A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Brooks Outlines Measures to Combat Future WMD Proliferation
Washington File: U.S. Department of State
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
A top U.S. Department of Energy official says the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must be addressed through measures that focus on counter-proliferation, strengthened non-proliferation, and minimizing the effects of WMD use.
Ambassador Linton Brooks, who is acting administrator of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), said it will also be important to "rely on improved intelligence capabilities, robust research and development, strengthened international cooperation and other such measures" to ensure future national and homeland security.
"Countering proliferation can no longer be considered separate and distinct from our broader national security policy," Brooks said during a keynote speech on the new security challenges of a new century which he delivered to a conference at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, N.M., on April 23.
Too many nations are trafficking in WMD or WMD components, he said, and too many are pursuing an indigenous capability "for the United States to do anything less than give these issues the attention they deserve." They are central to how security will be defined in the 21st century, he said.
Brooks told conference attendees that given the scope of the WMD problem "cooperation in suppressing terrorism and countering proliferation should be central elements to how we organize internationally."
The NNSA official also suggested that traditional arms control "is largely the agenda of the past." He suggested that the term "cooperative disarmament" may describe how the United States seeks to address the problem by working with multilateral organizations, as well as working bilaterally and trilaterally and forming coalitions of the willing to stem the flow of illicit weapons and materials.
Brooks also described the re-orientation of the U.S. strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers. "We now plan in terms of offensive strike forces," he said, "which includes not only our strategic offensive deterrent, but precision strike forces; defenses, both active and passive; and the revitalization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure."
B. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. Duma Ready To Ratify Arms Treaty In May
Associated Press
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - A top Russian lawmaker said Friday that the upper house of parliament was ready to ratify a major arms control treaty with the United States in the last 10 days of May.
Mikhail Margelov, head of the Federation Council's international affairs committee, said after meeting with President Vladimir Putin that he hoped the lower house, the State Duma, would approve the treaty next week or immediately after the May 9 Victory Day holiday, according to the ITAR-Tass news agency.
The Federation Council can take up ratification only after the Duma's approval.
Earlier this month, Margelov's counterpart in the Duma, Dmitry Rogozin, said the Duma might vote on the treaty May 16.
The Duma had been expected to open debate on the Treaty of Moscow last month, but it indefinitely postponed a ratification vote as a sign of protest against the then imminent U.S.-led attack on Iraq, which Russia vehemently opposed.
The treaty, which Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush signed in May, calls on both nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads, by 2012.
C. Plutonium Disposition 1. Experts Debate Fate Of Plutonium
Christian Bourge
United Press International
4/24/2003
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON - The large stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States and Russia represent an enormous security challenge that is not being adequately addressed by either country, according to think tank analysts who specialize in nuclear non-proliferation issues.
"There is general agreement that we should be doing plutonium disposition," Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the non-proliferation project at the liberal-leaning Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told United Press International. "We have more plutonium than we would ever need, and this stuff is a huge security risk."
The United States is currently spearheading a campaign to turn 68 metric tons of American and Russian weapons-grade plutonium -- 34 tons from each nation -- into fuel for civilian nuclear reactors, but the material is only a small portion of the plutonium stockpiled in both countries.
The Russian plutonium is a matter of particular concern because much of it is inadequately secured and has long been considered a possible source of nuclear material for terrorists groups seeking to build a nuclear bomb.
It is more difficult to develop a weapon with plutonium than with uranium, a much more commonly used fuel for nuclear reactors. However, plutonium is capable of producing a much larger nuclear blast and so might more desirable to terrorists. Wolfsthal stressed that this problem must be adequately addressed.
"This is top order magnitude stuff," he said. "Small amounts of this material can destroy an entire city. By small amounts I mean levels you can hold in your hand, and there are rooms and rooms of this stuff. Getting it secure it is not a 'nice to have,' it is a 'must have.'"
The United States and Russia agreed to the plutonium the reprocessing plan during the last year of the Clinton administration. However, Wolfsthal and other nuclear non-proliferation experts say the effort would actually heighten security risks because the material would be transported to other facilities for processing and then be distributed when sold afterward.
In addition, critics say the plan is not economically viable because the resulting mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX, is far more expensive than uranium fuel and is less attractive for use in commercial nuclear reactors than uranium. Uranium remains the material most commonly used to fuel reactors around the world despite some overseas efforts to move to the use of plutonium, and is currently the only fuel used in American nuclear power plants. MOX production is largely government subsidized around the world.
On Wednesday at a panel discussion on the reprocessing plan at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said the issue has not received the attention it deserves, given the security risks involved.
"It has been almost impossible to have dedicated hearings in our legislative system on this issue," said Sokolski, whose group co-sponsored the AEI forum. "It is something that our government has not taken on as a matter of real public debate."
The idea of using plutonium to fuel reactors in the United States was abandoned during the Ford administration when officials decided that the nuclear proliferation risks outweighed any economic benefits that might gained.
Victor Gilinsky, a senior associate of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and a former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said that plutonium reprocessing it is not a good method of securing the material.
"Now we know (the use of plutonium as nuclear reactor fuel) is not only dangerous but also grossly uneconomic," Gilinsky said at the AEI forum. "We are in a situation where there isn't really any good answer. But I think reclaiming plutonium for nuclear reactors is a particularly bad answer," he said. "It isn't a good idea considering the risk of theft (during transportation of the material for processing) and (the risk of) successful hostile use of this explosive. The overall effect of this in my mind is to undermine long standing U.S. non-proliferation policy."
Gilinsky and Wolfsthal agreed that it would be safer to continue storing the plutonium where it is currently held, and to make it unsuitable for weapons production by mixing it on-site with radioactive waste. Wolfsthal said this competing idea was originally supposed to be used as a complement to the reprocessing plan, but was abandoned by the Bush administration.
Nevertheless, many experts see it as a superior option because it would require only an increase of security at sites where such material is already held, and would not entail the transportation risks of the other plan.
Richard Garwin, director of science and technology policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and chair of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board for the U.S. State Department, said at the forum that this competing option must be conducted in tandem with the reprocessing plan to ensure that all the excess Russian plutonium is secured.
Proponents of the reprocessing plan counter that it is debatable whether the waste-mixing storage plan is safer, because the plutonium would remain retrievable through further processing. Ambassador Michael Guhin, fissile negotiator for the U.S. Department of State and the lead Bush administration official handling negotiations with the Russians over the issue, said at the forum that the process of turning the material into spent fuel is tightly controlled and has been proven effective. He added that, as a practical concern, the waste storage method is a "non-starter" with Russia.
"I am not going to argue that this (reprocessing) program isn't risk free: there is no such thing as a risk-free program," said Guhin. "Plutonium traveling between facilities has some risks, but I do believe this program has far fewer risks than the only alternative."
American taxpayers would also have to substantially underwrite the construction of the Russian and American processing facilities needed to complete the plan. The cost for construction of the Russian plant alone is estimated to be $1 billion. The U.S. government has already pledged $400 million to that cost, with the rest of the cost expected to be picked up by other Group of Eight most industrialized nations.
Guhin said the greatest concern is whether there is adequate control over the excess plutonium in the Russian nuclear stockpile.
"The course we are on seems to this administration after careful revue, seemed to the previous administration after careful revue, and seems to nearly all the G8 countries after their own review, the safest and most prudent course to pursue now and in the long run," said Guhin.
Asked to clarify Guhin's statement, a State Department official made it clear that the official position is that if the current program is abandoned, it will mean the loss of the stringent controls established in the 2000 agreement on the future use of the Russian plutonium.
Henry Rowen, a senior fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution and the former assistant secretary of defense for international security in the administration of George W.H. Bush, said at the forum that this type of thinking ignores the economic impacts the plan would have.
"This has to have (economic) consequences if facilities are built and people get into this," said Rowen. "This is (also) what we ought to be talking about, not only the 68 tons (of plutonium)."
After nine years of secret research, the Nuclear Power Ministry has admitted for the first time that it is working with the United States on an experimental program to turn bomb-grade plutonium into fuel for existing nuclear power plants.
The idea is to help eradicate the vast stockpiles of plutonium from thousands of decommissioned nuclear warheads by mixing the extremely toxic material with thorium, a less-dangerous and naturally occurring metal commonly found near uranium deposits.
The Nazis experimented with thorium as a potential weapon of mass destruction before the war, and invading Soviets confiscated tons of the stuff as war booty and brought it back home.
Although the Nazis never achieved a chain reaction with thorium, Russian and American scientists eventually did. And now Russian specialists, with American money, are working on peaceful applications of the radioactive element -- one of which is using plutonium to trigger an energy-producing chain reaction out of it.
The result, they say, will not only be a cheap source of electricity for millions of homes and enterprises, but also the degradation of weapons-grade plutonium to the point that it will be unsuitable for making nuclear weapons.
Unlike uranium, the supplies of which are dwindling, thorium is abundant and can be easily mined in numerous areas, including the Tomsk region, the United States, India and China.
"The possibility of using thorium fuel in existing reactors is very significant because it means we will not have to change the reactors," said Valery Rachkov, who runs the Russian side of the project as deputy head of the Nuclear Power Ministry's scientific research department. "It is also very important that it serve nonproliferation purposes," Rachkov said in a recent interview.
So far, funding for the project has come solely from the American side and has been relatively paltry -- $2 million from the U.S. government and $3 million from Thorium Power, a private Washington-based company founded in 1992 to capitalize on the scientific work of Alvin Radkowsky, a former student of hydrogen bomb "father" Edward Teller and the chief scientist of the U.S. Naval Reactors program from 1950 to 1972.
Despite the relatively small budget, Thorium Power president Seth Grae and influential members of the U.S. Congress are optimistic that the project will eventually lead to the neutralization of tons of the deadly substance -- just 8 kilograms of which could be used to flatten Moscow or New York.
"Our fuel is really designed to be a way of disposing of the plutonium, to eliminate it while also making energy," Grae said in an interview during a trip to Moscow earlier this month. While in town, Grae met with some of the more than 300 researchers from seven institutions -- including Moscow's famous Kurchatov Institute -- now working on the project, which is being coordinated by the Nuclear Power Ministry and monitored by the State Nuclear Inspection Agency.
There is already an international mechanism for plutonium disposal similar to the 20-year program for uranium signed in 1994 called "Megatons to Megawatts," through which Russia has already diluted and sold -- for some $3.5 billion -- uranium from 7,000 of a planned 20,000 nuclear weapons to the main supplier to U.S. nuclear power stations.
In 2000, Russia and the United States each agreed to eliminate 34 tons of plutonium by burning it as so-called MOX fuel, a mix of oxidized uranium and oxidized plutonium. To do that, however, Russia would have to build a special facility at a cost of some $2 billion, or roughly half the amount required for the entire project. The money was supposed to come from the international community, but to date few countries have appropriated any cash.
Grae says his version will be faster, cheaper and safer than the MOX alternative, as does a formidable backer of the project in Congress -- Representative Curt Weldon, a Russian specialist on the House Armed Services Committee who has traveled widely here.
"I have strongly supported additional funding to test the thorium process at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow," Weldon said by e-mail from Washington. "The thorium process provides the double benefit of reducing weapons-usable fissile material and producing advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. As such, it is in the best interests of the United States to provide funding to advance this technology."
While nuclear experts involved in the MOX program refuse to speculate when or even if the project will get off the ground, Grae says that with just $200 million in funding the thorium-plutonium fuel could be ready for commercial use within three years.
Of Russia's 30 nuclear reactors, eight -- four in the Saratov region, two in the Tver region and one each in Volgodonsk and Novovoronezh -- are of the type (VVER-1000) that can be easily adapted to run on thorium-plutonium fuel. Two more plants with the modern VVER-1000 reactors are currently being built, and another is planned.
The Russian scientists working on the project say that each of these reactors will be able to burn about 700 kilograms of plutonium a year -- just a fraction of the plutonium Russia has stockpiled in underground facilities belonging to nuclear power plants, which are already filled to the brim. In fact, even if funding is found eventually for both the MOX facility and the thorium project, it would take decades to dispose of it all.
In his recently published book "Nuclear Danger," independent nuclear expert Vladimir Kuznetsov estimates that Russia is already sitting on 150 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and with up to 18,000 warheads set to be dismantled over the next few years, dozens of tons more will have to be dealt with.
This year the team of scientists working on the project expect to produce a working model of the process and test fuel samples. "It is a huge volume of work, but we believe that if the funding opens, we will be able to prepare it," one researcher said.
Weldon, the congressman, has been lobbying hard for the U.S. government to allocate $3.5 million this year to expedite the project. However, the U.S. Department of Energy said earlier this month that no budget funding had been allocated specifically for the project this year. Nonetheless, Weldon said he was confident the cash would be found despite the budget squeeze after the war in Iraq.
"Expenses incurred by the U.S. during the war in Iraq should not hinder the allocation of the funds," Weldon said. In fact, he said, while the war in Iraq will require significant resources, "it has taught the world a valuable lesson about the dangers that proliferation of weapons technology presents. My intention is to convince my colleagues in Congress that the thorium process can play a vital role in preventing nuclear weapons materials from falling into the wrong hands and its development should receive the funds necessary to continue its progress."
The project is facing opposition on two fronts. One is the increasingly powerful global environmental groups that are against nuclear energy of any kind, and the second has to do with Iran.
Tom Cochran, director of the nuclear arm of the nonprofit environmental group Natural Resources Defense Council, said the whole issue of funding for the project is tied to building nuclear reactors in Iran.
"The U.S. spends close to $1 billion per year on cooperative threat reduction efforts," he said.
"Spread over several years, the [thorium] program is fundable. But the greater threat to U.S. funding of programs like this is not the war in Iraq, but Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran."
Proponents of the program like Weldon, however, say the opportunity for the United States is too good to pass up -- if the project works in Russia, it could work in the United States, too.
"If such systems were attainable, American nuclear facilities would be remiss if they did not consider such a system," Weldon said. Indeed, the fuel could eventually be used all over the world.
Of the 441 nuclear reactors that existed in the world at the beginning of this year, 260 can burn thorium-plutonium fuel, according to the London-based World Nuclear Association.
Environmental organizations and nuclear safety experts say the whole idea is wrong and dangerous and that burning thorium is no better than burning uranium, since both produce substances that could be used by terrorists to make small nuclear devices.
Specifically, irradiating thorium in a reactor produces uranium-233, a fissile material that can be weaponized.
"Look, uranium-233 is a wish for any terrorist," said Kuznetsov, who formerly worked for the State Nuclear Inspection Agency. "Only four kilograms of it could make an operational nuclear device that could be easily hidden in a backpack or suitcase. This is the biggest reason to refuse to deal with thorium fuel altogether."
Grae dismissed these concerns, saying the process developed by Radkowsky, Thorium Power's former chief designer, essentially eliminates uranium-233 as a byproduct.
"In our design, almost all of the uranium-233 that is produced is burned instantaneously in the core as it is produced, generating some of the reactor's power," he said.
Experts familiar with Radkowsky's work backed Grae's claim. Richard Garwin, a physicist who helped build the U.S. hydrogen bomb and the author of several books on nuclear proliferation and security issues, said in an e-mail interview from New York that under certain circumstances it is indeed possible to completely eliminate uranium-233 when burning thorium fuel.
"If the thorium fuel is mixed with some natural or depleted uranium, then the U-233 cannot be separated chemically from U-238. It is true that most of the U-233 is burned up during the long residence time -- which is typically nine years, as I understand it," Garwin said.
A Russian nuclear physicist working on the thorium project said the new fuel assemblies that will go into existing reactors to handle the thorium are designed to work for exactly nine years.
Rachkov, the Nuclear Power Ministry's point man for the thorium venture, said that although Russia is in no rush to introduce the new fuel, the project will continue with or without U.S. funding.
"When the first assemblies prove good, we will start calculations, and we will be able to say clearly what thorium's prospects are as a fuel," he said.
"But nothing will be completely clear until real fuel is used in real reactors, which will take two to three years." And if U.S. funding dries up, "we will finish what we have started, but we will not start anything new," Rachkov said.
3. U.S.-Russia Nuclear Disposal Project Said To Be Advancing
Carol Giacomo
Reuters
4/23/2003
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON - The United States has made substantial progress on a long-delayed project to dispose of 68 tons of Russian and U.S. weapons-grade nuclear fuel and expects to conclude a multinational accord with $1 billion in financing by year's end, a senior official said on Wednesday.
"I believe we could, by the end of 2003, achieve donations of over one billion dollars or more," U.S. fissile material negotiator Michael Guhin told reporters after a presentation at the American Enterprise Institute.
Although the Bush administration has promoted the project as an effective way to rid the world of a dangerous Cold War legacy, critics say the approach will increase the risks of nuclear theft by terrorist groups or rogue states.
The plan is to have the United States and Russia each take 34 tons of separated plutonium that could be easily used as fuel for nuclear weapons and turn it into mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for use in commercial nuclear power plants.
It was arranged by then-President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2000 as a means of dealing with the residue of thousands of nuclear weapons set for dismantlement after the fall of communism.
Under the strategy, which has been under discussion since 1995, the United States intends to build a MOX fabrication facility at Savannah River, South Carolina, and a comparable facility is planned for Russia.
The U.S. program is expected to cost $4 billion while the Russian program is projected at $2 billion, including half for construction and half for operational expenses.
After Russia said it could not afford to finance the facility on its own, Washington worked with its partners in the Group of Eight industrial nations -- France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia and Japan -- to underwrite the project.
So far, all the G8 members but Germany have announced contributions, which now total $400 million. The U.S. pledge toward the Russian project is also $400 million but officials predict non-U.S. contributions, including an amount from Russia, ultimately will constitute more than half of the cost.
The United States has been negotiating a multinational agreement to cover management and financing of the Russian project and expects to complete that by year's end, although a major dispute continues with Moscow over liability issues, said a senior official who spoke anonymously.
"We have made substantial progress this year on how you manage this program internationally," he said, adding that construction is expected in 2004.
U.S. officials expect the G8 summit in Evian, France, in June will issue a new statement endorsing the project.
But Victor Gilinsky, a former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said "recycling plutonium in civilian reactors is a particularly bad answer" to the problem of growing stocks of weapons grade plutonium.
Especially in Russia, the materials would be susceptible to theft and loss as they were moved from storage to the fabrication facilities and then to nuclear power reactors, he said.
He also expressed concern the United States would be subsidizing commercial interests and bureaucracies in both countries that would seek to make further profit by recycling surplus plutonium into an expanding nuclear power industry.
"The overall effect of this in my view is going to be to undermine long-standing U.S. nonproliferation policy," said Gilinsky of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
Some critics have argued that it would be safer for the United States and Russia to mix the weapons-grade plutonium with radioactive waste and secure it where it is now stored.
But the senior U.S. official said this is not an option because Russia insisted on being able to recycle the plutonium so as to earn revenue from it.
D. Russia-U.S. 1. Editorial: The Road to St. Petersburg
The New York Times
4/27/2003
(for personal use only)
While the Bush administration has decided to punish France for its opposition to the war in Iraq, it seems inclined to forgive Russia its transgressions. We would favor mending fences with France as well, but at least the White House understands the importance of repairing relations with the Kremlin so the two nations can work together on common problems.
To that end, Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, recently traveled to Moscow, and President Bush still plans to visit President Vladimir Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg this spring for its 300th anniversary. We hope the meeting will not be another symbolic embrace, but an earnest attempt to turn the good chemistry of the Bush-Putin relationship into an enduring partnership between the two nations.
The reason is not only that magnanimity in victory is wise, nor even the vast leftover arsenal of Soviet nuclear missiles. The fact is that we need Russia's help on a variety of critical issues. The war on terrorism, on nuclear proliferation, on the illicit trade in arms or drugs - all these require intense international cooperation. Russia, more than many countries, is critical as an ally.
Few countries have as much relevant real estate in the war on terrorism as Russia, whose endless border winds through some of the most explosive regions on two continents. No country has as many arms, technology or experts to proliferate. The Soviet Union had advanced programs in biological and chemical weapons, and Russians know how to combat them.
Unfortunately, the relationship has been largely one-sided - in Washington's favor - since Mr. Bush famously declared that he had looked into Mr. Putin's soul and found a partner to be trusted. Mr. Putin offered considerable help in Afghanistan, and he swallowed NATO expansion and the scuttling of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. But he has received little in return beyond Washington's misguided decision to go mute on Russia's brutal war in Chechnya.
That puts Mr. Putin in a vulnerable position. He still presides over a governing bureaucracy heavily laced with cold warriors who resent American power, and they have wasted no time in accusing him of kowtowing to Washington. This, in fact, is shaping up as the dominant battle in parliamentary elections later this year, and it is one reason Mr. Putin sided so publicly with France and Germany against the American war in Iraq.
A helping hand now from Washington, despite Mr. Putin's stand on Iraq, would go a long way toward demonstrating to his electorate that his opening to the West is not a humiliating failure, and it would encourage him to stay the course in his next term. Giving Russia a serious stake in postwar Iraq, for example, would do much to help.
The benefits might extend well beyond retaining Mr. Putin as a soul mate. An anxious world is looking for signs that the United States is not the arrogant and vindictive superpower so many fear. Supporting Mr. Putin would also show that the United States is serious about helping emerging democracies. It wasn't that long ago, after all, that Russia pulled down its own statues.
2. U.S. "Bunker Buster" Development Worries Russia
David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. - Russia is concerned about U.S. efforts to develop low-yield nuclear weapons for destroying deeply buried targets, a top Russian nuclear official said yesterday.
In 1994 the U.S. Congress banned research and development on nuclear weapons with yields below five kilotons, but the U.S. Defense Department has asked lawmakers to lift the ban.
"Where did this talk come from to do away with the five-kiloton threshold?" asked Nikolai Voloshin, the head of the Department of Nuclear Ammunition Development and Testing at the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.
"The idea is being circulated to do lower yield charges, I question the thoughts of using such low-yield weapons, which means that nuclear weapons cease to be a deterrent and become combat weapons," he told Global Security Newswire at an international security conference here organized by the Energy Department's Sandia National Laboratories.
Earlier this year, in a draft of the fiscal 2004 Defense Department budget request, Pentagon officials told Congress the ban must be repealed to "train the next generation of nuclear weapons scientists and engineers."
The Pentagon needs a "revitalized nuclear weapons advanced concepts effort," but the ban has had a "chilling effect" on any such initiative "by impeding the ability of our scientists and engineers to explore the full range of technical options," according to the draft request.
Developing the new weapons would not be exceptionally difficult, according to Voloshin. He questioned U.S. motives in publicizing the debate on potential new nuclear weapons.
"No one denies it can be easily done, why bring all the hype about it?" he asked.
He also criticized the U.S. approach to international arms control agreements, specifically the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Bush administration does not support.
"We are very concerned about why the U.S. has not yet ratified the CTBT," Voloshin said.
The United States has restarted production of plutonium parts for nuclear bombs at its Los Alamos National Laboratory for the first time in 14 years.
Under the headline "After 'Decline,' U.S. Again Capable of Making Nuclear Arms," the Los Angeles Times, which broke the story Wednesday, called the move "an important symbolic and operational milestone in rebuilding the nation's nuclear weapons complex."
Specifically, American scientists working for the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, have started producing the plutonium "pits" that are at the core of nuclear weaponry. (Conventional explosives encase a hollow plutonium sphere, or pit, and trigger a chain reaction when detonated.)
Under a program put forward by the White House, the United States is also working on a new factory to supply components for hundreds of weapons each year, according to the report.
The U.S. Department of Energy, which oversees the NNSA and runs America's weapons program, could not be reached for comment late Wednesday. But the Times quoted unnamed department officials as denying that they are actually producing nuclear weapons -- only ensuring the reliability of exiting weapons.
But nuclear scientists in both Russia and the United States disputed this claim.
"Pits are empty spheres of plutonium, they cannot age," said a senior nuclear expert at one of Russia's leading institutes, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
"Such production cannot be justified by the need to maintain the safety of the existing stockpile of U.S. weapons. First of all, it could mean that America has restarted the production of nuclear warheads and that it is supporting the industry," the expert said. "In Russia, such workshops are being closed down."
Arjun Makhijani, an acclaimed nuclear scientist who runs the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research in Tacoma, Washington, agreed: "There is absolutely no need in my opinion to do this. On the contrary, it is very dangerous," Makhijani said by telephone.
"This is just the beginning of pit manufacturing. The U.S. has a capacity to eventually make 50 to 80 pits a year, but the Department of Energy has proposed to build a new pit facility where they will be able to make up to 500 pits per year. The United States does not need any more nuclear warheads."
Igor Ostretsov, the deputy director for science of the All-Russia Research Center of Nuclear Machine-Building, said that while the United States may need new parts to maintain the efficiency of its warheads, it looks as if it is also moving to improve its nuclear arsenal.
"If they are making pits, it may be linked to making new [nuclear warhead] models," he said.
The move may also violate the Nonproliferation Treaty that the United States, Russia and other nuclear nations signed in 2000, in which they pledged to undertake an "irreversible reduction" of their nuclear arsenals.
Under Article 2 of the treaty, signatories are forbidden from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
"I don't know whether it will reignite the arms race, but it is certainly in line with the U.S. strategy of continuing to use nuclear weapons as a central part of its military strategy," Makhijani said.
Some military experts also said that the real aim of the program appears to be boosting the United States' nuclear complex -- a costly move that makes no strategic sense.
"It is a sign that after a long period of decline, the weapons complex is back and growing," Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Energy Department weapons expert, told the Times.
"To the average U.S. citizen, it would be accurate to say we have restarted the production of nuclear weapons." Ivan Safranchuk, a Moscow-based researcher for the Center for Defense Information in Washington, said by telephone that it would be senseless militarily for the United States to improve its nuclear warhead arsenal, "which is excessive anyway and is supposed to be reduced."
Makhijani said "U.S. policy is a provocation to proliferation because it raises the question that if the most powerful country in the world by far, in conventional, or non-nuclear terms, still needs to build more nuclear weapons, what about everybody else?
"It is a dangerous policy because the United States and Russia continue to have between them about 4,000 nuclear weapons that can be fired in a few minutes."
E. Russia-Iran 1. Bushehr NPP's Construction Is Behind Schedule
Bellona Foundation
4/24/2003
(for personal use only)
A Russian nuclear industry expert says that the Bushehr nuclear power plant is behind schedule for completion.
"The precise dates of the reactor's launch will be determined after Iran compensates the lacking units instead of rejected German produced equipment," the expert said. "Nuclear fuel for initial reactor loading should be delivered half a year before the actual reactor start-up. All spent nuclear fuel will be returned to Russia on the fixed dates for storage and subsequent reprocessing".
The expert stressed that Russia "has no claims against Iranian nuclear program". He believes that "Iran as a participant of the IAEA and Non-Proliferation Treaty has the right to develop civil nuclear energy and create full nuclear fuel cycle inside its frames".
"Teheran confirms its dedication to the principles and demands of the IAEA and assures that its nuclear program is absolutely transparent and does not contain arms component. Cooperation with Iran is only limited by assistance on the first Bushehr reactor construction. There is understanding regarding reactor no.2, but it is still necessary to examine technical and economical issues concerning expediency of its completion."
2. Russia To Buy Back Spent Nuclear Fuel Burnt In Iranian Reactor
Igor Kudrik
Bellona Foundation
4/24/2003
(for personal use only)
In an attempt to convince the world in its non-proliferation commitments and Russian public in the fact that spent nuclear fuel is a valuable resource, Russian Minister for Nuclear Energy says Russia will pay Iran for the return of spent fuel from Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Russia's Ministry for Nuclear Energy, or Minatom, is going to pay Iran for the return of the fuel burnt in Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which Russia is constructing in the Islamic republic.
"The Iranians believe - and we support them on it - that the fact they buy the fuel from Russia means it becomes Iranian property, and Russia will have to pay for the irradiated fuel," Aleksandr Rumyantsev, Russian Nuclear Energy Minister, was quoted by ITAR-TASS as saying at the recent press briefing.
Russia will supply nuclear fuel for Bushehr nuclear power plant, which will begin after completion of the plant and finalization of export agreements. The plant is expected to be ready for loading of the fuel by the end of 2003, although some experts believe this date is too optimistic.
The construction of Bushehr plant by Russia angers the United States, whose officials say Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Russia has long denied these allegations, insisting that the nuclear program in Iran is entirely peaceful. During the past few months, however, Minatom being confronted with hard facts of Iranian nuclear activities, started to admit that there might be a problem.
Pointing at press reports that Iran has built a pilot cascade of 150 to 200 centrifuges as well as premises for several thousand such centrifuges at one of its nuclear facilities, Mr. Rumyantsev said: "If true, those centrifuges may help enrich uranium to weapons-grade conditions, in which case the situation cannot but cause concern." But Mr. Rumyantsev also fought back the US by saying that Iran was using technologies of a certain US-based company. "On one hand, the US is criticizing Iran and Russia for cooperation at a nuclear plant project, but on the other, a US company is helping Iranians build a powerful uranium-enrichment facility," Rumyantsev was quoted by ITAR-TASS as saying.
The brief statement by Mr. Rumyantsev that Russia will pay Iran to take back spent nuclear fuel indicates that in addition to all the trouble with United States, there are other problems looming.
Minatom has long advocated for the project to import foreign spent nuclear fuel to Russia for storage and reprocessing, claming that it may bring a profit of up to $20bn, given 20,000 tons of fuel is shipped in. The President of the Russian legislation approved the highly controversial legislation package, which favors foreign spent fuel imports, in July 2001.
By since the approval of the package, there was no flow of cash earned on the importation. There have been indeed a couple of shipments from the Eastern European countries, which operate Soviet design reactors. But the charge for the shipments was much lower than suggested by Minatom during the PR-campaign to ensure the passage of the importation legislation in the Russian State Duma. Countries like Ukraine had troubles covering even these low priced services. Earlier this year, Ukraine had debt of $9m to Russia for spent fuel shipment for storage at Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk County, situated in western Siberia.
Other countries, which Minatom considered as attractive markets for these services, in particular Asian countries, could not send any spent fuel to Russia without the consent of the United States.
The USA holds rights over an approximate 80% of the world's spent fuel according to various estimates. Until now the United States did not show any particular interest in granting Russia the right to import this fuel. There were some statements, however, coming from the States Department, which said that the US administration might consider such option, given Moscow drops its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Minatom has so far rejected such proposal, but at the same time has become more cautious in blatantly denying nuclear weapons ambitions of Iran as the ministry did before.
Seeing the planned earning of $20bn not materializing, Minatom complained - for domestic public consumption - about the high competition at the "international spent nuclear fuel market", where "Russia is not welcomed" and started to work on a more realistic approach. That was to lease nuclear fuel to nuclear power plants in other countries and - after the fuel is burnt - take it back for storage or reprocessing.
Such a deal could be very lucrative to many countries, which operate nuclear power plants. The current practice suggests that once a country buys nuclear fuel, it will stay in this country, and this country also has to ensure its safe storage. The management of spent nuclear fuel is a very expensive, headache-causing venture and, should Russia agree just to take it back for good, everyone will be happy about it. It is even a better option for a particular country than sending spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing in Great Britain or France - the two countries which unsuccessfully try make business by providing such services. Firstly, it will be more expensive and, secondly, the waste generated during reprocessing will be shipped back to the country of origin. Russia agrees in its leasing scheme to take care of the waste as well.
For some reason, however, Minatom's scheme is malfunctioning in the case of Iran. Russia will have to pay Iran for its own fuel to be returned. One may wonder what are the reason for Iran's stance and Russia's readiness to bow to such a demand. It can either be a bad management of the contracts from Minatom's side, which did not work out the leasing option properly. It can also be the understanding from Iran's side, that Minatom will simply have no choice but to accept such conditions.
Minatom stated earlier that the spent fuel would not remain in Iran after contractual documents between the two parties were made public by Greenpeace, where the return of spent nuclear fuel was not stipulated. This reveal gave more arguments to the USA in criticizing Russia's nuclear cooperation and Minatom was forced to give a firm promise that Iran will not keep the material, which can be potentially used to create weapons of mass destruction. Iranians from their side decided to either take advantage of this situation, or to make it more difficult for Minatom to take the fuel back.
On the other hand, the whole argument about the fuel return is becoming obsolete as Iran declared its intentions to develop its own fuel cycle. "Entirely for peaceful purposes," Iranian officials say, but the US is not convinced.
The spent fuel details of other Minatom's projects, such as in China or in India, are not known. But looking at Iranian example even the leasing option does not seem to be easier than the original importation scheme advertised earlier by Minatom.
F. Russia-North Korea 1. Russia Urges North Korea, US To Continue Non-Proliferation Talks
Agence France-Presse
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia's envoy to North Korea called on Pyongyang and Washington to continue the search for a peaceful settlement over non-proliferation and said that guarantees of the Stalinist state's security were the key to a solution.
"We hope North Korea and the United States will patiently continue the search for a negotiated settlement that will bring North Korea back into line with the non-proliferation regime while ensuring its sovereignty and economic development interest," Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said.
Three-way talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear weapons program between North Korea, the United States and China ended a day early Thursday amid recriminations by both sides, with US President George W. Bush later accusing Pyongyang of "blackmail." North Korea said it had made a "bold" proposal to resolve the nuclear crisis and accused the United States of dodging the essential issues.
Losyukov, who holds the Asian affairs brief at the foreign ministry, noted that "throughout the entire course of the North Korean crisis, (Russia) has warned of the dangers of uncontrolled escalation."
Russia "believes Pyongyang must abandon its nuclear option, and this can be achieved by giving (North Korea) reliable guarantees of security and non-interference, including possibly on a multilateral basis," he said.
Losyukov said it was too early to comment on the Beijing talks. "We are not yet fully clear as to how the talks proceeded, what was discussed and whether they will be continued," he said.
"It will be difficult to find a comprehensive solution due to the fact that the parties' positions are diametrically opposed," Loskyukov noted.
Moscow had pushed for direct talks between North Korea and the United States and argued against Washington's demands for a multilateral format. Beijing brokered a compromise deal that saw the two sides hold talks with China as an active third party. China said earlier Friday the United States and North Korea had agreed to keep diplomatic channels open after ending the talks. The Beijing talks marked a resumption of dialogue between US and North Korean officials six months after the crisis erupted.
Washington accused Pyongyang last October of carrying out a secret nuclear weapons programme and suspended fuel deliveries to North Korea. In response Pyongyang reactivated a reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium and announced its withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Pyongyang's agreement to enter tripartite talks was seen as an easing of its hardline stance, which it said was a response to hostility from the Bush administration. Bush last year branded the communist state part of an "axis of evil."
Russia was excluded from the Beijing talks in what observers here said may have been tied to its fierce opposition to the US-led war in Iraq. President Vladimir Putin has enjoyed privileged relations with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, meeting the reclusive Stalinist three times over the past two years.
Separately, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev warned that Pyongyang's reported claim that it possessed nuclear weapons should be taken seriously. "If the statements are official, their veracity will have to be checked by international inspectors," he said.
Washington has informed Japan that during the talks North Korea confirmed its possession of nuclear weapons.
Rumyantsev stressed that Russia had "no contacts with North Korea over nuclear matters for the past 10 years."
A decade ago Pyongyang "lacked the facilities to make nuclear weapons," he said.
G. Nuclear Submarines 1. Newly Upgraded Typhoon To Be Fuelled Shortly
Vladislav Nikoforov and Vitaly Bratkov
Bellona Foundation
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk is preparing to fuel the newly upgraded Typhoon class nuclear submarine Dmitry Donskoy, which has been under repairs since 1989.
The newly upgraded Russian Typhoon class submarine has left the dry dock of the Sevmash plant in Severodvinsk in June last year. At the moment all the preparatory works before nuclear fuel loading, or so-called operation No.1, are soon to be completed. Malina class service vessel, PM-63, will load the fuel into the submarine reactors. PM-63 has room to accommodate two sets of fresh nuclear fuel (around 480 fuel assemblies). Sevmash plant has already received approval for the operation from the Main Authority on Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Defense Ministry. It is scheduled to start loading nuclear fuel already in the middle of June.
The first submarine within Typhoon class - TK-208 - commissioned in 1981 has been under repairs in Severodvinsk since 1989. Its repairs and upgrade seem to near the end as the submarine was taken out of the dry dock and has been undergoing pre-sea trial testing since October 2002. During this long 12-year resting period submarine's ID-number TK-208 was replaced with name Dmitry Donskoy. Design Bureau Rubin (St Petersburg) developed third generation Typhoon (Akula) class submarine project 941. Sevmash built six Typhoons. The submarine has multi-hulled design, having two parallel main hulls, also called strong hulls, inside the light hull. Maximum diving depth is 400 m. Speed is 12 knots when surfaced and 27 knots when submerged. Typhoon is capable of spending 120 days at sea. The submarine is divided into 19 compartments and powered with two 190 megawatts nuclear reactors.
The longish repairs of Dmitry Donskoy were apparently not caused only by the lack of funding. It is still unclear what type of missile system will installed at the upcoming fourth generation ballistic missile submarines - the first of them, Yury Dolgoruky is currently under construction at Sevmash. Some sources say Dmitry Donskoy could be used as a testing platform for the development of the new missile system. Last year Russian admirals started to refer to Dmitry Donskoy as to the submarine of the forth generation. This submarine built in early 1980 belonged at that time to the third generation. No submarines of the forth generation have been constructed in Russia so far.
2. Submarine Of An Entirely New Type To Be Developed In Russia
Olga Fedina
RIA Novosti
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
ST. PETERSBURG - Russia is planning to develop a submarine with an anaerobic /air-independent/ engine, Vladimir Alexandrov, director-general of the Admiralteiskiye Verfi shipyard that builds surface ships and submarines, said on Friday.
The yard contemplates to allocate 55 million dollars for the creation of such a submarine until 2007. He described the plans as "a 21st century project".
Similar work was done at Verfi in the late 40s and early 50s of last century. Results were a submarine of Design 615, and a unique submarine of Design 617, which was fitted out with a turbine giving it a submerged speed of 20 knots.
But the plans were shelved, since priority was given to the development of a nuclear-powered navy, Alexandrov noted. Meanwhile, according to him, everyone in the world has now come to the conclusion that nuclear installations are not always up to ecological and radiation safety requirements.
Anaerobic engines are currently being developed in Germany and some other countries, Alexandrov said.
H. Nuclear Industry 1. Blaze Hits Idle Unit Of Russia's Nuclear Power Plant
Yury Khots
ITAR-TASS
4/28/2003
(for personal use only)
VORONEZH - A non-functional energy unit caught fire at Russia's Voronezh nuclear power plant on Monday.
A spokesman for the regional emergencies center told Itar-Tass that the blaze happened at about 14:00 Moscow time in one of rooms of the unit that is temporarily closed.
Preliminary information suggests that welding operations set wooden structures on fire.
The plant's personnel rapidly put out the blaze on its own. There is no threat to working reactors.
The radiation background at the plant remained normal.
2. Putin, Armenian President Discuss Atomic Energy Cooperation
ITAR-TASS
4/27/2003
(for personal use only)
DUSHANBE - Russian President Vladimir Putin met with his Armenian counterpart Robert Kocharyan in Dushanbe on Sunday to discuss the implementation of agreements reached during a Moscow official visit of Kocharyan early this year.
The presidents focused on trade and economic cooperation, primarily the interaction in atomic energy.
Kocharyan thinks that the participation of Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Community, where it obtained the observer status on Sunday, will promote its trade and economic cooperation with Russia and other member countries of the organization.
3. Belarus Can Do Without Nukes For Now, Lukashenko Says
Olesya Luchaninova
RIA Novosti
4/25/2003
(for personal use only)
GOMEL - Belarus does not need a new nuclear power plant at this point, President Alexander Lukashenko said Friday as he was touring areas badly affected by the 1986 breakdown at the Chernobyl plant, in Ukraine. Tomorrow will mark the 17th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.
According to the Belarussian leader, the republic has sufficient capacities to satisfy its electricity needs. Nuclear power plants cost billions of dollars to construct, and Belarus still has enough of untapped resources, Lukashenko said. He cited the example of Finland and Sweden, which widely use alternative sources of electrical power, such as wood.
Discussing whether the construction of a nuclear power plant is feasible in Belarus will be appropriate only when the nation exhausts all the resources it boasts, Lukashenko pointed out.
I. Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. Russia Completes First Phase Of Chemical Weapons Disposal Effort
RIA Novosti
4/24/2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia has completed the first phase of the effort to dispose its chemical weapons stockpiles.
"This morning Russia can announce worldwide that it has completed the first phase of the effort to destroy its stockpiles of chemical weapons," Zinovy Pak, who heads the Russian Munitions Agency, told reporters Thursday.
General Viktor Kholstov was appointed new head of the Agency yesterday.
Russia has disposed 400 tons of weapons, or 1% of its overall stockpiles - 40,000 tons, said Mr. Pak.
Over 396 tons were disposed at the Gorny facility, Saratov region, and more than 6 tons of emergency munitions were disposed earlier under the international community's control.
2. Chemical Weapons Disposal Running Ahead of Schedule
Global Security Newswire
4/23/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia is set to eliminate 1 percent of its chemical weapons arsenal one month ahead of schedule, ITAR-Tass reported Saturday. Russia's sole chemical weapons disposal plant, located in Gorny, is on track to complete the destruction of 400 metric tons of mustard gas within a week, one month ahead of schedule, according to sources. Russia is expected to begin disposing of lewesite stockpiles in the second quarter of this year after commissioning new upgrades for the Gorny plant.
On Monday, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov designated Col. Gen. Viktor Kholstov to become head of the Russian Munitions Agency, which oversees the chemical weapons disposal effort. Former agency Director Zinovy Pak was replaced because he reached retirement age.
Meanwhile, Italy is set to provide Russia with more than $1 billion in aid for arms disposal efforts, Kasyanov said Saturday. The aid will go toward helping Russia dispose of its chemical weapons stockpiles and to recycle decommissioned nuclear submarines.
3. U.S., Russia And India On Track To Reduce Chemical Weapons Stockpiles
Agence France-Presse
4/22/2003
(for personal use only)
THE HAGUE - The United States, Russia and India are on target to meet the deadline for destroying some of their chemical weapons, the director general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said on Tuesday.
"Four member states have declared to have chemical weapons in their possession: the Russian Federation, the United States, India and a fourth state that does not want to be named," Director General Rogelio Pfirter told journalists.
"By April 29, all four possessor states will have destroyed the percentage of munitions and chemical agents that they have committed themselves to reduce under the (1993 chemical weapons) convention."
Based in The Hague, the OPCW brings together 151 member states that have signed the 1993 convention, which aims to eliminate chemical weapons by 2007.
Russia had the largest chemical stockpile, with 40,000 tons, and has undertaken to destroy one percent of that by April 29.
The United States had 28,000 tons of chemical weapons and has successfully destroyed 20 percent of its stocks, fulfilling its undertaking to the OPCW.
According to the OPCW, both India and the fourth, anonymous state have fulfilled their objectives.
Pfirter added that Albania had undertaken to destroy a stash of recently discovered chemical weapons, apparently dating from the Cold War era.
He lamented the fact that various countries in the Middle East had not yet ratified the convention to eliminate chemical weapons. Syria, recently accused by Washington of possessing chemical weapons, has not signed the convention, but is seeking to put a resolution to the UN Security Council calling for the Middle East to be chemical-weapon free.
Commenting on the Syrian move, Pfirter said that "all initiatives are welcomed", but added that the OPCW already existed for the same purpose.
J. Announcements 1. On Russia's Implementation of First Stage of Chemical Disarmament
Daily News Bulletin: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
4/28/2003
(for personal use only)
A significant event occurred on April 26 in the area of chemical disarmament: at the facility specifically created for this purpose in Gorny, Saratov Region, and launched four months ago, the liquidation of a total amount of 400 tons of a chemical weapon - the poisonous mustard gas - was carried out. At the ceremony held in Gorny with S. V. Kiriyenko, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Volga Federal District and Chairman of the State Commission on Chemical Disarmament, D. F. Ayatskov, Saratov Region Governor, and the representatives of the apparatus of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries and departments and of the diplomatic corps in attendance, it was noted that by the same token Russia, strictly fulfilling its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, had destroyed 1 percent of its arsenal of chemical weapons and had completed the first stage of chemical disarmament, as established by the Convention. This fact was attested to on the ground by the international inspectors of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons carrying on continual monitoring at Gorny.
Russia has again reaffirmed that commitment to the strict fulfillment of the obligations under international agreements is an invariable priority of our state policy. The Federal Goal-Oriented Program for Chemical Disarmament in the Russian Federation will continue to be consistently implemented with a view to the complete liquidation of the stockpiles of chemical weapons in two more stages by the year 2012.
The facility in the steppe township of Gorny is a unique pilot plant which functions practically in an automatic mode and uses the advanced technologies devised by Russian scientists. The very strict norms of ecological monitoring, and the reliability and the doubling character of the equipment ensure the safety of personnel, of the population and of the environment. The immediate plans are to establish in Gorny a second line for the destruction of the stockpiles of a poisonous substance - lewisite. Taking into account the experience of the work in Gorny it is planned to build two more large chemical disarmament facilities in Kambarka (Udmurtia) and Shchuchye (Kurgan Region).
Considerable technical and financial assistance in the construction of the facility had been rendered by Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and the European Union. Gorny has become a veritable symbol of the European partnership in the liquidation of a whole type of weapons of mass destruction.
At the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention opening at The Hague on April 28, Russia will actively support the further strengthening of this major international legal instrument and continuation of consistent, controlled and ecologically safe chemical disarmament.
2. Statement By The Russian Ministry Of Foreign Affairs In Relation To Opening Of First Review Conference Of Chemical Weapons Convention
Daily News Bulletin: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
4/28/2003
(for personal use only)
The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is opening at The Hague, Netherlands, on April 28. It will last until May 9.
The participants in the Review Conference will have to comprehensively analyze the starting five-year stage of carrying out the Convention and work out recommendations for subsequent improvements in the practice of its implementation. This is an event of global dimension and significance. Russia will take an active part in it. Our delegation will be headed by Sergey Kiriyenko, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Volga Federal District and Chairman of the State Commission on Chemical Disarmament.
CWC is a unique international treaty ensuring the prohibition and nonproliferation of a whole type of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention entered into force in 1997 and became the most rapidly growing global treaty in the sphere of disarmament - 151 states, including Russia, are now participating in it. Effectively functioning is the mechanism for the verification of the observance of the CWC: under the control of a specially created Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) the amassed stockpiles of chemical weapons are being progressively liquidated.
Russia as one of the largest possessors of chemical weapons bears the main load of their destruction. Our country conscientiously performs its obligations both in ensuring the verification regime and in the field of the elimination and conversion of plants which used to produce chemical weapons and of liquidating their stockpiles.
The national chemical disarmament program is being successfully implemented. In the Saratov region a pilot plant for the destruction of chemical weapons has begun to work rhythmically in Gorny, where 400 tons of poisonous substances have already been liquidated, thus completing the first stage envisaged by the Convention. Big and complex work is still ahead, but one can say with confidence that we will cope with it - of course, in fruitful cooperation with other states parties to the Convention.
2. New Security Challenges for a New Century: Keynote Address at the "International Security Challenges and Strategies in the New Era" conference at Sandia National Laboratories
DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News.
RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List
If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134