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RANSAC Nuclear News, June 13, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Plutonium Disposition
 A. Plutonium Disposition 1. MOX Eludes Mention at Evian G-8 Summit (modified) (The quotes attributed to Matthew Bunn in a story included in an earlier Nuclear News were incorrect. The corrected story follows below � ed.) Of all the nuclear issues that came under the scrutiny of the Russian and American governments during last weekend�s Group of Eight industrialised nations, or G-8, summit in Evian, France, one important and urgent issue was almost entirely absent from the agenda: plutonium disposition through MOX fuel�an oversight some say could lead to the scrapping of the entire programme by late July. Member states did point out in the G8�s Senior Officials Group Annual Report that �significant progress can be noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia�s plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on concepts for effective programmes management and oversight,� the statement read. �We look forward to completion of these negotiations.� But no specific mention of MOX�the primary future method of plutonium disposition�was made by the leaders. The MOX programme, however, is already a year behind schedule and, insiders say, bickering over management, liability and safety regulations continues. The plutonium disposition scheme, which is meant to destroy 34 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and the United States equally, involves mixing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium oxides to create a nuclear fuel called MOX, or mixed oxide fuel. The fuel will then be burnt, in parallel progress, in specially retrofitted conventional reactors�like Russia�s VVER-1000s. The plan also requires the construction of parallel MOX fabrication plants in both the United States and Russia. The arrangement has been controversial since it was formally announced in 1997, involving, as it does, expensively revamped reactors and an untested fuel. Environmentalists have also pointed out that spent MOX fuel still contains weapons-usable plutonium, which, with the right technology, could still be separated out and used in nuclear weapons�thus defeating the very purpose of the programme. Other concerns raised by environmentalists include that the MOX scheme involves more processing and transportation, and therefore higher risks of plutonium theft, as well as arguments that using MOX in reactors will increase safety risks. Environmentalists and others experts have also pointed out that while the US supports the idea of also using the MOX method to get rid of their stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium separated from commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel, or SNF, their example will embolden other countries to separate their own weapons-usable plutonium through additional reprocessing�thus leading to a closed plutonium cycle. Several officials and analysts in Washington and Moscow, who had spoken to Bellona Web prior to the summit, predicted a far more robust G-8 endorsement of plutonium disposition efforts, especially MOX programme�but their prognosis did not come true. However, according to one Russian official, a fuller mention of the programme was needed because, unless a crucial 1998 technical agreement between Russia and the US is extended within the next several weeks, the project will grind to a halt. �The MOX agreement turned out to be a low priority [at the G-8 conference],� said one Russian source close to the negotiations. �In any case, the big thing is to negotiate the government-to-government extension of the project.� MOX Survival at Risk Over Technical Agreement Expiration? This five-year long 1998 agreement, outlining the technical aspect of the MOX programme, was signed by former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and then US Vice President Al Gore. It covers concept design, research and development, small pilot projects for fuel testing, equipment transfers, limited testing of lead-test assemblies, and international seminars. It also expires July 31st. Without the promise of a renewed technical agreement, contracts for work on the project are drying up. According to one official with the United States� National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, the agreement may get a one-year extension. But this official noted that �one more year is not attractive potential for contractors or government funders.� Both sides, therefore, are still under immense deadline pressure to agree on a substantive extension for the technical accord�an agreement, said the Russian source, that seems unlikely, given the resources already expended on the lagging programme. If some agreement is not reached, the source said, the entire MOX plan could well unravel. �The people who are supposed to be talking to each other about it are not talking about it,� said the Russian source. As an example of this, the source pointed to lapses in communication between the US State Department and the NNSA. As of May 30th�during the last of the pre-summit talks in Washington�Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who is in charge of non-proliferation, and Ambassador Linton Brooks, Deputy Administrator for the NNSA, hadn�t even formally spoken about the future of the MOX plan. Neither the NNSA nor the State Department would confirm or deny this. Financing for the Russian MOX fabrication plant is also not going as planned. The State Department�s point man on the MOX programme, Ambassador Michael Guhin, had said that the US would pledge $400,000 toward the construction of Russia�s $1-billion plant. Another $400,000 was pledged by members of the European Union, Japan and Canada. Nothing, however, was said at the summit about the EU pledges, or other commitments to make up the remaining $200,000 difference. But Harvard University nuclear expert Matthew Bunn, who has been close to MOX negotiations, did not agree with the dire predictions by the Russian source that the MOX programme would fall through any time soon. �I very much doubt it will collapse this year, though you can�t rule out problems down the road,� said Bunn. Agreement Extension in Limbo The deadlock in which the MOX technical agreement currently finds itself is �already a serious problem,� said Bunn. According the Russian source, there isn�t even a replacement agreement in the works to extend the old one. Bunn did not know if there was a new version of the agreement in the works, but he was optimistic. �One way or another, they will manage to produce a new version,� he told Bellona Web in a telephone interview from Cambridge, Massachusetts. The key to an extension on the technical agreement, said the Russian source, is to get the governments to talk to each other about it and hash out the details. But compelling the US State Department to act on this, said the Russian source, is unlikely. One of the State Department�s primary concerns, said Bunn, was that extending this agreement would set a bad precedent for liability. He said the current disagreements over liability issues are still smouldering between the State Department, Russia, and the US Department of Energy, or DOE. The 1998 agreement did not adopt the provisions of the �umbrella agreement� of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, which places all liability for any accidents on Russia. The State Department reasons that all US-Russian threat reduction agreements should be modelled on the CTR liability approach. However, under an agreement signed in 2000 by US President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which codified that the project would indeed go forward, liability was �to be negotiated� between the two countries. State Department officials would not comment about what these liability needs may be. The last opportunity to secure any extension on the technical agreement, according to Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, Russia�s nuclear regulatory body, will come at a conference to be held on July 21st to July 23rd�eight days before the technical assistance agreement expires. This conference, according to a highly placed GAN official who did not wish to be named in this article, �will put licensing agencies back in charge� of the MOX programme�as opposed to the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy, or Minatom. According to the Russian source, many important contacts and developments between Russian, European and American nuclear regulatory agencies will be jeopardised if the government-to-government technical agreement is not extended. �Finally, the NNSA and GAN, the [US] Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and even at times Minatom, are talking to each other, and developing, regulatory procedures that did not exist in Russia before,� said the source. �GAN has received serious training in nuclear regulation thanks to the group efforts of US and European nuclear regulatory bodies,� he said. �It would be a pity to lose that rapport,� said the source. MOX Plant Design Also a Snag Another sticking point in the MOX agreement is the design of the MOX fuel fabrication plants, which will be built in both the US and Russia by American nuclear company Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster, or DCS, which was specifically formed to build the MOX facilities. But at recent meetings in Moscow between the Russian and American sides over the design of the Russian plant, embarrassing inconsistencies and unpleasant arguments arose. While the US MOX fabrication facility has long been slated for construction at South Carolina�s Savannah River Site, or SRS, arguments have raged for years about where to put the Russian plant. First, it was slated for construction at the Siberian Mining and Chemical Combine near Krasnoyarsk. Then, according to a highly placed GAN source, the US State Department�s Guhin inked a deal with Minatom to build the site near the Mayak Chemical Combine�the most radioactively polluted site on earth. Then, at the end of May, it was decided the facility would be built near the Siberian city of Tomsk. According to the Russian official, this kind of last-minute decision-making on the Russian side will throw the programme far enough behind schedule and over budget that the State Department will most likely scotch extending the deadline for technical cooperation. However, according to one US expert on MOX, who requested anonymity, moving the construction site of the facility should not affect the outcome of the MOX programme. He was strongly opposed to the notion that failing to extend the technical cooperation agreement would derail the MOX programme. �It�s pure and undiluted speculation that this would lead to an abandonment [of the MOX programme],� he wrote in an email interview. �Abandoning the effort would not be up to the State Department�this is a US government-wide project, largely being implemented by the DOE, with National Security Council oversight of all the agencies� activities. Final decisions are the subject of interagency discussion and are ultimately up to the White House.� Immobilisation versus MOX: Theory It has long been Bellona�s position�as well as that of other international environmental organisations�that plutonium disposition through MOX is an environmental and economic error on behalf of both the Russian and American governments. Bellona has advocated for �immobilisation� of the surplus plutonium in both countries. Immobilisation can be achieved via two processes. One combines high level radioactive waste, a specially fabricated sand, and weapons-grade plutonium oxide, which would all be homogeneously melted together. This approach, however, was not pursued by the DOE, and has not been promoted by the various European advocates of immobilisation, the US expert said. The more recent approach in the US, prior to adopting the all-MOX option, was the so-called �can-in-canister� approach, according to the expert. In this variant, plutonium would be immobilised, without being immediately surrounded by high-level wastes, in ceramic �pucks��similar in size and shape, as the term suggests, to hockey pucks. These pucks would be loaded into cans, the cans would be arrayed on a rack inside huge canisters, into which molten glass containing high-level waste would then be poured up to the rim. Such a design would provide an intense radiation self-defence similar to the highly radioactive components found in spent MOX fuel. �[�] This [method of immobilisation] was expected to be substantially less costly,� the US expert said. The expert noted, however, that with the can-in-canister approach, it may be less complicated to extract the weapons plutonium than in the case of spent MOX fuel, at least for the host state. If the canister were reheated to the melting temperature of the glass, noted the expert, and a hole cut in the bottom of the storage canister, the glass would pour out leaving the immobilised plutonium puck behind with no radiation barrier. But environmental and nuclear experts at Bellona say that, be it MOX or immobilisation, the point is to provide security as nearly impenetrable as possible for storing the disposed plutonium. In theory, say Bellona�s experts, this would be easier and cheaper to achieve for immobilised plutonium, for which special centralised storage facilities would likely be built. In fact, US funding is building such a site at the Mayak Chemical Combine�slated to open this year�and the US is pursuing its Yucca Mountain repository. In the case of spent MOX fuel, however, the likelihood is that it will remain scattered at poorly guarded onsite storage facilities at the reactors slated to burn MOX, as is the current practice at most Russian reactors where commercial reactor SNF is stored. Thus, in addition to the almost prohibitive expenses for reactor upgrades and MOX fuel fabrication, a centralised facility for storing spent MOX fuel will be needed, or security at MOX-burning reactors would have to be almost completely restructured all over Russia�a country notorious for its lax SNF storage procedures, Bellona experts said. Additionally, the MOX method, as opposed to immobilisation, is essentially a method of breeding even more plutonium, because, as in any reaction involving uranium�which is present in the MOX combination�plutonium is accumulated as a by-product, Bellona said. Immobilisation versus MOX: Practice At the initial discussions over plutonium disposition between Russian ex-President Boris Yeltsin and American ex-President Bill Clinton in 1994-1995, both leaders declared that they would dispose of 34 tonnes each of weapons-grade plutonium that the two countries regarded as surplus to their weapons needs. Both sides, however, have more weapons-grade plutonium in stock. The US has declared its stocks equal to 100 tonnes. Russia has released no official figures, but most estimates indicate it has some 150 tonnes stockpiled. These initial discussions advocated disposing of the surplus plutonium via both methods�immobilisation and MOX. But Russia�s original objections to immobilisation were fuelled by Minatom�s assertions that plutonium is the nuclear fuel of the future. The Russians have also argued against immobilisation from a financial point of view: Making MOX employs more scientists who, since the collapse of the Soviet military complex, the state is hardly able to pay. In the MOX scheme, more jobs would be created and these workers would be paid in part by the US government. Minatom�s scandal-tarred former chief, Yevgeny Adamov, was especially critical of the immobilisation approach. Adamov, who still maintains a shadowy influence over Minatom�s current administration, wrote in a recent article that, aside from a few �insignificant� tonnes of plutonium that would have to be burned for the sake of political agreements, the remaining weapons reserves could fuel a whole new generation of plutonium-burning BREST series reactors. Minatom has long had this project on the drawing board. The BREST series are breeder reactors, which both run on and produce reactor-grade plutonium�a sort of nuclear perpetual motion machine. Another one of Russia�s arguments against US advocacy of immobilisation, according to the US expert, were suspicions that it was a smokescreen for storing the US�s own strategic reserves of plutonium. �Hence, the Russians have long opposed having the United States immobilise its [own] plutonium while the Russians used theirs as fuel, since immobilisation does not change the isotopics, making it possible in principle to recover the plutonium and put it back into existing weapon designs without testing,� wrote the US expert. The DOE has nonetheless noted that immobilisation is �modestly� cheaper than an all-MOX approach, but the US expert wrote that �an all-immobilisation programme doesn�t get the main job done�dealing with Russia�s plutonium�since Russia refuses to immobilise it.� The Bush administration�which, like Minatom, has its own plutonium dreams�formally scratched immobilisation from the plutonium disposition accord. Return to Menu B. Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. Russian CW disposal plan complicated by US funding delays: official Russia warned Tuesday that US failure to make regular payments to help dismantle the country's huge chemical weapons arsenal was complicating efforts to meet its international obligations to disarm. The United States last June pledged 10 billion dollars (8.5 billion euros) over the next decade to safeguard Russian chemical and nuclear weapons from preying terrorists, with another 10 billion dollars to come from other industrial nations in a plan known as "10 plus 10 over 10." The president of the country's chemical weapons disarmament commission, Sergei Kiriyenko, warned however that Russian efforts to complete the second phase of its chemical weapons disposal programme were being complicated by US delays in releasing funds. "The United States is adopting a policy of unfreezing the money for a year which then expires, and we then have to start discussions over again," the Interfax news agency quoted him as saying after a meeting of the disarmament commission held Monday. Kiriyenko said in April that Russia had completed the first phase of its chemical weapons disposal programme, destroying 400 tonnes -- or one percent -- of the arms. For the second phase, due to be completed by 2007, Russia risks failing to meet the deadline because of funding difficulties, and the commission is having to weigh several options to take account of available resources, he said. However the commission has decided to triple its present budget, Kiriyenko said. "The main priority is anti-terrorist and environmental security," Kiriyenko said as quoted by Interfax. The commission's preferred choice is for the construction of a dismantling facility in the Kurgan region in the southern Urals which he said "must be contructed together, we cannot do it alone." A standby option at another facility was being envisaged because "Russia cannot risk a failure to meet its commitments even because of external circumstances," he said. "In any event, we have to build all these facilities. The deadline for disposal is clear: no chemical weapons must remain on Russian territory by 2012," he said. Nikolai Bezborodov, deputy head of the lower house of parliament's defence committee and a member of the disarmament commission, said the government had allocated 300 million rubles (9.8 million dollars, 8.4 million euros) in this year's budget for the safe storage and disposal of chemical weapons, up from 100 million rubles as originally planned, Interfax reported. Kiriyenko, as quoted by ITAR-TASS, said the extra money would be used "to heighten anti-terrorist measures at facilities where combat toxic agents are stored... (and) to modernise protection structures and carry out checks and maintenance work." Russia has the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, including stocks of sarin and VX nerve gas. Dismantling its stocks of military plutonium and chemical weapons, seen as vulnerable to theft in the corruption-tainted post-Soviet era, was made a priority goal in international efforts to halt proliferation, prompting leaders at the G-7 summit at Kananaskis, in Canada, last year to offer up to 20 billion dollars in aid to dispose of them. Return to Menu C. Russia-Iran 1. Putin Pledging More Scrutiny On Iran Nukes (excerpted) Russian President Vladimir Putin, meeting with a group of senior American Jewish communal leaders in a hastily arranged Kremlin session Tuesday evening, promised to tighten Russian monitoring of Iran's nuclear program, but he rejected a request to cut off ties with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The two and a half hour meeting, which was initiated by the American Jewish participants, came hours after an Israeli Cabinet minister, Natan Sharansky, canceled a separate meeting with Putin because of political disputes in Jerusalem. Israel's foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, was said to be planning his own trip to Moscow to meet with Putin later this week. The rush of Israeli and Jewish contacts with the Kremlin gave rise to intense speculation over the motives for the meeting. Several observers said that Israel was seeking to cultivate Putin as a counterweight to the increasing pressure on Israel from the Bush administration, while others suggested that it was part of a Russian campaign to improve ties with America following its opposition to the war in Iraq and criticism of its nuclear aid to Tehran. Russia is the only member of the so-called Middle East Quartet � the others are the United States, European Union and United Nations � that that does not chair a monitoring committee within the framework of the so-called "road map" to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israelis are said to be interested in increasing Putin's role, viewing him as a potential ally partly because of his war against Islamic militants in Chechnya and partly because of his close ties to the Likud and right-wing Jewish groups in Russia. Putin told his guests that he was just coming off a telephone call with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, according to the Russian Interfax news agency. Putin had already met American Jewish leaders during a visit to Washington in November 2001 and when he was still head of the Russian secret services in early 1998. Russia was also said by observers to be seeking American Jewish help in winning cancellation of its trade restrictions with the U.S. under the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment. Putin, who received his guests in the Kremlin, said that Russia would withhold delivery of fuel for a nuclear facility built with Russian assistance in Iran until Tehran provides additional information about its intended use, several sources said. However, he declined to accept the group's position on sidelining Arafat. Putin told his guests that Moscow felt closer to the American position than to the European one regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict. But he added that Moscow continued to view Arafat as a legitimate leader. Still, one Jewish American communal leader said this stance was "under review." Jewish communal leaders emerging from the meeting were cautiously optimistic over its results. "It was an excellent meeting in which we pointed [out] our concerns and he very honestly explained Russia's position," Jack Rosen, the president of the American Jewish Congress, told the Forward in a phone interview from Moscow. The Bush administration and several European governments have been pressuring Putin to halt the delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran's Bushehr nuclear facility until Tehran agrees to further inspections by the U.N. nuclear agency. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said recently that Putin had accepted the demand, but Russian officials promptly contradicted him. According to Rosen and others, Putin said Russia would suspend the delivery of fuel until Russia obtains further information about the use of the spent fuel from the facility. However, he did not say explicitly that Russia would wait for further inspections. Still, Putin said he felt Washington was exaggerating Iran's threat and that he saw Pakistan as a greater danger since it already has nuclear weapons and harbors Al Qaeda sympathizers. [�] Return to Menu 2. Iran must pledge to return spent nuclear fuel: Russia Russia will deliver nuclear fuel to Iran for its controversial nuclear power plant at Bushehr only if it pledges to return the spent fuel after use, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said Thursday in Brussels, Russian media reported. "Russia will supply the fuel to the Bushehr plant ... only if Iran signs a memorandum committing itself to returning the spent fuel to Russia," the Interfax news agency quoted him as telling Russian journalists on his arrival for a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council. It would be in Iran's own interest "for all arrangements to be transparent and controllable in order to avoid ambiguity or divergent interpretations on the matter," Ivanov said, noting that the plant at Bushehr was under "the full control of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)." The issue of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, bitterly opposed by the United States, was likely to feature in his talks with US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Brussels, he said. "The approaches of Russia and the United States to the issue are clear, having been reaffirmed at the Russia-US summit in Saint Petersburg (on June ," Ivanov said. Washington Wednesday reiterated its long-standing demand that Russia halt its nuclear cooperation with Iran until Tehran signs a new UN protocol allowing for closer inspections of its suspected weapons program. It opposes Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran on the grounds that the spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr could be diverted to make nuclear weapons. Tehran has insisted that the construction of the Bushehr plant has a purely civilian objective. Russia for its part insists that its sale of nuclear technology to Iran does not breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev Wednesday reaffirmed Moscow's stance that a signature of the additional IAEA protocol never featured in the original Russia-Iran agreement and that the project would be maintained. But among a flurry of mixed signals last week, a foreign ministry spokesman stressed that Moscow still wanted to see Iran agree to stricter IAEA controls. And the atomic energy ministry issued a statement, apparently aimed at soothing Western concerns, stating that fuel would not be delivered to Bushehr at least until 2005 when Bushehr's construction is completed after several delays. Return to Menu 3. Iran's Nuclear Program: the Russians May Be Ready to Help Iran's nuclear energy program will be at the top of the agenda when the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors meets in Vienna next week. This time, Russia may be more inclined to cooperate with efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. For more than a decade, Washington has unsuccessfully worked to sway Moscow from its cooperation with Iran in areas that can help Tehran develop weapons of mass destruction. Recent revelations by Iranian leaders and officials, however, are prompting the Russians to reassess their cooperation with Iran. President Mohammed Khatami of Iran recently disclosed that Iran has been mining uranium and pursuing technologies to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel from its reactor in Bushehr. "We need to com- plete the circle from discovering uranium to man- aging remaining spent fuel," he said. Iran has also declared that the spent fuel, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, may not be returned to Russia. Tehran further confirmed the existence of an uranium enrichment facility and plutonium production plant, making fuel supply from Russia eventually unnecessary. The announcements suggest that Tehran is coming close to being able to make nuclear weapons, with or without outside help. These disclosures contradict Iranian commitments to Russia, as well as commitments made by Moscow to Washington. A decision by Tehran actually to construct nuclear weapons, however, would be influenced by several strategic considerations. The prospect of losing Russia's support at the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations, for example, could still have a major impact on Iran's next moves. There are also hundreds of Russian scientists and engineers in Iran whose withdrawal could seriously hamper the civil nuclear program - and who are in a position to know what equipment or technology Iran still lacks. Recent statements by President Vladimir Putin of Russia and the head of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, indicate that Moscow is starting to view Iran's nuclear program with concern. "While Russia is helping Iran to build its nuclear power plant, it is not being informed by Iran of all the other projects that are currently under way," Rumyantsev said. Now Moscow is urging Tehran to sign the additional inspections protocol advocated by the IAEA, and it recently announced a decision to delay the signing of an agreement with Iran on spent nuclear fuel. Several articles in the Iranian press also suggest that Russia is beginning to give Iranian officials the cold shoulder on nuclear cooperation. All this indicates that Russia is re-examining its nuclear cooperation with Iran. It may be ready now, instead, to cooperate with Washington. Departing from previous lines of disagreement with the Putin announced following the summit meeting in St. Petersburg, that "The positions of Russia and the US on the issue are much closer than they seem." Putin has also taken a number of steps as president to take control of the various foreign policy and national security apparatuses that had a free reign in a number of fields during the Yeltsin era. Most important, Putin sacked Yevgeni Adamov in 2001 as head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and replaced him with own appointment. In his dealings with the United States, Putin bargains hard, but has generally shown that he know how to implement the agreements he makes. In order to succeed, the United States should work quietly with Putin and not give the impression that it is pressuring Moscow. Beyond demanding that Tehran sign the IAEA inspections protocol, Moscow must insist that Iran return the spent reactor fuel to Russia in accordance with its previous commitment. Russia should also join international efforts to demand that Iran halt its uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs, which are clearly beyond the requirements of a civil nuclear program, and condition further cooperation on this. Finally, Russia should encourage its scientists and engineers in Iran to provide information on their projects. Iran is at a critical juncture in its nuclear program, and the loss of Russian backing will influence its next steps as well as the actions of European states in international forums. We need Russia at this crucial stage. The writer is research director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Return to Menu 4. US again presses Russia on Iran nuclear link The United States once again called Wednesday on Russia to halt its nuclear cooperation with Iran until Tehran signs a new UN protocol allowing for closer inspections of its suspected weapons program, Interfax reported. The issue was raised during a telephone conversation between US Energy Secretary of State Spencer Abraham and his Russian counterpart Alexander Rumyantsev, the news report said. Interfax said Spencer urged Russia to halt construction of Bushehr, Iran's first nuclear power plant, until Tehran signs an additional protocol with the UN's nuclear energy watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Ministry (IAEA). In response, Rumyantsev reaffirmed Moscow's long-held stance that signature of the additional IAEA protocol never featured in the original agreement signed between Russia and Iran, and that the project would be continued, Interfax said. Russia earlier this month delayed Bushehr's launch until2005 , a move seen as an indirect concession to both US and Israeli concerns over the Russia-Iran link. The project's cost is estimated at between 800 million and one billion dollars ( 680million and 850 million euros). Interfax further quoted an atomic energy source as saying that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran was limited strictly to Bushehr and did not involve new projects aimed at helping Tehran develop its own nuclear fuel for the reactor. Russia defended its Iranian relations during a meeting between Rumyantsev and visiting Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom earlier this week, Interfax said. "The Russian position that our bilateral ties (with Iran) are consistent with international agreements and are controlled by the IAEA was reiterated during the meeting" between Rumyantsev and Shalom, a ministry source told Interfax. Return to Menu 5. Russian signals on nuke aid to Iran don�t mean cooperation to end soon Russia�s leadership has indicated in the past two weeks that it is ready to rethink its long-standing nuclear cooperation with Iran -- but experts here agree that Moscow has not yet decided to ban such cooperation. The United States and Israel long have criticized Russia for helping develop Iran�s nuclear energy program, including helping build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "Russia doesn�t know yet where it goes from here," said Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent Russian defense analyst. "Russian policy on Iran is shifting, yet there is disarray among Russian leadership about what to do next, what do we ask from Iran," Felgenhauer said. "President Putin is saying one thing and the foreign minister" Igor Ivanov "is saying another." At a joint news conference with President Bush earlier this month in Evian, France, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow�s position on Iran is much closer to Washington�s than previously believed, and that Russia does not "need to be convinced of the fact that there should be no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." He added that Russia will work with the United States to prevent such proliferation "everywhere, including Iran." Also in Evian, Putin told his fellow G-8 leaders that Russia will halt "all nuclear exports" to Iran until that country signs on to a stricter protocol on nuclear inspections. This week, Putin reinforced his statements at a meeting with visiting U.S. Jewish leaders. Putin indicated that Russia has suspended delivery of nuclear materials to Iran until there is more transparency in Tehran�s use of sensitive technologies. He added that Moscow would seek additional guarantees from Tehran that Russian technologies are not being used to produce weapons of mass destruction. Putin acknowledged that materials sold to Iran carry a potentially great threat of being used as weaponry because of Iran�s support of terrorism. But earlier this month, a senior Russian Cabinet member dismissed U.S. concerns that Russian nuclear technology could be used to create atomic weapons in Iran. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Tehran is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and abides by its regulations. He said the technology that will be employed at Iran�s Bushehr nuclear power plant couldn�t "even hypothetically" be used for the production of weapons-grade plutonium or "other military purposes." "This is purely a commercial project," Ivanov said. Similarly, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Russia would not necessarily link its completion of the Bushehr plant to Tehran�s signature on additional agreements that would make its nuclear facilities available for unannounced inspections. Georgii Mirskii, an expert on Middle East affairs with Moscow�s Institute of Global Economics and International Relations, agreed that the Kremlin is ambivalent about U.S. demands to end nuclear cooperation with Iran. Moscow is reluctant to give in to American pressure for reasons of economics and prestige, but it agrees that concerns that Iran might be seeking to build nuclear weapons increasingly are being substantiated, Mirskii said in a recent interview. If Tehran succeeds in acquiring such weapons, they would pose a more direct threat to Russia than to the United States, he said. "A nuclear Iran that has territorial claims in the Caspian basin is a real concern for Russia, and is not something that Russia would want to see near its borders," Felgenhauer said. Russia consistently has stated that its cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere doesn�t go beyond the energy sector -- the light-water reactor that Russia is building in Bushehr is not of great proliferation concern � but Iran reportedly is just three to four years away from completing a working nuclear bomb. It remains an open question to what extent Russian cooperation has helped Tehran reach that goal. The existence of a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, Iran, was publicly revealed in August 2002 by an Iranian opposition group. International observers later confirmed that the technology can be used to enrich uranium beyond the needs of power reactors, for use in weapons. "Moscow clearly does share concerns about the real intentions of Iran," Felgenhauer said. "It was a nasty surprise for Russians that they had built a uranium purification plant. That was apparently done in secret from Russia." Evgeny Satanovsky, president of the Russian Jewish Congress and a leading expert on the Middle East, said Russia is not helping Iran develop weapons of mass destruction. "Iran is one of the most stable Russian neighbors in the region, but Russia understands that Iran is not its strategic partner," Satanovsky said. "Russia is ready to heed U.S. concerns, but simple pressure won�t work here." He continued, "Keeping Russian contracts in the Iranian nuclear energy sector is an important way to have some control over Iran�s nuclear program. It should be understood now when we see that Tehran will soon have its bomb with or without Russia." In fact, during this week�s meeting with American Jewish leaders, Putin said Russia is "against using the pretext of a nuclear weapons program as an instrument of unfair competition against us." Russia is expected to receive about $500 million in revenues from the completed Bushehr plant. The cost of the entire project is estimated at $10 billion. Some analysts say it may not be up to Putin to change or terminate the Bushehr contract. Russian business leaders have their own interests at stake, and the future of the sensitive projects in Iran largely lies with them, experts say. Kakha Bendukidze, a powerful Russian business tycoon, has an industrial conglomerate, United Machine Building Plants, that is the largest shareholder of Iran�s nuclear energy project and is responsible for building the reactor turbines. Felgenhauer said it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that "instead of going to Bush or Putin, those who are concerned about the program rather should go to Bendukidze." Analysts say it will be nearly impossible to persuade Russia to cancel the Bushehr contract using economic inducements. "The economic compensation the U.S. is offering to Russia will not work here," Felgenhauer said. "You have to find a way to meet the interests of those who actually own the project, not Russia as a nation. The compensations and business incentives should be precision guided, otherwise they�re not effective." Return to Menu D. Russia-North Korea 1. Defusing North Korea Speaking in Finland on Monday, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that "If these parties deem it necessary that Russia should play a more active part in this dialogue, we will be ready." The parties in question are the United States and North Korea. The dialogue is between a belligerent Washington worried that Pyongyang will acquire nuclear weapons and a North Korea that says the United States gives them no choice but to try to obtain them. The Korean peninsula is in a crisis situation. Scared by having been placed on the United States' "axis of evil" and having seen military operation take place against Iraq, the North Korean leadership has reacted by stating that, as long as it feels threatened by the United States, it has the right to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. North Korea already has one of the largest armies in the world, with heavy artillery pieces within range of Seoul. The U.S. Bush administration's policy toward North Korea has been counterproductive, to say the least. First, the United States effectively bulldozed the North Korean-South Korean Sunshine Policy, aimed at brining the two countries closer together and coaxing the North out of its self-imposed isolation. Second, in putting Pyongyang in its crosshairs, at least rhetorically, the United States has given North Korean leader Kim Jung Il every reason to get its hands on weapons of mass destruction and the sooner, the better. Russia is one of a very small number of countries that has any real leverage on Pyongyang � probably only South Korea and China have more. It was the country's Pricilla sponsor until the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has in recent years sought to revive trade and other links, such as the envisioned trans-Asian railroad that would provide a direct land-transport route extending all the way from South Korea to the Netherlands. Unlike the United States, Russia has realized that force, or threats of force, are useless in the case of North Korea: Not only does it simply encourage the regime to engage in precisely the opposite type of behavior than what is desired, any actual armed conflict on the Korean peninsula would almost certainly result in Seoul being reduced to rubble and ash under a barrage of artillery shells. Moreover, Pyongyang is desperate to establish links to the outside world in order to bolster up its ruinously collapsed economy. This was what the Sunshine Policy was all about, after all � reaching out in order to encourage economic growth at home. And Russia is one of North Korea's largest, or even only, real trading partners. In other words, while Washington uses only an (in this case ineffective) stick, Russia at least has at least a carrot to dangle before Kim's nose. In short, Russia is positioned to play an important role in making sure the Korean peninsula becomes a stable place. And it can do this without bluster, without bombs and without setting the groundwork for a potential catastrophe in Southeast Asia. Return to Menu 2. North Korea Problem Cannot be Solved Without Russia, Said the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister The solution of the North Korea is impossible without taking into consideration the interests of Russia. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said this at a press conference in Moscow. He refuted the assertions of some mass media that the United States was allegedly trying to remove Russia from the process of settling the North Korean problem. "Only a person who does not know the situation at all can say that Russia in some way or another is being forced out from the settlement process," underscored Losyukov. According to him, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is so complicated today that it cannot be settled without the participation of Russia. "And nobody intends to do it," he pointed out. In particular, he referred to the recent statement by the White House press service that the United States is interested in including Russia in the solution of the North Korean problem. Losyukov pointed out that "today a complicated game in many spheres is being played with regard to the Korean problem." "The situation is very complicated and very dangerous because there can be very grave consequences of its negative development and also because no simple solutions of this problem can be seen," said the deputy minister. According to him, "unfortunately, there is a tendency towards its deterioration." So far, the sides are very far from a common understanding of the problem. First of all, this concerns the positions of the United States and North Korea but, Losyukov noted, "all the countries, involved in this or another way in the situation - the USA, North and South Koreas, Japan, China and Russia - are interested in resolving the problem peacefully." "The final task has been set by all the countries in one and the same way - to de-nuclearise the Korean Peninsula," pointed out Alexander Losyukov. He underscored that North Korea was interested in preserving the present regime in the country, in guarantees of its security, and will try to achieve this by all means. "This fact should be taken into consideration," underscored the deputy minister. He noted that Russia stands for negotiations on this problem and "that any format in this case will be effective and acceptable." In particular, Russia supports the efforts of China to organise a tripartite meeting involving Beijing, Washington and Pyongyang. "The negotiations in this format would be a very good development of the situation. If the number of the participants increases, then other variants are possible," noted Alexander Losyukov. Return to Menu 3. Official: Russia must have role in solving N. Korea crisis Russia should have a role in finding a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said Wednesday. "No issues concerning North Korea can be resolved without taking into account Russia's interest and the country's involvement," Losyukov told reporters. North Korea accuses Washington of fomenting the nuclear tensions and has demanded direct talks with the United States. Washington has refused, saying the North's nuclear program concerns the entire region, and says it wants multilateral talks involving China, South Korea, Japan and possibly Russia. Losyukov said tensions on the Korean peninsula were rising, and he urged the United States to engage more actively in talks with Pyongyang. Washington should also offer some sort of security guarantee to North Korea in exchange for the termination of Pyongyang's nuclear program, he said. The nuclear dispute flared in October, when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted it had a clandestine nuclear program. Washington and its allies are trying to muster international pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions, but the North has responded by pulling out of key nuclear arms agreements. Return to Menu E. Nuclear Security 1. Meeting on �Reliability and Security of NPP�s Materials And Fuel� Project Held in Moscow June 10-11, a meeting of the international panel involved in the preparation of the implementation program of the IAEA�s regional project RER/9/076 �Reliability and security of NPP�s materials and fuel� was held in Moscow. As Nuclear.Ru was informed by Sergei Adamchik, Head of Department for supervision over NPP nuclear and radiation safety of Gosatomnadzor of Russia (GAN), within the framework of this off-budget project that started a year ago, the following issues are addressed: fuel�s security feasibility, fuels research. The criteria applied to the nuclear fuel in different countries are also discussed and compared, he said. �The nuclear fuel market is in constant development, which turns it necessary to make the fuel more secure and analyze the different attitudes towards the West-made and East-made fuels,� Mr. Adamchik explained. The IAEA project aims to put forward recommendations on common criteria to be applied to the nuclear fuel, in order to avoid such discrepancy, he stressed. �The fuel must be reliable and secure regardless where it was produced or where it�s used,� Mr. Adamchik noted. While speaking about the competitiveness of Russian nuclear fuel, he highlighted its performance indexes as being �rather good� and promising even more due to current work aimed to make it more secure and cost effective. �Probably, it�s beneficial that the market is developing because it makes the national manufacturer, JSC TVEL, improve the fuel characteristics to make it more competitive,� S. Adamchik said. He also noted that many countries are interested in the implementation of the IAEA project. The meeting in Moscow was attended by representatives of research institutes and regulators from Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine. The previous meeting held in Romania joined representatives of France, Sweden and the Great Britain. According to Mr. Adamchik, the Moscow meeting addressed the project management issues, the task forces� main goals with respect to the research work, fuel samples transport for research purposes, discussion and comparison of studies carried out in different countries and elaboration of a management directive. Return to Menu F. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Sevmash started loading fuel to Dmitri Donskoi N-sub reactors Officers of the Russian Ministry of Defense Nuclear and Radiation Safety Department (NRSD) inspect the nuclear submarine Dmitri Donskoi which is under repair and upgrading at PA Sevmash shipyard based in Severodvisk, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Sevmash press-service. Presently Sevmash carries out the so-called Operation #1, i.e. charging nuclear fuel to the N-sub�s reactors. Ready-assembled cores are loaded first on the special reloader-ship PM-63 and then to the reactors. One core has already been delivered on board of the PM-63, when it is unloaded to the N-sub the ship is to get the other one. Some time ago Sevmash got the license for these operations and the Commission headed by rear-admiral Oleg Tregubov, the commander of Belomorsk NAVY base, certified that the shipyard is prepared for the operations. The rear-admiral is daily reported on the progress by the shipyard officer in charge of refueling operations. As Yevgeni Slobodyan, the officer directly responsible for refueling, said, now the potentially risky phase of work was approaching, that is the loading of the cores. He said, the reactor head had been removed, all its systems inspected, the beginning of work agreed upon with the inspectors who now check on preparedness of the reactor, compartment, crew and the ship as a whole to take on nuclear fuel. The preliminary inspection of the ship is conducted by the resident inspectors � the Northern Fleet NRSD. The final acceptance will be conducted by the Moscow expert team. All operations are on schedule which was approved by Russian NAVY commander-in-chief Vladimir Kuroyedov. Anatoli Shlemov, the head of NAVY shipbuilding department, and Vladimir Pospelov, the director general of Russudostroenie, noted that all operations are performed well on schedule. Return to Menu G. Missile Defense 1. Missile Defense and Russia U.S.-Russia cooperation on missile defense may be slowed. Missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia � something both sides have been touting lately � may be held up by political concerns. The recent Bush-Putin summit resulted in a declaration vowing �to develop specific joint projects in the sphere of missile defense.� However, Agence France-Presse reports (June 8, 2003) that according to a senior U.S. official, �specific projects have not yet been identified.� For the U.S. side, the stumbling block may be Russia�s aid to Iran�s nuclear program, while Russian participants worry about handing over sensitive weapon technologies without adequate compensation or assurances of future profit-sharing. Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov warns that it is not realistic to expect tangible results from U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation, �even in one or two years.� Return to Menu H. Official Statements 1. Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group (excerpted) [...] 15. We welcomed the agreement with the Russian Federation on a Work Plan for nuclear experts' consultations under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council. We agree with the plan to focus in the near term on nuclear weapons safety and security, but we also expressed our strong view that the nuclear Confidence and Security Building Measures proposed by NATO in December 2000 should be addressed in these consultations. We look forward to the next practical steps to further implement this important Work Plan. [...] Return to Menu 2. The Netherlands Participation in the Global Partnership The United States warmly welcomes the decision of the Netherlands to participate in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has conveyed in a letter to Deputy Secretary Armitage that the Netherlands will join the Partnership, and we look forward to cooperation on this initiative. The Netherlands has been strongly interested in nonproliferation issues, and is currently involved in cooperation in the nuclear field as well as chemical weapons destruction. The Global Partnership Initiative, launched by President Bush and other G-8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit of 2002, represents a significant undertaking by the international community to prevent terrorists or those that harbor them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. The Leaders committed to raise up to $20 billion over ten years for cooperative projects in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety, initially focused on Russia. At the Evian Summit June 1-2, Leaders reviewed progress during the first year of the Partnership, and welcomed the participation of Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Return to Menu 3. The U.S. and Russia: Space Cooperation and Export Controls, Testimony Before the House Science Committee, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics (excerpted) [�] The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 As our space partnership proceeds and explores new areas of cooperation, both the State Department and NASA have been rigorous in enforcing the legislative requirements of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) of 2000. With the International Partners and separately with Russian officials, the Administration has consistently made clear that all activity with Russia must be conducted within the bounds of U.S. law and our nonproliferation policy. Bolstering nonproliferation remains a core issue on the U.S.-Russia security agenda. The State Department and other U.S. officials in the Administration have engaged the Russian Government at the most senior levels to seek an end to sensitive cooperation between Russian entities and state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran. In the context of our diplomatic engagement, Russia has taken steps, though not yet sufficient, to implement stronger export controls and improve oversight at Russian facilities. In the case of Iran, we have made clear our very strong concern that Russian cooperation with Iran not facilitate Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or long-range ballistic missiles. While we cannot go into great detail in an unclassified forum, we can affirm that Russia has taken actions in response to specific cases related to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology in the course of our dialogue on nonproliferation. We continue to monitor the issue of ballistic missile technology assistance, and continue to be committed to Russia's cessation of any assistance that could help Iran with the delivery of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. Iran's nuclear program was a key issue addressed by Secretary Powell with President Putin in their May meeting in Moscow and by President Bush with President Putin in St. Petersburg on June 1. We have stressed our concerns about the recent revelations of hidden Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear fuel cycle capable of supporting a nuclear weapons program, such as the centrifuge facility at Natanz. Given what this new information says about Iran's nuclear ambitions, we have again urged the Russians to reconsider their nuclear cooperation with Iran and believe they are actively doing so. President Putin made clear at the G-8 Summit in Evian that all Iranian nuclear programs must be under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA Director General is conducting an investigation of the Iranian nuclear program, and his report will soon be taken up by the IAEA Board of Governors. Until Iran has fully satisfied the IAEA's examination and fully addressed the international community's concerns and questions, including full implementation of the Additional Protocol, no country should be engaging in nuclear cooperation with Iran. The Administration will continue to press the Russian Government not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran signs an Additional Protocol and verifiably abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Although it would be difficult to quantify the INA's impact on the Russian Government's export control policy, I assure you that the pressure applied by the INA is palpable in any dialogue with Russia on space. Mr. Yuriy Koptev, General Director of Rosaviakosmos, has been particularly active in promoting reform throughout the Russian Government, and frequently notes the constraints imposed by the INA on U.S.-Russian space cooperation. Other Russian officials also regularly express their concern about the INA constraints. While the Administration acknowledges Rosaviakosmos' sincere efforts to reform and to maintain a good record on nonproliferation, we remain concerned about Russia's broader nonproliferation record. We will continue our high-level diplomatic dialogue with Rosaviakosmos and other relevant Russian agencies to address this issue. The U.S. Export Control Process Domestically, State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs ensures that our own export control policy is sound and is implemented effectively, including in our space cooperation with Russia. The Directorate is charged with controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML). The Directorate's mission is to advance national strategic objectives and U.S. foreign policy goals through timely enforcement of defense trade controls and the formulation of defense trade policy. It carries out its mission by enforcing the law and reviewing export license applications for defense articles and services, ensuring that exports approved are consistent with this mission and that companies comply with defense trade laws and regulations. Through the licensing process, relevant U.S. Government agencies have the opportunity to review individual export license applications and advise whether proposed exports would be consistent with our national security and foreign policy. The State Department makes licensing decisions accordingly. This extensive procedure applies not only to exports to Russia, but to all U.S. exports, and helps ensure that federal agencies such as NASA and U.S. aerospace firms do not, even inadvertently, contribute to the proliferation of sensitive technology around the globe. U.S.-Russia Relations A word about our overall bilateral relationship with Russia. Our two countries are working hard to move past our recent disagreement over Iraq. In St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin made clear their determination to reinvigorate the partnership. Expanding cooperation in the security dimension remains at the top of the agenda, and this includes pressing the Russians to improve their performance on key nonproliferation issues. Likewise, the Administration will persist in its efforts to enhance U.S.-Russian cooperation in counterterrorism, strategic stability, and missile defense. We also hope to broaden our cooperation in space and expand the economic component of our relations, particularly in the energy field. We intend to continue working closely with our colleagues at NASA to implement the Presidents' commitment to enhance our cooperation in space, while remaining fully consistent with our security and nonproliferation goals for the bilateral relationship. Thank you. Return to Menu 4. Notice Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Created by the Accumulation of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material in the Territory of the Russian Federation On June 21, 2000, the President issued Executive Order 13159 (the "Order") blocking property and interests in property of the Government of the Russian Federation that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereinafter come within the possession or control of United States persons that are directly related to the implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, dated February 18, 1993, and related contracts and agreements (collectively, the "HEU Agreements"). The HEU Agreements allow for the downblending of highly enriched uranium derived from nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial purposes. The Order invoked the authority, inter alia, of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the risk of nuclear proliferation created by the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation. A major national security goal of the United States is to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various arms control and disarmament agreements is dedicated to peaceful uses (such as downblended to low enriched uranium for peaceful commercial uses), subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern. Pursuant to the HEU Agreements, weapons-grade uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons is converted to low enriched uranium for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. The Order blocks and protects from attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process the property and interests in property of the Government of the Russian Federation that are directly related to the implementation of the HEU Agreements and that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons. The national emergency declared on June 21, 2000, must continue beyond June 21, 2003, to provide continued protection from attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process for the property and interests in property of the Government of the Russian Federation that are directly related to the implementation of the HEU Agreements and subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. Return to Menu I. Links of Interest 1. The Post-Hussein Era: America, Russia, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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