inexpediency of further sales to GNSS of natural uranium transferred to the federal ownership of Russia in the US territory under HEU-LEU Deal. The decision basis was the lacking of "compliance of the GNSS contract terms with the interests of the Russian Federation and the legal basis for continuing its implementation". The statement made by Tenex says the natural feed supplies to GNSS will stop starting January 1, 2004. The Russian enrichers have not formally expressed their attitude to the situation. However, Nuclear.Ru has information that the Tenex's decision has evoked serious concerns of the Russian partners of GNSS. This is, primarily, due to uncertain future sales of the material accumulated in the US storages and legally owned by the Russian companies. Besides the natural uranium packages are owned by GNSS and it is still unclear whether Tenex is to compensate for these losses or the enterprises are to bear additional costs. Return to Menu B. Submarine Dismantlement 1. Audit of Minatom reveals millions in misspent cash and lack of control on sub decommission Between the years 2002 and 2003, Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, misappropriated several million dollars in submarine decommissioning funding to cover costs of naval spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and sold off $3.9m of scrap metal from the vessels that, by law, should have been pumped into the federal budget, a report by Russia's highest government auditing agency. The report also said that, in all, Minatom had misspent 118.7m roubles ($4m) and made ineffective financial use of another 117.9m roubles. Today Minatom officials, despite numerous requests for comment from Bellona Web, did not return calls. Earlier, they claimed they were "examining the documents." But in an interview with RBC, a Russia News agency, an anonymous Minatom source said the report�the draft of which was discussed by auditors with Minatom representatives at the Audit Chamber board meeting last month�"was of a routine character." "The Audit Chamber carries out yearly audits and their results reveal a positive dynamic," the Minatom official said. But an Audit Chamber official, who requested anonymity, told Bellona Web, that "It was the first serious checkup of this kind by the Chamber's Inspection for Control over Decommissioning." "Earlier the Chamber's audits focused on other parts of the [Minatom's] activities. Other people worked, and we've never had such documents in the outcome," he added. The Audit Chamber, went so far in its report, which was completed on October 31st, as to say that these incidents had caused the Presidential accounting structure to loose confidence in Minatom's ability to perform proper submarine decommissioning, a major public blow to the Russian nuclear industry's main power-broker and contractor. What the audit revealed As a result of the audit, which was performed from February to August this year, it was revealed that up to 30 percent of federal funds allocated for the purpose of submarine decommissioning is redirected to transportation of the retired subs' and the reprocessing of their spent nuclear fuel�a process that, strictly speaking, is not covered by Russian nuclear submarine decommissioning legislation. It was also revealed that up to 20 percent of federal decommissioning funding is spent on simply maintaining retired submarines�dozens of them still loaded with their nuclear fuel�afloat until they can be dismantled. Most of these subs, which are worn with rust and pocked with leaks, often wait years for that dismantlement. The report�which was not made public, but was obtained by Bellona Web�said another 20 percent of federal decommissioning money is spent by Minatom on safety and security for radioactive sites. All told, the report concluded, a mere 30 percent of Russian federal budget money supplied for sub decommissioning is left after Minatom misappropriates it. The report also identified occasions on which Minatom had spent $2.2m, plus another approximately $2m from the subs scrap metal, on decommissioning a Delta Class ballistic missile submarine. Western donors however�particularly the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, Programme�routinely pay $10m to dismantle ballistic missile submarines in Russia, meaning western funds are being bilked by the Russian side. Lack of sub decommissioning programme The Audit Chamber identified the roots of Minatom's improprieties in non-existent federal decommissioning programmes. Because of this lack of guidelines, Minatom developed its own�something the report said Minatom called "the Concept." Former head of Minatom, Yevgeny Adamov, the Ministry of Defence and other concerned ministries signed the Concept into power on January 30th 2001. The Concept was based on the notion of a so-called "closed" nuclear fuel cycle�in which used fuel is recycled for use in new fuel�for spent nuclear fuel or SNF submarines. The conception necessarily meant that spent fuel would have to be transported to and reprocessed at the Urals Mountain reprocessing facility of Mayak, located more than 2,000 kilometres south of the nearest Northern Fleet submarine base. However, as the report noted, definitions of so-called "comprehensive" submarine decommissioning�which includes care of the submarines from their retirement to their dismantlement�as given by various Russian regulatory acts, including those developed by Minatom itself, do not even include fuel reprocessing. Even Russia's committee for standardisation, Gosstandart does not envision reprocessing in its own suggestion for submarine decommissioning practices. "The principle of implementing the "closed" fuel cycle for SNF treatment predetermined both the existing trasportational and technological scheme of the whole costly mechanism of comprehensive submarine decommissioning," read the report. Because of this process, the report stated, 70 percent of funding allocated to dismantling submarines is spent on vessel storage, transportation, and reprocessing of fuel. "As a result, no more than 30 percent of federal budget funds is spent on the implementation of priority tasks of SNF unloading and the actual dismantlement of submarines," said the report. The report also noted that many of the provisions of the government decree that made Minatom responsible for submarine decommissioning were not being observed. The most serious of these is Minatom's failure to return to the state budget profits it makes on the sale of scrap metal from dismantled nuclear submarines. This money, theoretically, should be infused back into the decommissioning budget. Instead, the report noted, the metal is most often sold through a series of middlemen working with the shipyards where the subs have been dismantled. Adopting a decommissioning plan A governmental decree dated September 15th 2003 obliges Minatom to come up with a sub dismantlement programme draft and deliver it for consideration of the Russian Government by May 1st 2004. The Kremlin has also decided that the Ministry of Economic Development will be Russia's coordinator for submarine decommissioning from then on, with Minatom simply facilitating the work. The report then goes on to explain several definitions of comprehensive submarine decommissioning put forward by various scientific groups and government agencies. After the auditors had examined the definitions, they concluded that "an analysis of definitions of comprehensive nuclear submarine dismantlement and nuclear submarine decommissioning [...] reveals that there is a multitude of vague definitions of comprehensive nuclear submarine decommissioning." The auditors also wrote that "such circumstances where clear and accurate criteria of comprehensive nuclear submarine dismantlement are non-existent lead in certain case to misspending or unfounded spending of budget funds, or to the implementation of work that is not related to submarine decommissioning." Return to Menu 2. Russian Nuclear Submarine Will Be Dismantled The financial and work contracts for the disposal of a Russian Pacific Fleet Victor-3 class nuclear submarine were signed on Friday in Vladivostok. The Maritime Territory administration's press service told RIA Novosti on Friday that the contracts were signed as part of a plan adopted in January 2003 during Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Russia. The project is named "Star of Hope." It calls for submarines, including Victor-3 class, to be dismantled at the Far Eastern Zvezda plant in Bolshoi Kamen. The plant has all necessary production capacities and skilled personnel for dismantling submarines. Since 1989, 22 submarines have been dismantled at the Zvezda plant. After the documents are signed, Japan will finance the project. According to preliminary information, an investment in disposing a Victor-3 class nuclear submarine will make several million dollars. Return to Menu 3. Foreign Donors' Assistance In Russian Nuclear Submarine Utilisation Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov believes that assistance of foreign donor nations in utilising Russian nuclear submarines is quite relevant. "Recently the State Duma has ratified an important agreement on nuclear and ecological security, according to which utilisation should involve means of foreign donors," Kasyanov said when opening a regular government session. "Russia pays due attention to the problem, but assistance of foreign states is quite relevant," he pointed out. According to him, Russia has to utilise about 200 nuclear submarines. At the same time, annually it can utilise only 10-12 submarines. "In the last Soviet and the initial Russian periods the country did not have enough funds to solve the problem, such opportunities have appeared only recently," Kasyanov said. The problem of utilising submarines and nuclear ship reactors was a negative heritage the Russian Federation received from the Soviet Union along with such problems as foreign debts and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister added. Return to Menu 4. RF Government Discussed Steps To Expedite N-Subs Scrapping The realistic date of completion of nuclear submarines and nuclear propelled surface ships� dismantling in Russia is 2010. RIA Novosti reports this as said in Minatom�s documents submitted for the meeting of the Government on November 4, which discussed the issue of the progress in and measures to expedite dismantling of nuclear submarines and nuclear propelled surface ships. It is noted, particularly, that previously it was planned to scrap 20 N-subs and complete this work in 2006. Meanwhile, as of December 1, 2003, 193 N-subs and two nuclear propelled ships have retired from the NAVY. 94 N-subs out of this number have been scrapped with 99 awaiting the operation. The latter include 70 with nuclear fuel on board in their nuclear reactors. NAVY crews serve 73 submarines afloat and the shipyards� personnel keep 26 afloat. The existing industrial infrastructure provides for dismantling of 20-22 submarines a year. The federal budget allocated 1.9 billion rubles for the 2001 dismantling; in 2002 � 2 billion rubles and in 2003 � 1.9 billion rubles. Considering the financing trend it is possible to provide for receipt from the NAVY and dismantling of up to 10 nuclear submarines, and 5 N-subs more adding the international assistance. Minatom preliminary estimates that about US$ 4 billion will be required to finish the comprehensive dismantling and rehabilitation of radiation hazardous facilities. To expedite the N-subs dismantling process the measures are taken to involve the international assistance under the Global Partnership program and other international programs. In 2003 Russia signed intergovernmental and interagency agreements in this field with the Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy. A framework agreement is expected to sign with Canada. According to Minatom, the US has allocated for N-subs disposition in Russia US$ 200 million in the period 1997-2003. By present, 25 N-subs have been scrapped with the US participation. The cash allocated by Japan has assisted in completing construction and commissioning of the US$ 35-million floating complex for liquid radioactive waste reprocessing. Norway annually allocates about US$ 7 million for dismantling of nuclear submarines in Russia. In 2003 it is planned to sell products resulted from the N-sub scrapping for 91 million rubles. Minatom also noted that under the Global Partnership the majority of countries claim larger financial assistance than it is actually provided. For instance, the Great Britain claimed the readiness to allocate US$ 100 million but in 2003 it factually catered US$ 48 million. Germany�s committed US$ 300 million have turned out to be US$ 50 million and Italy�s committed US$ 360 million have never been provided. Canada committed to the assistance as to allocate US$ 200 million with US$ 40 allocated in fact. Norway promised US$ 100 million and provide for US$ 14 million only. The United States announced about its readiness to fund the Global Partnership in the amount of US$ 1 billion, however, has allocated US$ 10 million for the submarines� dismantling. France committed US$ 750 million and allocated US$ 20 million out of that amount; the European Union provided US$ 40 million out of US$ 1 billion, and Japan � US$ 5 million out of US$ 100 committed. Return to Menu C. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Russian to Review WMD Elimination Prgrms Based on Foreign Aid Russia is planning to revise all of its programs of elimination of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) involving foreign aid, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Oleg Chernov, said on the eve of the Council's Wednesday session. Its participants, chaired by President Vladimir Putin, are expected to discuss the maintenance of national security in the field of nonproliferation. "More often than not, aid [for destroying the WMD's arsenals] is just a lever of pressure on this country," Chernov said. He said Russia could not do long-term planning of the construction of facilities for destroying its nuclear or chemical weapons as the U.S. was annually revising its aid programs and tying them up to the some or other political motives. "In the final run, it affects the efficiency of implementation of our programs," Chernov indicated. He also said Russia would insist that the U.S. drop sanctions against some Russian companies. "We believe those sanctions to be based on political motives," Chernov said. Inspection of a number of companies, including the ones that had fallen under the U.S. sanctions, was over a few days ago, and a special inspecting commission would make its conclusions public at a later date, Chernov said. "Proposals will be made on how to improve the performance of some research and production centers," he said. At this moment, eight of the twelve companies the U.S. accused of cooperation with Iran are working in the conditions of sanctions. They are the Moscow Aviation College, the Baltic State University of Technology in St Petersburg, the aerospace company Glavkosmos, the Moscow-based research institute Grafit, the Dmitry Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, and nuclear research centers in Moscow, Snezhinsk, and Sarov. The U.S. Administration lifted sanctions from another four companies - Polus, Inor, Yevropalas-2000, and the now defunct company MOSO - in 2000 and 2001. Return to Menu D. G-8 Global Partnership 1. Russia and Japan prepare MOX-fuel testing contract November 26-28 in Tokyo Russia and Japan held 5-th consultations on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Valeri BEZZUBTSEV, the head of Minatom�s department for atomic energy, who led the Russian delegation commented the consultations results for Nuclear.Ru. V. Bezzubtsev: These were the fifth consultations, which have been underway for about a decade. This time the consultations were held in Japan�s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian side was represented by Minatom of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Rusia, Rosenergoatom Concern and Tekhsnabexport. Since Russia and Japan do not have a full-scale intergovernmental agreement in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which would cover all areas of our cooperation, all this time we have been seeking for approaches to those cooperation areas, which are of interest for Russia and Japan. Among them, those of the primary importance are the strategic activities in nuclear power development. This relates to fast neutron reactor technologies and closed nuclear cycle. These areas are built-in into both our strategy and the Japanese nuclear power future development program. The second strategic area, which was also discussed during the consultations, is the international ITER project. Recently the EC has approved the common European site in Cadarache. Now the two sites � one in Japan and another in France � will be discussed and competing. A decision on that issue is to be made in Vienna on December 4 or 5 by all the project participants. Another area of cooperation is the dismantling of Russian nuclear submarines retired from the Russian NAVY. Here we have achieved a certain progress as regards the joint work on the Landysh project, which deals with the liquid radioactive waste processing facility. By now the Russian side prepared new proposals. They were discussed in January with the Japanese side; and there is the joint decision to implement the next project: dismantling of one strategic nuclear submarine using the funds being provided by Japan in the frames of the Global Partnership. The forth issue is the disposition of excess weapons plutonium under the Russia-US agreement of 2000 under which both sides committed to burn 34 tons of weapons plutonium each in their reactors. Our joint project with the Japanese colleagues is targeted to the use BN-600 fast neutron reactor to eliminate a part of the weapons plutonium and use to this end the fuel fabrication technology, which has been developing by NIIAR Institute for many years � so-called vibropacked fuel fabrication technology. The Japanese colleagues are interested in applying this technology to their advanced fast neutron reactors. We have been working jointly on this problem for long. To get the license for the use in BN-600 of the plutonium disposition program resulted fuel we would have to carry out preliminary full-scale tests of this fuel. This is an important joint effort of our experts. Besides, during the consultations we discussed a number of other issues of political nature: DPRK, Iran. We did not produce a record of the consultations just like on previous occasions, but we agreed that next time we would generate the negotiations� record. Nuclear.Ru: In other words, you only discuss but not make decisions at these meetings? V. Bezzubtsev: Yes, we do but don�t. We discuss positions of each side on this or other issue. We are proceeding from the fact that to launch the wide-scale work in all cooperative areas we need the intergovernmental agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. So far, Japanese have been pursuing another approach: there are cooperative areas and we will carry out certain activities in them and when we approach a serious, wide level of interaction we would conclude the agreement. However, the problem is that under such approach we cannot carry out the wide-scale research in this or other area. We can hold some kind of consultations, seminars, and discussions in frames of, say, research. But the full-scale agreement would set the legal and other bases for more effective science and technology and economic cooperation in nuclear field. Nuclear.Ru: That means the lacking of the agreement hinders the cooperation development? V. Bezzubtsev: Undoubtedly. Both sides are interested in such cooperation. Nuclear.Ru: What the Japanese side is interested in most of all? V. Bezzubtsev: The fast neutron sodium-cooled reactors, vibropacked fuel technologies and technologies for processing the irradiated nuclear fuel, i.e. the technologies, which are actively being developed by NIIAR, IPPE, OKBM, the Radium Institute. Nuclear.Ru: Is the Japanese side ready to finance some of the new projects? Did you discuss this issue? V. Bezzubtsev: The consultations were mainly of political nature rather than commercial. However, afterwards we had meetings with the Japan�s nuclear forum, the science department of the Japanese ministry for science, technology, education and culture as well as with the Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC). We have common strategic approaches but it is not the matter of any serious contacts yet. But we hope, shortly we will conclude the contract for testing of about 21 NIIAR-produced vibropacked MOX-fuel assemblies in BN-600 reactor. Nuclear.Ru: Is Japan to fund the work? V. Bezzubtsev: All technical aspects on the side of NIIAR, OKBM, IPPE and Beloyarsk nuclear power plant were agreed upon with the Japanese side, but the financing issue is still open. In the frames of G8 Japan has allocated US$ 200 million which include US$ 100 million designated for the disposition of the Russian excess weapons plutonium. The Russian position is that we will not start the plutonium disposition process under the agreement with the US until the Western partners find the resources necessary to meet this challenge. This is about US$ 2 billion. By now the G8 has raised about US$ 800 million. Therefore, if Japan now starts using its US$ 100 million to study into the vibropacked fuel, this fact would confirm that Russia has already started the Russian weapons plutonium disposition. This means that the US$ 100 million must wait in the G8 common piggybank, while we would do the joint work using other funds to be raised by Japan. Nuclear.Ru: Did the consultations discuss the possibility of importation of the Japanese irradiated nuclear fuel to Russia for storage and processing? V. Bezzubtsev: We inquired as to whether Japan was prepared to start discussions of this issue? The Japanese delegation�s response was that they were planning to store and eventually process the fuel in their territory. In other words, this is the official opinion of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, one could not exclude the issue being discussed at the level of experts and utilities, still it is not the official position of Japan. Return to Menu 2. Russian and FRG Foreign Ministerial Groups to Participate in Founding Session of Bilateral High-Level Security Group Foreign ministers Igor Ivanov of Russia and Joschka Fischer of Germany will participate in the founding session of the Russian-German high-level security working group, set up at the decision of the Russian president and the FRG chancellor. Alexander Yakovenko, official spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, said this in a RIA Novosti interview on Friday. "Work of the interdepartmental group targets mostly the preparation of long-term recommendations for the leaderships of the two countries", said Alexander Yakovenko. The group will focus on strategic stability and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the struggle against international terrorism, efforts against drug trafficking, the settlement of regional crises. As regards the December 10-11 visit of the Russian foreign minister to Germany, Alexander Yakovenko noted that it is held within agreement on Russian-German interstate consultations in Yekaterinburg on October 2003. "The upcoming negotiations will focus on the discussion of an outlook for further interaction between the two countries in the key international problems, thorough analysis of the realisation of agreements reached at the Yekaterinburg summit and the two leaders' instructions on specific directions of bilateral cooperation", he said. During the visit, Igor Ivanov is going to meet with FRG Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Igor Ivanov will also appear before a representative audience - the German socio-political and business circles - with an analysis of the state and prospects of Russia-European Union partnership. Return to Menu E. Russian Nonproliferation Diplomacy 1. Putin Criticizes Russian Nonproliferation Approaches Russian President Vladimir Putin Wednesday criticized Russian nonproliferation policies, saying Russia lacked a �coherent system� to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 3). In an opening address to a meeting of the Russian Security Council convened to discuss nonproliferation issues, Putin said the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially to terrorists, remained �the chief global threat of the 21st century.� He noted Russia�s long borders and vast stockpiles of Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction, saying that nonproliferation remained a �top priority� issue. Even so, Putin criticized Russian nonproliferation efforts, singling out Russia�s export control system and its lack of trained nonproliferation specialists. �Elements of that [nonproliferation] work, such as, for example, export control[s], thus far, unfortunately give no right to speak of a coherent system,� he said. U.S. concerns with Russian export policies stretch back to the mid-1990s, when the United States first detected �serious problems� concerning Iranian entities obtaining first missile-related, then nuclear-related technologies, a U.S. State Department official told Global Security Newswire today. From 1998-1999, the United States sanctioned 10 Russian entities for alleged illegal transfers, with eight still under penalty, the official said. Last month, the CIA released an unclassified semiannual report of the WMD capabilities of countries of concern that listed Russia among supplier countries. The report warned that the economic situation in Russia has led Russian companies and research institutions to becoming increasingly interested in transferring WMD-related goods and expertise. According to the CIA, Russian entities have transferred nuclear- and missile-related technologies to several countries, such as Iran and India, and have remained a source for countries interested in developing chemical and biological weapons programs (see GSN, Nov. 11). �Russia is a target-rich environment for proliferators of all kinds,� the State Department official said. While praising the efforts Russia has made over the past several years in enacting and strengthening its export control regulatory system, the CIA assessment said that enforcement �remained a serious concern.� �Top officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting entities � as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them � that nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law will be prosecuted,� the CIA report said. The State Department official also said that Russia�s written export control regulations are �pretty good,� but concerns still remain regarding their enforcement and the priority Moscow places on them. The United States is continuing to work with Russia to crack down on illegal transfers by Russian entities, to help improve Russian export licensing and to pressure Moscow to end potentially illegal transfers to countries of concern, the official said. In his remarks to the Russian Security Council, Putin called for reprioritizing nonproliferation in national security policy and for an �in-depth and systematic analysis� of nonproliferation activities by Russian agencies. �We must expressly define the role of each department, eliminate the duplication of their functions and enhance control over the quality of their work,� he said. In addition, Putin also called for greater coordination of nonproliferation policies, including export control regulations, among all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The CIS consists of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Putin warned against using promises of implementing nonproliferation policies as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other countries. �Any attempts to use this theme as an instrument of momentary political or economic gain � should meet with resistance and an appropriate response on our part,� he said. Instead, Russia should view nonproliferation as being in its own interest, according to Putin. �I shall once again stress that competent and effective policies in the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction spell the security of our state as a whole and our citizens, promote international stability and enhance Russia�s prestige in the world,� he said. Return to Menu 2. Non-Proliferation of WMD Concerns Whole Country, not only its Foreign Policy The questions of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) concern the whole country but not only its foreign policy, vice-secretary of the Russian Federation's Security Council Oleg Chernov told journalists. He held a briefing in the run-up to the meeting of Russia's Security Council, scheduled for Wednesday, on the theme On Ensuring the Russian Federation's National Security in the Sphere of Non-Proliferation of WMD and Their Delivery Means. Chernov explained that a lot of enterprises of diverse forms of ownership have appeared in Russia, in particular, in the chemical industry, which boast up-to-date technologies and substances, which can be used in making WMD. "It is important that control (of these enterprises) on the part of the state be based on law, so that there would not be, on the one hand, any suppression, hampering of development, and, on the other hand, there would be absolutely effective accounting and control, especially in the light of consequences which may occur if terrorists get certain materials," the vice-secretary of Russia's Security Council stated. The theme of non-proliferation of WMD is important as a factor for development of the country's economy, since up-to-date technologies are interconnected with the non-proliferation problems, Chernov recalled. According to him, "Russia is being artificially labeled as a proliferant (spreader) of technologies, and efforts are made to slow down its emergence on foreign markets." The vice-secretary of Russia's Security Council assessed the use of the non-proliferation problems for time-serving purposes as "unsound competition." Return to Menu 3. Russia Calling for Upgrading Nonproliferation Regimes Strengthening of national security in the field of nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles will come into focus at a session of Russia's Security Council Wednesday. Council members will meet in the Kremlin under the guidance of President Vladimir Putin. The Council's Deputy Secretary, Oleg Chernov, said the session would discuss the degree to which the Russian laws, organization of operations, relations with other countries, and international controls over nonproliferation met the interests of national security. Major reports will be made by Deputy Prime Minister Boris Alyoshin and the chairman of the Commission for Chemical Disarmament, Sergei Kiriyenko, who is also President Putin's plenipotentiary representative in the Volga federal district. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov will make co-reports. Russia calls for setting up a global system of control over the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies, Chernov said. "The existing nonproliferation regimes and international treaties are far from universal, since far from all countries have signed them," he indicated. "We stand in need of new and more efficient ways of strengthening those regimes". The Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation is the basic document in that area - it has been signed by all countries with the exception of India, Pakistan, Israel, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chernov recalled. Russia insists, in the meantime, that the Treaty on Nuclear Tests Ban, which the U.S. has been reluctant to ratify so far, also become a basic international document in nonproliferation, he said. "Russia cannot ignore the appearance of the WMDs along the perimeter of its borders, and it's essential that we pool efforts with other countries of the CIS in designing model approaches to the controls over exports, unifying laws, and curbing the transits of sensitive materials," Chernov said. Return to Menu 4. Russian Deputy Security Council Secretary: Russia is not Indifferent to Appearance of WMD Near its Borders Russia is not indifferent to the appearance of mass destruction weapons near its borders, deputy secretary of the Russian security council Oleg Chernov told journalists at a briefing held shortly before the council's session scheduled for Wednesday. It will spotlight the issue of ensuring national security in the sphere of the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery means. "A number of countries," Oleg Chernov said, "continue using nuclear weapons as a deterrence means. After the Iraqi events several states, in particular North Korea, declared practical measures they will take in this respect." "In this connection, Russia is not indifferent to the appearance of the mass destruction weapons along the perimeter of its borders," he stressed. Chernov focused attention on the need to find joint approaches with the CIS countries to the solution of this problem, on condition of the transparency of their borders. "The export control model laws should be worked out in order to unify and harmonize our normative basis," Chernov emphasized. When trade barriers are removed within the CIS attention should be paid to cutting short the transit of dangerous materials, he pointed out. Return to Menu 5. Russian Government Will Develop Security Program To Combat WMD Proliferation, Vice Premier Says In mid-2004, the Russian government is to work out a proliferation security program to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and delivery vehicles, Vice Premier Boris Alyoshin told the media after a National Security Council session Wednesday. According to Alyoshin, the prospective program will be based upon the concept of national security, and will incorporate everything that has been elaborated on the topic by now. "It will include all issues having to do with non-proliferation and with resistance to interior and exterior threats, as well as issues related to the state control over [WMD production] technologies," specified the Vice Premier. Return to Menu 6. Russian Security Council to Discuss Strengthening Non-Proliferation of WMD Systems Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction systems should be strengthened, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Oleg Chernov told reporters on Tuesday evening. On Wednesday, the session of Russian Security Council will be devoted to ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. "Not all countries participate in international non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction treaties," Chernov said. "The implementation of these treaties depends on the political situation of the state. It is necessary to constantly strengthen these [non-proliferation] systems." According to Chernov, in the past few years, control over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery has deteriorated. Globalization and intensification of international terrorism are making the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the main threat of the 21st century. "The problems of control in the non-proliferation sphere are increased by the fact that in today's conditions even non-government entities and groups of people can create weapons of mass destruction," Chernov said. Oleg Chernov said that at its session, the Russian Security Council would consider the influence of international control over the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the activity of some countries in this sphere on Russia's security. Return to Menu F. Russia-Iran 1. Russia Insists on Lifting US Sanctions for Aiding Iran Nuclear Program Russia will insist on sanctions being lifted against several Russian universities and research centers imposed by the U.S. in connection with their alleged cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Oleg Chernov said, ITAR-TASS reported Wednesday. Chernov said that eight of the 12 institutes accused by the U.S. of nuclear assistance to Iran remain subject to sanctions. They are the Moscow Aviation Institute, St. Petersburg-based Baltic State Technical University, Mendeleyev's Russian University of Chemical Technology, Glavkosmos and Grafit research institutes as well as three more research centers in Moscow, Snezhinsk and Sarov. Chernov said Russia also plans to review all its programs of scrapping weapons of mass destruction, which envisage financial support from foreign countries because quite often foreign assistance turns out to be nothing more than a way to influence our country Return to Menu G. Russia-North Korea 1. Russia opposes including bilateral problems into six-party talks A top Russian official said Wednesday that Moscow is against the attempts to drag out talks on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s nuclear issue by including matters of purely bilateral interest in the agenda ofthe negotiations. Including individual questions on the agenda will hinder the guarantee for a nuclear-free status on the Korean peninsula and for the security of the countries in the region, Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said in a statement published on theministry's website on Wednesday. "In this respect, we understand the concern of our American partners," he said. Earlier, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said that attempts to put off the six-party talks because one or several sides want to raise vital questions at the discussions should be rejected. Bolton's statement followed Pyongyang's demand that Tokyo be prevented from participating in the talks. Japan has accused the DPRK of abducting its nationals in the 1970-1980s and hopes to discuss the matter at the upcoming meeting. The DPRK said Japan has no reason to link the issue with its nuclear program and accused Japan of the abduction and forced conscription of several million Koreans during its colonial rule of the Korean peninsula in 1910-1945. Yakovenko said Russia "favors continuity and priority of the six-sided talks on DPRK's nuclear problem," adding that a nuclear-free status for the peninsula and security guarantees to countriesin the region "would create a favorable atmosphere for resolving bilateral problems." Return to Menu H. Russia-China 1. Russia ready to build more reactors in China Russia has every chance to continue construction of new reactors in China, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told journalists commenting on China's desire to broaden construction of its reactors. According to Rumyantsev, Atomstroyexport has held a presentation of its possibilities to construct reactors in China recently. Currently the ministry is working on a project of a new reactor BBER-1500, which will be more competitive on the western market. The minister stressed that the continuation of activities on the Chinese market would depend on successive accomplishment of construction of the Tianwan nuclear power plant in China. Russia is constructing two reactors in China, one in Iran and two in India currently. Return to Menu 2. Russia to continue building nuclear power plants in china? Russia stands a good chance of continuing the construction of new nuclear power units in China, Russian Minister for the Nuclear Power Industry Alexander Rumyantsev said to journalists on Friday. It was his comment to Beijing's declaration of intent to open a tender for the building of nuclear power plants. "We hope we'll start up in due time the first and second units of the Tianwan facility and then go on", Rumyantsev explained. Russia has recently presented its reactors in China, he said. They were different VVER /water-moderated/ reactors of 640 to 1,500 megawatts. "The presentation marked our yet unfinished development, a new VVER reactor of 1,500 megawatts", he said. According to media reports, earlier China said that invitations to the tender would be sent to American, French and Russian companies before the end of December. Return to Menu I. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Russia Tests New Role for Cold War Nukes Russia moved closer to obtaining its cheapest rocket yet for commercial satellites after successfully testing on Friday a converted nuclear missile that was decommissioned to meet disarmament treaties. A Strela (Arrow) modification of a Soviet RS-18 Stiletto missile roared into space from an underground silo at Russia's Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, said spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Igor Zatula. The Stiletto was designed to carry six individually guided nuclear warheads, enough to destroy several Western cities, but may now end up providing satellites for phone networks and television broadcasters in countries it once targeted. Russia has to dismantle all its ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads in order to meet the terms of the 1993 START-2 strategic arms accord with the United States. It already launches Proton and Progress rockets from Baikonur, which are both modifications of nuclear rockets, but Russia's military has said decommissioned Stilettos may become the world's cheapest boosters. "This is the first test launch of this missile, also known by NATO's classification as SS-19 'Stiletto'," Zatula said. "This booster may be used to launch satellites into space." Zatula said Strela had delivered a dummy satellite into low orbit, 120-160 km (75-100 miles) above the Earth. He declined to give the weight of the payload and said several more test launches were needed before commercial use could start. Zatula said that apart from testing Strela's ability to launch satellites, Russia's defense ministry had also successfully checked the reliability and safety of the formidable missile, in service since the 1970s. Return to Menu 2. Test Launch of Stiletto Missile Made A test launch of the RS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-19 Stiletto according to the western classification) with a payload mock-up was successfully made from Russian cosmodrome Baikonur (Kazakhstan) in the morning on Friday. The missile stood on combat duty at a formation of the Strategic Missile Forces for more than 25 years. It was launched from a silo launcher in the Defense Ministry's interests. The tasks of the launch include confirmation of the missile's tactico-technical characteristics, including the degree of reliability of the missile complex itself provided its service life is extended, RIA Novosti was told in the press service of the Space Forces of the Russian Federation. According to the data obtained at the command point, the Space Forces are continuously exercising control over all the stages of the missile's flight through the systems of warning of a missile attack and space control, as well as through the ground-based command-measuring complex. Assessing the results of the launch, commander of the Space Forces Colonel-General Anatoly Perminov noted the good training of the combat duties of the test directorate of Baikonur cosmodrome, displayed during the preparation and accomplishment of the task set. The first Stiletto was phased in 1975, and its subsequent version with improved tactico-technical characteristics - in 1980. The two-stage missile's start mass is 105 tons, length - 24 meters, and diameter - 2.5 meters. Return to Menu 3. Russian Ballistic Missile Submarine Completes Test The Russian ballistic missile submarine Dmitriy Donskoi has recently completed a six-day trial off northern Russia, ITAR-Tass reported today (see GSN, Aug. 7). The submarine is now set to undergo further work at the Sevmash naval yard and is expected to enter into service next year (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring, Dec. 2). Return to Menu J. Russian Nuclear Industry 1. Russia Has Unique Nuclear Reactors Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev believes that the most promising nuclear technology is fast neutron reactors. At present Russia has such unique reactors that have no analogs in the world, Rumyantsev announced on Friday, when speaking at the Scientific and Technical Council devoted to the 100th anniversary since the birth of outstanding nuclear physicist Alexander Leipunsky, who founded a scientific branch developing fast neutron reactors. The minister described the work in the sphere as "a unique trend that will be the basis of the power industry in the middle of the 21st century." Return to Menu 2. Russia trying to keep its uranium quota in Europe The upcoming enlargement of the European Union forces Russia to seek preservation of its 25-percent quota to sell enriched uranium on the European market, an official said on Friday. "In this situation, the Atomic Energy Ministry is aiming at preserving its market niche, not at increasing its quota for delivering these materials to European countries," State Secretary, Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valery Govorukhin told reporters. At present, Russia supplies enriched uranium and fuel for nuclear power plants built under Soviet projects in countries of the former Soviet bloc, and has a quota of 25 percent for annual deliveries of enriched uranium to other European states," Govorukhin said. There have been proposals in the European Union recently to revise the Russian quota after EU enlargement, he noted, although the negotiations had been slow with "nobody making sharp moves." Answering an Itar-Tass question, Govorukhin said Russia presently delivers to the European market 150 million dollars worth of enriched uranium. He estimated the value of Russia's total annual exports of nuclear technologies and materials to all countries at three billion dollars. It includes deliveries of fresh nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants, the construction of new nuclear plants in a number of countries and supplies of enriched uranium for the production of nuclear fuel, Govorukhin said. Return to Menu 3. Minatom To Increase Annual Uranium Output Up To 5,000-6,000 Tons By 2020 Minatom of Russia intends to increase the uranium mining up to 5,000-6,000 tons annually by 2020 through exploring new deposits. This was said to Nuclear.Ru by the State Secretary � RF Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Valeri Govorukhin when he commented on the issue of cooperation with the CIS countries in the field of uranium mining and fabrication of fuel. The issue was discussed at the Minatom�s Council meeting on November 3-rd. �Today we feel sufficiently fine, however, we understand that we need to care of the future feed for nuclear power�, Govorukhin said. This is due to the fact that Russia�s nuclear power strategy plans for 2.1-time increase in nuclear electricity production by 2020. Presently, the world mines about 35,000 of uranium with the nuclear power annual need of 67,000-68,000 tons. The gap is filled majorly with the stored inventory. In Russia, where the annual mining output is 3,200 tons the need is about 10,000 tons (considering national consumption and export supplies). Russia exports about 800-900 tons from Ukraine with the rest being covered by the stored inventory. As Govorukhin noted, the excess stored inventory would be consumed if it were not replenished. Therefore, Minatom plans to increase the mining output up to 5,000-6,000 by 2020 using new deposits and to export nearly the same amount from the CIS countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The Deputy Minister also noted that Russia was still starting to develop the uranium mining cooperation with the CIS countries. In this regard, next year the mining will start at the recently set up joint venture � Kazakhstan-Russia-Kyrgyz enterprise Zarechnoye � which intends to mine annually up to 500 tons of uranium with the expansion possibilities of up to 1,000 tons. Govorukhin said, however, the potential still remained for Kazakhstan had vast uranium deposits: some data indicate about 500,000 tons, other � over 1 million tons. �The Joint Venture Zarechnoye is the first step. We can move this way further and further to supply ourselves with the feed for the next fifty years or even one hundred years until the new generation of reactors and fuel cycles comes into view�, the Deputy Minister stressed. The Council also noted that the geological survey should be pursued in parallel with the uranium mining cooperation with the CIS countries. According to the experts� estimates, the Priargunsky Production and Mining and Chemical Association (PPMCA) deposits would last for 15-20 years, however, it would be uneconomical to build-up output there in excess of 3,000 a year, Govorukhin said. As regards the Streltsovsky Ore Field, this deposit �has been examined thoroughly, however, its periphery has not been surveyed well enough�. According to Govorukhin, for many years Russia has been surveying uranium focusing on setting exact boundaries and refining estimates regarding the known stocks rather than finding new deposits. Meanwhile, there is a number of promising locations in Siberia and Kola Peninsula but they require in-depth surveys, which, in turn, need finance. �The Ministry of Natural Resources allocates US$ 7 billion for geologic surveys and only US$ 200 million are spent for uranium surveys�, Govorukhin noted adding that this amount had to be, at least, doubled. He says the geologic surveys to find new deposits must be funded both from the budget and proceeds of the companies pertaining to TVEL Corporation, which is interested in a sound feed basis. Geologists do not rule out the fact that �rich� uranium ores can exist in the Russia�s territory, the ones similar in quality to Canadian deposits with the amount of stock there being rather imposing. Return to Menu K. Official Statements 1. Interview with Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov Published in Moskovsky Komsomolets Newspaper under the Title "During These Past Years We Have Not Seen Our Relations with Any Country Grow Worse", December 5, 2003 (excerpted) [�] Question: Are there signs that America is ready to renounce a unilateralist foreign policy? Answer: I think complicated internal confrontation continues in Washington between those who favor a unilateral foreign policy and those who understand that in the present world even such a state as the US which can afford to spend more than 400 billion dollars a year on military purposes, is unable to solve single-handed the problems that arise. We have seen this in Iraq. It is the most vivid example. I think that the advocates of unilateral actions adhere to the Cold War philosophy. As a result of that policy, the US has made even its relations with its closest allies more complicated. Eventually Washington should understand that pursuing such a policy does not meet its own interests. It is, of course, a complicated process. But through a frank dialogue we should bring it home to Washington that the policy of multilateral mechanisms in no way infringes upon the interests of the US. There is no anti-Americanism involved. Question: Has the US drawn lessons from the war in Iraq, in your opinion? Answer: I think that the latest decision of the US administration to speed up the transfer of power to the representatives of the Iraqi people speaks for itself. But unfortunately this idea is sinking in slowly. The more the process of settlement drags out, the more difficult will it be to solve this problem. If the existing situation in Iraq continues, the country may become a hotbed of international terrorism, like Afghanistan in its time. Then all of us will have more difficulty eradicating that evil. So, we are interested in solving the situation together. But first there must be a reciprocal understanding on the part of America. I am sure that not only Russia but other countries could be prepared to take a more active part in the settlement if they received clear signals from Washington. Question: How serious are the calls of some American senators to exclude Russia from the G-8? Answer: This is not the first time such initiatives have been voiced. I find it hard to characterize the people who launch such initiatives. One has a feeling that they are totally out of touch with reality. One shouldn't rule out such initiatives in the future. Society has many faces and many different people. But I think that things will never move beyond the propaganda phase. Question: My own experience of foreign trips recently shows that the YUKOS case cited by the senators has dealt a crushing blow to Russia's international image. How will you go about solving that problem? Answer: I was appointed Minister precisely at the time when the Bank of New York scandal broke out. I too had to explain then that one had to look into the situation carefully before drawing conclusions. I am not familiar with the materials of the investigation into the "YUKOS affair", but I can repeat what I said then. Some representatives in Russia and abroad have hastened to present Khodorkovsky's arrest as a political action. But I think it would be more correct to wait until corresponding documents and the results of the investigation are revealed and only then draw the conclusions. Of course, it's important that the investigation should be as transparent as possible. Then everybody will be able to objectively assess the charges presented by the investigation. Only total openness in this process can bring the true picture to the public opinion here in our country and in the West. [�] Question: How would you assess the foreign policy balance during the Putin presidency? Answer: It is quite obvious that Russia's positions in the world have greatly strengthened. Russia has addressed a number of acute issues. We have managed by taking an unorthodox decision of creating the Russia-NATO Council, to leave the issue of NATO expansion behind us. Having said that, we still think that it doesn't meet the interests of European security. During these past years we haven't seen our relations with any country grow worse. On the contrary, we have substantially improved our relations with many states, for example in Eastern Europe. Another important factor is that we have managed to enlist the support of all the internal political forces in the country for the President's foreign policy. There is some criticism, of course , but there is support for the main guidelines. We have seen at various stages in history that foreign policy solved not only external tasks, but was a stabilizing factor inside the country. I think this is the situation today. If you ask me as a Minister with what areas I feel least satisfied, I would name the CIS. Question: And what is the main threat to Russian security? Answer: For most democratic states the threats today are universal: they are terrorism, the danger of the spread of mass destruction weapons, it falling into the hands of terrorists, various forms of extremism, separatism, organized crime and drug trafficking. All these are transborder problems and they have to be fought by common efforts, together. Return to Menu 2. Final communiqu� - Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council [...] 18. The NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO member states and Russia work together as equal partners in areas of common interest, continues to make valuable contributions to security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our political dialogue has developed on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the Balkans. Our practical cooperation has reached a new level, including in military-to-military projects; and, through our focus on improving interoperability, we have also laid the groundwork for future military cooperation , including potentially in joint peacekeeping operations . We welcome progress made on nuclear confidence building measures, and on the safe management of nuclear and radiological material. We look forward to approval of an ambitious Work Programme for 2004. We are committed to building on this progress, and to further enhancing the NATO-Russia relationship. [...] 21. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, including preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We stress the importance of abiding by, fully implementing and strengthening existing international arms control and disarmament accords and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes. Early admission of all invitees into all appropriate existing non-proliferation regimes could play a positive role in that regard. In particular, we underline our commitment to reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pre-eminent non-proliferation and disarmament mechanism, and ensuring the full compliance with it by all states party to the Treaty. We will also strengthen our common efforts to safeguard nuclear and radiological material. 22. The Alliance supports the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative to establish a more co-ordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council. [...] Return to Menu 3. Opening Address at a Meeting of the Security Council Good afternoon, colleagues, On our agenda today is the issue of ensuring national security in the sphere of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. I expect that the significance of this issue is clear for everyone. Along with international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the main threat to peace in the 21st century. And the situation is particular dangerous in which weapons of mass destruction can be available to terrorists. I would like to single out two main problem areas connected with possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The first concerns the international legal base of regulation. The existing international agreements in this area, unfortunately, do not set norms that are obligatory for all nations to observe, and do not contain mechanisms which adequately guarantee security for individual countries and the world as a whole. These agreements cannot be called universal, and the measures taken are not adequate for the degree of modern threats. The second thing I would like to note is that, as deplorable as this may be, now a significant number of countries have the technological capabilities of creating weapons of mass destruction. And we must also take this into consideration. On the whole, it must be admitted that the international community does not yet have a truly effective and all-embracing algorithm for solving this global problem. And so more effective measures of international control over the situation are required. Measures which should exclude the very possibility of unsanctioned use of weapons of mass destructions for both terrorists and individual nations. At the same time, I stress that all our actions in this sphere should be organized in a very balanced, consistent and careful way. But any attempts to use this subject as a tool of political or economic influence should of course be met with resistance and an appropriate reaction on our part. For the Russian Federation itself with its extensive borders and weapons potential that was built up in the past, overcoming the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a priority task. Individual elements of this work, such as export control, while they are important, unfortunately do not yet allow us to speak of a complete system. There is no unity in the interpretation of the very term of non-proliferation. To change the situation, we must move away from stereotypes, and above all, once more determine the priorities in the existing conceptual documents. Above all, in the Conception of National Security. Secondly, a profound and systematic analysis is required of all of our state activity on non-proliferation, including existing programmes in this area. And thirdly, there is a demand for clearer coordination of the activity of state bodies in this sphere. We must clearly determine the role of every department, ensure their functions do not repeat themselves, and increase control over the quality of their work. At the same time, we should also think about the system for re-training specialists working on this problem, and strengthen the personnel of the according departments. Coordinating the policies of non-proliferation in the CIS should also be given closer attention. And this does not just concern unified forms of export control, but also of model legislation in united approaches of CIS member countries to the problem of non-proliferation. Respected colleagues, Russia does not just consistently fulfil its international obligations in the sphere of non-proliferation, it is also prepared to develop this international cooperation further. Our country is one of the key participants in the non-proliferation process, and of course it will keep this role in future. In connection with this, we will promote the according initiatives in this sphere more persistently, including the initiative declared at the Millennium summit at the UN in 2000. In conclusion I will stress once more: competent and effective policies in the sphere of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions means the safety of our nation as a whole and of our citizens, and ensure international stability and increase the authority of Russia in the world. Return to Menu 4. Presdient Vladimir V. Putin Speaking at a Security Council meeting, December 03, 2003 Speaking at a Security Council meeting, President Vladimir Putin called international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the main threats to the world. Combating the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of Russia�s priorities. The President admitted, however, that Russia does not yet have a comprehensive system for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because of problems with export controls and questions regarding how exactly to define the term non-proliferation. Mr Putin called for a deep and systemic analysis of the state�s activities and the existing programmes in this area and said there is a need for better coordination between the agencies dealing with these questions. The President emphasised that a competent and effective non-proliferation policy will ensure people�s security, contribute to international stability and strengthen Russia�s authority in the world. Return to Menu 5. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Yuri Fedotov Converses with IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei On December 2 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov met in Vienna with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei. In the course of the meeting the most important questions of cooperation by Russia with the IAEA were discussed. There was reaffirmed on the Russian side consistent support for the Agency in carrying out its activities to help the observance of the existing international agreements in the fields of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Fedotov noted that the "disarmament dossier" of Iraq could not be considered closed until the requirements of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions were met. ElBaradei shared this point of view and emphasized the readiness of the IAEA to fulfill its mandate in this field. The approaches of Russia and the Agency also coincide as regards the solution of the questions linked to the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK. Agreement was reached that the IAEA Director General would make a visit to Russia in summer 2004. Return to Menu 6. Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture (excerpted) [�] I can report that the United States has made progress toward transformation during the Bush Administration. First, we�ve transformed our relationship with Russia. We�ve recognized that the hostility that characterized US-Soviet relations during the Cold War has ended, hostility that was enshrined in the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Accordingly, along with the hostility, we�ve set aside that morally dubious doctrine and that out-dated treaty. We�re cooperating with Russia in many fields. And Presidents Bush and Putin agreed formally to make unprecedented cuts in their nuclear arsenals. At the beginning of this Administration many commentators voiced anxiety about the risks of US-Russian tensions over arms control, NATO expansion and other issues. This is now a non-issue. [�] Return to Menu L. Links of Interest 1. The G8 Global Partnership: Progress report on the UK�s Programme to address nuclear, chemical, and biological legacies in the Former Soviet Union Return to Menu 2. The Murmansk Initiative-RF: An observer's point of view Return to Menu 3. Statement - Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the Level of Foreign Return to Menu 4. Russian Submarine Dismantlement Issues Return to Menu 5. IAEA Resolution On Iran's Nuclear Programme: The Jury's Still Out But Time Is Short Return to Menu 6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies Are Impractical Return to Menu 7. Seven Distinguished Americans Honored with Tenth Annual Heinz Awards Return to Menu 8. Global Partnership Funding Commitments Return to Menu 9. North Korea and Iran: Test Cases for an Improved Nonproliferation Regime? http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/CirincioneandWolfsthal.asp Return to Menu 10. Towards a New, Effective Non-Proliferation Strategy for the United States Return to Menu 11. Nuclear Safety Indicative Programme 2004-2006 including ISTC-STCU Return to Menu 12. REPORT on the results of an audit into the legality and proper use of funds allocated from the federal budget for the purpose of comprehensive decommissioning of nuclear submarines, including the fulfilment of international contracts in 2002, in the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation and other sites Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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