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RANSAC Nuclear News, June 2, 2003 Compiled By: Michael Roston A. Multilateral Threat Reduction
D. Official Statements
 A. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Allied move to curb WMD poses new test (excerpted) The US and its allies in the Iraq war yesterday launched an initiative to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in a move set to become a fresh test of the transatlantic relationship. As the leaders of the world's biggest industrialised nations met in France for a summit aimed to boost confidence in the fragile global economy, President George W. Bush injected a surprise element into what had been expected to be an informal discussion on WMD today. US and UK officials said the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative would seek an international agreement to intercept ships and aeroplanes suspected of carrying shipments of arms or nuclear, chemical and biological cargo. Mr Bush also issued a strong warning to North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions as tensions rose in east Asia following a naval clash between the two Korean states. In spite of growing political pressure over the failure to find significant evidence of banned weapons in Iraq, Tony Blair, the prime minister, said he hoped that the strongest possible message about the need to combat WMD would be issued at Evian. "The most important thing, particularly after all the differences there have been over Iraq, is that the international community comes back together and sends a very clear signal that we will do everything we can, collectively and individually, to deal with this issue," he said. He was speaking as rebel Labour MPs warned that they would press this week for an independent inquiry into the government's claims before the war about Iraq's weapons capability - one of Mr Blair's main justifications for the conflict. The Tories said they would consider backing the inquiry demand. According to British officials, there is broad agreement within the Group of Eight industrialized nations meeting in Evian about the need to agree an "action plan" to combat the spread of WMD. A statement on WMD may also spell out which countries are most at risk of developing into failed states that threaten world security and establish "a counter- terrorism action group" of donor countries to provide assistance to "countries with the will but not the skill to combat terror". However, Mr Bush's the Proliferation Security Initiative appeared to have taken France, the G8 hosts, by surprise. It looked set to test the willingness of France and Germany, which strongly opposed the Iraq war, to work with Washington. Although there is unlikely to be afull-scale row over Mr Bush's move, British officials said France had told the US that it wanted to study the proposals more closely. [�] Return to Menu 2. French hold up weapons deal The US and Britain were last night battling to overcome French objections to win the support of the Group of Eight major industrialised states for an action plan to tighten the screws on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. President George Bush and Tony Blair were desperate for a convincing show of unity after their bruising diplomatic row with Russia, Germany and France over Iraq, and keen to unveil an agreed action plan today designed to underpin fragile global economic confidence and reinforce diplomatic cohesion in the west. But the US-led initiative, which includes more stringent controls on civil radioactive material that could be diverted to make a nuclear "dirty bomb", was facing detailed opposition in Evian last night. President Jacques Chirac, who exchanged a curt handshake with Mr Bush when the two met for the first time since their fallout over Iraq, was resisting the White House's call for sweeping powers to allow ships to be intercepted on the high seas on suspicion that they were carrying weapons destined for terrorism. For political reasons, the Elys�e does not wish to be seen to dance to America's tune, but it also has reservations about US high-handedness which saw at least one abortive seizure off the Yemeni coast last year. The proposal to intercept ships is likely to be shelved for further discussion. The German chancellor, Gerhard Schr�der, who met Mr Bush in St Petersburg on Saturday, missed the opening exchanges between the world leaders because he was attending a crucial party conference in Berlin. The G8 summit drew some 75,000 anti-globalisation protesters to the French-Swiss border, and the day ended with clashes between police and anarchist and anti-capitalist groups. A British protester, Martin Shaw, 39, from Ealing, west London, suffered multiple fractures when he fell 20 metres into shallow water after a Swiss policeman cut a rope he was suspended from as he unfurled a protest banner from a bridge over the Aubonne river near Lausanne. Mr Chirac and Mr Bush and their aides have sent mixed signals recently, with the US president talking about the need to "work together", but also noting anti-French sentiment at home. Briefing the media, Mr Chirac referred to Mr Bush as one of "several other" leaders he had met. As usual, Mr Blair was caught in the middle. He praised French initiatives on Africa and said that Mr Bush had also showed how he was reaching out - over the Palestinian question, Africa and the UN - and listening. "The most important thing, particularly after all the differences there have been over Iraq, is that the international community comes together and sends a very clear signal" on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, he said. Tension was underlined by remarks by an unidentified senior US official on Mr Bush's aircraft that White House aides complain that France seemed more worried by US power than by Saddam Hussein's. "The forces out there that want to destabilise, that want to engage in terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, would like nothing better than to have the western alliance ... in an internecine battle about whose power needs to be checked," the official said. If endorsed by the eight leaders gathered in the security-drenched French spa town on Lake Geneva, the action plan will provide �460m over 10 years from a global partnership to help Russia deal with its legacy of nuclear waste and chemical weapons. Former Soviet scientists, a tempting target for both "rogue states" and terrorist cells, would be assisted to find employment, and help would be provided to dismantle two Russian submarines. The assistance to President Vladimir Putin would be extended to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and the making safe of spent nuclear fuel. The move signals growing concern about further nuclear proliferation. Much of today's expected statement, being finalised as the leaders and their guests dined and discussed the crisis in Africa, stems directly from last year's G8 summit in the Canadian Rockies and contains a high level of diplomatic feelgood to reassure voters and consumers whose confidence is urgently needed to stave off recession. But development charities claimed that development issues were falling off the agenda as a result of the focus on fighting terrorism and rogue states. "The G8 is more likely to find weapons of mass destruction than it is to do anything for Africa," one source said last night in a reference to the failure to unearth any of Saddam's biological, chemical or nuclear armoury. As part of the package the G8 will endorse stronger security measures in the stricken aviation industry, which has been left reeling by September 11 and other events, including the Sars outbreak across Asia. Shipping containers will also get closer attention, including renewed efforts to curb the illegal traffic in small arms and light weapons. Biometric checks, which include the use of irises and fingerprints on computer-readable ID cards or passports, will also receive the summit's endorsement. Return to Menu 3. Loose nukes are terrorist dream - Threat: President Bush should push the G-8 to join U.S. efforts to find and destroy nuclear weapons left from the U.S.S.R.'s mighty arsenal. A Group of Eight summit is often remembered more for its scenic locale and group photo opportunities than its substance. This certainly will not be the case when the leaders of the G-8 meet in France beginning today. With bruised feelings and mutual suspicions at an all-time high, this summit will be remembered for how well the leaders of the world's seven wealthiest nations plus Russia put behind them the past months of strident disagreement over policy toward Iraq and get on with the business of working together to promote world security. At the summit, President Bush should work especially hard to ensure that the rift in the G-8 is decreased so that there is not a further fracturing of relations among members of the group. He could find important common cause in the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Bush should announce bold steps to accelerate the work of the Global Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which was agreed to in principle at last year's G-8 summit. The G-8 Global Partnership committed the members to devote "up to" $20 billion over the next 10 years to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of those who wish the world harm and provided guidelines for projects to follow to ensure that the money is spent wisely. So far, so good. But the effort has not progressed fast enough. Moreover, the promised funding levels fall short of what will be required to address this most serious of problems. Eight months before the tragedy of Sept. 11, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler Task Force stated that "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home." Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has warned that terrorist networks are "going to get [weapons of mass destruction] at some point unless they're stopped." Clearly, the best and cheapest way to stop them is to secure and dispose of such weapons and materials at their source. The Baker-Cutler Task Force recommended increasing funding devoted to addressing this problem, arguing that with an investment of approximately $30 billion over eight to 10 years, the "most urgent unmet threat" could be properly addressed. The G-8 Global Partnership falls $10 billion short of this goal. The United States devotes about $1 billion a year to threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, while other G-8 members devote a considerably smaller sum, though pledges have been made to increase this contribution considerably. When the United States is spending tens of billions of dollars on various efforts to protect the homeland against another attack that could even be worse than that of Sept. 11, the United States should also increase funding for these crucial programs. President Bush should commit the United States to contribute $15 billion over the next 10 years to this effort, rather than the $10 billion pledged. Bush should also call upon the other G-8 members to up their contribution to $15 billion over the next 10 years. The work must be accelerated. As Sen. Richard G. Lugar, an Indiana Republican and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, recently noted, at the current rate, it will take another 27 years before some facilities are secure in Russia, where other republics have sent their share of the former Soviet arsenal. Meanwhile, every day those facilities remain unsecured is another day that bomb-making material or small nuclear warheads could be stolen for the black market by underpaid and desperate Russian nuclear physicists or engineers or disgruntled military guards. Since 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 16 cases involving thefts of weapons-grade material - plutonium or enriched uranium. In all cases, the stolen material was recovered. But, as Charles Curtis of the Nuclear Threat Initiative has observed: "Sixteen cases is a disturbing number, but it also may not tell us what we really need to know: What percentage of the actual thefts do we uncover?" Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida are shopping for nuclear weapons and materials - or do they already have them? In addition to increasing funding beyond the current pledges, the G-8 members should inject more funding into the partnership, as suggested in last year's agreement, through innovative mechanisms such as "debt-reduction-for-non-proliferation" swaps with Russia. Through such a program, a portion of Russian debt incurred during the Soviet era would be forgiven in exchange for Russia's agreement to use these funds to bolster efforts to account for and secure all of their nuclear weapons and materials. This would greatly increase Russian incentive to act. Encouraging bipartisan steps have been taken on this front in Congress, under the leadership of Lugar and Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., a Delaware Democrat, and Reps. John M. McHugh, a New York Republican, and Ellen Tauscher, a California Democrat. Last year Bush signed into law a bill providing for a U.S.-Russia debt swap. The president should urge other G-8 members, who hold the majority of Russia's $45 billion debt, to institute similar debt swaps. This would provide another major step forward in internationalizing efforts to address the dangerous potential of Russian loose nukes getting into the hands of terrorists. The need to increase funding and the effort devoted to the Global Partnership is made even clearer by the Treaty of Moscow, which is expected to come into force in the coming months. That treaty will require the United States and Russia to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by two-thirds over the next 10 years. That's good news, but it seriously compounds the complexity of the task of securing thousands of Russian warheads that will be removed from deployment under the treaty and disposing of the nuclear materials in those that are dismantled. In a new book, Our Final Hour, one of Britain's leading scientists, Martin Rees, argues that the world as we know it has only a 50-50 chance of surviving the 21st century. He notes many things that might do us in, from bioterror to asteroids to global warming. He calls urgent attention to the fact that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world is awash in enough nuclear material for 70,000 bombs. While avoiding asteroids may be beyond our control, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of those who wish us deadly harm is not. By taking bold steps at the G-8 summit, the president could demonstrate the continued U. S. commitment to working with the world's strongest countries to ensure the safety of our own populations as well as the people of the entire world. Return to Menu B. G-8 Summit Documents 1. G-8 Statement on Non Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources At Kananaskis, we, the Heads of State and Government of the eight major industrialised democracies and the Representatives of the European Union, endorsed six principles and launched the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Today, at Evian, in another concrete demonstration of our commitment to theses principles, we have agreed to improve the security of radioactive materials. Radioactive sources are found in everyday life and have beneficial applications in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry. Certain poorly protected sources pose a real threat because they could be manipulated by terrorists to construct a radiological dispersion device or a " dirty bomb ". We commit ourselves to employing high standards that reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources to acquisition by terrorists. We urge all countries to take measures to strengthen regulatory control of high-risk sources within their territories. In that context, we welcome the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing an appropriate legal framework to this end. We welcome the findings of the 2003 Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. We also recognise the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in combating radiological terrorism and endorse its efforts to establish international standards that ensure the long term security and control of high-risk radioactive sources. We have decided to undertake the following actions to reinforce and complement the IAEA's activities as well as to ensure the unavailability of radioactive sources to terrorists. The Group of Eight will: 1. Identify elements of the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that are of the greatest relevance to preventing terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to high-risk radioactive sources. 2. Consider developing recommendations on how those elements could be applied at the national level. Those elements may include, as necessary: 2.1. National registers for tracking sources; 2.2. Programs for recovering orphan sources; 2.3. National regulations limiting export of high-risk sources to States that have effective controls; 2.4. Notification requirements to recipient States of exports; 2.5. National measures to penalise theft or misuse of radioactive sources; 2.6. National physical protection measures and access controls;and 2.7. National laws to ensure the safe and secure disposal of high-risk spent sealed sources. 3. Work towards agreement on and implementation of these recommendations by the time of our next meeting in 2004. 4. Encourage all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources and observe the Code of Conduct when the revisions to it have been completed and approved. 5. Enhance international co-operation on locating, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive sources. 6. Support and advance the IAEA's programs to improve the security of radioactive sources, including considering the provision of additional resources as necessary to the Nuclear Security Fund in order to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the recommendations for its application. 7. In conjunction with the IAEA, convene an international conference in 2005, in France, to further discuss and raise awareness of the radioactive source problem, and to assess progress in implementing the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. 8. Continue to work on this issue and will review the implementation of the plan of action, as set out in the technical annex to this Statement, at the 2004 G8 Summit. Return to Menu 2. G-8 Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction "1. We recognise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security. "2. This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system. "3. We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat: international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; initiatives to eliminate WMD stocks such as the G8 Global Partnership; national and internationally-co-ordinated export controls; international co-operation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with international law. "4. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalisation of relevant treaties and instruments. "5. Last year, at Kananaskis, we endorsed a set of Principles to prevent the spread of WMD and materials of mass destruction to terrorists and those that harbour them. Since then, events in the world have underscored the relevance of those Principles and the urgency of implementing them. "6. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and we urge all states which have not yet joined them to do so. We consider these three treaties to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and cornerstones of non-proliferation and disarmament. We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks. "7. North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution. "8. We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program. "9. We call on all States to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of WMD and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all States to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively prevent proliferation and eliminate the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed." Return to Menu 3. Global Partnership Against The Spread Of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction - A G8 Action Plan The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which we launched last year at the Kananaskis Summit, has made significant progress over the past year toward realising the objective of preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology. With our determined commitment, significant progress has been made : " Substantial sums have already been pledged by Partners towards their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to $20 billion over ten years ; " The Russian government has made welcomed decisions to ensure implementation of guidelines, in particular full exemption of assistance from taxation, duties and other charges. Other guidelines have also been intensively addressed ; " The recent conclusion of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into concrete actions ; " All Partners have actively engaged in determining co-operation projects to be undertaken, and some significant projects have already been launched or expanded, in accordance with our priorities identified in Kananaskis ; " Outreach activities have been undertaken to invite and facilitate non-G8 countries to participate and contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the Global Partnership as donors. We commit ourselves to an active programme to continue the implementation of the initiative and to achieve substantial progress by the next Summit. Our goals are : " To pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation principles ; " To reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to $20 billion over ten years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from Partners ; " To significantly expand project activities, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already underway. We will continue to review progress in initiation and implementation of projects over the coming year, and to oversee co-ordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps, and assess consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities ; " To resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation of all guidelines in practice, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of Partners, reflecting our co-operative approach ; " To expand participation in the Global Partnership to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries including those of the former Soviet Union that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as the Ukraine has already done ; " To inform other organisations, parliamentary representatives, and publics of the importance of the Global Partnership. Return to Menu 4. Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction - G8 Senior Officials Group Annual Report Our Leaders decided at the Kananaskis Summit to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Their Statement set the scope of co-operation projects under this initiative to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among the priority concerns they identified the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapon scientists. It was agreed to review progress on the Global Partnership at the Evian Summit. The Global Partnership Senior Officials Group, established to review progress of the initiative and to co-ordinate projects, has undertaken an active work plan to implement this initiative, first under the Canadian Chair and then in 2003 under the French Chair. In the first year of Global Partnership activities, the Senior Officials Group can report substantial progress to translate the Global Partnership initiative into concrete projects. At the same time, much work remains to be done, and the Senior Officials Group has outlined a challenging action plan to be accomplished before the next Summit. The Senior Officials Group's activities over the past year have focused on four objectives: implementation and translation of the guidelines, as necessary, into concrete actions and agreements; initiation and development of concrete projects; financial contributions in conformity with the Kananaskis commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years; and outreach activities towards non-G8 countries to expand participation in the Partnership. For each, the objective was to ensure that the Kananaskis promises were being translated into practice. In order to do so, work has been pursued with determination on resolution of outstanding implementation problems, successful negotiation of implementing agreements, development and initiation of concrete projects based on allocated funds, national financial commitments to raise up to $20 billion over ten years, and inviting third countries to participate in the initiative and contribute to projects under the Partnership. 1. Implementation of Kananaskis guidelines The Kananaskis Statement defined a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements governing projects. Implementation of these guidelines has been a primary task of the Senior Officials, and was addressed at each Senior Officials Group meeting. In the course of their discussions, Senior Officials noted the difficulties and obstacles that were hindering the initiation of projects, and have conducted an in-depth review of the outstanding issues related to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements required for projects falling under the scope of the Global Partnership. We welcome the important progress that has been made on the issue of tax exemption on the basis of high-level political decisions. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements include such provisions. Nonetheless, these agreements have yet to be tested in practice. Full exemption from taxes, duties, levies and other charges is essential for projects to succeed; progress registered in this field is positive and has to be pursued. Another essential issue for Partners is liability protection. The efficacious implementation of the guideline which states that "adequate liability protection from claims related to the co-operation project to be provided for donors countries, their personnel and contractors" has been discussed extensively by Senior Officials. All Partners agree that adequate liability protections are essential for project implementation, while recognising that the protections differ depending on respective national requirements. Partners reinforced the need to have adequate liability provisions in all bilateral and multilateral frameworks and welcomed progress in this regard. Partners agreed that there should be uniform treatment of donors in this respect. The guideline regarding "adequate access to work sites" has also been under consideration by Senior Officials. The new proposal to simplify access to sites by reducing prior notification delay from 45 to 30 days through a procedure of annual lists has been considered as an improvement on past practice though still judged insufficient by some Partners. It should be evaluated over the next year. Other guidelines such as monitoring, auditing and accountancy of funds, or the implementation of projects in an environmentally sound manner, and establishment of project milestones have not been raised as presenting problems. Some of these guidelines have been satisfactorily translated into bilateral agreements. However, the Senior Officials will duly address such issues as they may arise during the implementation of projects. The Senior Officials have also noted in their discussions the importance of the guidelines concerning the assurance that "the material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes" and "appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives". After one year, Senior Officials can report some progress regarding the implementation of the guidelines and welcome Russian efforts in that respect. They recognise that, given the importance of practical implementation of guidelines for engagement of new projects, sustained and broadened efforts in this field are necessary. 2. Partners report on the state of advancement of co-operation projects, and specific projects for new co-operation A number of specific co-operation projects are moving forward into their concrete phase. For example, in the chemical weapons field, the Gorny facility was completed and went into operation, and has already destroyed 400 tonnes of yperite. After the conclusion of an agreement, the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Kambarka can start in the next months. Construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for nerve agents at Schuchye was initiated as well as other related infrastructure projects. They are important milestones in the field of chemical weapons destruction. It is also to be reported that Italy and Russia have recently signed an Additional Protocol related to the Schuchye chemical destruction plant. A new stage in dismantling former nuclear submarines has been reached with the concrete and tangible results for implementation of new projects in Sa�da Bay and at Zvezda Shipyard in the Far Eastern Region, as well as the funding of other projects for dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Agreement has also been reached on a programme to end Russian production of weapons-grade plutonium and on acceleration of efforts to secure Russian fissile material and nuclear warheads, while significant progress can be noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia's plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on concepts for effective programme management and oversight. We look forward to completion of these negotiations. The safety and security of biological research facilities is being improved. With respect to employment of former weapons scientists, in addition to the continued efforts in the multilateral International Science and Technology Centre framework, new bilateral engagements have been initiated with former non-conventional weapons production facilities to assist in their reconversion to develop and manufacture commercial products. The Senior Officials Group has followed closely the developments of bilateral contacts as well as multilateral consultations that preside over engagement of new projects. Additional efforts should be made to identify and start new projects. Partners have had an active programme of experts meeting and exchanges, including visits on the sites and seminars for dealing with concrete technical issues. This was the case for the seminar of experts on ecological problems in nuclear submarines decommissioning held in Vladivostok, and the meeting of submarine experts organised by Russia in Severodvinsk, followed by informal experts meeting on the same subject held by the presidency. Interested experts in the chemical fields also met in the margins of the Organisation for the Prohibition Chemical Weapons Executive Council sessions to discuss plans of countries to fund projects as well as outstanding needs. The Conference of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative hosted by the European Commission in Brussels under EU, US and Canadian Chairmanship also furthered the aims of the Global Partnership by facilitating information exchange, outreach to other countries and co-ordination of projects. All Partners have engaged in intensive bilateral consultations with Russia to identify fields of co-operation and select specific projects to be carried forward. The Russian side identified lists of specific projects that were presented to individual Partners. These lists were studied in depth by Partners who have responded, others are still in the process of discussion of projects. They have all, while keeping in mind the full scope of the Global Partnership, addressed those priorities identified among others by Leaders in Kananaskis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials and employment of former weapons scientists). They have also taken into account the two priorities on which Russia has put special emphasis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned submarines). Despite all these efforts and active endeavours, Senior Officials note that for practical implementation of projects to progress as fast and as effectively as expected, sustained and broadened efforts will be needed. 3. Financial Commitments Leaders in Kananaskis committed collectively to raise up to $20 billion to support Partnership projects over a ten year period. Over the past year, this collective commitment has been translated into firm national commitments of up to: United States - $10 billion; Germany - �1.5 billion; UK - $750 million; France - �750 million; Japan - $200 million; Italy - �1 billion; Canada - Can$1 billion. The EU has pledged �1 billion and Russia $2 billion. It is also to be noted that Partners have appropriated in their budgets of FY 2003 adequate funds for this year's projects. 4. Outreach strategy and modalities Following the Leaders' invitation to other countries prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents (statement, principles and guidelines) to enter discussions with Partners on participating in and contributing to this initiative, and their commitment to review this question at their next Summit, intense outreach activities have been developed. These activities were driven forward by the Canadian Chair, which sustained its efforts in this direction under the new French Chair. Contacts were made with countries that expressed an interest, and information was given on the content, aims and work of the Global Partnership. Meetings with interested countries were organised in Ottawa. Following bilateral additional consultations, an information meeting, co-chaired by Canada, France and the United States, was held in Paris on 8 April in order to encourage and facilitate potential donors to participate in the Global Partnership. Russia briefed potential donors about possible co-operation projects on the chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned submarines. They were informed of the inclusive character of the Partnership and offered the possibility, having endorsed the Kananaskis documents, to make a formal announcement of their interest and their intention to pledge. The Chair indicated that the G8 would be ready to give due recognition to the new donors at the Evian Summit. Potential new donors were also informed of the possibility of having back-to-back meetings of the enlarged Partnership group with the G8 Senior Officials Group meetings until future structures are decided upon. A similar information meeting with interested countries was also organised by the United States in Washington on 25 April. Although the initial Global Partnership focus was on projects in Russia as stated by the Leaders, the Partnership may extend to other recipient countries, including in particular those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents. The Leaders stated the G8 willingness to enter in negotiations with such countries. In that respect, an official application was presented by the Ukraine. After discussion in the Senior Officials Group, it has answered positively, in principle, while recalling that the Partnership was still in its initial phase and thus focused on Russian projects. The Chair has expressed its readiness to enter into preliminary discussions with interested recipients willing to adhere to the Kananaskis documents in order to prepare for their future inclusion in the Partnership. Some partners are already pursuing relevant projects in former Soviet States outside Russia. While encouraging the importance of the universal adoption of non-proliferation principles, Senior Officials have been eager to underline the importance of Global Partnership and to publicise its objectives and activities to third countries as well as the United Nations, the European Union, the Non Proliferation Treaty Prepcom and others. In this respect, Senior Officials welcome the EU plan to organise an inter-parliamentary conference on Global Partnership in November 2003. This conference, to be held in Strasbourg on 21 November 2003, is fully supported by the G8 Partners and Chair, and the future EU Presidency, who view the event as an important step to provide information on the Global Partnership to parliamentarians whose support for funding the initiative will be essential over the ten-year period. Senior Officials reviewing their activities over the year since Kananaskis note the progress achieved in implementing guidelines, the advancement of new projects, financial commitments and outreach activities, while recognising that in all these fields, further work has to be done. All of the Kananaskis documents thus remain under Senior Officials Group consideration and review, as part of a global ongoing process in order to yield substantive results. Return to Menu 5. Securing Radioactive Sources - a G8 Action Plan 1. Background The risks associated with radioactive sources have been the subject of increasing attention for several years now, particularly by the IAEA, with respect to safety and possible radiological accidents. But 11 September 2001 highlighted the risk posed by the use of certain highly radioactive sources for malevolent or terrorist purposes, i.e. the exposure of populations to radiation, or the use of one or more sources in a radiological dispersion device. In either case, this could have a major psychological impact on the population, going well beyond the actual radiological or chemical consequences produced-which would themselves be limited. Consequently, the international community must imperatively concern itself with the question of the security of these sources. 2. G8 approach The G8, recognising the vital need to strengthen arrangements for the prevention of acts of radiological terrorism, desires to give a strong political impetus to the consideration of this issue. The Evian Summit provides an occasion for the G8 to express international awareness of this issue at the highest level, to reaffirm its support for the IAEA work in this domain, to call on States to mobilise to improve the safety and security of the sources they produce, possess, use, import or export, and to develop a medium- and long-term approach aimed at reinforcing the security of sources and the mechanisms for co-operation between States. The G8 welcomes the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources. This work, performed in close co-operation with the IAEA, can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area. The utilisation of radioactive sources yields important benefits in many peaceful applications (including medicine, agriculture, the environment, industry, and so forth). Conscious of the vulnerability of many States with regard to the control and monitoring of sources used in these applications, the G8 agreed on the following approach to strengthen the safety and security of radioactive sources: 2.1 Support of the IAEA work The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources represents an essential feature of the IAEA work. The G8 encourages as many States as possible to observe the principles contained in the Code when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, with a view to improving national systems for the control of sources. The G8 lends its political support to the Agency for the implementation of its action in this field. It undertakes to promote the application of the Code of Conduct, collectively or individually, when the revisions to the Code have been completed and approved, and to encourage States to request the assistance of the Agency in this sphere (see Document 1-Support of the IAEA work). 2.2 Support for the most vulnerable States The G8 States are mobilising individually or in partnership, notably with the IAEA, to assist the most vulnerable States in taking steps to account and securely manage all high-level radioactive sources in their territory, including the search for and securing of sources no longer under regulatory control. They call on the other producers or exporters of highly radioactive sources to do likewise. They will exchange information and consult to review progress achieved in this sphere. 2.3 Mechanisms for the control of radioactive sources The G8 undertakes to carry out a long term review of the means to strengthen control over radioactive sources and international co-operation in this sphere. The following avenues in particular are being explored: 2.3.1 Political commitments by States producing, possessing, using, importing or exporting radioactive sources to uphold the "principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources", inspired by the relevant sections of the IAEA Code of Conduct (see Document 2-Political commitment by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources). 2.3.2 Identification of the elements of the completed Code of Conduct that are of the greatest relevance in preventing terrorism and encouragement to implement them world-wide. These may include national registers for radioactive sources, national measures to penalise thief or misuse of such sources and national physical protection and access control measures (see Document 3-Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources). 2.4 International conference on radioactive sources The G8 welcomes the success of the International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources held in Vienna on 11-13 March of this year, which emphasised in its findings the necessity of improving the control and security of radioactive sources at the national level and called for international initiatives in this sphere. It supports the proposal by France to hold in France, in the first half of 2005, the fourth international conference on this topic and to include both the safety and the security aspects of radioactive sources, in order to review the actions undertaken and to map out perspectives for the future (see Document 4-International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources). This conference will also serve to support the actions already in progress (e.g. IAEA programmes, and bilateral and multilateral co-operation), encouraging all national and international players in their chosen course. Document 1 Support of the IAEA work The G8 reaffirms its support for the actions undertaken by the IAEA in favour of the safety and security of radioactive sources, and declares its readiness to co-operate with the Agency on this issue. More specifically, 1. The G8 contributes financially to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and is co-operating with the Agency through contributions in kind, within the framework of the programme for protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism, via inter alia the secondment of experts, training programmes, evaluation on request of national systems for the control of sources, participation in campaigns for the detection and securing of uncontrolled sources, and in technical co-operation projects for the supply of equipment for the detection of illegal movements of radioactive sources (as part of the fight against the illicit trafficking in radioactive materials). 2. The G8 members will promote - individually and collectively - the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, and invite States to work through the Agency for its application. 3. The G8 will consider requests for assistance from the Agency in response to a radiological accident or malevolent act, to secure the incriminated source(s) and, where necessary, to treat persons who have been radiated by these sources. It will also consider requests for assistance, as needed, for preventive actions (e.g. the search for and securing of sources). 4. The G8 will consider supplying to the IAEA the information at its disposal concerning particular emergency situations involving a radioactive source, or information liable to assist the Agency in dealing with such emergency situations where so requested. It will also consider similar request from non IAEA members. Document 2 Political commitments by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources 1. Radioactive sources are used in a wide range of applications, including agriculture, the environment, industry, medicine, research and others. There are estimated to be several million radioactive sources of all kinds and sizes disseminated around the world. The great majority of these sources present no serious threat, even if they should be handled with the customary caution: this notably applies to smoke detectors or instrument calibration sources. Certain sources, on the other hand, call for strict safety and security measures owing to their highly radioactive nature. The main objectives are to prevent malevolent acts (theft, sabotage, or transformation into a radiological dispersion device) and avoid radiological accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers that roughly a hundred countries lack the legislative and regulatory framework needed to control radioactive sources adequately. 2. The G8 Heads of State and Government appeal to the international community of States, calling upon them to: 2.1. Account for the sources in their possession on their territory, 2.2. Take steps (where necessary with the assistance of the IAEA) to secure all high level radioactive sources, 2.3. Search for, locate and secure sources believed missing ("orphan" sources). This short and medium-term approach being conducted by States at the national level may be accompanied by international co-operation aimed at the most vulnerable States. The work performed by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing, in close co-operation with the IAEA, a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area. 3. International assistance is being intensified under the auspices of the IAEA. This may take the following forms, and in particular: 3.1. Campaigns to search for and locate orphan sources, based on information gathered locally or from the initial producer and/or exporter of these sources, 3.2. Securing these sources on-site and, in extreme circumstances, evacuating them to specialised facilities, 3.3. Install appropriate instruments at border crossings and strategic points which aim to detect illegal movements of radioactive materials. 4. These assistance missions, which are liable to take place over an extended period of time, may be implemented with the aid of international financing (via the G8 Global Partnership, the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, European or national funding, etc). 5. The States that produce and distribute radioactive sources have a special responsibility with regard to the safety and security of these sources. The G8 initially, and subsequently the other producer and exporting States as well, will give consideration to the type and nature of commitment the radioactive source producer and/or exporting States might enter into. This commitment could take the form of an individual declaration by these States to the IAEA, in which they affirm their determination to uphold the "principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources". Document 3 Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources 1. The IAEA Code of Conduct contains points contributing to the safety or the security of radioactive sources, or both. In its findings, the International Conference in Vienna, in March 2003, also identified points that ought to help strengthen the security of radioactive sources and render terrorist access to these sources more difficult. The G8 proposes that these points be considered by States in implementing control and monitoring systems within their territory. 2. The G8 will direct a working group to identify those elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to prevent terrorists from gaining access to radioactive sources and to develop recommendations for national consideration on the implementation of those elements, in close consultation with the IAEA. These recommendations will take into account the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources and could consider addressing, in particular, the following: 2.1. Establishing a national register to track sources throughout their life-cycle, 2.2. Setting up an outline for creating a national mechanism for the recovery and securing of "orphan" or poorly-controlled sources within their national territory, 2.3. Establishing a series of guidelines with respect to the control of exports of sources, conditions attaching to them, and mechanisms (e.g. notifications) for monitoring these exports, 2.4. Developing national measures as necessary to combat malevolent acts involving radioactive sources, 2.5. Identifying possible measures to be taken by the State in order to safeguard and restrict access to sources, 2.6. Identifying measures that the State could take regarding the conditioning and/or encouraging the recycling of sources at the end of their life, 2.7. Putting in place a system which aims to detect the passage of radioactive sources at strategic points such as border crossings. Document 4 International Conference on the Safety and the Security of Radioactive Sources 1. The international Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources held in Vienna in March 2003, co-chaired by Russia and the United States, set in motion a process for reinforcing and accelerating international co-operation in the field of safety and security of radioactive sources, and more especially from the standpoint of security. But it also follows on from the previous international conferences on safety and security held in Dijon (France) in 1998 and in Buenos Aires (Argentina) in 2001. 2. Over the next two years, it would be desirable to consolidate the political impetus given to this issue in 2003 (through the Vienna Conference in March and the Evian Summit in June). A progress report should be drawn up on action taken to secure radioactive sources by: 2.1. The competent international organisations, e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Customs Organisation (WCO), Interpol, the European Commission, etc., 2.2. States, at both national as well as bilateral and multilateral levels: safety and/or security authorities, export control bodies, customs administration, public or private agencies or enterprises with expertise in the field of radioactive sources (management, detection, search and location, securing, etc). 3. Consultations should be conducted, after the Evian Summit, with the main States concerned in order to give substance to the initiatives launched. In particular, the proposals aimed at making sources more secure need to be refined: these could include inter alia recommendations made on the basis of measures contained in the IAEA Code of Conduct and of the findings of the March 2003 International Conference. Consideration will also be given to the need to launch campaigns to secure poorly-controlled radioactive sources, and to search for, locate and secure "orphan" radioactive sources, with international funding (mainly via the G8 Global Partnership and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund). National expert groups could meet to discuss these themes at the IAEA in the second half of 2003 and in 2004. 4. France will organise a fourth conference in the first half of 2005, which will draw up a progress report on the process begun in 2003. This conference could work according to the following guidelines: 4.1. Consolidating the IAEA's international efforts with regard to radioactive sources (via its Action Plan, Code of Conduct, assistance in the detection of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, campaigns to locate orphan sources, and so on), and States in their national initiatives, as well as supporting bilateral and multilateral co-operative ventures, 4.2. Evaluating the main projects in progress, 4.3. Preparing a provisional assessment of the campaigns to secure poorly-controlled sources (covering safety and security aspects), and campaigns to search for, locate and secure orphan sources. 4.4. This conference would be attended by all of the aforementioned operational actors concerned by this issue. Return to Menu C. Bush-Putin Summit Documents 1. Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir VP Putin on the New Strategic Relationship On May 24, 2002, We Pledged to Build a New Strategic Relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. We declared our partnership, and our commitment to work together to advance stability, security, and prosperity for our peoples, and to work jointly to counter global challenges and help resolve regional conflicts. We also declared that where we had differences, we would work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect. We have met again to reaffirm our Nations' partnership and our commitment to meet together the challenges of the 21st century. With the completion of the ratification procedures by the United States Senate, and the two houses of the Russian Federal Assembly, we have been able to exchange instruments of ratification for the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. The Treaty takes effect immediately. The deep reductions of strategic nuclear warheads that it codifies are another indication of the transformed relationship between our two countries. We will intensify efforts to confront the global threats of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, that threaten our peoples and freedom-loving peoples around the world. In this regard, we declare our intention to advance concrete joint projects in the area of missile defense which will help deepen relations between the United States and Russia. Return to Menu D. Official Statements 1. Interview of Alexander Yakovenko, Official Spokesman of Russia's Foreign Ministry, to RIA Novosti in Connection with G-8 Summit in Evian (excerpted) [�] We are also going to stress the importance of tightening the WMD (weapons of mass destruction) nonproliferation regime. This is a major challenge confronting the international community in view of a likely upsurge of terrorism following the recent developments in Iraq. At the same time, we believe that this problem is to be dealt with on a fully legitimate basis without assigning the arbitrary `rogue state` status to any individual countries. Any attempts to oppose WMD proliferation by force or by a threat of force may only provoke acceleration of nuclear arms race and further regionalization of this problem. Such is our position on this issue and we are going to stand by it when discussing problems relating to Iran and North Korea. [�] Return to Menu 2. Background Briefing on the G-8 Summit by Senior Administration Official (excerpted) [�] We also expect them to endorse an initiative to better control radioactive sources in order to confront the threat of so-called dirty bombs. We also are going to receive a report on implementation of the global partnership to stop the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, the partnership launched at last year's summit in Kananaskis. WE have succeeded in broadening that partnership to a series of non-G8 countries: Norway, Poland, the Netherlands - a series of countries and have made progress in implementation of new initiatives in order to address the issue of proliferation. [�] Return to Menu 3. Background Briefing on the G-8 Summit by Senior Administration Official (excerpted) Q: How'd the meeting go with President Putin? Was there something more substantive, behind-the-scenes, than we saw in the press conference? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was really an excellent meeting. They talked about a number of issues, some of which came out in the press conference. They talked quite a bit about proliferation; they talked about North Korea. The President expressed his support for what the Russians have been trying to do. The Russians are also talking to the North Koreans. Everybody is expressing to the North Koreans that it's extremely important not to build nuclear weapons, to live up to their agreements under the NPT and other agreements. So they had a discussion about North Korea; had an exchange about Iran, which you heard about. I think when President Putin said that our views were closer than they seemed, it is absolutely the case that there's been some bridging of the differences about Iran over this last two years or so. Particularly, there have been very good discussions between the Minister of Atomic Energy here, and Spence Abraham, the Energy Secretary, about how to deal with the potential for civilian and nuclear -- civilian nuclear programs in Iran being diverted to nuclear weapons programs. So they pledged to have those discussions continue. They talked about the importance of strategic dialogue. And what's really meant by that is an opportunity to talk broadly about issues before there is a crisis in a particular area. So to have broad scale discussions about, say, the Middle East; or broad scale discussions about Asia before you confront a particular issue there. And President Putin said, there are multiple channels there, ministers meet all the time. They're now also going to have a channel between the presidential administration and the National Security Council. So the Presidents, themselves, have a sort of direct line on these issues. They talked some about economic issues. The President mentioned again his support for lifting the Jackson-Vanik restrictions on the Russians. The President has been very supportive of efforts to ready Russia for accession to the WTO. But we do have some issues concerning agriculture and tariffs -- again, chicken and pork and beef. (Laughter.) It's kind of the normal business, though, of international relations. And so the Presidents talked about the importance of the agricultural commission being set up between Gordeyev, the Agriculture Minister in Russia, and Veneman in the United States. So that was the general tone. [�] Q: On Iran, what's causing President Putin to change his mind about this program? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say we're having more of a meeting of the minds, is the way I would put it, Steve. And some of it undoubtedly has to do with what the IAEA found when they went into Iran, where they found a much more developed nuclear weapons -- I'm sorry, a more developed nuclear capability than anybody had seen heretofore. And we've always been in the United States, as you know, quite suspicious of Iranian intentions and believing that the Iranian civilian nuclear program was really a cover for their larger, nuclear weapons program. That has not been a common view with everybody of the world. But the extent of the program that the IAEA found, I think you're going to find that there are some elements that are at least questionable in a civilian use, if not down right inexplicable for civilian uses. And it's getting peoples' attention. But we've also been having very fruitful discussions with the Russians about this for a couple of years. And I think what the Russians want is that they don't want to be disadvantaged themselves, in terms of civilian cooperation. But if everybody is clear with the Iranians that they cannot have civilian cooperation and pursue a nuclear weapons program, therefore, and that the Iranians have got to do something about verification and the like, I think we'll be able to -- Q: President Putin says he's worried that this will be used as an instrument of competition against -- how do you get around that? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it means that everybody ought to be equally concerned about this, and not just Russia, I think is the point that he's making. And we would agree with that. Now, the point was mentioned was here about British and other companies. There is some technology that we believe was transferred illegally, without knowledge of western companies, sometime back in history with the Iranians. But even so, there ought to be export controls by everybody. Everybody ought to be concerned about not allowing the Iranians to use civilian nuclear programs to -- Q: What's the chance of getting those export controls? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we're making some progress. In some countries, they're there, but it's a matter of better enforcement. And in some countries -- as you know with China, for instance -- we've been working on the issue of trying to get the Chinese to improve their export control laws so that they actually have something to sanction companies with. Q: The good relations between the two leaders was pretty apparent. I mean, they were making a determined effort to put aside differences. How does that carry over to the summit in France, and sort of the mood of that meeting, of all the leaders? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say one thing first, Terry, about the good relations between the leaders, because they do have good personal relations. But it is translated into a lot in terms of U.S.-Russian relations. They signed, or they exchanged instruments of ratification today for a treaty that I think would have been unthinkable just a few years ago with a Russian president, significantly reducing their strategic nuclear forces with -- in a document that is three-and-a-half pages long, that has overwhelming support of both legislatures and that's going to make a really big difference in moving the world from very, very large nuclear arsenals. That would have been unthinkable a few years ago. The kind of counterterrorism cooperation that we enjoy with the Russians would have been unthinkable, probably just a little more than a couple of years ago, with 9/11. We were sitting here talking � or standing here talking about the trade issues that we have, but it's a remarkable thing when you think that trade disputes, trade issues are the thing of normal interaction between states. So this is a relationship that, yes, it's an important personal relationship, but it's come a long way in terms of the substance of the relationship, too. As to Evian, I think the President's speech in Poland spoke for itself yesterday. He believes very strongly that the United States and its allies -- both traditional allies and new allies -- share a set of values from which we can proceed to make the world safer and better. And he laid out a very ambitious agenda for all of us in making the world safer and better. Proliferation concerns, a new proposal that we look at ways to interdict dangerous cargo. A very strong focus on poverty alleviation and AIDS and defeating the scourge of AIDS that is causing the continent of Africa, as well as other places, the flower of its youth, its ability to be prosperous. A very important agenda on NATO and NATO reforms, so that NATO can be an important force in fighting terrorism. And, of course, the war against global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. [�] Q: Did the President explicitly raise with President Putin this new counterproliferation initiative? And what did he ask Putin to do? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, it was a short meeting, unfortunately. We will raise this with the Russians in greater detail, but they did not talk about the specific initiative today. He just asked President Putin through our strategic dialogue to say to his people that we really need to take some serious looks at what we can do on the proliferation issue. And I should mention that it was actually President Putin who first brought up the proliferation issue and said that he saw it of extreme importance. So we will get there with the Russians. [�] Return to Menu 4. Press Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official [�] The meeting with President Putin has already -- has been preceded by some very good meetings in Russia, including by Putin's long-time associate, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who spent -- in addition to spending time with Secretary Rumsfeld, visited the White House, met with Dr. Rice and met with the President. We have the strong sense that Russia wants to put our differences over Iraq behind us; that Russia was not comfortable with where it found itself. And Russia wants to work with the United States and build on the very good relationship that President Putin and President Bush have. They will -- it's always dangerous to predict what they will discuss, but the natural topics would be the new strategic relationship and its prospects for the future, especially in light of the fact that both houses of the Russian parliament passed the Treaty of Moscow, since the Senate has provided its advice and consent. That Treaty of Moscow goes into force and the Presidents will mark that important occasion, because that is an historic document. They will talk about the way ahead. They'll talk about the challenges that both Russia and the United States face: challenges from terrorism, challenges from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And these are challenges that affect both countries' interests very seriously. They'll talk about the need for Russia � I suspect they will talk about the need for Russia and the United States to work together and to work with Europe. And the President will very likely explain his vision of the United States-Europe and a Europe whole, free and at peace, working together on a common agenda. Russia certainly has a place, and an important place, working with the United States on a common agenda. I expect it will be a constructive meeting. The two Presidents have always been open with each other, open when they agreed, open when they disagreed. American-Russian cooperation is strong in a number of areas: in energy, in space. And I expect that they will mark that -- mark that cooperation. So we're looking forward to a good meeting. They don't agree -- the two Presidents, the two countries don't agree on everything, but they've always had a good relationship and an ability to work through these problems. So we're counting on good meetings. They will meet tomorrow. And then we're off to Evian. Q: Iran? Will they discuss their differences on Iran? How will they -- will they be able to narrow those at all? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dangerous and -- it is dangerous and foolish to predict meetings that haven't happened yet. Q: -- you're here. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I am here, actually, to give you a maximum of information at a minimum risk of making a fool out of myself. And we'll see how well I do. Q: (Inaudible.) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Russians have expressed, in recent weeks, serious concern about the direction and extent of Iran's nuclear program. They have said this publicly. It's clear that they are concerned. We have spoken -- the President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and others in the administration have spoken with the Russians for quite a while about the problem that Iran's nuclear program poses. The Russians -- and Secretary Powell heard this when he was in Moscow -- the Russians are beginning to realize that the American concerns were justified. Those are words that Russians have used, and characterizations Russians, themselves, have made. So we have seen some good developments in Russian thinking. We hope that this translates into good developments in Russian actions with respect to Iran and with respect to North Korea. I expect, also, that the President will discuss his counter � his initiative announced today on nonproliferation, on counterproliferation. And, obviously, we will want the widest circle possible of countries at the right point joining with us. Q: -- what you think is the cause of the Russians awakening on this issue? They have long resisted American concerns about their arms program. Did we provide them with new information, new intelligence or new ways to look at this that suddenly made them realize that Iran wasn't completely sincere in its -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The IAEA reports, I think, were -- impressed Russia very much. And when they heard from the IAEA that Iran's program is more advanced than they had acknowledged, they realized that they had heard the same sorts of arguments from us for some time. Now, I don't want to characterize their thinking too much, but they said to us things like: we realize that you were right; we realize your concerns were justified; we realize you had a point. So I think it is a slow realization that this was not, in fact, an American effort to try to damage lucrative Russian commercial contracts, but was a genuine and serious concern about a serious problem. Q: Do you have time to talk a little bit about the nuts and bolts of the counterproliferation initiative? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's an initiative -- it's an initiative which is starting with a series of consultations with close allies and others. We've approached already the United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, Australia, and a number of other countries about this. The President mentioned only Poland because we were in Poland -- but, in fact, these countries I've mentioned have expressed an interest in being part of this. Now, what the "this" is, is a series of efforts to develop legal and actual capabilities to stop the proliferation of dangerous technologies and materials, and aimed at expanding interdiction efforts. I will tell you what our inspiration was for this initiative, and it's sort of the origin of our thinking. You may remember some months ago a Spanish vessel stopped in a very dangerous operation, a very difficult operation -- stopped an unflagged vessel that was found to be carrying Scud missiles for North Korea. It was a courageous action by the Spanish navy, by the Spanish frigate. It was successful. And in the end we discovered, as you'll recall, that we'd lacked the legal authority to hold the cargo and the cargo was sent on. That was not the favorite moment of many people who worked on this issue. And it was as a result of this that the administration started thinking about ways to develop new capabilities and groups of countries willing to develop legal tools and pool resources to actually prevent proliferation from occurring. We plan to get together with our close allies, with countries that I named and with others, because we want -- the more countries you have in an effort like this, the better -- in a multilateral way and working with countries individually to develop the tools we need so that we can succeed in stopping such shipments in the future. So we're going to be talking in the next two weeks, and working rather intensely. So this is an initiative that is being developed, and we will be working on it in the weeks and months ahead. Q: You said you need new legal authority, and who do you go to get that? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We may need -- countries may have to develop their own national authorities to do these sorts of things, and our lawyers are looking at different kinds of authorities that may be needed. I'm not a lawyer. I know that we're looking -- each country has to -- we will want to discuss with countries authorities that they think they need, authorities that they already have, and then we'll decide what we need to do. Q: Because that case was in international waters. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know. And so one of the things we need to do with the countries that are interested is to decide what authorities we need for actions inside territorial waters, inside national airspace, at ports, in the air, to get things done. So this is -- that's a very good question, and we need to work with all of these countries to determine what we need to do. Q: -- go back to the U.N.? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll see -- we will see what we need to do in a serious way to get the authorities we need. And those are the kinds of questions we'll be asking. This is a serious initiative to deal with a serious problem, and it has a real world aspect. I mean, there's nothing more real than shipping this kind of stuff and stopping it. It's not a wonk problem, if I can use the term; it's a real world problem and one which we're serious about. Q: Are you expecting any decisions tomorrow after they talk and have their news briefing? Or are they just going to talk about Iran and the nuclear thing, or is there something going to be decided? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they're going to talk about it. We'll see how the discussions go. This is a tough issue for the Russians, and if you follow the Russian public statements carefully, you will see that sometimes they're very forward-leaning publicly and acknowledging the depth of the problem; sometimes they're at pains to stress that it's not their fault. And I'm choosing my words carefully. So given that record, I want to see as much progress as we can get. But this is going to take -- we've been at this with the Russians and I think we'll continue the go after this with the Russians. Q: Will the President make a specific request of Putin? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get into the specifics other than talk about the topic. Q: How long ago did you approach these initial members of the new initiative? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Within the last couple of weeks. Within the last couple of weeks -- that's all. So it's fairly new. And we got -- the response we got from the British, the Spanish, the Poles, and some others was extremely positive. The reaction by -- if I could characterize it is: this sounds really interesting; we would love to be a part of this. The Spanish added a few things: this is great, we know exactly why you want to do this; boy, do we want to be part of this. Q: Now, is it a coincidence that the countries that you cited were all principal allies in the war? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those are countries we went to, but we are not limiting ourselves. We are not bounded by that. I want to emphasize that -- we are not limiting ourselves and using � a country's position on Iraq is not going to keep us from working with that country. Not at all. Q: But that is why we went to them first? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're going to a lot -- we're going to other countries. Without -- I don't want to name any countries unless I am sure that they have responded favorably. And so -- Q: That's one of the issues -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would not be accurate to say that we are only going to countries who were very supportive on Iraq. But I don't want to go further because I don't want to characterize the position of countries who may not want to have their positions characterized. Q: Who is in charge of this initiative? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Who's in charge? Within the administration? Oh, it's very much an interagency product of -- State, Defense, NSC have all been working -- and I stress working in complete harmony, by the way. Q: Where does the buck stop? Who's the coordinator of that interagency -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a presidential initiative. He's announced it, so people working -- Dr. Rice and people working on her staff have been very active. But State Department has been involved at every -- and Defense have been involved at every stage. I would say there's a very effective interagency troika of people running this, and they have -- when I say this is an interagency, I mean that, and it has been a very productive period of policymaking and a launch. [�] Return to Menu 5. Remarks by the President to the People of Poland (excerpted) [�] The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop proliferation. The countries of the G8 committed last year to aiding Russia and others in securing and eliminating deadly weapons that remain from the Soviet era. I welcome Poland's decision to join this effort. And I call on America's G8 partners to follow through on their financial commitments so that we can stop proliferation at one of its sources. When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies. [�] Return to Menu 6. Interview of National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice by Foreign Print Journalists (excerpted) [�] But I see no reason that Russia should not have very strong relations with a new Iraq, and important economic relations with a new Iraq. In terms of Iran, the United States has long said that there was a problem in Iran, that the Iranians were, perhaps, using peaceful -- what they called peaceful nuclear research, and nuclear � development of civilian nuclear reactors to mask a larger program in -- that was leading to a nuclear weapons program. And I think very disturbing things have been found by the IAEA. We will see what the IAEA report says about what Iran has been doing. But there are very real reasons to be concerned about Iran. Now, we've been in discussions with the Russian Federation about Iran for some time. I think we've made some progress in a better understanding about how to make certain that Iran cannot use its civilian nuclear programs for the advancement of its military goals. And we're going to continue to have those discussions with the Russians. Minister Rumyantsev and Secretary Abraham have had particularly fruitful discussions in this regard, and I think those are going to continue. [�] Q: Russia was criticizing for quite a long time U.S. national missile defense. But now, somehow, Moscow wants to participate in this program. What's your reaction? What's your position? DR. RICE: We're obviously delighted that Russia wants to participate. We want Russia to participate, because missile defense, we have always seen as, literally, defensive. It didn't threaten anyone to have � it doesn't threaten anyone to have missile defense. The whole purpose of missile defense is to deal with exactly the kinds of elements that we've been talking about here -- the rogue element, or the hostile state with ones, and twos, and threes of weapons of mass destruction, and the ability to deliver them by ballistic missile. And so, it is a part of -- the missile defense is a part of the response of the civilized world to the threats of the 21st century. What we had to go through with Russia was to break out of the mind-set of the Cold War that believed that large offensive forces and missile defenses led to an instability in the relationship. Well, the instability in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was not because we had large numbers of nuclear weapons and might, or might not, have had missile defenses. It was because we were adversaries. That was the instability. When the United States and Russia were no longer enemies, where was the source of instability? I think with the decision to move beyond the ABM Treaty with the Treaty of Moscow, which reduces dramatically American and Russian ballistic missile forces, nuclear forces, we have a new start on how to now create a stable relationship for the entire civilized world that takes advantage of all of the possibilities that we have, and the technologies that we are working on on missile defenses -- just one of those possibilities. And it will be, I think, when we and Russia are working together in that regard. [�] DR. RICE: -- the offensive forces and defensive forces were starting to come up, which you get into a position in which it looked like it was safe to launch a nuclear attack. Well, that was in a time when you had a Warsaw Pact and you had Soviet forces deep into the heart of Europe. And everybody -- nobody worried that just one day, the Soviet Secretary General of the Communist Party, General Secretary of the Communist Party, might get up and launch an attack against the United States. There was a fear that you'd have a conventional war in Europe, and that would lead, then, to an unstable situation. So people worried about this very careful balance between American and Soviet strategists. Well, who can imagine the circumstance under which you'd have a war in Europe today, of that kind, with Soviet forces heading across the German plain? It's just not conceivable. So we had to get out of that one incident and start to think about what missile defense could do to deal with today's threats, which is the threat of a North Korea armed with ballistic missiles, or an Iran armed with ballistic missiles. And I think once we broke the Cold War hold, a lot of countries really started moving in -- [�] Return to Menu E. Links of Interest 1. Press Availability with President Bush and President Putin � St. Petersburg, Russia Return to Menu 2. A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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