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RANSAC Nuclear News, May 13, 2003 Compiled By: Lauren Arestie A. Nuclear Nonproliferation
 A. Nuclear Nonproliferation 1. Nuclear Nonproliferation Is Under Threat (excerpted) John Zarocostas, special correspondent for The Washington Times, spoke last week in Geneva with Patricia Lewis, director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Question: Dr. Lewis, what's the state of play on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty following the two-week preparatory committee review here? Answer: Well, I'd say things within the Non-Proliferation Treaty are in a very bad state in many respects, and certainly things are not boding well for the future. As you know there are five legally defined nuclear weapons states within the treaty - the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia - and there were three states outside the treaty, two of which have exploded nuclear weapons - that's India and Pakistan, and one country that is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons but has never admitted [it does], and that's Israel. There are lots of issues within the NPT about the way nuclear-weapons states are disarming [or] not disarming as the case may be, and there's this general consensus among the other states that they're not disarming rapidly enough and are probably not committed in the way they should be to nuclear disarmament. And from other points of view there's a great deal of worry about states that are breaking out of the treaty. Now early this year, in January, we had the North Koreans announce they were pulling out of the treaty. There's been a lot of debate as to whether that's actually legally taken place or not. They were not in the room, their nameplate was held in custody by the chairman because it couldn't be decided what to do about North Korea, and the whole issue of whether North Korea is developing nuclear weapons or not is still a very big issue and no one knows how to deal with it. The issue over the Iranian civil nuclear program has caused a great deal of problems within the discussions. The Americans are asking some very difficult and severe questions of the Iranians as to why they have such an extensive civil program. The Iranians have been trying to answer these questions, but I would say they have not satisfied the United States or many of the other allies of the United States. Question: A cross section of industrialized and developing countries spearheaded by New Zealand are asking the nuclear powers to do more, and to do more in the area of compliance and enforcement as well. The response from some of the P5 member states, such as the United States, is that "we are doing a lot," and they highlight the recent treaty with Russia, the Moscow treaty. Where are we here? Answer: Well of course, the Moscow treaty is a useful step. It takes a lot of weapons off alert, although how many are actually off alert is unclear, and it takes a lot of missiles probably into storage, but there is no real disarmament aspect. It is a good confidence step, and it is to be welcomed, but it is not a real disarmament treaty and, as such, doesn't fulfill their obligations under the treaty. I think there are a number of compliance issues. There's compliance with the treaty by those who have agreed not to possess nuclear weapons, and that clearly is eroding. It started to erode with Iraq and North Korea in the early '90s. We've still got the issue of North Korea. In Iraq, the situation has changed dramatically, obviously. But there are also now the concerns over Iran. A number of other countries were brought up as potential concerns in the future. What we are talking about is 1945 technology, and we are now in 2003. So this technology - which was available [only] to very advanced technical countries in the '40s and '50s - is now much more accessible to other developing countries. The material is not so accessible. But if they can get hold of the material or manufacture their own material, and do that through a civil program, then obviously they could develop nuclear weapons. [...] Question: There's concern [that] the biggest threat to security from nuclear weapons might be in a stolen weapon or a crude nuke being set off by some terrorist group. ... Is the system of enforcement and checks and balances by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and member-state cooperation like the nuclear suppliers group, sufficient to prevent technologies or weapons [from] falling into the hands of people who might be prepared to use them? Answer: I think the system is not yet sufficient. If it were sufficient, there would not be a worry about it. And this has been an issue that cropped up in the debate. It's clearly a very live issue and hot topic. There's a lot of concern, still, about the security and safety of facilities in the former Soviet Union countries, and how to cope with a possibility of leakage from them - whether it's already occurred, or whether it could occur in the future. There's big concern over countries that might be developing nuclear weapons in the longer term [and] whether they might transfer material. And there's a great deal of concern about the link to the transfer of missiles - which is now ongoing - and there's no treaty, there's no legal impediment [for] stopping the sale of missiles. Question: The United States has been concerned that some of this [nuclear] technology could find its way into bomb-making, also through the civilian nuclear programs. Are the safeguards adequate, and is the International Atomic Energy Agency a good-enough watchdog to prevent these technologies from falling into the wrong hands? Answer: I think the IAEA could do that if it had enough resources and were given the powers to do it. The problem is the agency is very underresourced in terms of the task it needs to do right now. And its hands are tied in terms of the powers it has. The "additional protocol," which is the new protocol to monitor compliance with the treaty, is a voluntary measure. And many countries have not signed up to it. And there are many other issues over the protection of fissile materials, which the agency is working on. But again, it's where the political will lies, and where the funding and resources might come from. [...] Return to Menu B. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. Arms Reduction Treaty Won't Leave Russia Unarmed The Russian-US Treaty on cutting strategic offensive weapons allows Russia to retain combat potential necessary for the destruction of any aggressor, Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, told reporters after a meeting of the Duma's Council on Tuesday. He said the Council had decided that the ratification of the treaty should be discussed by the State Duma on Wednesday. According to Mr. Rogozin, the discussion of this treaty, which is very important for Russia, was scheduled for late March, but it was postponed because of the war in Iraq. Mr. Rogozin stressed that the accord was aimed at strengthening the strategic stability and responsibility of both Russia and the United States for maintaining peace. "It corresponds fully to Russia's national interests and allows it to retain its combat potential, including the number of weapons necessary for the destruction of any aggressor," he said. At the same time, Mr. Rogozin noted that the framework of the treaty had been slightly expanded, particularly regarding the improvement and modernization of Russia's strategic forces. "The treaty contains provisions that allow us to withdraw at any time," he added. Mr. Rogozin hopes that the State Duma would ratify the arms reduction accord. Return to Menu 2. Duma Majority Is Expected To Favor Ratification Of Moscow Treaty MOSCOW - Chairman of the State Duma defense committee Andrei Nikolayev is confident that the treaty on strategic offensive reductions, also known as the treaty of Moscow, will be ratified by Russian parliament. "I am convinced that despite objections of the left-wing factions this document will be ratified by an absolute majority of the Duma deputies," Mr. Nikolayev said in an interview with ITAR-TASS on Tuesday. In Mr. Nikolayev's view, the Treaty of Moscow is of great significance for Russia because it is a legally binding document in accordance with which each party can have between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear charges on their deployed strategic missiles and heavy bombers. "It is no less important that Russia no has the possibility to develop its strategic nuclear forces proceeding from her own national interests," stressed he. The head of the pertinent lower house committee also noted that Duma members had submitted a large number of proposals to allow Russia maintain its nuclear forces at a level that would guarantee the country's national security irrespective of possible trends in the development of the international situation. The state Duma plans to consider ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed by the presidents of Russia and the United States in Moscow in May 2002 at the end of this week or at the beginning of next week. Return to Menu 3. Duma To Consider Ratifying SOR Treaty On May 14 MOSCOW - The Russian State Duma will consider ratifying the Russian-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR) on May 14, Andrei Kokoshin told the press on Tuesday, citing a Duma Council decision. Kokoshin is the chairman of the Duma committee for the CIS and the Russian diaspora and is a member of the Fatherland - All Russia faction. The U.S. Congress ratified the SOR Treaty in February. Return to Menu C. Russia-NATO 1. Russia Sees Importance Of Cooperation With NATO In Three Fields MOSCOW - Russia attaches special significance to cooperation with NATO in the struggle against terrorism, drug threat and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, said Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko in his comment on the agenda of the visiting session of the Russia-NATO Council that has opened in Moscow. In Mr. Yakovenko's view, "a discussion of the Iraq crisis by the participants in the Russia-NATO Council must not supplant the work that is being done by the United Nations in connection with the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council." "The United Nations are called upon to handle the Iraq issue," he stressed. "We have specific tasks which we plan to discuss,' the spokesman noted. "They are, in particular, the struggle against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threat of illicit drugs." Alexander Yakovenko said, "Ways to counter narcotics will be discussed also at the forthcoming Russia-EU summit in St. Petersburg." He noted that Moscow attaches great significance to international cooperation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. "We are interested in seeing Afghanistan become a peaceful, prosperous country, from whose territory no threat emanates of distribution of narcotics in Russia and other countries," said he. The Russian spokesman confirmed Russia's stance on plans for enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. "We do not think that the NATO enlargement mechanism is a way to ensure security of the world community," said Mr. Yakovenko. Return to Menu 2. Russia, NATO Discuss TMD Cooperation Program MOSCOW - Russia and NATO are coordinating a program of co-operation in the sphere of theatre of missile defense, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson told a Tuesday press conference while summing up the results of a Russia-NATO Council session in Moscow. "Just one and a half years ago, it was the most disputable problem in the international community," he said, reminding the assembly that Russian President Vladimir Putin had been advancing his proposals in the sphere. "We have carefully inspected these along with proposals from the USA and Europe and put them together, and are now working on a concrete program," Robertson added. Russia and NATO have achieved a breakthrough in the TMD sphere, said Robertson, who referred to the document as the Council's "flag-program." According to his words, the effort to co-ordinate the program eased tensions between alliance members, since all of them recognized new threats and the inadequacy of the existing response to them. The secretary-general stressed that TMD co-operation was linked to certain financial expenditure. "It is not a rhetorical exercise," he said. "Co-operation means financial expenditure for each of the 20 parties, and each has claimed to be ready to pay. A program is successful if well-financed," he went on. "I think we have managed to achieve a breakthrough and will be able to effectively co-operate in the future." Return to Menu 3. Russia, NATO Praise New Cooperation MOSCOW - Top NATO and Russian officials on Tuesday praised the spirit of cooperation between Moscow and the western alliance as the newly formed NATO-Russia Council met for the first time in the Russian capital. "We have achieved important practical results," NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said in his opening address to the council. "NATO members have benefited from the experience of our Russian colleagues." Along with the mutual praise, however, Russian officials reaffirmed Moscow's long-standing concerns about the possible deployment of NATO forces in new NATO members states including former Soviet republics on its borders and said the issue could damage arms control efforts. Russia has criticized NATO members for failing to ratify the modified Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which limits the numbers of warplanes, tanks and other heavy non-nuclear weapons in Europe. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the subsequent spread of regional conflicts prompted the drafting of an amended version of the 1990 treaty, which was signed in Istanbul in November 1999. Russia has also insisted that new NATO members join the CFE treaty to prevent a military buildup near its borders. "We are concerned about the deceleration of the introduction of the adapted version of the CFE treaty and discussions of limitations on military deployment on the territories of new NATO members," Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the joint council Tuesday. "If we fail to reach agreement ... a dangerous gap may emerge between new geopolitical and military realities and the existing system of international arms control." Still, the mood at the council meeting was overwhelmingly positive, and Ivanov said the meeting was proof of a "common readiness to work for the benefit of security in the Euro-Atlantic region." "The relations between Russia and NATO are becoming one of the pillars of the international security system," Ivanov said. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said NATO-Russian cooperation on theater missile defense and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction was intensifying, and said NATO's promise to help Russia eliminate its stockpiles of anti-personnel mines opened up a new prospective field for joint work. NATO and Russia set up the joint council last May to make decisions on counterterrorism, nonproliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, missile defense, peacekeeping, search-and-rescue at sea and other issues. Those closer ties have helped soothe Russia's concerns about the alliance's expansion plans, which had previously caused fervent Kremlin protests. Last fall, NATO invited seven new members, including the three former Soviet republics in the Baltics, to join. Moscow said it considered the expansion unnecessary but refrained from stronger criticism. Return to Menu 4. Russia-NATO Cooperation Acquires Practical Dimension MOSCOW - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov believes that cooperation between Russia and NATO, until recently a theoretical possibility, has been acquiring a practical dimension. "Steps already taken or yet to be implemented under the Russia-NATO cooperation plan are evidence of a new quality of relations between them," he said at the ambassador-level session Russia-NATO Council in a so-called "at 20" format. Ivanov believes cooperation between Russia and NATO in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles has been "intensive and successful." "The results of the Russia-NATO working group meetings are evidence cooperation in this sphere has a great potential," Ivanov said. Under the Russia-NATO framework agreement signed in Munich last February on cooperation in the salvation of submarine crews in distress experts have been conducting systematic bilateral consultations to develop bilateral agreements between Russia, on the one hand, and Britain, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United States and France, on the other. "Drafting of new agreements on military cooperation by Russia and NATO is the issue of the day," Ivanov said. He recalled that at the April 29 meeting of the joint working group Russia received a draft memorandum on NATO's assistance to Russia in disposing of anti-personnel mines. Russian specialists are now studying this proposal. "Russia will be prepared to sign this document soon. In the future we plan to expand our cooperation with NATO to other types of ammunition." Return to Menu D. Russia-U.S. 1. U.S. Ambassador To Moscow: Russia Should Not Contribute To Building Of Atomic Power Plant In Bushehr MOSCOW - Washington believes that Moscow should not contribute to the accomplishment of the project on the building of an atomic power plant in Bushehr (Iran), US Ambassador to Moscow Alexander Vershbow said as much at a conference, "Russia in Global Politics". Iran started work on uranium enrichment long ago, the ambassador stressed. "Iran continues building an atomic power plant in Bushehr with Russia's help. Spent fuel is supposed to return to Russia, however, Iran is conducting secret activities to use spent fuel for the production of weapons-grade plutonium," the ambassador said. The problem of nuclear non-proliferation is of vital importance today, Vershbow stressed. According to him, the actions by the US-British coalition in Iraq were originally aimed at a peaceful solution to the nuclear non-proliferation problem in this country. "Unfortunately, the UN Security Council's policy did not make Saddam obey our demands," the ambassador said. According to him, Washington believes it "tried to solve this problem legitimately." North Korea and Iran should guarantee the complete observation of the non-proliferation regime after the accomplishment of the operation in Iraq, Alexander Vershbow said. "Nuclear energy should be used only for peaceful purposes without any attempts to produce weapons of mass destruction," the ambassador stressed. Vershbow also expressed concern about North Korea's nuclear program. According to him, Pyongyang can start selling its nuclear programs just as it is trying to sell its missiles. The adherence to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of key importance today, the ambassador said. Return to Menu 2. USA Opposes Russian-Iranian Cooperation In Nuclear Industry MOSCOW - Russia should not give assistance to Iran in completing the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow believes. He made this statement at the international conference "Russia in Global Politics" in Moscow today. Vershbow remarked that in accordance with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, depleted nuclear fuel from the nuclear power plant in Bushehr should be taken back to Russia. However, the ambassador has information that Iran is making efforts aimed at receiving plutonium for military purposes. According to the ambassador, it is necessary to toughen sanctions and to use different diplomatic methods to guarantee non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In Vershbow's opinion, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not fully enforced. As a result, such countries as Iran and North Korea continue to receive support and technical assistance in the implementation of their nuclear programs. In this connection, Vershbow underlined the necessity of foiling any attempts to deceive member-countries of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Return to Menu E. Russia-Iran 1. Tehran Offers Conditional Assurances on Nuclear Weapons Program (excerpted) Gholamreza Aghazadeh Iran's top nuclear official denied in Vienna Tuesday that his country was working on an atomic weapons program - and despite the furor surrounding the Islamic Republic's nuclear capabilities, he told the UN that his country was not willing to submit to a tougher regimen of inspections from international observers. On the same day, the US Senate's Armed Service Committee - a group largely in the hands of the conservative republicans beholden to the administration of George Bush - approved a new measure that would allow for the testing and development of low-yield nuclear weapons. A vote on the issue is expected by September, a congressional aid said. Aghazadeh told the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA - the UN's nuclear watchdog group - that Iran's nuclear program was "only for peaceful purposes," a diplomat who attended the meeting said. Aghazadeh, however, Aghazadeh said further cooperation with IAEA inspectors would "depend on conditions... It was very conditional," the diplomat quoted Aghazadeh as saying. Aghazadeh was speaking before the 135 members of the IAEA during a closed door-meeting during which he told them that Iran needs its nuclear facilities to make its own nuclear fuel, the diplomat quoted him as saying. Aghazadeh, said the diplomat, spoke in general terms about Iran's energy planning and why the economic and environmental costs of oil in the long term don't make sense as the only energy source and "that they want nuclear in the mix." Iranian officials have said they have nothing to hide because their nuclear program is meant only to generate electricity, said the diplomat. The US has been skeptical of this stated motive because of Iran's vast supplies of natural gas. In Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said Tuesday there was no evidence Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons. Very sound evidence is needed to accuse anyone. So far, neither the United States nor any other countries can present it, Losyukov said, according to the Interfax news agency. Losyukov did acknowledge that Iran's nuclear program had some uncertainties, and that Moscow would work with Tehran to "add more transparency" to its program. As for Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, Losyukov said the work was "strictly in line with IAEA norms." The US move toward low-yield nuclear weapons testing was seen by many analysts as a forceful message to Iran to cease its nuclear program or face the threat of a possible attack from the United States - a peril that the Bush administration has grown less wary of brandishing since its war on terrorism began and its successful war in Iraq has been all but declared victorious. The Iranian issue is bound to come to a head as US Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, meet in Moscow on Wednesday, say diplomatic sources and analysts. The IAEA chief, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, is expected to deliver the findings he made in Iran last February to a closed-door session of the IAEA board of directors on June 12. Much of ElBaradei's activities since his visit to Iran, say sources close to the IAEA chief, have been to get Iran to sign accords that would make its nuclear program more transparent. One expert source familiar with the issue said that the seemingly protracted nature of the negotiations has proved to be "a long, arduous process," but that is was not unusual." He noted that, despite recent Iranian bravado about blocking nuclear inspections, the country "is undergoing inspections on a regular basis." By some estimates, the IAEA has inspection teams in Iran at least once a week. According to the source close to the negotiations, the results of the June IAEA proceedings, will not - at least immediately - be made public. A spokeswoman for the agency, Melissa Fleming, told Reuters that "inspections and analysis" of Iran's nuclear sites were still under way, and that the report to be delivered in June was not yet ready. "Were not yet in a position to make any kind of judgment about the nature of Iran's nuclear program," she said. Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear program is pivotal because Russia has helped Iran construct a nearly completed $800m 1,000-megawatt, light-water reactor in the western port of Bushehr, and has considered additional nuclear reactor projects for Iran. Bushehr, which will receive its first 80 metric tons of fuel this month, is expected to go on line in late 2003 or early 2004. The United States believes that the Bushehr project is a cover for the exchange of more sensitive technologies to develop nuclear weapons - something both Russian and Iran have repeatedly denied. Washington also suspects that Russian scientists, without Russian government approval, are helping the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program, and it wants Moscow to crack down vigorously on such activity. The United States government, and several Iranian exile groups operating in Washington, have accused Iran of having already tested its uranium enrichment capabilities at a secret site, which the US and the exile groups say fronts as a watch factory. If this is true, it constitutes a direct violation of the 1973 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. These exile groups, who have held press conferences largely at the expense of the US administration, have unequivocally stated that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. This US-side frustration culminated last month, according to diplomatic sources, when Undersecretary of State, John Bolton - one of Washington's chief arms negotiators visited Moscow to speak with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksander Rumyantsev to again try to dissuade Russia from aiding Iran's nuclear efforts. In the past, the State Department has offered Russia lucrative imports of US-controlled spent nuclear fuel - a failing pet project of the Russian Atomic Industry - but US officials were rebuffed. On this occasion, too, the leaders made little headway, and Bolton returned home empty-handed, diplomatic sources said. In Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said during his daily briefing Tuesday that the evidence collected by the IAEA and even Iranian statements pointed to an alleged weapons program. "I think there is a lot of information available on Iran's nuclear program. There are statements the Iranians have made themselves, information that the International Atomic Energy Agency has collected during the course of their visits," said Boucher. "And I think it is important for people to look straight at that information to face up to what it says - and it says that Iran, despite the economics, despite their protests, despite their claims, Iran is developing a full-scope nuclear program that it would not behove anybody to cooperate with." "And so we will keep making the case. We will keep making the point with the information that is available, and I would say increasingly available, that Iran's nuclear ambitions are much bigger than many had hoped," Boucher added. The tough talk from the State Department, however, meant little in the wake of Bolton's unsuccessful visit. In an effort to mollify western concerns, Moscow and Tehran drafted stipulations indicating that Moscow would be the sole supplier of uranium fuel - with the first 80 tons due in May - for the reactor, and would buy back the spent product to prevent it from being reprocessed for plutonium. But Iran's goals in the nuclear area have grown increasing bold and independent in recent months. In February, President Mohammad Khatami announced that Iran was mining its own uranium deposits. The IAEA's ElBaradei also viewed a site near Natanz, in central Iran, where several hundred hexafluoride gas centrifuges stand ready to enrich uranium. The site, according to Elbaradei's report, is equipped to build as many as 5000 more centrifuges, giving Iran the almost entirely indigenous capability of producing at least two uranium bombs - the type that destroyed Nagasaki - per year. The presence of this heavily fortified plant at Natanz - with walls nearly a meter-thick apparently to thwart a military attack - was initially discovered by commercial US satellite photography, which also revealed the presence of heavy water facility, a necessary component for the production of plutonium - another route to a nuclear bomb, the kind of which was used to destroy Hiroshima - near the Iranian city of Arak. Russia's agreement to buy back spent fuel from Iran in an effort to prevent proliferation is therefore in tatters. In recent months, Russian officials have begun to back away from their previous and repeated insistence that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful, and in March, Russian Atomic Minister Rumyantsev said he no longer knew Iran's native capability for producing fuel or weapons. In December, sources in the Pentagon accused Russia of assisting Iran in build the Arak and Natanz sites. But since that time, it has been revealed that much of the technology has possibly come from Pakistan, and possibly North Korea - an assertion that has incensed Khatami and others, who insist that Iran's own national capabilities were responsible for the plants. The source familiar with the IAEA's Iran work confirmed this. "I don't think they would have been that dumb," said the source. "Russia wouldn't have done anything so blatant. They have done this on their own - it's cobbled together from a number of places." IAEA inspectors, speaking anonymously, said they were "shocked" that the fundamental designs of the centrifuges at Natanz were of the type designed by Pakistan, an erstwhile, well-paid ally of the United States during its original incursion into Afghanistan during the first phase of the war against terrorism. "The question is, where is the factory that supplied the Iranian facility at Natanz?" one senior IAEA official said in an interview. "Is it in Pakistan, or is it in North Korea?" Iraq, with North Koran and Iran, has been bracketed by the Bush administration as "the axis of evil." Said Andrei Kortunov, vice president of the Russian Foreign Policy Association: "There has indeed been a certain change in Moscow's attitude toward North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs." Moscow, meanwhile, has expressed growing concern about North Korea's diplomatic brinkmanship, particularly its recent withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty - a route, according to one Russian Foreign Ministry source who requested his name not be mentioned, Iran may take in the future, especially with the presence of American troops in the area following the war with Iraq. [...] Return to Menu F. Russia-North Korea 1. Russia Regrets North Korea's Pullout From Nuclear Free Status Agreement MOSCOW - Moscow regrets North Korea's unilateral withdrawal from an agreement with South Korea on the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula. When addressing a news conference in Moscow, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov described this step of North Korea as deplorable. He then urged for more intensive politico-diplomatic steps towards the Korean settlement. The minister said it was not that important in which format the settlement effort would proceed - involving the United States and North Korea only or all the countries neighboring the region, i.e. South Korea, Japan, China and Russia in the first instance. "Russia has always advocated a nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula, North Korea's rejoining all the non-proliferation understandings, including the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the unconditional respect for the North's sovereignty and legitimate security interests," said Mr. Ivanov. Return to Menu G. Nuclear Waste Disposal 1. Kyrgyz Officials Fear Radioactive Spills BISHEK, Kyrgyzstan - Environmental officials in Kyrgyzstan are warning that a spate of landslides threatens to contaminate large parts of the Fergana Valley with radioactive waste. Killer landslides could spread radioactive pollution across much of southern Kyrgyzstan, they fear. Thirty-eight villagers died in a landslide at Karataryk in southern Kyrgyzstan on April 20. Landslides caused by rains occur annually. A landslide last May blocked the Maili-Suu River and posed a threat of radioactive floods as far away as Uzbekistan. This year downpours have been unusually heavy, and the mudslides they create are made worse by the deforestation of mountain slopes that has taken place over the last decade. Analysts now fear that toxic waste dumped 30 years ago at a disused uranium mine near the town of Maili-Suu could be washed away in a torrent of mud. One landslide has already taken place in the danger zone around Maili-Suu. Southern Kyrgyzstan has 23 landfill dumps and 13 slag heaps containing radioactive waste. The Mailuu-Suu mine produced uranium for the old Soviet Union from 1946 to 1967. It was finally closed down in 1973, but the waste was left where it was, buried in the ground or simply piled up in heaps. The waste is both radioactive and toxic, and lies dispersed over a number of sites, which were never properly sealed or made stable. Since then there has been a continuous threat of contamination, initially because of the lax safety standards of the old Soviet Union, and more recently because of mismanagement and under-investment by the post-communist government of Kyrgyzstan. The uranium dumps have never looked more precarious. The structures built to contain the waste are in dire need of renovation, and there are more mudslides every year. "In 10 or 11 years, the system for maintaining the dumping pits has been completely destroyed," said Kyrgyz Environment Minister Satybaldy Chyrmashev. "We are praying to God that there are no landslides at Maili-Suu." Just days before the tragedy at Karataryk, the Ministry for Emergencies and the Environment warned that further landslides could wash away several uranium dumps. The April 16 statement said that the damage from such an accident would stretch far beyond Kyrygyzstan's borders. On April 29, the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry appealed to the United Nations to invest expertise and money to avert such an accident. Most of the densely populated Fergana Valley is located in Uzbekistan, downstream from Kyrgyz territory. Anarkul Aitaliev, who is in charge of the uranium waste treatment at the ministry, says the danger to the region cannot be underestimated, "If there is a catastrophe, not only will the entire flora and fauna of the Fergana Valley suffer, but so will the three and a half million people who live there." Aitaliev says the situation is so bad that foreign aid agencies are finally sitting up and taking notice, "They used to think our appeals and letters to them were without foundation. Now our foreign colleagues say that measures need to be taken right now." Scientists from 55 countries met in Kyrgyzstan on April 16-18 to discuss how best to address the issue. Funded by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, meeting delegates recommended setting up an international body to lobby for funds. But the likely costs of stabilizing the uranium dumps has raised doubts over whether anything will be done before it is too late. Chyrmashev believes it will take US$20 million to fix the problem. "We need real money so we can start to do real work to save the region from a catastrophe," said Akylbek Kerimbekov, a manager at the AZAT company, which has been doing maintenance work on the waste dumps for 10 years. He believes that no more time or money should be wasted on conducting surveys of the sites, as there are enough Soviet-era documents to work from - the funds should go on repair work. "Unfortunately, this problem is talked about a lot, but no one is doing anything," said Kerimbekov. Return to Menu H. Nuclear Industry 1. Russian Nuclear Plants Generated Over 11.6 Billion kWh Of Electricity in April In April 2003 the nuclear power plants of Rosenergoatom Concern generated 11.646 billion kWh of electricity to surpass the amount for the same period last year by 1.342 billion kWh, or 13%, the utility's press center reported. Presently Russia operates 21 nuclear units of total load 14,303 MW(e) with 9 units undergoing planned outages and refueling. No violations of operational conditions and radiation safety are recorded. The background radiation at 10 NPP sites and nearby territories in Russia corresponds to the normal operation and does not exceed natural values. Return to Menu I. Announcements 1. On the Course of Implementation of Global Partnership Agreement Against Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction A regular meeting of G8 Senior Officials (SO) was held in Paris at the beginning of May to discuss the progress in implementing the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, established in July 2002 at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada. France, as is known, coordinates this work in the current year. The present SO meeting was the last one before the G8 summit scheduled for the beginning of this June in the French city of Evian. In this context it focused mainly on the review of the work done over the past year and on the preparation of an appropriate SO progress report on the GP to the G8 countries' leaders. Possible lines of activity in this sphere were mapped out for the subsequent one-year period until the next G8 summit in the US. The work carried out by the Russian side in coordination with other partners on the establishment of an international legal basis for cooperation, designed to secure the fulfillment of the obligations assumed at Kananaskis, received a positive assessment. Of great importance in this context will be the future Agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR), which is expected to be signed by the foreign ministers of the participating states on May 21, 2003, in Stockholm. This document can then be used as a guideline in the elaboration of bilateral accords within the GP framework. The tangible progress in advancement towards the aims set in Kananaskis was noted during the discussions. Nevertheless, as was stressed, extensive joint work will still have to be accomplished in the continuation of the switchover of the political decisions adopted by the G8 leaders onto a practical track. And the criterion for the success of the GP, in the Russian side's view, can be only the implementation of concrete projects in the priority areas of cooperation, particularly in the destruction of chemical weapons and the disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Return to Menu 2. Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Answers a Question from ITAR-TASS News Agency About U.S. Global Missile Defense Program Question: How can you comment on the Canadian Prime Minister's statement that the decision by Ottawa on participation in the United States Global Missile Defense program is being postponed? Answer: This is a well-considered and responsible position. It is necessary not to develop and build any new destabilizing weapon systems now, but to pool the efforts of the international community for preventing the proliferation of the already existing systems of this kind. In the first place it is necessary to strengthen the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile nonproliferation regimes. In the Russian side's view, attempts to create a global ABM system, on the contrary, contribute to proliferation, to a new arms race, including in space. We hope that together with France, Canada, the United States and our other partners it will be possible to take at the upcoming G8 Summit in Evian some new decisions bolstering the multilateral nonproliferation regimes and to develop the Global Partnership ideas, adopted at the G8 leaders' previous meeting at Kananaskis, Canada. Return to Menu 3. Remarks To The Conference "Russia In The New World Order" Thanks for the opportunity to speak today. I regret that I can't stay for the entire conference - my Embassy has a busy week ahead, with Lord Robertson and all the NATO Ambassadors arriving later today from Brussels for the first-ever meeting in Moscow of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Then Secretary of State Colin Powell arrives Tuesday night for meetings with Foreign Minister Ivanov and President Putin. These visits underscore the timeliness of this conference's theme, "Russia in the New World Order." Russia's place in the New World Order is obviously central. In fact, in recent years, one of the goals of U.S. foreign policy has been to encourage Russia's deeper integration into the institutions and structures that exist for dealing with the political, security and economic challenges of the new century. This has been based on the assumption that, with the collapse of Communism and Russia's re-emergence as a democratic, free-market state, we are coming to share the same values and interests that make real partnership and integration possible. In some cases, we have sought to strengthen and adapt institutions in which Russia already participates (such as the UN Security Council, OSCE, APEC) to make them more effective in dealing with today's problems. In others, we have supported Russia's accession (such as to the G-8, WTO and OECD) or the creation of new mechanisms short of membership (like the NRC) that provide Russia an equal seat at the table for addressing areas of mutual interest. So we are not against multilateralism; what matters for us are results. Our recent differences over Iraq, and the deep split that emerged in the UN Security Council, have prompted many commentators to suggest that we need to transform the institutions by which we manage crises in the 21st century. I would submit, however, that the institutions are not the main problem. Rather, what is needed is fresh thinking about the nature of the threats we face to international peace and security and the new tools that the international community needs to counter those threats more effectively. If we can come to agreement on how to deal with new and emerging threats, when the next crisis occurs, it should be much easier to achieve the essential unity and political will that were missing in the UNSC in the weeks leading up to the Iraq war. You have heard many times the U.S. view that the two most serious threats to the New World Order are international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are not new threats - the U.S. has been dealing with terrorism for over 20 years - but the global scale of the threats has increased. And the combination of these two threats - the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists - is perhaps the greatest danger of all. Since 9/11, we have made considerable progress in strengthening international efforts to defend our societies against the threat of international terrorism. With UN Security Council resolution 1373, we established a broad set of obligations that are binding on all nations - including blocking terrorist financing and denying safe haven to terrorist groups. At the same time, the victory of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan freed that nation from the Taliban regime that made the country one giant base for Al-Qaida. We have killed or captured several Al-Qaida leaders and disrupted the planning of many new terrorist acts. We have also dealt a heavy blow to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, another terrorist threat to Russia's south. And we have made great strides, working with Georgia, to root out terrorist forces and camps with links to Al-Qaida in the Pankisi Gorge. At the same time, we have strengthened cooperation among intelligence and law enforcement agencies to go after terrorist networks and sources of finance. This said, the anti-terror struggle is far from over. Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida figures are still at large plotting new attacks. We still have to deal with radical groups in the Middle East - Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and many others - that carry out or sponsor terrorist attacks against Israelis and set back chances for peace in the Middle East. Russia, as a member of the UNSC and the "Quartet," needs to do its part in pressuring the Palestinian leadership - as well as the Government of Syria that supports many of these groups - to shut them down. (As Russians never cease to remind us: there can be no double standards.) But, even though there is much unfinished business, the international norms and the tools for dealing with terrorism are well understood - and they are working. The same cannot be said, however, with respect to our means for countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the case of Iraq, we and our coalition partners had to use force to topple a regime that refused to give up its WMD peacefully (which was the condition for the ceasefire at the end of the Gulf War in 1991). Diplomacy failed because the UNSC did not have the unity of purpose to insist that Saddam comply with its demands. While we consider the use of force in Iraq to be fully legitimate, we share the disappointment that a diplomatic solution could not be found. We need to develop better tools to deal with the next proliferation challenges - Iran and North Korea - if we want to avoid the need to use force in the future. The cases of Iran and North Korea demonstrate that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is not working as intended. That regime is based on a simple bargain: if a state renounces nuclear weapons, it can gain access to assistance and technology for developing peaceful uses of atomic energy. Although a state must accept some safeguards and verification measures, the regime is based heavily on trust. What has happened? North Korea has cheated on the 1994 agreement under which it supposedly gave up its nuclear weapons by starting a covert program for uranium enrichment. This program began years before President Bush took office and dubbed North Korea part of the "Axis of Evil." Now Pyongyang has renounced the NPT, restarted its plutonium reactor, and even claims it already has a nuclear weapon. There are also threats that it will sell nuclear weapons to other buyers (just as Pyongyang recklessly sells ballistic missiles to rogue states all year round). Meanwhile, Iran has been building a nuclear power station at Bushehr with Russia's assistance for some years. The proliferation risk was supposed to be reduced by Iran's reliance on Russia for supplies of fuel and a commitment to return all spent fuel to Russia. Yet we have now learned that Iran has secretly been developing its own uranium enrichment capability - with technology from sources other than Russia - which suggests a determined quest to acquire nuclear weapons. It certainly calls into question the assumptions behind Russia's assistance to the Bushehr project. So we need to consider what new tools, what new forms of leverage, we can bring to bear to stop these two countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, and to strengthen all the non-proliferation regimes. Do we need to impose stricter forms of inspections? Do we need to impose sanctions or other punitive measures if diplomatic suasion doesn't work? Should we accelerate our cooperation on anti-missile defense in order to protect our countries against nuclear blackmail in the event we are unable to prevent proliferation? Do we need new strategies for our militaries, or for the new NATO-Russia Council, to prevent or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Our ability to find answers to these questions will be an important determinant in whether or not the New World Order turns into the New World Disorder. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and original member of the NPT and other non-proliferation regimes, has a major role to play in finding those answers. The fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation are not the only areas where Russia's contribution is needed. The most immediate topic on the agenda, of course, is post-war Iraq. Success there - that is, establishment of a stable government that represents the true interests of all the Iraqi people, that does not threaten its neighbors, that is free of WMD - could mark the beginning of a new era of peace and progress in the Middle East as a whole. So we hope we can find common ground on the essential first step, passage of a new UN Security Council resolution to lift the sanctions and to define the UN's role in building stability and democracy in Iraq. Agreement on that resolution will help the people of Iraq, and help restore confidence in the UN Security Council itself as we turn our attention to Iran, North Korea and other future challenges. Return to Menu 4. RIA Novosti's Interview With Spokesman Of Russia's Ministry Of Foreign Affairs On An Upcoming Visit To Moscow By Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary Of State Question: What are the priorities of Mr. Colin Powell's forthcoming visit to Moscow? Answer: Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, will appear in Moscow on a routine visit, May 14-15, in compliance with an available understanding. He will meet Igor Ivanov, Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the negotiation table in several rounds of talks. The Parties proceed, above all, from a priority task - to further strengthen the partnerly basis of Russo-US relations, and guarantee progress of, and predictable developments in those relations, which are among the key factors of global security and stability. Russian-US summitry is timed to the upcoming St. Petersburg tricentennial celebrations and the nearest of the regular G8 summits, due in Evian, France. Those top-level Russian-US contacts mean to give an impetus to bilateral interaction in every sphere, and preparations for such contacts will be the principal goal of the Ivanov-Powell talks. The negotiators will analyze the entire range of issues on the current Russian-US agenda - in particular, strengthening strategic stability and mass destruction weapons nonproliferation, combat against international terrorism, team efforts to settle regional conflicts, and promotion of bilateral contacts and mutually lucrative economic partnership. The role of the United Nations and the entire international community in postwar Iraqi rehabilitation will be among matters in the foreground, and that is quite natural. Question: The negotiators - foreign political chiefs of the two Great Powers - can be expected to discuss global problems, among others on the agenda. Answer: You are right. Among other matters, priority will be given to issues pertaining to strategic stability, security and nonproliferation. To bring to final success ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive reductions, signed in Moscow, will be one of the key issues. The US Senate ratified it this past March. We hope the State Duma will ratify it within May. Next come analyses of the ways and means to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals in compliance with the treaty. The negotiators will go on discussing cooperation in anti-missile defense. Detailed debates are envisaged of the present state of, and further prospects for an alliance against mass destruction weapons proliferation. International legal mechanisms of nonproliferation must be buttressed, and are not to be undermined by unilateral steps. We regard that as key aspect of the problem. The negotiators will analyze the implementation of a G8 Kananaskis summit initiative for global partnership against proliferation of mass destruction arms and materials. Everyone sees how important the success of that initiative will be from the viewpoint of counteracting the interconnected problems of WMD proliferation and international terrorism. President Vladimir Putin explicitly defined our priorities in that sphere - utilization of discarded submarines, and chemical arsenal destruction. There is another key aspect of the problem. That is further implementation of the bilateral Nunn-Lugar program. Russia has been receiving assistance on that program for ten years now to dispose of its mass destruction arsenals and strategic carriers as it reduces them in compliance with its international obligations. The negotiators will discuss the implementation of summit understandings for a new nature of Russia's relations with NATO - in particular, in the context of a NATO-Russia Council session, soon to gather in Madrid at a ministerial level. Question: Under what angle will Igor Ivanov and Colin Powell regard burning topics on the international agenda? Answer: Developments round the North Korean nuclear program are among the most acute issues. Russia is consistently working for political and diplomatic settlement. Nuclear-free status of the Korea peninsula, and safe progress of the two Korean states are the final goals of such settlement. We look forward to a detailed opinion exchange - mainly in the context of US-North Korean-Chinese consultations, which have opened in Beijing to find a way to peaceful crisis settlement. If necessary, Russia is willing to join the negotiation process. The Parties will exchange opinions on principal global and regional issues - certainly including developments round Iraq after the coalition's armed action. As for Iraqi post-conflict rehabilitation, here Russia is consistently arguing for the Iraqi settlement process to return as soon as possible into the international legal channel with the United Nations and its Security Council to play crucial part. The negotiators also intend to discuss current humanitarian developments in Iraq. It will promote the interests of all members of the global community to reach an accord on universally acceptable terms of UN participation in the many matters pertaining to the Iraqi situation. That is the point from which we proceed. The Parties will carry on discussion of team efforts for Mideastern settlement. To urgently implement the roadmap, which the international mediating quartet has made public, and to launch implementation monitoring are part and parcel of such efforts. Afghan developments are also essential among global and regional issues - in particular, Russian-US alliance against the drug threat coming from Afghanistan. The negotiators will also analyze the progress of Russian-US alliance on a bilateral and multilateral footing against international terrorism and other latest challenges; and the two countries' prospects for closer coordination of efforts to repulse the terrorist threat as connected with the use of mass destruction weapons, and to block the channels of terrorist financing. Question: To what extent will the negotiators tackle bilateral relations? Answer: They will have detailed discussions of bilateral economic cooperation, with an emphasis on energy and banking dialogues and high technology cooperation - in particular, for civil-oriented space efforts. The Parties intend to evaluate negotiation prospects for Russia to join the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD, for full membership of the international commission against money laundering, and to finally get out of the action of the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment. Igor Ivanov and Colin Powell will certainly regard other topical aspects of bilateral relations, as well. Return to Menu 5. U.S. Consulted Russia and China Over Iranian Nuclear Facilities Question: Have governments other than the Russian government assisted -- either wittingly or unwittingly -- in the development of Iran's nuclear program? Answer: The United States has made clear to friends, allies, and partners its strong concerns about Iran's ambitious pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, and have called for the strictest possible enforcement of national and multilateral nuclear export controls with regard to Iran. The United States is engaged in frequent and high-level discussions with Russia to share our strong concerns about Iran's nuclear program. Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly raised with senior Russian officials our view that Russia should reconsider its ongoing cooperation with Iran and disavow any additional cooperation. . Russia agrees that we share a mutual interest in ensuring that Iran abides by its Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia continues nuclear cooperation with Iran and we will continue to discuss these issues at senior levels with Moscow. We have also held discussions with China regarding its past nuclear cooperation with Iran and have urged China to ensure that Chinese entities are not still aiding Iran's nuclear program. In our discussions with China leading up to the 1997 U.S.-China Summit, China undertook a number of important nuclear non-proliferation commitments, including agreeing not to undertake new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete within a relatively short time two existing contracts for non-sensitive assistance. China also agreed to cancel cooperation on a uranium conversion facility. We also believe that Iran attempts to support its nuclear program via covert procurement efforts. All members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, except Russia, have agreed in principle not to provide nuclear cooperation to Iran. Most have put in place strong export control policies, including catch-all controls, and are willing to exercise this option to deny nuclear-related exports to Iran. Unfortunately, countries that are developing clandestine nuclear programs typically employ illicit procurement tactics to circumvent export controls, including use of front companies, falsification of end use or end user information, and use of third countries as intermediaries. In this way, Iran can target any state with both nuclear or dual-use technology, and it important that all states with such technology be alert to such attempts. Return to Menu J. Links of Interest 1. Agency Faulted On Radioactive Matter Return to Menu 2. Editorial: Here's the Way to Find The Weapons Return to Menu 3. Statement By The Delegation Of The Russian Federation At The Second Session Of The Preparatory Committee For The 2005 Review Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons Return to Menu 4. Deadly Germs at Home in Russia Return to Menu 5. Index of Major U.S. Nonproliferation Programs Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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