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RANSAC Nuclear News, May 9, 2003 Compiled By: Lauren Arestie A. Cooperative Threat Reduction
 A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Senate Committee Approves Bush Nuclear Weapons Objectives WASHINGTON - In passing a $400 billion defense budget for fiscal 2004 yesterday, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved new measures for developing and testing nuclear weapons that were sought by the Bush administration. The marked-up bill, the largest ever, will now go before the full Senate for consideration. The House Armed Services Committee is expected to complete its companion bill next week and approve similar, if not the same, measures. Last year, Democrats, who then controlled the Senate, beat back a number of similar measures proposed by the Bush administration. Now Republicans control both houses, and the recent committee actions suggest that most, if not all, of the Bush administration's nuclear weapons-related requests will prevail. "The president got most of what he wanted," said Steve LaMontagne, a research analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, noting that two measures approved by the Senate committee related to U.S. aid for nuclear and chemical weapons elimination abroad could conflict with language in the House bill. In perhaps the most controversial of the nuclear weapons-related measures, the Senate committee authorized a repeal to a 1994 ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has sought the repeal so it can explore designing new weapons to use against facilities containing chemical and biological agents, as well as deeply buried, hardened targets. Critics have charged such activity would undermine international nuclear nonproliferation efforts and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty . A House Armed Services subcommittee also approved the repeal this week, but the full committee may agree to some limitations under a compromise now under negotiation with the ban's original co-author, Representative John Spratt (R-S.C.). The Senate committee also authorized $15 million to continue a feasibility study on a system called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and $6 million for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, which aims at improving earth-penetrating weapons. The Senate committee also approved an Energy Department request to reduce the time it would take to prepare for a nuclear weapon test from 32 months to 18 months. Analysts say the move suggests the administration might be contemplating testing new low-yield nuclear weapons. Bush administration officials, however, have said there are no plans to resume testing and that shortening the test readiness time is only a contingency measure. The United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. Critics say the move could undermine international efforts to discourage nuclear testing that is banned by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a measure that has not yet entered into force, and one that President George W. Bush has indicated he will not ratify. The Senate committee also approved two measures related to threat reduction aid outside of the United States, items that apparently do not appear in the House bill. A waiver authorizing funding for chemical weapons destruction in the former Soviet Union garnered a one-year extension. The waiver, which was approved last year, would allow fiscal 2004 funding to be spent on the Russian chemical weapons demilitarization program at Shchuchye in the event that Russia does not meet six conditions required in another U.S. law. Experts say the Defense Department is unlikely to certify that Russia has met all of the conditions, which include facilitating U.S. verification of destruction activities there and complying with all relevant arms control agreements, and so, without the waiver, chemical weapons destruction activities at Shchuchye would end when fiscal 2003 money runs out. Last year's extension was fought and defeated by Representative Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), who now chairs the House Armed Services Committee. The waiver was not included in the 2004 bill introduced by Hunter. The Senate committee also approved an administration request to allow allocating a portion of the $450 million Defense Department Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to be spent outside the former Soviet Union. Similar legislation also was opposed by Hunter last year and does not appear in the House bill, although a separate bill introduced this year in the House would give the Energy Department such authority. Return to Menu B. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Nuclear Environmental Program For Russia To Be Inked In Stockholm ROME - The agreement on a multilateral nuclear environmental program for Russia will be signed in Stockholm on May 21, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has said. Appearing at the Wednesday news conference on results of his talks with his Italian opposite number Franco Frattini, the Russian minister said the agreement "will provide a good legal basis for international cooperation in questions related to nuclear and environmental programs in our country." Igor Ivanov thanked his Italian analogue for "active involvement in projects on the destruction of chemical weapons and utilization of discarded submarines in Russia." Return to Menu C. Russia-U.S. 1. Deeper Rifts Drive U.S.-Russia Iraq Split WASHINGTON - The disconnect between the United States and Russia over the U.S. invasion of Iraq is an indicator of further divisions between the two countries, according to analysts at a conference sponsored by an influential Washington think tank on Thursday. Celeste A. Wallander, director of the Russia/Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said at the forum, which was sponsored by the conservative American Enterprise Institute, that although the administration of President George W. Bush has shown that it is willing to forgive Russia's opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Moscow's active attempts to block the action and the lifting of the United Nations embargo on Iraq present major problems. These problems involve not only the relationship between the United States and Russia, but also some overall issues in developing U.S. foreign policy. "I think there are significant long-term impacts on the American-Russian relationship," Wallander told United Press International. "Russia was clearly trying to use the U.N. Security Council and its veto for leverage over the United States," she said. "Not only is that not likely to work, but doing so for power reasons -- as opposed to substantive reasons -- is pretty transparent. It helps justify the (incorrect) view that the United States should not be working through multilateral institution like the United Nations." Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged his country's support in the war against terrorism in the aftermath of the Sept.11, 2001, attacks, a move that brought the two nations closer together. However, with Bush scheduled to travel to St. Petersburg this month to meet with Putin, few dispute that the U.S.-Russian relationship has been damaged by Moscow's opposition to the war in Iraq. Allegations of military and intelligence cooperation between the Russia and Saddam Hussein's regime have further complicated the issue. While some Americans feel that Russia's role in actively opposing the Iraq war was a diplomatic and possibly a military betrayal, Russian experts say there is also a widespread sense of resentment among Russian political elites based on a feeling that the Bush administration is an ally unwilling to provide the support needed to ensure Russia's domestic and foreign policy goals. Nikolai Zlobin, director for Eurasian and Russian programs at the Center for Defense Information, said that the seriousness of the rift between the two nations should not be downplayed. He noted that the framework of U.S.-Russian diplomacy is a holdover from the cold war and is designed to serve the perspective of another historical era, not the realities of contemporary geopolitics. "We should not ignore the seriousness of how this happened and look at this as a misstep in Russian-American relations," Zlobin said about on picking up the pieces of the relationship after the war in Iraq. "Iraq should be a very dangerous sign for us to start to think (about these problems)," he said. Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russian and Eurasian program at the liberal-centrist Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that Russia's actions are at least partially a reaction to its loss of imperial power, which has declined precipitously, along with its economic and political power, in the years since the end of the Cold War. He said this has resulted in an identity crisis in Russia, with Russian leaders often giving in to American positions on issues that involve both nations. "What is really going on (most of the time), is (Russian) accommodation to a (U.S.) hegemony, said Kuchins at the AEI forum. "That has been the pattern since the collapse of the Soviet Union, broadly speaking," he said. Leon Aaron, director of Russian studies at AEI, said that Russia's opposition to the war in Iraq represented its leadership's succumbing to the so-called "French syndrome," the temptation of a formerly great power to try and show it still matters in the world. Aaron, Kuchins and other analysts agreed that the U.S.-Russian conflict over Iraq is symptomatic of problems underlying other serious disagreements that divide the countries. These include America's anti-dumping tariffs on steel imports and issues surrounding Russian ascendancy to the World Trade Organization. Nevertheless, they also say there are fundamental priorities on which U.S. and Russian interests remain aligned. These include the needs for strong counter-terrorism policies, for the reduction of nuclear stockpiles, and for an increasing trade in energy products. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at the libertarian Cato Institute, said that these interests have minimized the impact of the war on U.S-Russian relations. "I think in general the relationship has been marginally weakened but that it is no worse than that," Carpenter told UPI. "We will still have many occasions on which to cooperate with Russia, particularly against Islamic terrorism in Central Asia," he said. "There are still far more cases where American and Russian interests overlap than where they conflict." Kuchins and Aaron also said Russian leaders understand the need to focus intently on economic growth. They argue that this ensures that Putin's team will do whatever it can to keep close ties with the strongest economic power in the world, the United States. "Certainly people around Putin -- and Putin himself -- understand that in the end only partnership (with the United States) will allow Russia to be a great power," said Aaron. Another major issue that illustrates the rift between Russian and U.S. foreign policies is Russia's support of Iran's nuclear energy program. While Russia needs sales of nuclear equipment to Iran to prop up its failing nuclear industry, the United States views Iran's program as a violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The United States also views Iran's development of nuclear energy capabilities as dangerous because the technology could be used to develop nuclear weapons, and because nuclear material could be transferred to Islamic terrorists. The Russians do not see Iran as a terrorist threat in the same way the U.S. government does because Iran lacks solid links to transnational terrorists, such as al-Qaida, that have ties to the Islamic Caucasus states along Russia's southern boarder. Wallander said the United States and Russia are coming up on a real clash of views on Iran, and said she doesn't know how the problem can be solved unless one side backs down. While Russian fears about losing Iraqi oil business after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime can be easily addressed by allowing Russian companies to bid for post-war oil contracts, there is no easy way to address the economic concerns of Russia's flailing nuclear energy industry. "I see Iran in some ways being much more difficult than Iraq is," said Wallander. "Iraq doesn't have to be a zero sum game. It seems to me that Iran is fundamentally a zero-sum game." Aaron said the United States should avoid the temptation to sweep the issues that underlie these policy problems under the rug in the name of political expediency. He called instead for a thorough review of U.S. and Russian policies toward each other in order too minimize future problems. "Without such a thorough review from top to bottom, from Bush and (national security adviser Condoleezza) Rice all the way to the bowels of the State Department and (Russian) Foreign Ministry, I think we will not proceed with rebuilding the relationship in a fundamental way," said Aaron. Return to Menu 2. U.S. Woos Russia on Nuclear Issue MOSCOW - In a bid to increase pressure on Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear ambitions, U.S. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton met here Monday with key Russian officials to seek additional help. The consultations preceded a series of summits and other meetings that could lead to U.N. Security Council consideration of Iran's alleged failure to live up to the country's nuclear commitments, Bolton said at a news conference. The issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program already has gone to the council. The summits include a meeting in St. Petersburg between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin at the end of May and a summit of the Group of 8 major industrialized nations in France in early June, Bolton said. The International Atomic Energy Agency board will consider the Iran issue at a mid-June meeting in Vienna. From there, it could go to the Security Council, Bolton said, implying that Washington wants Moscow's support for such action. Discussion at the Vienna meeting will focus in part on the IAEA's confirmation that Iran possesses centrifuges capable of producing weapons-grade uranium, he said. "President Putin and President Bush have already agreed that it is neither in Russia's interest nor in America's interest to have a nuclear weapons-capable Iran," Bolton said. The reasons for Russia's growing concern "should be obvious," he added, because Iran also is developing ballistic missiles and "here in Moscow we're a lot closer to Iran than I am when I go back to Washington." Moscow's position on Iran's nuclear program is critical because Russia has helped Iran construct a nearly completed 1,000-megawatt, light-water reactor in the western port of Bushehr and has considered additional nuclear power projects. The United States believes that the Bushehr project, estimated to cost $800 million, is a cover for obtaining sensitive technologies to develop nuclear weapons. Washington also suspects that Russian scientists, without government approval, are helping the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program, and it wants Moscow to crack down vigorously on such activity. In recent months, Russian officials have begun to back away from their previous insistence that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Moscow has also expressed growing concern about North Korea's diplomatic brinkmanship, particularly its recent withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. "There has indeed been a certain change in Moscow's attitude toward North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs," said Andrei Kortunov, vice president of the Russian Foreign Policy Assn. But Moscow has greater "misgivings" about North Korea's government than about Iran's and is less confident in its ability to influence it, Kortunov said. Concerning Iran, Russia is likely to try harder to draw a careful line between civilian and military technologies, he said, although this more careful approach has not crystallized into support for U.S. positions. The Russian news agency Itar-Tass reported that at the meeting between Bolton and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, the two sides "expressed an interest" in having Iran sign an agreement with the IAEA on additional nonproliferation guarantees. At a news conference last month, Rumyantsev expressed concern about Iran's nuclear program, saying that if reports of Iran's possessing centrifuges that can make weapons-grade uranium were true, "the situation is worrisome." "There must be IAEA guarantees," he said. "Iran must declare such activities and provide for the possibility of control." On Monday, Bolton said the IAEA's June meeting is critical because "if the IAEA board finds that Iran has violated its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the agency, then it's required to report the matter to the Security Council for such action as the council might deem appropriate." He added that with regard to North Korea's nuclear program, Washington shares with Russia "the determination that if at all possible, the matter be resolved through diplomatic and peaceful means." "I don't think there's any doubt that there's complete unity of opinion on the subject between Russia and the United States that it is not acceptable for North Korea to have nuclear weapons," he said. "Since the United States and Russia share a common objective, we ought to be able to find a peaceful way through this." Return to Menu 3. U.S.: Russia Obstructing Reconstruction WASHINGTON - Russia is obstructing progress on the reconstruction of Iraq, refusing to curtail dangerous nuclear cooperation with Iran and not using its leverage to ease crises in the Middle East and North Korea, a senior US diplomat charged Monday. Despite these concerns, the diplomat said Washington is hopeful that ties with Moscow will improve as both sides work to overcome an "undercurrent of bitterness" in the relationship caused by the Iraq conflict. To that end, Secretary of State Colin Powell will travel to Moscow next week to prepare for a June 1 summit in Saint Petersburg between US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin at which the leaders will try to put the Iraq divisions behind them, the diplomat said. "We're in a kind of a renewal phase in our relationship with the Russians," the diplomat said, noting that despite the litany of differences, progress in other areas, notably trade, was being made. But the diplomat, speaking to reporters at the State Department on condition of anonymity, said the United States remained deeply disappointed by Russia's positions on some of the most pressing matters of US concern. Chief among those at the moment are Iraq and Iran, he said. On Iraq, Russia is obstructing US efforts to lift UN sanctions imposed against Saddam Hussein's toppled regime for commercial reasons, fearing that Russian firms may lose out on lucrative contracts and that the massive debt owed it by Baghdad may never be repaid, the diplomat said. Moscow's insistance that sanctions be lifted only after Iraq is certified as being free of weapons of mass destruction is outdated, unhelpful and hurting the Iraqi people, the diplomat said. They should not be "engaging in obstructionist tactics that only complicate the process of renewal of the country," he said. With Iran, Russia is continuing its nuclear cooperation despite persistant US calls for a halt to such dealings, most recently delivered earlier Monday in Moscow by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton. Bolton told reporters after talks with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev that he had presented Moscow with evidence that Iran was using nuclear technology to develop weapons. Russia, along with Iran, has repeatedly denied the program is for anything other than energy purposes but the diplomat said recent developments including Tehran's admission that it is building facilities to enrich uranium into weapons-grade material should force a reassessment. The developments "provide further grounds for the Russians to reassess their relationship with Iran," the diplomat said, adding that until the cooperation ceased, Russia would continue to forfeit potentially lucrative deals with the United States. On North Korea, the diplomat said it appeared as though Russian officials were not yet prepared to fully use their leverage to press Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. "What is still unclear is just how much leverage the Russians are prepared to exert," he said. "Are they prepared to make this a make-or-break issue in their bilateral relationship with North Korea?" In the Middle East, Moscow is also falling short in US eyes by not pushing Syria and the Palestinians hard enough to crack down on anti-Israel groups and terrorism, the diplomat said. "The Russians continue to have potential leverage that they could exert there too, that perhaps they haven't fully exerted in the past, particularly on Syria to definitely shut down (anti-Israel groups) and do their part to end the suicide bombings through their direct dealings with the Palestinians," he said. Return to Menu D. Russia-Iran 1. Iran Denies Having Nuke Weapons Program VIENNA - A top Iranian official denied his country had a nuclear weapons program but told the United Nations on Tuesday Iran was not willing to submit to tougher inspections of its facilities. The United States has accused Iran, which is building a centrifuge plant at Natanz in southern Iran, of having secret plans to make nuclear weapons. It fears Iran could enrich weapons-grade uranium at the site. Iran's atomic energy chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh told the U.N. nuclear watchdog group that Iran's nuclear program was "only for peaceful purposes," a diplomat who attended the meeting said. Aghazadeh told 135 members of the the International Atomic Energy Agency at the closed door meeting that Iran need the facilities to make its own nuclear fuel, according to the diplomat. Iranian officials have said they have nothing to hide because their nuclear program is only meant to generate electricity. But in Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the evidence collected by the U.N. agency and even Iranian statements pointing to a weapons program. "Despite their protests, despite their claims, Iran is developing a full-scale nuclear program that it would not behoove anybvody to cooeprate with," Boucher said. "And so we will keep making the case. We will keep making the point with the information that is available, and I would say increasingly available, that Iran's nuclear ambitions are much bigger than many had hoped," Boucher added. In Moscow, meanwhile, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukova said Tuesday there was no evidence Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons. "Very sound evidence is needed to accuse anyone. So far, neither the United States nor any other countries can present it," Losyukov said, according to the Interfax news agency. Losyukov did acknowledge that Iran's nuclear program had some uncertainties, and that Moscow would work with Tehran to "add more transparency" to its program. As for Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, Losyukov said the work was "strictly in line with IAEA norms." Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran has long been a contentious issue between Washington and Moscow. The United States claims that the technology and expertise Iran is gaining from Russia's construction of the $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant could be used for a weapons program, and that Russian companies - perhaps without official permission - have transferred weapons technology to Tehran. Aghazadeh also faced "tough questioning" from the representatives of 10 countries, including the United States, Britain, Japan, Canada, Netherlands and France, the diplomat said. The main controversy centered on the U.N. agency's request that Iran agree to more intrusive inspections, the diplomat said. Washington has also urged Iran to agree to the tougher regime. Aghazadeh, however, said it would "depend on conditions. ... It was very conditional," the diplomat said. The IAEA oversees compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which Iran has signed. The head of the Vienna-based agency visited Iranian nuclear sites in February and is expected to report to the agency's board in June. Washington claims that Iran has tested nuclear material at the site without declaring it to the U.N. agency, and is pushing the agency to declare Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. A spokeswoman for the agency, Melissa Fleming, said that "inspections and analysis" of Iran's nuclear sites were still under way, and that the report to be delivered in June was not yet ready. "Were not yet in a position to make any kind of judgment about the nature of Iran's nuclear program," she said. Aghazadeh told the group that Iran hoped to eventually generate 7,000 megawatts of nuclear power using three different types of reactors, the diplomat said. He spoke in general terms about their energy planning and why the economic and environmental costs of oil in the long term don't make sense as the only energy source and "that they want nuclear in the mix," the diplomat said. In turn, the U.S. representative "challenged what he was saying about the economics of oil," the diplomat said. Return to Menu E. Russia-North Korea 1. Russian Official, Korean Diplomats Discuss North Korea Nuclear Program MOSCOW - Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander on Tuesday had meetings with the ambassadors of North Korea and South Korea to Russia, Pak Ui Chun and Ghung Tae-ick. Sources at the Foreign Ministry said Losyukov and Ambassador Pak had discussed results of recent Beijing talks between North Korean and U.S. officials, in which Chinese representatives took part. The two men stressed the importance of continuing negotiations on a nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula and the security of both Koreas. As Losyukov received Chung Tae-ick, they discussed certain bilateral issues and the schedule of political contacts, including the ones between the Russian and South Korean presidents. "The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and the South Korean ambassador exchanged views on possible constructive solutions to the critical situation in Korea," the Foreign Ministry source said. Return to Menu F. Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement 1. Delta-I Class Nuclear Submarine Decommissioned In Severodvinsk Nuclear submarine K-385 of Delta-I class has been decommissioned at Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk, Bellona's correspondent reported from Severodvinsk. The submarine of 667b project was built at Sevmash in Severodvinsk in 1973. During 20 years of service for the Soviet Navy, it had gone overseas more than 20 times. In 1980, K-385 was the first submarine of the 667b project repaired at Zvezdochka. The submarine was taken out of service in November 1994. After missile compartments were cut off, K-385 was moored in Severodvinsk. Decommissioning began at Zvezochka in 1997. Now, as the decommissioning finished, the crew of K-385 handed to the museum at Zvezdochka an emergency signal buoy of the submarine. Return to Menu G. Plutonium Disposition 1. Thorium-Based Fuel May Play Role in Plutonium Disposition (excerpted) Following what Russian insiders call increasingly futile negotiations with the US over renewing agreements to destroy weapons-grade plutonium in mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel, Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry announced - after nearly a decade of silence - that it is developing, on US money, another plutonium demolishing fuel that would cut the embattled MOX program's costs in half. The newly revealed fuel project by Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, or Minatom, and Moscow's Kurchatov institute, has been under quiet development over the past nine years with $15m of combined private US and government funding. The research has been overseen by GAN, Russia's state nuclear regulatory agency. The fuel combines thorium and weapons grade plutonium to produce assemblies for burning in conventional, power producing nuclear reactors. Unlike the MOX design, the new thorium fuel's engineers say it would require no expensive overhauls in the reactors it would power - which has been one of the major impediments to the MOX-based program. They also say that the spent fuel produced by the thorium-plutonium mixture eradicates any possible weapons use the plutonium could have. By contrast, MOX spent fuel can still be separated for bomb-grade plutonium. The new fuel would also be fabricated in existing Russian plants - possibly Elektrostal near Moscow, or the Novosibirsk Plant for Chemical Concentrates - provided appropriate licensing agreements are in place. Thorium supporters say the plutonium burning fuel would advance the foundering bilateral agreement between Russian and the United States to destroy 34 tons a piece of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, and reduce the time it would take to do so by at least 50 percent. Proponents say they could start burning the fuel in contemporary Russian VVER-1000 reactors by 2006. In early January, Atomic Energy Minister Aleksander Rumyantsev, in a speech at the Kurchatov institute, endorsed the thorium program, saying, "It is again acceptable, that the Kurchatov institute ... is conducting its own research in the IR-8 to study the thorium-uranium nuclear cycle in atomic energy." The current plutonium disposition agreement - which was signed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin in 2000 - has banked on MOX, which combines uranium oxide with small amounts of highly toxic plutonium oxide - or powder - that would, like the thorium based fuel, be burned in civilian, energy producing Russian VVER-1000 reactors. But the MOX program, which is the cooperative responsibility of the US Department of Energy, or DOE and Minatom, has been plagued by bitter technical and political disputes since its inception in 1995. This continuing stalemate, say insiders, is preventing cooler heads from prevailing to seek an extension of the Russian American agreement that allows technical cooperation on the project to continue past deadline. If this extension is not reached, the MOX program could be dumped for good by late July. One well informed Russian source called the last month's round of US-Russian MOX discussions - which included arguments about extending the agreement and discussion the design of Russia's $1bn MOX fabrication facility - "a complete failure." "There is no interface between the two sides," said the informed Russian source. "The MOX option is in big trouble." Another industry expert, who has observed the years of bickering from both sides said, "It's even worse than that." Adding insult to these injuries, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, this week refused for safety reasons to approve designs for the American MOX fabrication plant - slated to be built at the DOE's Savannah River Site, or SRS in South Carolina. DCS Spokesman Todd Kaish said the safety shortcomings will be corrected by November, and construction will begin in 2004, according to Nuclear.Ru. [...] According to several highly place US and Russia officials, Minatom's announcement of its long silent thorium research was likely timed to offset the prevalent stagnation of the MOX program. "The MOX project has cost Congress political embarrassment. And there are some people coming out with criticism. And when they see some people involved with [MOX] in France [through DCS's associations with Cogema] it causes more embarrassment," one US nuclear official said. "Secondly," the official added," there are concerns about getting the MOX funding. They're looking to make sure there's something there in return for US government support." But Seth Grae - president of the private, Washington based company Thorium Power that has funded much of the research - was quick to point out to Bellona Web that the fuel is not meant to compete with or replace MOX - despite the touted safety and speed advantages of the fuel. During his most recent trip to Moscow last month, Grae met with some of the more than 300 researchers from seven institutions - including the Kurchatov Institute - who are now working on the project, which is being coordinated by the Nuclear Power Ministry and monitored by the State Nuclear Inspection Agency "What we have is a technology. The technology is not designed to compete with MOX. It is what it is - whether the government decides to use it instead of MOX, in combination with MOX only, that's up to them," Grae said in a telephone interview from Washington "We do not take a position on whether to fight MOX. Even with both programs, there will still be a lot of plutonium left," he said. Just how much plutonium that may be is a government protected secret and a source of wildly conflicting estimates. Official tallies for Russia's plutonium are still being added up at the Obninsk nuclear research facility near Moscow. Kuznetsov, in his most recent book 'Nuclear Danger,' estimated that Russia is sitting on several hundred tons of weapons-grade plutonium. According to an article published by the scandal -tarred former Nuclear Energy Minister, Yevgeny Adamov, and cited by Kuznetsov, Russia could have as much as 780 tons of the nuclear material. Kuznetsov went on to note that Adamov's estimate conflicts outrageously with the commonly accepted figure of about 150 tons of weapons grade plutonium in Russian storehouses. The figure also seemed outrageous to Harvard University nuclear researcher Matthew Bunn, who in a telephone interview put the figure closer to 140 tons. In addition to however many tons of the stuff Russia currently has, 18,000 Russian warheads, which have been dismantled since mid 1990s, will produce another 162 tons of plutonium - which by itself is 62 percent more than the 100 tons of weapons grade plutonium officially declared by the United States. The growing Congressional discomfort over the political and technical issues surrounding MOX has mobilized a Congressional fan club for thorium-based fuel led by Curt Weldon, chairman of the powerful House Armed Service Committee. Weldon plans to lobby congress to allocate an appropriation of $3.5m for the 304 budget to being the program in earnest. Before that, though Grae said $3.5m will be required in 2003, $25m will be required in 2004 out of a total budget of $200m, to run so-called lead test assemblies in a VVER-1000 in 2006. Eight of Russia's 30 nuclear reactors are VVER-1000's. Four are located in the Saratov region, two near Tver, and one a piece in Volgodonsk and Novovorornezh. Two more plants with VVER-1000 reactors are being built and another is planned, Minatom officials said. Preceding this lead test slated for 2006, before which Grae said the fuel will continue to undergo ampoule irradiation tests at the Kurchatov Institute's IR-8 experimental reactor. It also, said Grae, is undergoing thermal-hydraulic, temperature and pressure tests at the institute. Although the DOE budget request for the 2004 fiscal year included no funding for the thorium project, Weldon told The Moscow Times he was confident he could squeeze out the money during September's congressional allocation process - even after the mammoth US expenditures on the Iraqi war. "I have strongly supported additional funding to test the thorium process at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow," Weldon told the Moscow Times. "The thorium process provides the double benefit of reducing weapons-usable fissile material and producing advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. As such, it is in the best interests of the United States to provide funding to advance this technology." [...] Return to Menu 2. NRC Wants Safety Questions Answered Before MOX Facility Is Built COLUMBIA, S.C. - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission wants 19 lingering safety questions answered before it gives approval to a facility that would convert weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. A revised safety evaluation report completed last week found the issues that must be addressed by Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, a group of companies selected by the Energy Department to build and operate a mixed-oxide fuel plant at the Savannah River Site. The safety questions include how the company would handle fire and chemical issues as well as uncertainties about ventilation and any possible atomic reaction. The MOX facility will make blended plutonium fuel for use in two Duke Energy commercial nuclear power plants near Charlotte, N.C. Duke Cogema spokesman Todd Kaish said the company expects to resolve the questions and begin construction in 2004. If all issues are resolved, the NRC could issue a license this fall, Kaish said. The NRC's safety evaluation updates a report issued in 2002 that had 59 unresolved issues that the company would needed to address. The recent concerns from the federal agency come after DOE decided to use more impure plutonium in the MOX plant than originally projected. Anti-nuclear activists have opposed the MOX program, saying it is dangerous to ship and use in commercial plants. Instead of making fuel, they want the government to immobilize the material into glass. A nuclear nonproliferation agreement with Russia calls on both countries to make surplus plutonium useless for atomic weapons. Both countries have agreed to neutralize 34 metric tons each. While questions about the Russian program remain unresolved, the U.S. government says it will ship 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium to SRS for eventual use in MOX fuel. About 6 metric tons of plutonium are coming to SRS from the Rocky Flats weapons complex, which is closing. Those shipments are expected to be completed by the end of the summer. Return to Menu H. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Russia To Launch 10 Military Satellites By End Of The Year MOSCOW - Russia is to launch 10 military satellites by the end of 2003, ITAR-TASS news agency cited the defence ministry as saying on Thursday. Russia has already launched two military satellites this year. The satellites, which will have a lifespan of seven to 10 years, will be launched from cosmodromes in the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan in central Asia and the northern Russian region of Arkhangelsk, the ministry said. The Russian military intends over the next few years to move activities from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan to its cosmodrome in Plesetsk, Arkhangelsk, where it hopes to develop the ambitious Angara rocket project. Currently almost three quarters of Russia's military satellites are launched from Baikonur, which is leased by Kazakhstan to Russia for 115 million dollars (100 million euros) a year. Return to Menu I. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors 1. Editorial: Loose Nukes of the West Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and especially since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has been trying to control "loose nukes" -- the former Eastern Bloc's nuclear materials -- to prevent their being stolen or sold to make an atomic bomb. This effort is vital, but its narrow regional focus has obscured an equally pressing danger: the loose nukes of the West. In fact, while Russia has been gradually tightening controls on bomb-grade materials, the United States and Europe have been slackening theirs, and a bill moving rapidly through Congress would roll back protections still further. Unless remedial action is taken, Osama bin Laden may soon have better luck shopping for nuclear bomb material in Western markets than in the former Soviet Union. A particular vulnerability is posed by civilian commerce in highly enriched uranium. This fissile explosive, which powered the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, is still used at many research and commercial facilities in North America and Europe that lack adequate security forces. If terrorists got hold of a sufficient amount, they could quickly fabricate an atomic bomb using the simplest design. According to the late Manhattan Project physicist Luis Alvarez, "terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half." Just 100 pounds is enough for a Hiroshima-era bomb, while even less is needed for a moderately sophisticated design such as Pakistan's. Dangerous civilian commerce in bomb-grade uranium persists for two reasons. First, unlike modern nuclear reactors, a few old research facilities in Europe and America still use bomb-grade fuel. Second, pharmaceutical companies in Canada and Europe have rejected safer production methods and still use bomb-grade uranium to produce medical isotopes for hospitals. Oddly enough, the West confronted this nuclear threat more seriously before the advent of al Qaeda than it does today. In 1978 it started developing technologies to fuel reactors and produce isotopes using much safer, low-enriched uranium, which is unsuitable for weapons. In 1992 a bill by then-Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), now a senator, was enacted that banned all further exports of bomb-grade uranium, except on an interim basis to facilities in the process of converting to low-enriched uranium. But a decade later, despite the rise of catastrophic terrorism, pharmaceutical companies and reactor operators are trying to undermine this landmark anti-terrorism law. One culprit is a large new German research reactor that is the West's first in a quarter-century built to use bomb-grade uranium fuel. Located on a vulnerable university campus near Munich, the reactor is slated to require 1.2 tons of such fuel -- sufficient for at least a dozen nuclear weapons. President Bill Clinton refused to provide the fuel, but the Germans then struck a deal with Russia. President Bush, rather than discouraging such Russian trafficking, has legitimized it by seeking identical material from Moscow to fuel U.S. nuclear research reactors. The Germans could convert to safer fuel before starting up their reactor but have refused. The biggest offender in the pharmaceutical industry is the Canadian isotope producer Nordion, which reneged on an explicit pledge to design its new facilities to eliminate any need for bomb-grade uranium. The Canadians have constructed an isotope plant that will require more highly enriched uranium than any other. Though the lightly guarded Ontario facility is yet to begin commercial operation, it already has stockpiled 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium -- enough for at least two nuclear weapons. Still worse, the foreign pharmaceutical companies are lobbying to repeal the Schumer provision that requires them to gradually convert to low-enriched uranium as a condition for receiving bomb-grade uranium in the meantime. The repeal amendment, sponsored by Rep. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), already has been approved by the House in its new energy bill. In the Senate, it is being pushed toward quick enactment by Kit Bond, a Republican from Missouri, where the overseas isotope producer Mallinckrodt has its corporate home. The shame is that the foreign pharmaceutical companies could have ceased their reliance on bomb-grade uranium years ago, if they had put as much effort into converting their production processes as they have into lobbying. There is no technical barrier to conversion. The United States has significant leverage on foreign producers, because we are the main source of bomb-grade uranium and the primary consumer of medical isotopes. Several years ago the State Department worked with these companies and the Nuclear Control Institute to draft a pledge under which all producers would agree to convert. Unfortunately, a mid-level official in the Bush administration's Department of Energy spiked the initiative in 2001. In Iraq the United States has budgeted $60 billion and sacrificed more than 100 American lives in a war premised mainly on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The very least that the pharmaceutical companies and our ally Germany can contribute is to stop undermining U.S. anti-terrorism law. And as the energy bill heads to the Senate floor, Congress must halt the special-interest effort to overturn this vital law. Return to Menu J. Announcements 1. Security for a New Century 108th Congress: The Global Language Challenge When: Monday, May 12 at 2 p.m. Where: Russell Building, Room 189 Ambassador Michael Lemmon, Dean of the School of Language Studies at the Foreign Service Institute, and Dr. Richard Brecht, Director of the National Foreign Language Center, will join us for a discussion of foreign language competency as a critical national security challenge. Foreign languages come into play at all points of the intelligence cycle - from collection to exploitation, to analysis and production. Language skills, as well as sophisticated cultural knowledge, are required for human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), various aspects of law enforcement, and, of course, for those serving abroad in civilian and military capacities. What efforts exist to provide language expertise to meet today's national security demands? Are we training and recruiting sufficient foreign language experts to adequately address these needs? If not, what more should be done? Prior to his current position, Ambassador Lemmon served as U.S. Ambassador to Armenia and from 1995-1998 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs with global responsibilities for regional security and arms transfer policy, international peacekeeping and security assistance issues. Dr. Richard Brecht is also a co-founder and former Executive Director of the National Council of Organizations of Less Commonly Taught Languages. His most recent book is Language and National Security for the 21st Century: The Federal Role in Supporting National Language Capacity. "Security for a New Century" is a bipartisan study group for Congress. We meet regularly with US and international policy professionals to discuss the post Cold War and post 9/11 security environment. All discussions are off-the-record. It is not an advocacy venue. Please call 4-2575 for more information or write Libby_Turpen@Brownback.senate.gov. Return to Menu 2. Congress, Majilis Establish Friendship Group Members of Kazakhstan's Majilis and of the U.S. Congress established the U.S.-Kazakhstan Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group on May 7 with the goal of enhancing political and economic ties between the two countries. The majilismen were led by Deputy Speaker Mukhambet Kopei, while congressmen Robert Wexler (D-FL) and Joe Pitts (R-PA) became co-chairs from the U.S. side. Majilismen and congressmen, including Ivan Chirkalin, Omirgali Kenzhebek, Nurdaulet Sarsenov from Kazakhstan, and Tom Tancredo, Chris Bell, Henry Waxman and others from the U.S., signed the Statement of Friendship and Cooperation saying that they seek "the goal of strengthening the long-term, strategic partnership between the United States and Kazakhstan." Speaking at the inauguration ceremony on the Capitol Hill, Rep. Robert Wexler said that "Kazakhstan has served as America's ally, partner and friend and a cornerstone of stability in the former Soviet states. In the past eleven years, Kazakhstan has begun the process of building strong civil institutions, reforming its system of governance and reaching out to the United States in goodwill and cooperation." Congressmen Joe Pitts said it represent "a new level of political and social engagement between our two unique nations." Both congressmen agreed that "as the United States works to rebuild Iraq and promote democracy throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, it is in America's best interest to strengthen ties with nations like Kazakhstan; nations that have provided support to the United States in our global campaign against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Mr. Kopei noted that new group furthers the agreements of presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev and George Bush on new Kazakhstan-U.S. relations in the 21st century and expressed hope that the two legislatures will be able to work more closely on the political and economic side. Ambassador Kanat Saudabayev said the new group is recognition of the role Kazakhstan's parliament plays in the country's life and "signifies the appearance of a completely new dimension in our bilateral relations." Return to Menu 3. State Department Briefing on Russia and Iran (excerpted) [...] QUESTION: Can I ask you about the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister? After the Bolton talks, saying he's not convinced, there's no evidence that Iran is bent on a nuclear weapons program, I guess the Secretary is next to try. But is there any hope of persuading Russia? MR. BOUCHER: I think there is a lot of information available on Iran's nuclear program. There are statements the Iranians have made themselves, information that the International Atomic Energy Agency has collected during the course of their visits. And I think it is important for people to look straight at that information to face up to what it says; and it says that Iran, despite the economics, despite their protests, despite their claims, Iran is developing a full-scope nuclear program that it would not behoove anybody to cooperate with. And so we will keep making the case. We will keep making the point with the information that is available, and I would say increasingly available, that Iran's nuclear ambitions are much bigger than many had hoped. QUESTION: Well, he says there's some ambiguities, but basically they don't -- the Russians don't buy the argument. And I guess there's no gray area there where it's just a matter of semantics, is there? MR. BOUCHER: It is not a matter of semantics. It is a matter of the facts of what Iran is doing, and we will continue to put those facts before Russia and others in the international community to deal with this situation. QUESTION: And is there a disagreement on North Korea, how to approach North Korea, as well? MR. BOUCHER: Not that I've heard, but we'll have to see. QUESTION: So, if this is so obvious to the United States and you say it's out there for anyone to read, how do you explain the Russians not being willing to accept your argument? MR. BOUCHER: I would leave it to the Russians to explain the Russians. QUESTION: Well, what does this mean about the U.S.-Russian relationship, then? MR. BOUCHER: I don't think this is purely a matter of the U.S.-Russia relationship. It is a matter we have pursued frequently over a long period of time. Under Secretary Bolton has been on a number of trips to Moscow, and during every trip, whether it is working on G-8 nonproliferation concerns or it is working on arms control treaties or whatever, he has always taken the opportunity to raise and to press the Russians on this. We have had continuing discussions in the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, indeed, I would say -- Barry was referring to the Secretary as the next step -- this may or may not, probably will, come up during the Secretary's visit. But there are also active discussions underway in the IAEA based on the -- because of the work that they did in their visit in February. So I would hope that the international community will become increasingly aware of the dangers of Iran's nuclear programs. QUESTION: But isn't that just the point, that you bring it up over and over and over again, and they are still saying that they don't necessarily swallow it? MR. BOUCHER: Well, that is part of the point. The other part of the point is there is more and more information available, and it is time for people to wake up and smell the coffee, and we will keep suggesting they do that. [...] Return to Menu K. Links of Interest 1. Liability and Western Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia: Time for a Fresh Look? Return to Menu 2. The Democratic Party and Foreign Policy Return to Menu 3. Russian Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis Return to Menu 4. Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Working paper submitted by Austria, Mexico, and Sweden - English Version Return to Menu 5. Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Working paper submitted by Austria, Mexico, and Sweden - Russian Version Return to Menu 6. Joint Statement By The Russian Federation And The United States Of America On The Moscow Treaty (SORT) To The Second Session Of The Preparatory Committee For The 2005 Review Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons - English Version Return to Menu 7. Joint Statement By The Russian Federation And The United States Of America On The Moscow Treaty (SORT) To The Second Session Of The Preparatory Committee For The 2005 Review Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons - Russian Version Return to Menu 8. Statement By The Delegation Of The Russian Federation At The Second Session Of The Preparatory Committee For The 2005 Review Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons Return to Menu 9. Verification Of Nuclear Disarmament: First Interim Report On Studies Into The Verification Of Nuclear Warheads And Their Components, Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - English Version Return to Menu 10. Verification Of Nuclear Disarmament: First Interim Report On Studies Into The Verification Of Nuclear Warheads And Their Components, Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Russian Version Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. 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