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RANSAC Nuclear News, May 6, 2003 Compiled By: Lauren Arestie A. Cooperative Threat Reduction
 A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Editorial: Calming Russia's Nuclear Insecurity President Bush is right to say that, should nuclear weapons fall into the hands of terrorists, the situation would pose a "most horrifying" danger to the United States and its people, and that it must be his administration's "highest priority" to prevent this. But he has to be looking in the right direction. For terrorists, Russia offers by the far the most attractive source of nuclear weapons, materials and expertise. Russia's nuclear stockpile is gigantic and poorly secured. Nevertheless, Bush has paid astonishingly little attention to defusing this ticking time bomb. A new opportunity to do just that is the summit this month between Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin--one Bush should vigorously exploit. The Russian stockpile holds hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium. Less than 100 a hundred pounds of such uranium is needed to make a crude bomb of the type that destroyed Hiroshima. A capable terrorist group like Al Qaeda might well be able to build such a weapon if it could get enough uranium. More sophisticated weapons of the type that destroyed Nagasaki need just a handful of plutonium, and the Russian stockpile has enough for thousands of such bombs. Especially attractive to terrorists are Russia's thousands of "small," relatively portable battlefield nuclear weapons. According to knowledgeable sources, many are not equipped with electronic locks to prevent their use without the appropriate codes. The detonation of one such weapon in a city would wreak vastly greater death and destruction than the 9/11 attack. During the Cold War, the Soviet stockpile was protected from intruders and smugglers by all the means available to a police state with tightly sealed borders. Today, Russia swarms with foreigners, and its borders are as porous as America's. The huge army on which the antiquated nuclear security system relies is very poorly paid, and Al Qaeda and its Chechen collaborators have made documented attempts to get Russian nuclear materials. In 1991, anticipating that the collapse of the Soviet Union would create entirely new nuclear dangers, the United States and Russia launched the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program under the leadership of Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and then-Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). Since then, this program has installed security upgrades on about 40 percent of the Russian materials, but less than half of these upgrades now meet the standards of the U.S. stockpile. About 15 percent of the uranium has been rendered unusable for weapons and converted into fuel for civilian reactors, but at the current pace, finishing that job will take more than two decades. Perhaps the program's most important benefit is that it has provided alternative work for many of the thousands of the Russian nuclear scientists and engineers whose expertise is a most serious proliferation risk. The United States also has helped remove vulnerable stores of weapons-grade uranium from research reactors in Serbia, Georgia and Kazakhstan and take them to secure sites in Russia, Britain and the United States. The State Department has identified 24 other high-risk sites of this type in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Under current plans, it will take many years to secure all of them. Why is it going so slowly? Why, after a dozen years, does this flagrant nuclear threat persist? Throughout its existence the threat reduction program has been hampered by opposition from shortsighted members of Congress and by inadequate commitment by the Clinton and Bush administrations. Not only has Congress failed to fund the program properly, it has restricted both presidents' ability to use even these funds effectively. The initiative also labors in a bureaucratic maze because it is administered by more than 30 different programs across the Departments of Defense, State and Energy. On the Russian side the bureaucratic frustrations are even worse. And the Russians have not given adequate access to highly secret facilities, in part because the U.S. has been unwilling to reciprocate with access to ours. U.S. funding for the threat reduction program is currently about $1 billion annually, which is just the level projected for the current budget cycle by the Clinton administration long before 9/11. This sum must be judged from the perspective of homeland defense and the global war on terror, because as Nunn explained, "the most effective way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for terrorists, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step is easiest for terrorists and hardest for us." The budget for homeland defense is $41 billion. As for Iraq, which probably has neither nuclear weapons nor materials, the first installment on the conflict and its aftermath will cost the U.S. $79 billion. If one nuclear explosion were to occur in the United States, the blow to the economy would dwarf these sums. Bush should now make a commitment to the threat reduction program comparable to his commitment to homeland defense and to military means for battling proliferation. When he meets Putin, he should request a corresponding Russian commitment and back this with an offer of full cooperation. Only such a partnership between the heads of state can reduce the danger posed by nuclear terrorism at the pace and to the point that our security demands. Bush should ask for a steep increase in funding. A tripling of the budget was recommended eight months before 9/11 by a bipartisan Department of Energy task force headed by Howard Baker, the former Republican leader of the Senate, and Lloyd Cutler, counsel to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. The task force called the Russian stockpile "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today." An exhaustive Harvard University study released recently by Nunn and Lugar (available at www.nti.org/cnwm) spells out other recommendations. Proper funding alone will not suffice. Bush should make clear that he will not tolerate the bureaucratic problems that have plagued the program. He should appoint an official whose sole responsibility would be to take charge of the entire program, with the authority and backing to cut through the barriers. The president should devote sustained attention and political capital to rally congressional support. Lugar, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gives the president a powerful congressional ally, but other members of the House and the Senate need to be convinced of the importance of the effort. At the St. Petersburg summit, Bush should propose to Putin that their governments construct a joint plan, with targets and timetables, to secure the entire Russian nuclear weapons complex, and to render Russia's nuclear materials unusable for weapons. Bush has the opportunity at hand to swiftly reduce the threat posed by the Russian stockpile--to shut off in a matter of years, not decades, the most dangerous resource for nuclear terrorism facing this country. Return to Menu B. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Germany To Help Russia Disarm MOSCOW - Germany will allocate EUR 30m to Russia in 2003, within the framework of the program for the destruction of chemical weapons. According to the press service of Sergei Kiriyenko, the presidential envoy in the Volga Federal District and chairman of the state commission for the destruction of chemical weapons, a corresponding agreement has been reached at a conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague. Mr. Kiriyenko headed the Russian delegation at the conference. He held talks with Peter Schmidt, Deputy German Foreign Minister and head of the German delegation. The two sides exchanged notes on further cooperation within the framework of the chemical weapons destruction program. In particular, Germany planned to transfer about EUR 29.7m for the implementation of the program in 2003, including EUR 6.2m for the launch of the second line in the Gorny settlement (in the Saratov region) and EUR 23.5m - for the construction of a plant in the town of Kambarka (in the Udmurtia region). Mr. Kiriyenko also met with Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, Dutch Foreign Minister Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, and the heads of the American and German delegations. All participants of the meeting praised Russia for destroying 1 percent of its chemical arms arsenal, which was completed at the Gorny settlement on April 26, 2003. In 1997, Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. According to it, the country committed itself to destroying all its chemicals weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. The destruction of chemical weapons will be implemented in four stages. At the first stage, 1 percent of the reserves should be destroyed, during the second stage - 20 percent, during the third stage - 45 percent. Finally, the rest should be destroyed at the fourth stage. Russia's total chemical weapons reserves are estimated at 40,000 tons, which are kept in seven arsenals: 15.9 percent - in the town of Kambarka (the Udmurtia region), 2.9 percent - in the Gorny settlement (the Saratov region), 14.2 percent - in the Kizner settlement (the Udmurtia republic), 17.4 percent - in the Marasykovsky settlement (the Kirov region), 18.8 percent in the town of Pochep (the Bryansk region), 17.2 percent - in the Leonidovka settlement (the Penza region), and 13.6 percent - in the Schuchye settlement (the Kurgan region). Russia has earmarked a total of RUR 90.238bn (about $2.91bn) for the implementation of the chemical weapons destruction program, including RUR 1.28bn for insuring safety of storing and destroying weapons, RUR 1.58bn - for a comprehensive medical and sanitary examination of areas surrounding destruction facilities, and RUR 1.96 - for state environmental control and monitoring. According to plan, two thirds of these funds will be allocated within the framework of the Global Partnership" program. Return to Menu C. Nuclear Nonproliferation 1. Editorial: Kazakhstan's Contribution Although the recent PBS screening of "Avoiding Armageddon" did mention Kazakhstan as a country that chose to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it was disappointing that Americans were not fully informed of what was behind that choice and what it means for global security. Kazakhstan's "notable example" of disarmament, as the White House recently described it, could be used as a counterweight to aspirations of some countries to develop WMD as means to assert their interests in the world. I strongly believe that Kazakhstan's story of responsible international behavior and strong cooperation with the U.S. is of paramount importance, as it might lead to solutions to today's most acute international problems. In 1991, having suffered through almost 500 Soviet nuclear tests that destroyed the lives of 1.5 million people, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced what would have been the world's 4th nuclear arsenal and shut down the world's largest nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. Together with the United States, we have since destroyed the remaining infrastructure of the loathsome legacy of the Cold War. Amongst the most graphic examples of our cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar program have been Project Sapphire, which shipped more than 1,300 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to the U.S., and the destruction of the world's largest anthrax production and weaponization facility at Stepnogorsk. The path of history could have been different, however, had President Nursultan Nazarbayev chosen to go with the significant portion of Kazakhstan's elite that was in favor of keeping the nuclear weapons as means to ostensibly gain international respect. To the contrary, it was Mr. Nazarbayev's unswerving commitment to disarmament during all these years that led Kazakhstan to renounce the nuclear weapons, becoming a strong disarmament advocate, and ultimately, gaining the recognition as a peace-loving nation. Indeed, it is our policies that enabled Kazakhstan to launch a new security organization for Asia with the participation of the leaders of 16 nations. At its inaugural meeting in Almaty in June 2002, we hosted the presidents of China, Russia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the prime minister of India and others. At the height of a crisis between New Delhi and Islamabad, their leaders sat at one table and were able to directly listen to each other. This event became Kazakhstan's important contribution to the reduction of tensions between the two nuclear powers of the subcontinent. "Countries like Kazakhstan that have renounced nuclear weapons for all time provide an example and can provide valuable leadership on these issues," former Sen. Sam Nunn said this month at a Washington conference. "One of the things I hope we can do is pay some real attention, and put in a leadership role, to countries that have given up nuclear weapons." I couldn't agree more. We believe our example should become international public knowledge and a factor in dealing with threshold countries. Though our disarmament might seem something of the distant past, it also relates directly to present challenges to global security. We still need to take care of what Mr. Nunn calls the human factor. As we moved to disarm and destroy the military infrastructure, scores of experienced nuclear scientists and biological specialists and their families, were left lingering in ghost towns with neither proper jobs nor means to live. They can be instrumental in commercial projects of conversion in such areas as the peaceful use of atomic energy and biotechnologies. The help from the United States will not only give them an opportunity to peacefully apply their skills, but will also strengthen our joint counterproliferation efforts at a time when numerous countries and terrorist groups continue to seek WMD. Our cooperation with the United States in nonproliferation and fighting terrorism has served as a strong foundation for our relations, dubbed "strategic partnership" by Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev and George Bush. The people of Kazakhstan were outraged by the horrific attacks of September 11, and we have worked closely with the United States in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan. As of now, more than 1,000 coalition aircraft have flown over Kazakhstan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. We have provided our major airport for the use by U.S. Air Force, and significantly expanded the cooperation between our armed forces and intelligence services. We have supported the American-led efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein, who failed to present clear evidence of the disarmament of Iraq and hence bore the full responsibility for the military action. Today, we stand united in bringing stability to that country and the region. It is crucial then that in this fragile time, policy-makers and people of both Kazakhstan and the United States make strong efforts to support our cooperation further. This will bode well with the long-term interests of both nations and will help us build a safer and more prosperous world. Return to Menu D. Russia-U.S. 1. U.S. Persuades Russia of Iran's Nuke Program MOSCOW - The United States is trying to persuade Russia to acknowledge Iran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program and hopes for Moscow's support when the U.N. nuclear watchdog discusses Tehran's alleged violations of the nonproliferation regime next month, a top U.S. diplomat said Monday. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said he had discussed Washington's longtime concerns over the Iranian nuclear program with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, referring specifically to the findings of a recent visit to Iran by International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed El-Baradei. Those included a cascade of centrifuges that could be used to enrich uranium to weapons grade, and other nuclear activities Tehran had started over the past several years and never disclosed to the IAEA, Bolton said. "We think these and other examples and the overall clandestine way Iran has carried out this activity demonstrate why Iran is in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA," Bolton said. "The Russian government has a somewhat different view at present." Still, he said recent statements by Rumyantsev and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov suggested that Moscow was slowly coming to share Washington's concern about Iran's nuclear potential. Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran has long been a bone of contention between Washington and Moscow. The United States contends that the technology and expertise Iran is gaining from Russia's construction of the US$800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant could be used for a weapons program, and that Russian companies - perhaps without official permission - have been involved in transferring weapons technology to Tehran. Bolton said a group of Russian and U.S. experts had discussed the Iranian nuclear program last week, and that he had discussed other possible joint work on the issue in the run-up to the June IAEA board of governors meeting with Rumyantsev and with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov. Bolton also expressed hope that the IAEA would conclude that Tehran had violated its nonproliferation obligations, which would require that the issue be referred to the U.N. Security Council for action. Russian support for the U.S. position would be key in swaying the nuclear watchdog toward such a finding. Following the U.S.-Russian disagreement over Iraq, Bolton said Washington was hoping to refocus bilateral relations on the "strategic partnership" launched with the arms control treaty signed last year by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. He said he and Mamedov had discussed the prospects for Russian ratification of the so-called Moscow Treaty before the two presidents meet in St. Petersburg at the end of May. Leaders of Russia's lower house of parliament have said they may present the treaty, which calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds by 2012, for ratification on May 16. They had put off ratification earlier because of Russia's opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq. The U.S. Senate unanimously approved the treaty in March. "Preparations for considering ratification of this document are in full swing," Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the lower house's international affairs committee, was quoted as saying Monday by the Interfax news agency. "I am sure that the treaty answers Russia's interests and for that reason the majority of deputies should support its ratification." Return to Menu 2. Russian-American Nuclear Energy Ministry Consultations Focus On Iran's Nuke Program MOSCOW - The nuclear program of Iran was in focus at the Russian-American consultations held at the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State, told a press conference on Monday. At the get-together with Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, the Iranian nuclear program was discussed within the context of the information supplied to Mohamed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by Iran during his visit to that country, John Bolton said. The United States has voiced preoccupation over Iran still seeking access to the production of nuclear weapons, he said. The Russian and American evaluations of the Iranian nuclear program do not fully coincide, he noted. At these consultations, Russia and the United States agreed that outstanding questions should be settled at the June 16 session of the IAEA board of governors, due in Vienna. They will hear El Baradei's report on the state and prospects of the Iranian nuclear program, said John Bolton. Return to Menu 3. U.S. Wants Russian Help on North Korea's, Iran's Nuclear Issues MOSCOW - The U.S. expects Russia to help it halt North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs, a move that would improve U.S.-Russian relations after Russia opposed the war on Iraq, a U.S. diplomat said. U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin will discuss the threats from possible weapons of mass destruction held by North Korea and Iran when they meet later this month in St. Petersburg, Russia's former capital and Putin's native city, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton told reporters in Moscow. The issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has been "solved,'' he said. "We'll move to other issues on non-proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran,'' Bolton said. "I think this is what the presidents will discuss in St. Petersburg.'' Russia joined France, Germany and China in opposing the U.S.- U.K. invasion of Iraq. Putin has said the war in Iraq was unjustified, a mistake and undermined international stability. He called for the return of United Nations arms inspectors to Iraq, where weapons of mass destruction yet have to be found. U.S. and U.K. forces are interviewing Iraqi scientists and studying documents to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Bolton said. He ruled out UN involvement in verifying any evidence the military coalition may discover, saying it's possible the UN will play a role "further down the road.'' The U.S. has protested Russia's technical and scientific assistance to Iran in building the Bushehr nuclear plant, in the southern part of the country. Russia also signed a $5 billion agreement to build five nuclear reactors in Iran. Russian officials say the facilities would only be used for civilian purposes and would be under inspection by international monitors. The U.S. has concerns about possible "clandestine'' nuclear programs in Iran, Bolton said. "It's neither in Russian nor in U.S. interests to have nuclear weapons in Iran,'' Bolton said. "On North Korea, Russia's and the U.S.'s position is the same: We don't want to see North Korea possess nuclear weapons.'' Both the U.S. and Russia support having multilateral discussions with North Korea aimed at stopping its nuclear program, he said. Return to Menu 4. US Pressures Russia Over Iran Nuclear Cooperation MOSCOW - The United States on Monday held high-level talks with Russia on Iran, aimed at persuading Moscow to rethink its nuclear cooperation with the Islamic republic which Washington says is trying to develop nuclear weapons. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton met foreign and atomic energy ministry officials in a fresh effort to get Moscow to curtail cooperation in Iran's Bushehr power station project and rein in Russian scientists who Washington says are clandestinely supplying Tehran with nuclear technology. With the Iraq war winding down, officials in President Bush's administration say they are now focused on the dangers of nuclear proliferation coming from Iran and North Korea, bracketed together in Bush's so-called "axis of evil." "We have believed for some time that the Iranians were pursuing nuclear weapons," a senior U.S. administration official told journalists in Moscow ahead of Bolton's talks. "Although an Iranian nuclear weapons capability may be years down the road, time moves quickly and they may have a lot of activity going on that we don't know about," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity. Iran says its nuclear ambitions are limited to producing electricity and has allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to visit several of its nuclear facilities. Russia has until recently stoutly defended its program to help Tehran build a 1,000-megawatt nuclear plant at Bushehr. It says it is providing Iran only with civilian equipment, with fuel to be shipped back to Russia for reprocessing, and has said Iran is incapable of building nuclear weapons. But in March Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev appeared to backtrack saying Moscow could not judge whether Iran was secretly developing nuclear arms as Washington alleged. Bolton was holding talks with Rumyantsev and Georgy Mamedov, a deputy foreign ministry, chiefly on the Iran question. He also discussed Washington's nuclear standoff with North Korea with Russia's top Korean specialist, deputy foreign minister Alexander Losyukov. Washington wants Pyongyang, who it says has admitted to having nuclear arms, to dismantle its nuclear program. Talks in Moscow took place with both sides trying to bury differences over the U.S.-led war on Iraq that Russia opposed. But President Vladimir Putin, while wanting to keep his close partnership with Bush on track, has continued to oppose the U.S. view that U.N. sanctions on Iraq should now be lifted. It is not clear to what extent, if at all, he is prepared to give ground on the question of nuclear cooperation with Iran. The issue has rebounded on relations in the past, with the U.S. Congress three years ago passing a bill which effectively rules out further U.S. funding to Russia's cash-strapped space agency, Rosaviakosmos, until Moscow proves it is not assisting Iranian ballistic missile programs. The U.S. official suggested Moscow may, however, be having a change-of-heart. "The Russian view before was that there is no Iranian clandestine nuclear weapons program, but I think that view has changed," he said, referring to Rumyantsev's statement and comments by other Russian officials. He said Washington wanted Moscow to focus on ways of curbing the activities of Russian scientists and technicians who, he said, were passing on nuclear know-how to the Iranians clandestinely without the Russian government's knowledge. Return to Menu 5. US, Russia Talk On Arms Control MOSCOW - U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton held talks with top Russian officials Monday on arms control and ways to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in Iran and North Korea. Bolton met with Nuclear Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, and he was scheduled to confer with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, Moscow's point man on the Koreas. He was expected to reiterate U.S. concerns about Russian aid to Iran's nuclear program and about North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Over the past few months, U.S. officials have had "some measure of success" in getting their Russian counterparts to acknowledge that Iran has a covert nuclear weapons program, a senior U.S. administration official said Monday on condition of anonymity. The official said that Moscow had also exhibited a new readiness to consider the threat of U.N. sanctions to push Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Bolton was also expected to discuss the prospects for ratifying the latest arms control treaty, the Treaty of Moscow, before U.S. President George W. Bush's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg later this month. Leaders of Russia's lower house of parliament have said that they may present the treaty, which calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds by 2012, for ratification on May 16. They had put off ratification earlier this spring because of Russia's opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq. "Preparations for considering ratification of this document are in full swing," Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the lower house's international affairs committee, was quoted as saying Monday by the Interfax news agency. "I am sure that the treaty answers Russia's interests and for that reason the majority of deputies should support its ratification." The U.S. Senate unanimously approved the treaty in March. Putin and Bush may exchange the instruments of ratification at the St. Petersburg meeting, the U.S. administration official said. Bolton was also expected to discuss possible Russian-U.S. cooperation in missile defense systems. On Sunday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said the issue would be on Putin's and Bush's agenda in St. Petersburg. After a two-day visit - his 21st in two years - Bolton was scheduled to leave for Paris on Tuesday to attend a meeting preparing for next month's Group of Eight summit in Evian, France. That summit will include discussions of progress on the group's year-old pledge to devote US$20 billion over 10 years to help Russia dispose of its deadly arsenal of aging nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Return to Menu 6. Putin, Bush to Focus on Missile Defense MOSCOW - Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush will discuss possible cooperation in missile defense when they meet this month at St. Petersburg's 300th anniversary celebration, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Sunday. Moscow said in January that it had proposed a draft "political agreement" for the two nations to cooperate in developing defenses against ballistic missiles. It released no details of the proposal but said it hopes Washington would agree to the deal. There has been no U.S. comment on the proposal. Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said Sunday that missile defense was to be discussed in the context of the latest U.S.-Russian arms treaty, which is expected to be ratified by the Russian legislature before the celebration at the end of May. The treaty, which Putin and Bush signed in May 2002, calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads, by 2012. "It is a very serious issue which, we think, will be a very important channel for further interaction and strategic military partnership between Russia and the United States," Yakovenko was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. He said that Washington and Moscow could cooperate on so-called theater missile defense, Interfax reported. Russia opposed the U.S. withdrawal last year from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which banned nationwide missile defenses of the type the Bush administration wants to build. Reiterating criticism of the U.S. move earlier this year, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Russia was eager to cooperate with NATO partners in developing defenses against short-range missiles. On Sunday, Yakovenko also said that Moscow was pushing for a new U.N. treaty to ban weapons in space and at space facilities. Yuri Koptev, the head of Russia's space agency, said that the United States wanted to militarize space. "This is a destabilizing factor," Interfax quoted Koptev as saying. "If such programs are developed, our doctrine and plans will have to be reviewed in order to deal with the potential threat." Return to Menu E. Russia-Iran 1. Russia: No Signs Of Iran Nuke Violations MOSCOW - In a rebuff to the United States, a top Russian diplomat said Tuesday there was no evidence that Iran had pursued a nuclear weapons capability in violation of the international nonproliferation agreement. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov contradicted allegations about Iran's nuclear program made Monday by U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton in Moscow. Bolton had sought to persuade Russian officials to acknowledge Tehran has a clandestine weapons program and to win Russian support for a critical report on Iran's nuclear efforts by the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency. "Very sound evidence is needed to accuse anyone. So far, neither the United States nor any other countries can present it," Losyukov said, according to the Interfax news agency. Losyukov did acknowledge that Iran's nuclear program had some uncertainties, and that Moscow would work with Tehran to "add more transparency" to its program. As for Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, Losyukov said the work was "strictly in line with IAEA norms." Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran has long been a bone of contention between Washington and Moscow. The United States contends that the technology and expertise Iran is gaining from Russia's construction of the $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant could be used for a weapons program, and that Russian companies - perhaps without official permission - have been involved in transferring weapons technology to Tehran. Losyukov also contradicted Bolton's contention that Russia and the United States see eye-to-eye on how to handle the North Korean nuclear crisis. Bolton said Monday that neither Washington nor Moscow would like to see a nuclear-armed North Korea and that both favored multilateral talks on the problem. However, Losyukov said "there is a broad divide between our countries on North Korea and Iran," Interfax reported. He did not elaborate. Return to Menu 2. Russia Tells U.S. No Reason to Accuse Iran on Nuclear Energy TEHRAN - Russia, which helps Iran build a nuclear energy plant in southern Bushehr, on Monday turned down US claims that Tehran had violated international conventions on weapons of mass destruction, the Itar-Tass news agency said. "Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told US undersecretary of state (for arms control) John Bolton on Monday that there are no reasons to believe at present that Iran has violated its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency," the agency said. Bolton is in Moscow mainly to discuss Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, which has irked the United States. Rumyantsev visited Washington last month, in which 'he played down US fears that Russian construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran may trigger proliferation and made it clear that Moscow would continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran'. According to Itar-Tass news agency, Rumyantsev said he assured US officials that "everything will be done in strict compliance with international norms and agreements". "We tried to remove American officials' fears that Russian construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran may trigger proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction)," Itar-Tass cited Rumyantsev as saying at the time. "Therefore, our information on cooperation with Iran was apprehended with understanding that we do not violate any international commitments," the minister said. Rumyantsev's new statements evidently jarred with those in March when he said that US "is always criticizing us, but its close economic partners supply Iran with sensitive technology". He was referring to media reports that an Iranian gas centrifuge, a sophisticated apparatus able to enrich uranium for both power stations and weapons, was made by Western companies. Iran said it was surprised by those "irresponsible" remarks of Russian officials. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi reiterated that "the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic are indigenous and Iran uses its own know-how and possibilities (to build a complete nuclear energy cycle)". A delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February inspected the gas centrifuge in central Natanz. Washington has whipped up its anti-Iran rhetoric after President Mohammad Khatami made public Tehran's plans for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The announcement came shortly after US officials were cited late last year as alleging that American satellites had spotted two sites in Arak and Natanz, which suggested they could be used for making nuclear weapons. Washington suspects Tehran's plans, arguing, "Iran's costly pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle only makes sense if it's in support of a nuclear weapons program." US says Iran's nuclear programs, while the country sits on some of the biggest oil and gas reserves of the world, are questionable. Iran says it wants the programs as part of the country's bid to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity to cope with the rising energy demand in the 65-million-nation in the next 20 years, while its gas and oil reserves are becoming overstretched. Washington also alleges that Russian construction of a nuclear plant in Bushehr could enable Iran to build a nuclear weapon, a charge that both Tehran and Moscow deny. Return to Menu F. Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement 1. Japan, Russia To Start Scrapping N-Subs In Summer The Japanese and Russian governments have agreed to begin this summer dismantling and removing nuclear materials from 41 decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines left languishing in the Russian Far East, government officials said Saturday. The two governments will sign an agreement in late May on dismantling the submarine, the officials said. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Russian President Vladimir Putin will announce their intention to dismantle all of the submarines at the Group of Eight summit to be held in early June in Evian-les-Bains, France, the officials said. The two governments are planning to incorporate the project in a statement to be delivered by the summit chairman, the officials said. The submarine that will be dismantled first is a Victor III-class general purpose submarine, currently in the sea off Vladivostok. The one-year dismantling project will begin about August after spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste are moved from the submarine to storage facilities, the officials said. Spent nuclear fuel from superannuated Russian submarines leaking into the Sea of Japan prompted Japan and Russia to agree in 1993 to cooperate in dismantling the submarines as part of a project to help remove nuclear materials from the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Japan-Russia nuclear weapons disposal committee was established in the same year to receive funds from Tokyo for the dismantling project. Since Moscow failed to coordinate opinions within the government on the project, none of the submarines has yet been dismantled. Because the G-8 Partnership declaration adopted at last year's Group of Eight summit in Kananaskis, Canada, calls for the prevention of the spread of the former Soviet Union's weapons of mass destruction and nuclear materials to contain terrorism, dismantling the submarines became an important project. The Japan-Russia action plan signed by Koizumi when he visited Russia in January incorporates a clause to beef up the system to dismantle the submarines, leading to immediate preparations for the project. Japan has provided about 25 billion yen for the project. Part of the money was used to build facilities unrelated to dismantling, such as a treatment facility for liquid radioactive waste, leaving about 15 billion yen remaining. Return to Menu G. Nuclear Industry 1. NAC Kazatomprom Acquired Facilities Of Mangistauski Atomic Power Combine The April 30 tender resulted in the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom (NAC) acquiring facilities of the state-owned Aktau-based Mangistauski Atomic Power Combine (MAPC), as Nuclear.Ru was informed by the company's press service. Since May 1 NAC has incorporated JSC MAPC-Kazatomprom with a number of district heating plants HPP-1,2,3; fast neutron reactor BN-350; distillate production plant (DPP) and a number of auxiliary facilities supporting productions continuity. The NAC Kazatomprom experts believe that this key enterprise of Mangistauskaya region suffers hard times. Its equipment is worn out and last decade has been serviced only to keep up the productions. The crisis has been caused by frequent changes in management and old-fashion labor arrangements along with systematic non-payments by Mangistauski Region companies and population for electricity, heat and fresh water supplied by MAPC. NAC sent its experts to manage the new entity headed by Vladimir Ivanov, the Director of JSC MAPC-Kazatomprom, who formerly careered as the deputy director general of JSC Ulbinsk Metallurgical Works and deputy director of the mining department and materiel supply department of NAC Kazatomprom. By the end of 2003 NAC plans for a set of measures to revive the combine including the overhauls of boilers at HPP-1, two turbines at HPP-1,2; major repairs of power generating equipment of DHP; overhaul of DPP equipment; restructuring of the local banking and accounting office, etc. The company also plans for further decommissioning and mothballing BN-350 reactor as per the plan previously approved by the Ministry for power and mineral resources. Presently, NAC President Mukhtar Dzhakiev is making a familiarization visit to the JSC MAPC facilities in Aktau where he is also to meet Mangistauskaya Oblast and the city of Aktau officials to discuss issues of interaction between the executive powers and JSC MAPC management to resume full-scale operations at the plant and its repair plan. Return to Menu 2. Russian Company Will Supply Fuel For Chinese Reactor MOSCOW - The Machine Building Plant in Elektrostal, Moscow region, will deliver fuel for China's Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) at the Guizhou nuclear power plant, the plant's senior marketing official Vadim Novoselsky told Interfax. "The fuel will be produced and sent to China this year," he specified. The plant's construction started in April 1999, under a design provided by Atomenergoproyekt company in St. Petersburg, and was finished in August 2002. The plant is now being fitted with equipment. Experts from Russia's Afrikantov experimental design bureau and the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation will finish this work by late 2004. According to experts, the reactor's main virtue is that it is capable of using recycled fuel. Russian Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told Interfax that the CEFR project will be completed by 2005. Return to Menu 3. Springtime for Russia's Nuclear Industry? MOSCOW - Russian nuclear power? To most people, that means one thing: Chernobyl. But this popular association is misleading. Industry experts say human error and an unusual design were to blame for the explosion of the Soviet-made reactor in Ukraine that in 1986 sent a lethal radioactive cloud over Europe. Russians generally make sturdy, efficient reactors -- as shown by the European Union's acceptance as safe 14 Soviet-made pressurized-water reactors currently operating in the EU accession countries of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. What the post-Soviet Russian nuclear-power industry really lacks is sophisticated financial management. That's about to change. On completion of a due-diligence audit by Ernst & Young in the second half of May, United Heavy Machinery, a well-regarded Moscow-based shipbuilder and manufacturer of oil-drilling equipment for global customers, is expected to acquire a controlling stake in state-controlled Atomstroiexport, Russia's monopoly exporter of nuclear power equipment and services. The planned acquisition is an ambitious play by UHM, already a prime subcontractor of Atomstroiexport, to pull the Russian nuclear power export industry alongside Western giants General Electric Co. and France's state-controlled Framatome. UHM's CEO, Kakha Bendukidze, 47, is convinced that the long, post-Chernobyl "dead season" in new nuclear construction is over. "There will be increasing demand for nuclear power" as the environmental and health hazards of coal-fired power plants become better recognized, he says. If Bendukidze is right, a modernized Russian nuclear export industry would be well-positioned to go up against Western rivals. "The Russians have good designers, excellent scientists, and great technology -- they just need to get organized," says Ann MacLachlan, European bureau chief for Platts Nucleonics Week in Paris (published by The McGraw-Hill Companies, which also publishes BusinessWeek). Top-notch Russian nuclear scientists, engineers, and other technical personnel can be hired at rates one-third of those in the U.S. or Europe. "They can certainly do it a lot cheaper than GE can, and can probably do just as good a job," says financial analyst Rob Edwards of Moscow brokerage Renaissance Capital. There are certainly no complaints from the Finns, for whom the Russians in 1977 and 1980 built reactors still operating in the town of Loviisa. "These two units are among the best in the world for safety and performance," says Peter Gango, chief engineer at the Loviisa reactors. What's more, foreign customers should be comfortable dealing with UHM, which is regarded as one of Russian industry's more transparent companies. George Soros, with a 10% stake, is the second-biggest shareholder after Bendukidze. The company has access to the Eurobond market and is planning a listing on the London Stock Exchange in September. In 2002, it reported $6 million in profits on $400 million in sales. Its Russian-listed shares have outperformed the Russian Trading System index by 133% since January, 2001. "We will open doors for Atomstroiexport for financing, and we can deliver better management," says Alexei Shavrov, UHM's deputy general director. UHM's first big test is in Finland, where Atomstroiexport is bidding for construction of the country's fifth nuclear reactor, a prize project worth as much as $3 billion. The Russians are in the running. "They come in very strong," says industry analyst Adrian Collings of the London-based World Nuclear Assn., a trade group for nuclear power vendors and utilities. UHM will need to move fast, though, to overhaul stodgy Atomstroiexport. That company operates under the umbrella of the state's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom), an opaque, Soviet-style behemoth over which even the Kremlin has limited control. The takeover will be a big gulp: Atomstroiexport's $800 million in expected export revenues this year will exceed UHM's expected sales of $450 million to $500 million. General Director Viktor Kozlov, 58, an engineer who cut his teeth in the Soviet nuclear power industry -- as did most of his 800 employees -- says that Atomstroiexport is profitable, but declines to say by how much. Political risk also needs to be managed. UHM will inherit a dispute with the Bush Administration over Atomstroiexport's contract to construct the Bushehr nuclear reactor in southern Iran, due to start operating next year. The Administration strongly opposes the venture for fear that Russian transfers of materials, fuel, and know-how could assist Iran in obtaining a nuclear bomb. But Bendukidze, who has met with Bush Administration National Security Council officials, says their concerns are groundless. "This project is open, transparent, controllable, and safe," he says. Other target export markets are China and India, where demand for electricity is growing fast. "I'm not sure it [nuclear plant construction] can be done a lot cheaper," says John G. Rice, president and chief executive of GE Power Systems. But "we certainly appreciate the Russian technology, and we welcome the new competition." The Russians are coming. Return to Menu 4. Beloyarsk-4 BN-800 Gaining Momentum "The capital investments for 2003 BN-800 at Beloyarsk NPP will be increased twice as compared to the last year", Plant Director Nikolai Oshkanov said commenting on Nuclear.Ru question regarding progress of construction of a fast neutron reactor power unit BN-800 at his site. "The finance increase decision was made to mean that the increase in the pace of construction", Mr. Oshkanov said and noted that the funds are in full correspondence with the capabilities to invest them. "Last year they allocated the funds we were capable of spending to build the forth power unit. Now the organization and expedite construction allow us to gain the pace 2 times faster, in other words we can invest twice more", Mr. Oshkanov explained. He also informed that the number of construction workers would be increased from 500 up to 1,500. "We have capabilities to accommodate them, still we will have do more", the N-Plant Director stressed. At present, the construction work is done on the so-called start-up complex of the district heating plant, which is to be commissioned in 2004. The BN-800 power unit construction cost 1,200 million USD is to be completed by the end of 2009. Return to Menu H. Announcements 1. State Department Briefing, Remarks On Bolton's Trip To Moscow (Excerpted) [...] QUESTION: Could you -- could you give us more -- more details about Secretary Bolton's visit there? And also, I understand that Iran is going to be, as it always is, on the agenda but perhaps even higher on the agenda this time with more allegations about Iran's pursuit of nuclear material? MR. BOUCHER: I don't have the exact agenda or schedule of meetings for him in Moscow. He is in Moscow to carry on broad discussions in his area, particularly the nonproliferation field, which is something very important to us. Russia's cooperation with Iran has long been a concern to us. As you know, in recent months, more and more information has been coming out to confirm that Iran is running a complete nuclear fuel cycle, that they have been interested in developing various aspects of the nuclear cycle that not only don't make sense for Iran, but also have -- or don't make sense for people to cooperate with, and so this is a chance to look at those new facts and to talk with people who have been cooperating with Iran in the nuclear area and make, once more, clear the point that we've always made,- that it's not in anybody's interest to have nuclear cooperation with Iran, given their ultimate goals and intentions. [...] Return to Menu 2. Statement On Article VI Of The Nonproliferation Treaty (Excerpted) Over the last year, there has been considerable progress toward the goals of Article VI. The United States welcomes the opportunity to present a statement on these developments. Last May, Presidents Bush and Putin signed the historic Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which calls for reductions in strategic nuclear warheads by nearly two-thirds. The preamble of that Treaty includes the following paragraph: "Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968." I can think of no more authoritative and high-level statement of the U.S. commitment to Article VI than the signature of President Bush on this Treaty. The Moscow Treaty is the latest important step in our strategic offensive reduction process. Under the Treaty, the United States will be legally bound to reduce from approximately 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. I am pleased to note that the United States Senate unanimously approved the Treaty earlier this year. The Moscow Treaty marks a new era of a strengthened U.S.-Russian partnership. Our two countries also have established a Consultative Group on Strategic Stability that serves as a broader forum to discuss issues of strategic importance and to enhance mutual transparency. The heads of the United States' and Russian delegations to this meeting forwarded a joint statement on the Moscow Treaty to participants at this session of the Preparatory Committee. The Moscow Treaty represents a milestone in arms control. In 2001, the new U.S. administration decided to proceed with strategic nuclear reductions based on the dramatic changes taking place in the international security environment, including our improved relationship with Russia. The President announced that the United States would unilaterally reduce its strategic nuclear forces and invited Russia to reciprocate. President Putin made a similar statement and the two leaders eventually agreed to make these commitments legally binding. Our countries took an approach that led quickly to a treaty that will cut U.S. strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in decades. In less than six months, the administration was able to accomplish what had proven to be impossible for almost a decade -- to agree with Russia on deep strategic nuclear reductions. The new trust and openness in the U.S.-Russian relationship, along with the various means of inspecting and monitoring already available, will provide the necessary confidence in implementation of the Moscow Treaty. It was not necessary to negotiate hundreds of pages of new verification procedures. We have already begun further reductions since we met the START Treaty level of 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads at the end of 2001. Our 50 Peacekeeper missiles are being deactivated and four Trident submarines are being removed from strategic service. We no longer maintain an ability to return the B-1 bomber to nuclear service. Some warheads removed from operational service will be stored in active status, others will be stored, but will be disabled and not available for quick redeployment; still others will be designated for retirement and dismantling. The United States needs to store some warheads for reasons related to nuclear safety and reliability. If a warhead on operational status is found to be unsafe or unreliable, we must have the ability to replace it. The United States has no plans to redeploy strategic warheads removed from operational status. Barring unforeseen changes in the global security environment, there is no reason we would want to reverse these reductions. The Treaty does not require the destruction of nuclear warheads, but then no arms control treaty ever has. However, the United States has unilaterally dismantled over 13,000 U.S. nuclear weapons over the past 15 years. Dismantling activity continues at the U.S. Pantex facility. The Moscow Treaty is a new and bold approach for a new era. It clearly promotes implementation of the United States' nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Article VI measures related to fissile material get little public attention, but have a substantial impact on the irreversibility of nuclear reductions. The United States has not produced fissile material for nuclear weapons in over a decade. At the Conference on Disarmament, the United States supports the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty that advances U.S. security interests. In 1997, we entered into the bilateral Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement with Russia that codifies the shutdown of 24 U.S. and Russian plutonium production reactors. Further progress was made on this agreement over the last year through an amendment signed in March 2003. It calls for the shutdown of Russia's three remaining plutonium production reactors and replacement of their energy production with fossil fuel sources. On existing stocks of fissile material, the United States and Russia continue efforts to dispose of over 700 tons of fissile material declared excess to defense needs. More than 170 tons of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been converted for peaceful uses in the United States under the 1993 agreement that calls for the conversion of 500 tons of Russian HEU. The United States has unilaterally identified 174 tons of excess HEU, of which approximately 30 tons has been converted. The United States is actively pursuing implementation of the U.S.-Russian agreement reached in 2000 that calls for each side to dispose of 34 tons, of weapons plutonium into forms no longer useable in nuclear weapons. Our current priorities include plans to establish financial arrangements and related organizational mechanisms for multilateral support of Russia's disposition program. The vast majority of the excess 700 tons is subject to transparency measures pursuant to U.S.-Russian negotiated arrangements. Both sides have also worked with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to develop practical measures for IAEA verification of excess material. This work has been carried out through the Trilateral Initiative, which reached a milestone last September when the parties concluded they had fulfilled their initial task to examine relevant technical, legal and financial issues. The United States has voluntarily placed some of its excess material under IAEA safeguards. Earlier this month the IAEA conducted its 100th inspection of excess material at U.S. facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington. This work represents steady and significant progress toward nuclear disarmament. These measures help ensure that neither the United States nor Russia would be able to rebuild their nuclear weapon stockpiles to previously high levels. To date, the quantities of excess fissile material removed from U.S. and Russian military stockpiles slated for disposition could be used to manufacture more than 30,000 nuclear weapons. In addition to the Moscow Treaty and limits on fissile material, the United States has been engaged for more than 10 years in a massive cooperative program with the states of the former Soviet Union to address the nonproliferation threat posed by the Cold War legacy of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs. The United States has allocated over $8 billion for these programs, with about $1 billion requested for FY 2004. This program has helped to eliminate around 900 ballistic missiles, over 100 bombers and nearly 50 ballistic submarines. It has helped to redirect thousands of scientists formerly involved in WMD programs into sustained civilian programs. It has assisted in upgrading the security of hundreds of tons of weapons-useable fissile material. This represents an enormous investment for a safer world. Mr. Chairman, since September 11 there has been a new sense of urgency in nonproliferation. Nations around the world recognize the huge risk presented by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or their state sponsors. Last June, President Bush and other G-8 leaders launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a bold new effort to address this risk to civilized nations. They pledged up to $20 billion over 10 years to fund nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety projects. The G-8 have devoted much time and effort to implement this initiative over the past year. In the Global Partnership statement, G-8 leaders endorsed six nonproliferation principles to prevent terrorist access to WMD, and the material required to produce them. One principle invites states to manage and dispose of excess fissile material, to eliminate chemical weapons, and to minimize stocks of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins. Fulfillment of these six principles would make it more difficult for terrorists to threaten us all with the world's most dangerous weapons. When fully implemented, the Global Partnership will make a significant contribution toward the goals of Article VI. [...] Return to Menu I. Links of Interest 1. Fact Sheet on U.S. Actions And Policies In Support Of Its NPT Article VI Obligations Related To Nuclear Disarmament Return to Menu 2. Statement on Regional Issues of the Nonproliferation Treaty Return to Menu 3. Information Paper from the United States Concerning Article VI of the NPT, Provided to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference Return to Menu 4. Russia, America, Iraq Return to Menu 5. U.S. Unprepared for 'Dirty Bomb' Aftermath Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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