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RANSAC Nuclear News, May 30, 2003 Compiled By: Michael Roston A. Multilateral Threat Reduction
 A. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Russia will be full-fledged participant in G8 summit Russia is a full-fledged member of the Group of Eight leading industrialized nations, presidential adviser Andrei Illarionov said. "Russia's participation in the upcoming G8 summit in Evian [France] will be different from previous years," Illarionov told Interfax. "Russia is now playing the same role as the other G8 members in decision-making and in the activities of all working groups," he noted. The adviser said that this has become possible thanks to "the drastic steps taken by Russia, which have helped remove most of the obstacles to our full-fledged participation in the G8." These problems included Russia's foreign debts and ensuring the security of its nuclear facilities. "Since this spring, Russia has had its say on all financial issues discussed within the G8," he said. Asked about Russia's agenda for the Evian summit, Illarionov stressed that "Russia views the G8 as an important instrument for protecting our interests and determining conditions for development around the world." Illarionov said that the issues addressed at these summits can be resolved only through international efforts. Russia hopes that "the G8 will help it settle some of its own problems," the adviser said. At last year's G8 summit in Kananaskis (Canada) it was agreed to allocate $20 billion to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. "Most of these funds should go to Russia, which will also provide $2 billion for these purposes," he stressed, adding that "Russia is not begging for money any longer." Russia's funds will be used to dispose of chemical weapons arsenals and decommissioned nuclear submarines, Illarionov specified. Return to Menu 2. Destroying WMD Getting rid of weapons of mass destruction is a great idea embraced by all nations, with one implicit condition: The United States must pay for almost everything. June 1-3, President Bush travels to the French Alps for three days of talks with leaders of the world's largest economies and Russia � the G-8. This year's host, France, suggests focusing the summit on several major themes, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction � good advice, but no more than that unless the French president helps to implement already existing agreements within the exclusive club. The group's principals, the leaders of the world's wealthiest nations, need a reminder that worldwide nonproliferation projects demand of them real financial contributions, not just idle chatter. During last year's summit in Canada, the G-8 decided on an ambitious funding strategy to support nonproliferation and disarmament efforts in the states of the former Soviet Union, and eventually elsewhere. Under the arrangement, the United States would contribute $10 billion over the next decade, with the group's other charter members � Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom � plus the European Commission raising an equal amount over the same period. Disappointingly, the "10-plus-10-over-10" plan has only highlighted an unwillingness on the part of G-8 members to address serious nonproliferation issues. Paris, for example, recently announced that it had earmarked only $750 million for the nonproliferation effort over 10 years, a relatively tiny share given the size of France's economy. Most other members have promised as much or less, with one state committing just $200 million to date. All told, our wealthiest allies have identified $6 billion, three-fifths of their pledge, while the United States � on track to meet its funding requirement years ahead of schedule � will boost its nonproliferation and disarmament spending by about 14 percent next year, most of it from the Department of Energy and an already overburdened Department of Defense. Unfortunately, our friends' tightfisted attitude toward the 10-plus-10-over-10 plan is merely a symptom of a larger cooperation problem facing the United States. Despite Washington's sustained appeals to do more, our European allies have only reluctantly contributed to U.S.-led nonproliferation projects in the former Soviet Union. In fact, our European friends have collectively contributed a little more than 1 percent of the costs of building a billion dollar facility intended to destroy nerve gas-filled munitions in the Russian town of Shchuch'ye. Some European states, which stand to gain as much from the project as the United States have promised additional funds to the risky project, but none of the nominal contributions exceed $6 million a year. Few, if any, European capitals have yet to make Russia's residual weapons of mass destruction a spending priority. By contrast, the United States is on track to spend nearly $2 billion on worldwide nonproliferation and disarmament projects in 2004, with American taxpayers likely handing over $170 million on the Shchuch'ye initiative alone. Enhanced funding from Russia also will help prevent another "Krasnoyarsk" � a city in central Russia, where U.S. taxpayers recently funded a $100 million plant to neutralize volatile missile fuel. It will never be operated, because the Russians diverted the fuel to their space program before the plant was even completed � and never bothered to tell us. President Bush should not miss the opportunity to argue for larger European, Canadian and Japanese contributions; but Congress, too, needs to act. Proposed legislation would begin this process, making a portion of the Shchuch'ye project's funding contingent on foreign assistance. The House Armed Services Committee recently endorsed H.R. 1588, bipartisan legislation that would guarantee more than $70 million and match, on a two-to-one basis, up to another $100 million. In other words, the committee recommends creating a financing mechanism that would create incentives for other countries to honor their commitments to nonproliferation. A second provision in this year's bill would help enforce guidelines established in last year's G-8 agreement by creating incentives for Russia to open up its secret biological research facilities, some of which are suspected of harboring illegal weapons programs and others that would benefit from security upgrades to prevent theft. Another section would give teeth to the G-8 guideline requiring "clearly defined milestones" by requiring Russia to obtain and transfer to Washington land-use permits necessary to construct and operate disarmament facilities, so nonproliferation dollars are not unnecessarily wasted on facilities that cannot be used because of Russian red tape. Taken together, these and other elements in the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act would ensure accountability, promote transparency and improve nonproliferation cooperation in Russia,and among other members of the G-8 ,whose rhetorical commitment to eliminating threats from weapons of mass destruction has so far surpassed their willingness to commit real resources. The United States should continue to take the lead in combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; it serves our interests to do so. However, America's commitment must not become an excuse for other countries to duck their financial responsibilities. The funding formulas, requirements for accountability and incentive structures created in legislation the House are the best means of ensuring that our global nonproliferation focuses on results, rather then rhetoric. Rep. Duncan Hunter is a California Republican and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Return to Menu B. Nuclear Terrorism 1. FSB does security exercises at Krasnoyarsk region nuclear facilities The officers from regional FSB (Federal Security Service of Russia) department for the Krasnoyarsk Krai carried out jointly with other law enforcement agencies the exercises �Atom-2003� targeted to security enforcement at nuclear power facilities, as ITAR-TASS reported referring to the FSB regional public information office. The special operation to end terrorists was mastered at the Mining and Chemical Combine site in Zheleznogorsk. A �terrorist� group was missioned to get into the restricted access premises of the combine and take hostages. As negotiating, the extremists, acting in the name of an international terrorist organization, put forward political demands and threatened to kill the hostages. The special security force captured the �criminals� and set free the �hostages� within several seconds. Anatoli Kovrigin, the security secretary for the Krasnoyarsk Krai was positive assessing the special operation. Return to Menu C. Russia-US 1. New Detente to Die Young Last week Russia, together with France and Germany, reluctantly approved a UN Security Council resolution that lifted economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990, legalized the U.S.-led administration in Baghdad and allowed Washington to resume export of Iraqi oil to finance postwar reconstruction. After the vote, French government officials, including President Jacques Chirac, declared that the UN affirmation of the postwar reality in Iraq was not an endorsement in retrospect of the U.S.-led invasion. Moscow, which during the last several months of the Iraqi crisis had often echoed French opinions, this time did not copy the "no legalization" theme. The climbdown on Iraq that the Kremlin performed in the space of one week was too steep, too painful and accompanied with too much infighting inside the ruling elite to try to cover it up with empty talk about legality. The only Russian official who ecstatically declared the UN resolution on Iraq to be a "victory" was Vladimir Putin's foreign policy advisor, Sergei Prikhodko. During the run-up to the war, Prikhodko and chief of the presidential administration Alexander Voloshin tried desperately to forge a deal with Washington on Iraq, but ultimately failed, opposed by the united forces of the anti-American lobby. This time the pro-Western lobby succeeded, but the call was also very close. Just recently during British Prime Minister Tony Blair's short working visit to Moscow that was expected to close the gap between Russia and the Anglo-American coalition, Putin announced that he would not allow the lifting of sanctions until UN inspectors operating in Iraq under the guard of UN peacekeepers officially verified the liquidation of all weapons of mass destruction. When U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell came to Moscow on May 13 to press the Russians into supporting an early lifting of sanctions, the talks seemed to begin with the sides wide apart. While Powell was in Moscow, several Russian strategic bombers --Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks -- flew from a base in the Volga region to the Indian Ocean to simulate an attack by nuclear-tipped long-range cruise missiles on U.S. Navy ships and the main U.S. air base in the region at Diego Garcia. The mission by long-range bombers was coordinated with a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean by a large task force of Russian surface ships and nuclear attack submarines (sent to the region before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime), which simulated attacks on U.S. aircraft carrier groups. The Defense Ministry did not make much of a secret of the purely anti-American nature of the Indian Ocean military exercise and leaked the details to friendly journalists in an apparent attempt to influence foreign policy decision-making. Under growing public pressure to reform a wasteful Soviet-style military, the generals are desperately trying to retain the United States as their main antagonist, hoping this will result in a drastic growth in defense spending sometime in the future and help keep an extended armed forces structure at present. The apparent victory by pro-Western forces did not change the Defense Ministry's underlying anti-American posture. When Paris announced it would not use its veto in the UN Security Council, Russia was left isolated. Putin was persuaded that if Moscow continued to be stubborn for too long, the cherished summit with U.S. President George W. Bush and other world leaders in St. Petersburg would be ruined. But how long will this new detente last? This week an Iranian opposition group disclosed evidence of two previously unknown uranium enrichment facilities near Tehran. With the United States and Iran already clashing over the future of Iraq and the presence of Western forces in the country, a new acute confrontation seems inevitable. Russia supplies Iran with nuclear technology and advanced conventional weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles. After the vote in the UN, Washington does not need to placate Moscow as much as before, and pressure is mounting to force an end to the construction of the nuclear power reactor at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf. In fact, the Bush administration seems to be moving toward sending the Kremlin an ultimatum: End Bushehr or we will bomb it to bits anyway. The St. Pete summit may still survive the new controversy, but the strain is growing. Russia is scheduled to supply enriched uranium to fuel the Bushehr reactor in the coming months, while the U.S. is adamant this should not happen. Return to Menu 2. Real cooperation Considering all the blathering in the United States about Saddam Hussein's "now you see 'em, now you don't" weapons of mass destruction and expressed concerns over whether Iran may - or may not - have a nuclear-weapons program hidden beneath the guise of the construction of Russian-backed power plant, not too much has been said concerning weapons of mass destruction - or the materials with which to fashion them - that we know already do exist. And in large quantities. Russia and other former Soviet republics, as the inheritor states of one of the largest military powers the world has ever known - one of only two superpowers in history - must deal with the legacy of the Soviet Union's vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. And the resources it has to guard them are limited. In addition to actual weapons, the former Soviet Union has many nuclear power plants, reputed to be poorly secured, capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium or proving the lower-caliber material needed to make a "dirty bomb." One thinks of the people who occasionally die in the former Soviet Union because they accidentally came across radioactive or other hazardous materials - like the children in Chechnya recently who were actually playing with some, or the Ukrainians who died after warming themselves with radioactive canisters they found lying in the forest. If a nuclear weapon or biological or chemical agent is used by people with terrorist intent in the future, it is far more likely to have found its way to them from the stockpiles of the former Soviet Union than from any country on the "axis of evil." And preventing this from happening should be on the top of the agenda for the United States, Russia and the rest of the world. Indeed, it is Russia, not the United States, that is most at danger. Luckily, some in the United States have wised up to the fact. Former Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar have put lobbying for American assistance in securing Russia's arsenal - and in part destroying it - as a top priority for years. They have, however, had mixed results, with some in the U.S. government bizarrely questioning whether securing huge amounts of lethal weaponry that could easily fall into the hands of an enemy is worth the money - as if any amount of dollar savings could justify a small nuclear warhead going off in downtown Manhattan. On Tuesday, the U.S. Energy Department announced that it had agreed to construct two coal-burning power plants on the territory of the Russian Federation, in the cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. In exchange, Russia is to shut down three plutonium-producing reactors. The Energy Department is shelling out $466 million to two American companies to do the construction, and Russian companies will do much of the actual work. This is money well spent. The Russians were already prepared to stop production of plutonium at the reactors and destroy the stockpiled weapons-grade stores, but not until a replacement source is found for the power they supply to the area. The coal-burning replacement plants are to be up and running in five to eight years. It is cooperation like this that will really make the most difference in the "war on terrorism." One hopes that we see much more of it in the months and years to come. Return to Menu D. Russia-Iran 1. Minister offers US to join nuke deal with Iran In a surprising twist of the U.S.-Russian controversy over Iran's nuclear program, Russia's atomic nuclear minister on Friday offered Washington to join Moscow in building a nuclear power plant in Iran. "There is enough place for everyone" in building the nuclear plant in Iran's southern port of Bushehr, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said, according to the ITAR-Tass news agency. Rumyantsev added that with Iran planning to build the total of six nuclear reactors in Bushehr, other nations, including the United States, may join Russia which is building the first reactor. "We have made this proposal to our American colleagues several times during discussions on expert level, and they have been saying they need to think about it," Rumyantsev said. Iran's nuclear program has been one of the major sources of friction in the U.S.-Russian relations since Moscow signed a 1995 contract with Tehran to build a light-water reactor in Bushehr. Moscow has shrugged off U.S. concerns that it could help Tehran build an atomic bomb. Iran's nuclear program is expected to figure high on the agenda of this weekend's summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in St.Petersburg. During last year's U.S.-Russian summit, Putin tried to turn the tables on Washington by saying that the reactor Russia was building was similar to the one the United States planned to build for North Korea during the 1990s. Rumyantsev on Friday insisted that Russia was doing nothing wrong by building the Bushehr reactor which he said was scheduled to become operational in mid-2005. "Why should we stop the plant's construction if we obey the rules and violate nothing?" he said. While remaining defiant on the Bushehr deal, Moscow has recently issued strong signals that it shares U.S. concerns over Iran's nuclear program, with top Cabinet officials urging Tehran to sign an additional agreement with an international nuclear watchdog to make sure it wasn't developing nuclear weapons. The change of heart appears to reflect the Kremlin's desire to mend relations with the United States after their recent fallout over Iraq during this weekend's summit between Putin and Bush. Washington has recently toughened its line on Iran, accusing it of harboring al-Qaida terrorists suspected of being connected to the recent bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Rumyantsev reaffirmed Moscow's call on Iran to sign the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA that would put all its nuclear facilities under closer scrutiny. At the same time, he reaffirmed that only the International Atomic Energy Agency has the authority to accuse Iran of breaking the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Washington wants the IAEA to declare in June that Iran has violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by secretly developing a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz in southern Iran. "Only when we have facts, we could talk about the violation of the non-proliferation regime," Rumyantsev said. Return to Menu 2. Deliveries of Russian Nuclear Fuel to Iran to Begin this Summer The deliveries of the Russian nuclear fuel to Iran are expected to begin in the summer of 2003, a staff worker of the atomic energy ministry's press service said last Thursday in an interview with RIA Novosti. According to him, the article in the British business paper Financial Times published on Wednesday, May 28th surprised the ministry. According to its author, Russia will not begin delivering nuclear fuel for the Bushehr atomic power plant, being built now, until Iran fulfils several terms. The paper writes that, first, Moscow demanded from Teheran additional guarantees that this type of fuel would be used for peaceful purposes only, and second, requested that it signed additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would allow international inspectors to receive access to all nuclear facilities in Iran. "The statement of the newspaper is surprising since Russia has not delivered and does not deliver now nuclear fuel to Iran," pointed out the staff worker of the Ministry's press service. "We plan to begin deliveries, but first Moscow and Teheran will sign an addition to bilateral international agreement," he concluded. The point at issue is a document, which regulates the procedure of returning to Russia wasted nuclear fuel and which has been already prepared for signing. "It is precisely a key document, and the signing by Iran of a protocol with the IAEA is of a recommendation nature since Russia is building the atomic power plant in Bushehr in compliance with all international agreements, including that on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the press service pointed out. The staff-worker also stressed that this addition has nothing to do with the additional agreement with the IAEA which the author of the article mentions. "Even if Teheran does not sign an additional protocol with the IAEA, Russia will continue its cooperation with this country since it does not go beyond the framework of peaceful use of atomic energy," the staff member of the atomic energy ministry's press service stressed. Return to Menu 3. Russia suggests U.S. build Iran reactor too Russia suggested on Friday that the United States join it in building a nuclear power plant in Iran, calling it a way to ease Washington's concern that Tehran would use the Russian reactor to develop atomic weapons. As President Vladimir Putin prepared to host U.S. President George W. Bush, Moscow's atomic energy minister floated the seemingly improbable idea in an interview with Itar-Tass news agency. U.S. officials say Russian cooperation with Iran, part of Bush's "axis of evil", is on the agenda for Sunday's talks. Another agency quoted an official in the ministry as saying a multinational effort in building Iran's first atomic power station at Bushehr could ensure that Tehran's Islamic rulers stick to treaty commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. "We have asked our American colleagues this question a few times while having top-level discussions. But so far they have only said they need to think about it," Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told Tass. Noting that Russia was building only one reactor out of a possible six at Bushehr, on Iran's Gulf coast, he said there was plenty of room for U.S. involvement. Moscow is keen for trade profits from its long experience with nuclear power technology. There was no immediate reaction from U.S. officials. Bush and Putin are to hold talks in St Petersburg on Sunday. Washington, which questions the insistence of oil- and gas-rich Iran that it needs nuclear energy, has stepped up its criticism of Tehran since U.S. forces took over neighbouring Iraq in an invasion strongly criticised by Moscow. The United States wants the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare Iran in violation of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Tehran has signed. Russia has also expressed concern about Iran's nuclear programme. But Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said this week that no one could object to Moscow's involvement at Bushehr. Another Russian official said that only the United Nations could decide if Washington was right in saying the civilian programme was a front for developing nuclear weapons. Interfax news agency quoted a source at the atomic energy ministry saying other countries' involvement would help ensure Iran adhered to its NPT obligations: "This would increase control over the nuclear programmes," the source said. Rumyantsev was adamant that Russian help to Iran was above board and noted IAEA experts regularly check Iran's activities: "Why do we have to stop building power stations if we stick to the rules and violate nothing?" he said. Return to Menu 4. Russia-US summit may solve Iran, N. Korea issues The U.S.-Russian summit in St. Petersburg isn't expected to spawn any key developments, but could bring the two countries' presidents closer on working to defuse tensions over Iran and North Korea, an analyst said Thursday. The Sunday meeting of President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush also is "perfectly timed to soothe hurt feelings," said Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After rifts caused by Russia's opposition to the war in Iraq, the two leaders could reaffirm their intentions to jointly face common threats - terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, she told a news conference. The United States and Russia should prevent North Korea and Iran from developing nuclear weapons and selling them, the analyst said. A package deal on North Korea could offer this nation energy assistance in exchange for verifiable elimination of its nuclear program, Gottemoeller said. Addressing Iran, the United States and Russia should join efforts to persuade the country to sign the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the analyst said. Iran recently admitted to construction of a uranium enrichment plant and heavy water plant, which if completed, would boost its chances of acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Russia is helping Iran to construct a nuclear power station in Bushehr, having already built one reactor. On Monday, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant wouldn't be affected by the frictions between the United States and Iran. Return to Menu 5. Why Moscow won't back down Unlike what many American reports based on unidentified sources suggest, Russia does not seem to be bowing to American pressure to stop its non-military nuclear cooperation with Iran. On the contrary, Russian authorities have repeatedly stated their intention to continue such peaceful cooperation, as they did on May 27 when an Iranian Nuclear Energy Ministry delegation visited Moscow. Although Moscow's firm stance on this issue is not new, the timing of the recent Russian statements made them distinct from all previous ones as the American government has heated up its campaign against Iran's nuclear program. Hence, Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, commented on his country's construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power reactor during his talks with the Iranian delegation. In a clear show of "defiance" to the United States, he stated: "We will continue to fulfill our obligations despite the fact that our positions on this issue differ from those of [the] officials in Washington." Disregarding repeated American requests, including one made in May, to stop the Bushehr project, he stressed his ministry's determination to complete the reactor project. "The Russian side does not see grounds to revise its obligations with regard to the construction of the first power unit at the nuclear power plant in Bushehr." During their talks with the Iranian delegation, Rumyantsev and his ministry made it clear that worsening American-Iranian relations would not affect "Russia's cooperation with Iran with respect to the completion of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr", as Itar-Tass reported. For example, an unspecified ministry spokesperson stated: "There are no reasons [for Russia] to halt [the] construction of the first phase of the Bushehr Nuclear plant or cease future cooperation between Iran and Russia in nuclear energy." Not only that, but, according to IRNA, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry repeated its readiness to cooperate with Iran on building five more nuclear power plants, an offer made initially in 2002 when the Russian government released its plans for future economic relations with Iran. Russian-Iranian nuclear ties have received the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a Vienna-based agency in charge of the verification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Consequently, Russia's commitment to continue and to expand its ties should not be controversial under normal circumstances. However, the international environment since last year has been anything but normal. The American and British governments justified their war against Iraq and its subsequent occupation under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They justified their actions, although they had no proof to substantiate their claim of Iraq being in material breach of its obligation under the United Nations resolution on its WMD. Having Iraq under occupation, the American government is shifting its attention to Iran with the same objective in mind, ie, bringing the country into its sphere of influence through a regime change. Of course, there are fundamental differences between Iran and Iraq with regard to their internal situation and external ties and significance, which raise great doubts about the feasibility of such plan. Nonetheless, Washington seems to be preparing grounds to achieve the mentioned objective, probably through different means, but with resorting to the same type of allegations as it did prior to its war with Iraq. Such allegations are mainly the country's ties with al-Qaeda and its pursuit of WMD. The American government drew on Iraq's well-known WMD program in the 1980s to justify its unsubstantiated claims regarding that country in 2003. However, its allegation on Iran having an active nuclear weapon program is based on pure speculations and lacks any credibility, as, unlike the case of Iraq, there is not even a historical precedence to make such allegation. Moreover, Iran's nuclear program has received IAEA approval, clear proof of its non-military nature. Nevertheless, Washington has pressured the IAEA to declare Iran in material breach of its nuclear obligations in the upcoming IAEA meeting in June, although the February visit of the IAEA head and his inspector teams to Iran did not prove any wrongdoing by the Iranians. In particular, Washington has tried to portray Iran's declared plan to establish facilities to have a complete nuclear fuel cycle as a clear violation of its IAEA obligations and a proof for its pursuing a nuclear weapons program. This is notwithstanding the fact that having such objective and its required facilities to enable the Iranians to exploit their own uranium mines and to enrich uranium are well within Iran's rights under IAEA rules and regulations. Thus, Iran's two declared and under-construction uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz and heavy water production facility in Arak are not proof of its wrongdoings; the former inspected by the IAEA team in February. This is especially so as IAEA regulations require the declaration of nuclear facilities when they contain nuclear material, which is not even the case for the two under-construction facilities. In light of these realities, Russia's clear determination to continue its nuclear relations with Iran reflects not only its attempt to preserve its economic interests in Iran, but its growing concern about America's aggressive foreign policy. Undoubtedly, such policy has major security implications for Moscow. In particular, the Russians are concerned about the possibility of Iran's domination by the US, in one form or another, which could also lead to a long-term American military presence in that country. Moscow's loss of its Iranian strategic ally, if it happened, would seriously endanger its security at a time that it requires a long period of peace and security to revitalize its devastated economy. Such loss will complete its encirclement by hostile or potentially hostile pro-American states hosting the American military. The American government's behavior since late 2001 has indicated its pursuit of a plan to ensure its uninterrupted access to energy resources and strategically important regions, such as the Persian Gulf, its unchallenged power and its leadership of a unipolar international system. That requires eliminating the potential "troublemakers", the current and future "rogue" states. Given this reality, Russia should have every reason to believe it to be one of the next states, if not the next one, on the American list of targets if Washington restores its influence in neighboring Iran. Fear of such a scenario seems to be a major reason for the Russians to continue their multi-dimensional ties with Iran, including in the nuclear realm, to prevent its weakness and isolation, two tempting prerequisites for any future American designs on Iran. Return to Menu 6. America's Iranian Policy and Russia's Interests The contradictions between Russia and the U.S. on Iraq are not so sharp already, but the Iranian question is likely to take their place. According to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, U.S. President Bush plans to continue discussing the Iranian problem with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. It will also be on the agenda of the G-8 Evian summit, where Rice said Bush would discuss the steps that "can be taken to make certain that any efforts in which anyone is engaged in with Iran [...] are not actually contributing to the potential problem of a military nuclear program in Iran." The old discussion about Iran is changing its nature in the new geopolitical situation. This is clear from the words of William Kristol, editor of the conservative Weekly Standard, who wrote in one of the latest issues of his magazine: "The liberation of Iraq was the first great battle for the future of the Middle East. [...] But the next great battle - not, we hope, a military battle - will be for Iran. We are already in a death struggle with Iran over the future of Iraq." Prior to the war on Iraq, Washington promised Iran via intermediaries that it would not suffer the fate of its neighbour. Tehran observed neutrality and was quite reserved with regard to the U.S. However, the Iraq war is officially ended and Tehran cannot stay aside from the post-war settlement. General Director of the Centre of Contemporary Iranian Studies Rajab Safarov says that "new government in Baghdad will anyway be pro-Iranian," because of Iraq's Shiite majority (whereas most Iranians are also Shiites, followers of one of the two major Islamic religious schools). The American administration realises that it will not achieve stability in Iraq (and also in Afghanistan, where the Iranian influence is significant) without gaining control over Tehran. There are other reasons why the U.S. is trying to establish control over Tehran. First, Washington did not put up with losing its positions in Iran following the 1979 Islamic revolution. In 1977, Washington and Tehran signed a $24 billion-worth contract, which provided for the U.S. constructing 8 nuclear power plants in Iran within 10 years. Armaments worth $14 billion were to be supplied. The U.S. military enjoyed diplomatic immunity in Iran and any political decisions taken by Iran were agreed on with the U.S. Even now, with the absence of official contracts, the U.S.-Iranian turnover is around $1 billion. By way of comparison, the trade turnover of Russia and Iran, two strategic partners, was $803 million in 2002. A war for Iran's market is taking place. Washington is unwilling to let Russia or Europe there. It was under the U.S. pressure that the European Union did not sign the programme of trade and economic co-operation with Iran. This is basically the background of the current U.S. claims to Russia with regard to Russo-Iranian co-operation in the nuclear energy sphere. Second, Iran is a crossroads on the strategic ways between Europe and Asia. The North-South transport corridor opened last year and connecting India to Russia and west Europe via the Caspian basin runs across Iran. Large-scale transit of energy resources is carried out via Iran. Russia and Iran have plans of transit of their electric energy to third countries. They also plan to unify their electric systems via Armenia and Azerbaijan. At last, Iran's gas resources are the world's largest (after Russia). Its geopolitical role in the Caspian region is also evident. It is clear that breaking status quo in Iran will change the entire situation in the Caspian region, Central Asia and the North Caucasus and will directly affect Russia's interests. Therefore, the issue of Russo-Iranian partnership should not be confined to nuclear co-operation (and, in particular, the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant first energy bloc), as America is trying to do. Moscow is interested in maintaining stability in Iran and the whole region. According to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, "Russia hopes that the U.S. claims to Iran will not lead to a conflict like that in Iraq." Return to Menu 7. Federation Council official on US-Iranian relations Mikhail Margelov, the head of the International Affairs Committee of the upper house of the Russian parliament, believes that it is too early to make conclusions about the USA elaborating on plans of military operations against Iran. He voiced his opinion in an interview with RBC. "However the toughening of Washington's rhetoric towards Iran obviously attracts one's attention", the senator added. The position of the US administration is due to their fears about the increasing influence of Iranian religious leaders on the development of political processes in Iran, Margelov thinks. Accusations of Teheran having ties with al Qaeda have not been convincing. "Iran played a constructive role in the anti-Talib operation", he noted. As far as Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation is concerned, "it will never go beyond the framework of international obligations on the non-dissemination of weapons of mass destruction", Margelov said. He expressed confidence that this approach would not result in disagreements at the upcoming Russian-US summit in St. Petersburg. Return to Menu 8. Iran's Authorities Must Exclude Any Suspicions that their Nuclear Programme is not Peaceful Iran's authorities which have repeatedly expressed their readiness to help increase the efficiency of the IAEA guarantees, must undertake real steps aimed at excluding any suspicions with regard to their nuclear programme. Head of the Federation Council International Committee Mikhail Margelov said this, while commenting on the American allegations that Russia assists Iran with the development of nuclear weapons. Like the IAEA and other participants in the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Russia needs clarity with regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Therefore, the senator stressed, Russia expects an objective report of IAEA General Director Mohammad Al-Baradei in June. According to the senator, the Russo-Iranian co-operation will never go beyond the clear framework of international non-proliferation commitments. "I am sure that this approach will not bring about any differences at the Russo-American summit in St Petersburg," he said. Return to Menu 9. Russia does not Help Tehran Create Nuclear Weapons Iranian ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Shafee has called "fake" the words of American representatives that Russia helps Iran create nuclear weapons. "Declarations by high-ranking American officials that Russia helps Iran create nuclear weapons are frequent. Experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency have often given the lie to such accusations," the Iranian ambassador said in Vladikavkaz (capital of the constituent republic North Ossetia-Alania) on Thursday. Gholamreza Shafee drew the attention to the ambiguity of the American position as regards many international problems. "It is the United States which in its time gave Saddam Hussein contemporary weapons, promoting Iraq's further attack on Iran (1980-1988). Now the United States has attacked Iraq, groundlessly accusing it of having to do with the manufacture of chemical and bacteriological weapons," he said. "The United States obviously believes that time has come to 'put things in order' in Iran. But this line of aggressive behavior has no prospect for any state, including the United States," stressed the Iranian ambassador. Return to Menu E. Nuclear Industry 1. Ukraine to buy nuke fuel from Russia Ukraine plans to buy U.S. $280 million worth of nuclear fuel this year to reload all the 13 functioning power units of its nuclear plants, the director of the maintenance department of Ukraine�s national nuclear power company Energoatom, Vladimir Komarov, told reporters Tuesday. He said that last shipment of the nuclear fuel this year is expected no later than in November 2003. Since Russia�s TVEL, the state-run nuclear industry engineering and manufacturing holding, trades with Ukraine only on terms of advanced payment, Energoatom has already transferred $100 million and received nuclear fuel for four power units. At present, Ukraine operates four nuclear plants, which generate 75 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power annually, or 50% of the country�s total nuclear power production. Return to Menu F. Official Statements 1. Interview Granted by Russian Ambassador to the US Yuri Ushakov to the Newspaper Izvestia Published on May 29, 2003 under the Headline "My Predecessors Did Not Work in Such a Favorable Atmosphere" (excerpted) [�] Question: Many Washington experts claim that the topic of the differences between the US and Russia over the war in Iraq is closed, and this is the good news. The bad news is that at the next summit the two countries have nothing to offer each other, and that the agenda of the future summit is very lean. How would you comment on that? Answer: Yes, nobody regrets the fact that there is one problem less in the Russian-American dialogue. As for the range of topics of our cooperation it is more impressive and full than ever. In St. Petersburg the two presidents are to discuss how to implement the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty both countries have ratified. There is a prospect for real interaction in the field of anti-missile defense, and that is another topic for conversation. And the threat of the spread of mass destruction weapons and the joint fight against international terrorism are sure to be discussed in St. Petersburg. Settlement of regional conflicts is yet another topic. Finally, there are bilateral affairs. These are the ever more active dialogue in the energy sphere, participation of American companies in implementing large-scale projects in Russia. Outer space is an area where Russia is still head and shoulders above all other US partners. After the Columbia tragedy the functioning of the ISS depends on our cooperation, on the program of Soyuz flights. And of course the background to the summit, the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg, is conducive to discussion of humanitarian affairs. [�] Return to Menu 2. Official Spokesman for Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yakovenko Answers Question from Interfax News Agency Regarding Russian-Iranian Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Question: Could you comment on the statement by US Department of State press secretary Richard Boucher to the effect that Russia and other countries should stop any cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field? Yakovenko: As a sovereign nation that is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran has every right to cooperation with other nations in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Moreover, so far the regular IAEA monitoring activities in Iran have not established any violations by Teheran of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Russia is known to be helping Iran in building the Bushehr atomic power station on the basis of Iran's strict compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the agreement on IAEA safeguards. At the same time we take note of recent unofficial reports about military goals of the Iranian nuclear program. Russia proceeds from the assumption that it is only IAEA as a specifically authorized international institution can evaluate Iran's compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. In mid-June, 2003 in Vienna a session of the IAEA Board of Governors will hear, among other things, a report of the Agency's Director General analyzing the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran. Our assumption is that the Director General's report will be comprehensive and will remove any questions or concerns that the interested parties may have. Return to Menu 3. Official Spokesman for Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yakovenko Replies to Questions from Russian Media on North Korea Problems Question: What would you say about the level of cooperation with the PRC on settling the North Korean nuclear problem? Yakovenko: As strategic partners, Russia and China are closely collaborating on questions of settling the crisis on the Korean Peninsula by taking coordinated efforts in order to promote a solution to the "North Korean nuclear problem." This collaboration is based on the two countries' coincident approaches of principle to the situation in the region. We stand for the non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula and for the use of exclusively peaceful, political and diplomatic means and respect for the concerns of all the parties involved as solutions are worked out to the problems of ensuring security and stable development that exist there, problems that are not limited only to weapons of mass destruction. Naturally, the situation on the Korean Peninsula was on the agenda of the talks between President Vladimir Putin of Russia and PRC President Hu Jintao that took place in the Kremlin on May 27, 2003. Appropriate intentions were reflected in the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China that was signed at the summit level. The sides stated their broad mutual understanding on the modalities of solutions to the contradictions that had recently come to a head and agreed to continue to maintain close contacts and collaboration in the interests of the ongoing diplomatic process of comprehensive settlement of the problems of the Korean Peninsula. Question: Could you confirm that the so-called package plan of settlement of the DPRK nuclear problem that was put forward by the Russian side remains on the table? Yakovenko: Last January the Russian side drew up the fundamentals of a package settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem; they essentially consist in a sequence of synchronized interlinked steps to be taken by the parties concerned that would result in the DPRK renouncing its nuclear program in exchange for international security and development guarantees. Our partners showed interest in this initiative. What was noteworthy, Russian ideas figured in the proposals put forward by the Korean side at the tripartite talks in Beijing. At the same time, unfortunately, since Russia's initiatives were not put to use right away, time was lost, the situation grew complicated in many ways, and now more radical steps are needed in order to pull back from the dangerous brink. Nevertheless, the fundamental approach of the Russian side remains unchanged: we are convinced that it is only the removal of concerns in a "package," on the basis of a broad compromise, that makes it possible to achieve the goals formulated by the world community for itself with regard to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Question: Is the DPRK today an irritant in Russian-US relations, as was the case with Iraq? Yakovenko: Russian and US appraisals of world developments differ, to one extent or another, which is natural for sovereign nations. At the same time our approaches to the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula appear to pursue similar goals. They boil down to firmly ensuring WMD non-proliferation in that region, peaceful solutions to the existing problems and relaxation of tensions. As for the DPRK, that country and Russia have a history of diplomatic relations going back more than half a century and a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation that was signed in February 2000. The US-North Korean relations have so far not been settled, which cannot help affecting Washington's approaches to diverse developments on the Korean Peninsula. In these circumstances Russia is ready to play a constructive role in the settlement of US-North Korean differences, naturally, to the extent that Russia's assistance is needed. We believe that in this situation we have far more room for cooperation than was the case with Iraq. Return to Menu 4. The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Approves the Federal Law on Ratification of the Russian-US Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials On May 28, 2003 the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation approved the Federal Law on Ratification of the Russian-US Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials (SOP Treaty) signed by the presidents of Russia and the US in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The other day the law was passed by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The SOP Treaty is to become a major landmark on the way towards drastic reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the US. It provides for reducing the strategic nuclear warhead stockpiles of each party to 1,700-2,200 units by the end of 2012, which is roughly one-third of the level provided for by the START Treaty. The SOP Treaty fully meets the national security interests of the Russian Federation, and its implementation will become a solid contribution to strengthening international security and strategic stability. The Federal Law will now be submitted to the President of the Russian Federation for signature. The Treaty will take effect following the exchange of the instruments of ratification. Return to Menu 5. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on The President's Trip to Europe and the Middle East (excerpted) [�] Q: Dr. Rice, on the Russian part -- on relations with Russia, do you expect to bring up the subject of Iran? And what exactly do you want from the Russians on Iran? You don't really expect to drop Bushehr and other projects there? DR. RICE: Well, we're discussing with the Russians and have been discussing for some time the proliferation threat that we believe Iran poses. We believe that the recent findings of the IAEA on their visit to Iran will demonstrate that there is, indeed, a problem that needs to be dealt with in Iran. We will wait for that IAEA report. But I think that the Presidents will want to talk about what steps can be taken to make certain that to make certain that any efforts in which anyone is engaged in with Iran -- and by the way, it's not just Russia who is engaged in various kinds of cooperation with Iran -- are not actually contributing to the potential problem of a military nuclear program in Iran. We believe that we've had pretty fruitful discussions with Russia in recent months on this matter. Particularly, Minister Rumyantsev and Secretary Abraham have had very important discussions. And the discussions, as I said, have been fruitful and far-ranging, and I think the Presidents will want to build on those. [�] Return to Menu 6. Russia, NATO, and International Organization (excerpted) [�] With this in mind, it is useful to compare how the International Community is dealing with the two most serious threats to the global security today, international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since 9/11, we have made considerable progress in strengthening international efforts to defend our societies against the threat of international terrorism. We have not only dealt the Taliban and Al Qaeda a major blow in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world. With UN Security Council resolution 1373, we have established a broad set of obligations binding on all nations to block terrorist financing and denying safe haven to terrorist groups. We have strengthened coordination among law enforcement agencies and, in the U.S.-Russian context, engaged in unprecedented forms of intelligence sharing that have helped prevent attacks and shut down terrorist groups. In saying this, I am not suggesting that the anti-terror struggle is nearly over. Far from it. We have seen new, coordinated acts of terror in recent weeks, and Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda figures are still at large plotting new attacks. Yet, even though there is much unfinished business, the international norms and the tools for dealing with terrorism are well understood, and they are beginning to work reasonably well. The same cannot be said, however, with respect to our means for countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the case of Iraq, we and our coalition partners had to use force to topple a regime that refused to give up its WMD peacefully (which was the condition for the ceasefire at the end of the Gulf War in 1991). Diplomacy failed because the UN Security Council did not have the unity of purpose to insist that Saddam comply with its demands, or the means to make him comply short of war. While we consider the use of force in Iraq to be fully legitimate, we share the disappointment that a peaceful solution could not be found. The lesson is that we need to develop better tools to deal with the next proliferation challenges - Iran and North Korea - if we want to avoid the need to use force in the future. The cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is not working as intended. That regime is based on a simple bargain: if a state renounces nuclear weapons, it can gain access to assistance and technology for developing peaceful uses of atomic energy. Although a state must accept some safeguards and verification measures, the regime is based heavily on trust. What has happened? North Korea has cheated on the 1994 agreement under which it supposedly gave up its nuclear weapons by starting a covert program for uranium enrichment - and they did this many years before the Bush Administration came into office. Now Pyongyang has renounced the NPT and the North-South denuclearization agreement, restarted its plutonium reactor, and even claims it already has a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, there is new evidence that Iran is seeking to obtain nuclear weapons. Previously our concerns centered on the nuclear power station at Bushehr that Iran has been building with Russia's assistance for some years. The risks from that project were supposed to be reduced by Iran's reliance on Russia for supplies of nuclear fuel and a commitment to return all spent fuel to Russia. Yet we have now learned that Iran has secretly been developing its own uranium enrichment capability - with technology from sources other than Russia - which would circumvent the safeguards Russia has been trying to put into place. Secretary Powell's talks here ten days ago suggest Russia is coming to share this concern. So we need to consider what new tools, what new forms of leverage, we can bring to bear to stop these two countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, and to strengthen all the non-proliferation regimes. Do we need to impose stricter forms of inspections? Do we need to impose sanctions or other punitive measures if diplomatic suasion doesn't work? Should we accelerate our cooperation on anti-missile defense in order protect our countries against nuclear blackmail in the event we are unable to prevent proliferation? Do we need new strategies for our militaries, or for the new NATO-Russia Council, to prevent or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Russia has a major role to play in finding the answers to these questions Our joint efforts to fight terrorism and WMD proliferation are not the only areas where Russia's contribution is needed. The most immediate topic on the agenda, of course, is post-war Iraq. Success there � that is, establishment of a stable government that represents the true interests of all the Iraqi people, that does not threaten its neighbors, that is free of WMD - could mark the beginning of a new era of peace and progress in the Middle East as a whole. We are glad we have found common ground on the essential first step, passage of a new UN Security Council resolution to lift the sanctions. That agreement will help the people of Iraq, and will help restore confidence in the UN Security Council itself as we turn our attention to Iran, North Korea and other future challenges. I'm reminded of the Greek proverb that the measure of a man is what he does with power. The same goes for nations, too, and the measure of the greatness of Russia will be in how it wields its power in facing the challenges that currently stand before us, and how well it cooperates through the many international mechanisms that exist. Russia has a larger stake than most countries in helping to ensure global security, if only because geography puts it on the front lines in dealing with the dangers posed by North Korea, Iran, and by terrorism and instability in the Middle East and South Asia. In addressing these many problems, it is our hope that we can replicate elsewhere the cooperative spirit and new thinking that we have seen in the new NATO-Russia Council. Return to Menu 7. Japan-Russia Foreign Ministerial Talks at the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting (excerpted) [�] 4. Cooperation for Denuclearization Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that progress had been seen in the past few months in the field of the dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines through the lively efforts of the Committee on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and that he positively evaluated these efforts. He said that Foreign Minister Kawaguchi's visit to Vladivostok was also related to this point and that he welcomed the choice. In response, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi explained that the decision to visit Vladivostok had been made following a proposal by Deputy Prime Minister Khristenko to hold the joint chairpersons' meeting in the Russian Far East. At the same time, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi explained that the decision to visit Vladivostok had been made because she wanted to see the place with her own eyes in view of the fact that work on dismantling the first nuclear submarine is expected to begin there soon. [�] Return to Menu G. Links of Interest 1. �Do as I Say, not as I do� Nuclear Policy Return to Menu 2. Prime Minister Announces G8 Global Partnership Projects Return to Menu 3. Going Nuclear Return to Menu 4. New Nuclear Weapons? Return to Menu 5. Global Partnership Program Return to Menu 6. Strategic Plan � 2003 Return to Menu 7. Strengthening the Global Partnership Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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