 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
2/6/12 |
 |
||||||||
|
 |
Home / Projects & Publications / News |
|
||||||||
|
|||||||||||
|
RANSAC Nuclear News, June 17, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Russia-Iran
 A. Russia-Iran 1. Iranian Missiles 'Could Threaten 20m Russians' Iran could by 2006 mount a nuclear warhead on a missile with the potential to threaten 20m Russians living in the country's south-western region, according to a new study by the PIR Centre, a respected Russian non-governmental arms control organisation. The conclusions, drawn by a Russian nuclear physicist and a military missile expert, will have proved a fresh embarrassment to both Iran and Russia on the day the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) met in Vienna to discuss Tehran's nuclear programme. Anton Khlopkov, deputy director of the PIR Centre and a nuclear scientist, said the discovery of concealed nuclear facilities in Iran suggested that it would be able to develop a weapons capacity far more rapidly than previous estimates by the US of 2010. Russia, however, continues to resist US pressure to halt its $1bn contract to construct the Bushehr civil power plant in Iran until Tehran agrees to sign the IAEA's "additional protocol", setting out a toughened inspections regime. Mr Khlopkov argued that as a final point of leverage, if other arguments did not work, Russia should threaten to withhold supplies of nuclear fuel for Bushehr until Iran signed the IAEA's protocol. Igor Ivanov, Russia's foreign minister, yesterday reiterated calls for Iran to ratify the protocol, but has said that Russia will proceed with the Bushehr project even if Tehran does not agree, arguing that it is a commercial deal that carries no risk of proliferation. Mr Khlopkov agreed there was no risk of Bushehr contributing to Iran's nuclear military programme, saying that the light-water reactor could not be used for creating weapons-grade uranium. He also cast doubt on US claims that it could train Iranian nuclear experts whose skills could be transferred from civilian to military purposes. "Even in Russia, there are several thousand nuclear experts, but only a few dozen who could develop nuclear weapons," he said. He said he expected that Moscow and Tehran would soon finalise a document confirming that Iran would return all its spent fuel from Bushehr to Russia for reprocessing and storage, but that deliveries would not start until next year, giving time for additional guarantees to be provided before the first fuel was supplied. "I think that Russia should use this argument with Iran, but only as a last resort if it fails to persuade Iran to sign the IAEA additional protocol by other means," he said. The PIR Centre report, co-authored by General Vasily Lata, a professor at Russia's general staff academy, estimates that Iran's use of the Shihad 3 missile, with a range of 1,300km, could endanger Russians in the Astrakhan and Volograd districts, as well as parts of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Return to Menu 2. UN Nuclear Agency Tackles Tehran (excerpted) [�] One of the more critical players in the debate is Russia, which is helping build a 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor in the Iranian southern port city of Bushehr that is worth $800 million. Viktor Kozlov, the head of the state-run Atomstroiexport company, which is in charge of the reactor's construction, said that 3,900 Russian and Iranian workers were building the reactor. In April 2002, he said a total of 5,000 metric tons of equipment, including the reactor's body, had already been shipped to Iran. Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said last month that the Bushehr reactor was set to become operational in 2005. Moscow has strongly urged Iran to sign an additional agreement with the IAEA that would put all its nuclear facilities under the agency's control. The government has said that Russia will still ship nuclear fuel to Bushehr even if that push fails, provided that Iran agrees to return all spent fuel to Russia. "We hope that our point of view is heard in Iran," said Moscow's ambassador to the IAEA, Grigory Berdennikov. "We are working with Iran so that it would sign and ratify the additional protocol." [�] Return to Menu 3. Mayak Plant Refuses to Process Iran Nuke Fuel The Mayak plant, which is Russia's only plant processing depleted nuclear fuel, will not accept depleted nuclear fuel from Iran for processing, Yevgeny Ryzhkov, the head of Mayak's PR service, told RBC, commenting on the information that depleted nuclear fuel from Iran's first nuclear power plant will be sent to Russia for processing. "We have nothing to do with the nuclear power plant in Bushehr (Iran). This power plant is to be put in use in two years. It is most likely to use fuel (uranium) supplied by Mayak," Ryzhkov pointed out. He underlined that Mayak had no technical capability of accepting fuel from a reactor of the VVR-1000 type, which is being built in Bushehr. Mayak processes depleted nuclear fuel from Russian nuclear power plants and nuclear submarines. Before the State Duma adopted a law to impose a ban on processing foreign depleted nuclear fuel in Russia in 1998, Mayak processed fuel from nuclear power plants of Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and a number of other countries. Return to Menu 4. Russia Awaits IAEA's Report on Iran's Nuclear Programme to Make "Appropriate Conclusions" Russia awaits the IAEA's report on the Iranian nuclear programme, on whose basis it will make "appropriate conclusions." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov spoke about it on Monday in Delhi where he is staying now. Moscow is against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, above all, of nuclear weapons. "This concerns any country, including Iran," said the Russian minister. He again underscored that co-operation between Russia and Iran in the nuclear sphere "is exclusively peaceful and is under the control of the IAEA." Moscow hopes that Teheran will agree to expand the IAEA's inspection to all nuclear facilities in Iran. This will make it possible to "remove all the concerns" that can arise with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme, said the Russian foreign minister. The nuclear programme of Iran was discussed at the negotiations between Igor Ivanov and his Indian counterpart Yashwant Sinha. As the Indian minister told reporters, Delhi also stands against the secret proliferation of nuclear weapons and hopes that Iran "will be able to convince the international community that it is not developing a nuclear programme." Return to Menu 5. Russia Urges Iran to Agree to Strict Nuclear Checks Russia, helping Iran build a nuclear reactor, called on Tehran on Monday to allow stricter U.N. inspections of its atomic programme to erase suspicion it was secretly developing nuclear weapons. The Russian comments came hours after Iran said it may accept stricter U.N. inspections but had not made a final decision. "We hope that Iran will sign the additional IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) protocol which will allow the extension of the provision of the IAEA over all nuclear facilities in the territory of the country," visiting Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told a news conference. "This will thus allow (Iran) to wipe off any concerns with regard to the matter," Ivanov said. The Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the IAEA to grant inspectors wider access and undertake more intrusive short-notice inspections in order to be able to provide credible assurances about Iran's atomic plans. The IAEA has been regularly inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities and has undertaken at least six inspections since February, amid accusations by the United States that Tehran was tailoring its nuclear energy programme to make weapons. Iran vehemently denies it wants to do anything other than generate electricity from its nuclear facilities. Ivanov, who is on a three-day visit to New Delhi, said Moscow would wait for a new IAEA report before coming to any conclusion on Iran's atomic programme. The new report is expected to be issued in September. Ivanov tried to allay concerns, mainly from Washington, that the Bushehr atomic power plant Russia is helping Iran to build could be a front for a clandestine nuclear arms programme. "We are developing cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field but this is exclusively for peaceful matters and everything is under IAEA control and safeguards," Ivanov said. Return to Menu 6. Russian Lessons Russia is training hundreds of Iranian technicians and scientists in complex nuclear processes at institutes across the country, causing US officials to express concern that the knowledge will help Iran's ambitious nuclear weapons programme. Up to 200 Iranians have been trained at the prestigious Atomic Energy University at Obninsk, just outside Moscow, as part of a two-year programme. Other Iranian specialists are being trained at state-backed institutes elsewhere in the country. University officials said the Obninsk programme taught the Iranian students basic skills required to help run the nuclear reactor the Russian atomic energy ministry (Minatom) is building - to volleys of bitter protest from Washington - in the southern port of Bushehr. Yet the scale of the knowledge transfer, has led some US officials and experts to raise fears that more sensitive, possibly military, information may be gleaned by the Iranians. But many experts argue that the knowledge of how to make a nuclear weapon is harder to come by than the raw materials. A US embassy official said: "We believe the Iranian civilian programme is really a cover for a larger nuclear weapons programme." The revelations will add to the acrimony between Washington and Moscow over Russian assistance to Iran's ambitious nuclear programme. But Nikolai Shingaryev, spokesman for Minatom, said there were strict controls over dual-purpose nuclear equipment. Return to Menu B. Russia-US 1. Era of Independent Theater (excerpted) [�] From the interview with Nikolai Zlobin, Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information (CDI) - So, Bush travels to St. Petersburg to make up with Putin. In the meanwhile, the American Embassy rejects the visa applications of 50 Russian businessmen and scientists, who were invited to Washington to participate in a Russian-American forum ... - I think that, in general, our bilateral relations are noticeably degrading, and we need to speak about this candidly. The war in Iraq showed how serious our disagreements are. Nothing good will come from attempts to smooth them over. I am against the improvement of Russian-American relations. This system was constructed for the solution of very different problems -- problems from a different historical era, the Cold War. They cannot be improved. They have to be ended, cut short and forgotten. Then, we must create a new concept, a new philosophy for these relations. Over the last several years we have been trying to improve something that cannot be improved. No one understands what -- in the grand scheme of things -- to do with each other, or why we need each other. Without a concept, we busy ourselves with tactical steps. And we evaluate the success or failure of Russian-American relations based on these tactical steps. America has no policy on Russia. America has a policy on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and Russia has a little spot in the corner of that policy. America has a policy on the fight against terrorism, and Russia plays a certain role there. America has a policy on the Middle East, and it takes Russia into consideration. But no, America has no conceptual policy on Russia. - Nor does Russia have one... - And that�s why all we do is react to each other, to every separate action. - And Russia reacts more, while America acts. And the fact that it acts without a concept may be worse than inaction or simple reaction to the opponent�s moves. - Yes. And I can see several fundamental issues, which are not being solved. Apparently, we are approaching a situation in which unions -- whether alliances or partnerships -- cease playing any sort of role in international relations. We are still affected by the ideology of the Cold War, and we think we need to have unions; we think that, the more unions, alliances, signed agreements, etc. we have, the more influential, reliable and protected we are. But I think this situation no longer exists. And that�s why I find it strange that Russia is demanding the formation of unions, the signing of agreements and the construction of blocs. Life has changed, dynamics have changed, interests have changed, and a state is unlikely to find �friends� who will stick through to the next crisis. Geography no longer plays the primary role in a globalized world. Mosaic-like alliances appear instead of unitary large blocks. This allows for principally new combinations. As Rumsfeld once said: "The mission determines the coalition. The coalition must not determine the mission." - So, while we used to have a permanent theater of directors in geopolitics, now each play is produced by a different independent theater company? One independent theater company for Afghanistan, another for Iraq, and a third one for, perhaps, Iran? - Yes, exactly. And all of Russia�s foreign policy attempts to create some sort of union in Central Asia, or something with the United States, Europe or Germany, are vestiges of the Cold War Era, when it seemed that this was how foreign policy had to be developed. Now is the time of egoism in foreign policy. There was a problem in Iraq, and the Americans gathered a coalition, or an independent theater company, as you say. It already fell apart, because it is no longer needed. The problem has been solved. - Does that mean we no longer need the United Nations (UN) or other international organizations? Is the time of egoism a time for one against all? - We must make sense of the new situation. We need philosophers, not diplomats. No one was ready for everything to fall apart so soon. September 11th triggered a general collapse. It became necessary to question the structure of new international relations and international organizations. Everything we have today is a result of World War II, and it no longer works. Everyone understands this. It no longer works because it was created under different conditions and with different objectives and functions from those of today. With all my respect for the UN Security Council, it does not adequately reflect today�s state of affairs. Japan, Germany, India, Brazil and other major players are not permanent members. I can understand the interests of Russia and France, because both nations play a major role in existing structures. But they are unlikely to play such a role in new structures. The entire system required gradual evolution, which we did not think much about, but now everything began to fall apart much faster than could be expected. While the last world system was based on the results of the war against Fascism, the new system will have to be created in the process of the war against terrorism. And Russia must think about what role it will play and what part it will get. Furthermore, today�s international structures were created for interaction between states. What do we do today? Al-Qaeda, for example, is not a state. It cannot be summoned by the UN Security Council. It has no army to be vanquished. It has no economy, to which sanctions can be applied. And there is no one to sign a capitulation agreement with, as with Germany. There are also transnational corporations, which have more influence than many states. These also cannot be restricted or controlled through international organizations. Globalization is a process that parallels the UN, but their paths do not intersect. In the meanwhile, today we have a choice between anarchy, disorder and instability on one side, and injustice on the other. Either injustice or disorder. America�s rules of the game today are unjust. [�] Return to Menu C. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Norway and Russia Fail to Sign Non-Strategic Submarines Dismantlement Deal Norway and Russia failed on June 12th to sign a contract on the dismantlement of two Russian non-strategic submarines at an annual meeting on nuclear safety cooperation between the two countries, which took place in a northern Norwegian province of Finnmark, near the Russian border. The snag came when the Russian delegation suggested that Norway be financially responsible for the reprocessing of the submarines' spent nuclear fuel, or SNF�a process that is in violation of the Norwegian Parliament's policies on foreign nuclear assistance. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which runs Norway's nuclear assistance programmes in Russia, announced earlier this year its intention to fund dismantlement of two non-strategic Victor class nuclear-powered submarines at two shipyards in Northwest Russia. The work is planned to be carried out at Nerpa, located on the Kola Peninsula, and at Zvezdochka, in the Arkhangelsk region's city of Severodvinsk. The move was intended to set one of the first concrete examples for implementation of the "Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction" initiative issued by the world's Group of Eight, or G-8, leading industrialised nations at its summit in Kananaskis, Canada in June of 2002. This initiative is aimed at keeping track of, securing and cleaning up Russia's nuclear legacy, and pledges to spend $20 billion in ten years for these purposes. Assistance to Russia in decommissioning of non-strategic submarines was a pledge made by several countries following the summit. Prior to the meeting in Finnmark, the Norwegian foreign ministry issued a statement announcing the signing of the contract for the two submarines' dismantlement, but the announcement was premature. At the very start of the discussions Russian Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Sergey Antipov, who headed the Russian delegation, brought up the issue of spent nuclear fuel, which will be unloaded from the submarines' reactors prior to the dismantlement itself. Antipov said Russia wanted Norway to pay for the reprocessing of the spent fuel from the two Victor III class submarines at the Mayak Chemical Combine in the Southern Urals. Kim Traavik, the Norwegian Secretary of State, was not eager to foot this part of the bill. "This was unexpected and a pity", Traavik said. "It is out of question for the Norwegian side to contribute to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel." Traavik also said that Norway is ready to pay for the defuelling, the dismantlement itself and the shipment of the spent fuel to a storage place, whereas the responsibility for reprocessing that SNF should rest solely on the Russian side. The negotiations will continue and, according to Traavik, a mutually acceptable solution will be found shortly. Norwegian Foreign Ministry Forbidden to Support Reprocessing Norway once did make contributions to reprocessing at Mayak. With a nod from the Norwegian foreign ministry, the so-called Norwegian Plan of Action�a legal framework guiding Norwegian involvement in radiation safety projects in Russia�was developed. Under this plan, Norway paid Russia to build an extra train to carry spent nuclear fuel to Mayak. Russia had previously operated only one train. But in 2002, the Norwegian Parliament's Control and Constitutional Committee evaluated the implementation of the Norwegian Plan of Action and made a list of requirements�inspired by Bellona�which, among other things, prohibited the use of Norwegian funds to support the continuation of reprocessing at Mayak. The Mayak plant�considered to be the most radioactively contaminated place on earth�can theoretically reprocess up to 400 tonnes of SNF a year, but operates at reduced capacity of around 150 tonnes. In December 2002, Russian Nuclear Regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, revoked Mayak's reprocessing licence because of its continued discharges of radioactive waste generated during reprocessing into adjacent water reservoirs. Each year, regional spring flooding creates the risk that the contaminated water from these reservoirs may penetrate into the open river systems causing an environmental disaster. Nonetheless, Mayak's reprocessing license was renewed in 2003 on the precondition that the plant develop technologies that would avoid discharging radioactive water into the environment. Mayak, however, has been making those same promises for decade. More Than 40 Non-Strategic Subs Waiting for Dismantlement The Soviet Union built around 250 nuclear-powered submarines. Today, only around 50 of them remain in active service in the Northern Fleet in Northwest Russia and in the Pacific Fleet in Russia's Far East. Around 115 submarines were retired by the Northern Fleet, which only fully dismantled around 40 of them. Approximately 70 submarines, including 45 non-strategic ones, are still laid-up with spent nuclear fuel in their reactors at naval bases and shipyards on the Kola Peninsula. Since the early 1990s, the United States, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, or CTR, has funded the dismantlement of the Russian strategic submarines, or SSBNs, which posed a threat to US security. The old first- and second-generation non-strategic submarines fell beyond the scope of CTR, as they did not represent any immediate military threat to the Unites States. They do, however, represent a profound threat to the environment. But the word �environment' remains taboo�thanks largely to the conservative Republican majority in the US Congress�when used in relation to CTR programmes. After the encouraging G-8 announcement, hoping to ensure politicians' attention, many in the worldwide environmental lobby have modified their rhetoric, carefully underscoring that nuclear materials�particularly spent nuclear fuel�stored onboard non-strategic submarines also represent a non-proliferation risk as they could be used for making so-called "dirty bombs." CTR Pays for Spent Fuel Reprocessing The process of submarine decommissioning involves several stages. First, weapons and other important equipment are removed and the submarine is laid up, with a reduced crew onboard, at a military base. Prior to dismantlement�the literal sawing up of the vessel�spent nuclear fuel is unloaded from the submarine's reactors. The SNF is then loaded into a special train and shipped to Mayak for reprocessing. The dismantlement then starts with cutting out the reactor section and scrapping the rest of the submarine. Reactor sections are shipped to designated locations for storage. Sayda Bay, located in the northwestern part of the Kola Peninsula, is the storage place for reactor sections from the Northern Fleet's decommissioned submarines. In the early 1990s, CTR started out in Russia by supplying three shipyards�two in Northwest Russia and one in the Russian Far East�with required dismantlement equipment. Beginning in 1997, with the goal of speeding SSBN dismantlement rates and improving the process, the CTR programme officials shifted the focus of dismantlement assistance from providing equipment to awarding direct contracts to Russian shipyards. On Russia's insistence, CTR also received a waiver from the US Congress to send spent submarine fuel for reprocessing at Mayak�a practice previously strictly prohibited by CTR guidelines and US policy as a whole. The agreement that transpired after the waiver was to reprocess fuel from up to 15 SSBNs eliminated under the CTR programme. As one part of its SNF management scheme, CTR also funded the construction of a fuel unloading point, which included an interim storage pad, and casks for fuel transportation and storage at Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk and at Zvezda shipyard in the Russian Far East. A Safe Submarine Fuel Storage is Needed Coddled by CTR, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, which is now responsible for submarines decommissioning, contrived to sell what could be called a "submarine dismantlement package," which involves funding of both defuelling of a submarine and cutting it apart, and shipment of the submarine's spent fuel to Mayak for reprocessing. But Norway declines to support anything that has to do with reprocessing. Bellona has long advocated for the need to build a proper temporary storage facility at the Kola Peninsula. The reason for that is the necessity to secure the spent fuel that is stored in dilapidated onshore facilities, onboard semi-sinking support vessels and in the reactors of retired submarines. The Russian side, represented by Minatom, remains stubborn in its insistence that all spent submarine fuel be shipped to Mayak. The reprocessing plant at Mayak cannot, however, reprocess damaged nuclear fuel or some specific types of fuel stored at the Kola Peninsula. Additionally, moving the fuel to Mayak does not solve the problem, but rather simply transfers it from the Kola Peninsula to beyond the Ural Mountains. As was mentioned above, the waste accumulated at Mayak can penetrate, during any spring flood, into the nearby river systems and eventually reach the Arctic Ocean via the Ob and Yenisey rivers. A couple of days ago, Japan had reportedly signed a contract to dismantle a Victor III class non-strategic submarine at Zvezda shipyard in the Russian Far East. It is as yet unclear whether Japan also intends to pay for the reprocessing of that submarine's spent fuel. It is clear, however, that, being an important venture, the dismantlement of non-strategic submarines may face similar roadblocks in the future, if Minatom continues to stick obstinately to its so-called closed fuel cycle policy, which involves reprocessing and which cannot be justified by any economical or environmental considerations. Return to Menu D. Nuclear Business 1. Russia Flies in Fuel to Armenian NPP�Despite Concerns Over Plant�s Safety Despite protracted efforts by the European Union, or EU, to shut down Armenia�s single nuclear power plant, Russia�in an apparent stab at recouping a $40m debt�earlier this week flew in by air a shipment of 103 fresh uranium fuel assemblies so the plant can keep staggering out power and profit. The extremely rare method of transporting nuclear fuel by plane was adopted for this $13m shipment because there is no rail line linking Russia to Armenia. But the fact that it was not transported by trucks instead could be an indication of Russia�s intent to force Armenia to make good on the debt from the Armenian nuclear power plant�which is now under the control of Russia�s United Energy Systems, or UES�as soon as possible. The European Union is on record as saying that the plant is one of the most dangerous of those nuclear power plants, or NPPs, that still operate in Europe, and it has tried to entice Armenia with various methods�from encouraging gas pipelines from Iran, to outright financial compensation�to get the former Soviet Republic to shut the plant down. The Armenian NPP�s only functioning reactor unit�unit No. 2�was shut down after it ran out of fuel on April 4th, after producing 2282 million kilowatt-hours last year. Russian suppliers at first were unwilling to carry out a new fuel shipment because the Armenian NPP�s debt to UES for fuel has come to about $40m. However, Russia decided later that it was more profitable to keep the plant running and sell its electricity to cover the debt. Fuel loading will begin in about a month. UES� Involvement as Debt Collector As a method of bringing the Armenian NPP�s debt under control, Armenia, in March of 2003, handed over the plant�s financial management to Russia. Under this scheme, Armenia retains ownership of the plant, but Russia manages its financial resources and income. The controlling interest of Armenian NPP�which became a joint venture company between Armenia and Russia�is owned by UES. In order to make this fuel shipment possible, Armenia had to hand over the Sevan and Radzan resevoir systems�which comprise six hydroelectric power plants valued at $25m�to Nordig, a subsidiary of UES. These hydroelectric plants are in need of repair investments of about $30m, according to the news web site Iran.Ru, which cited the US consulting company Hagler Bailly. The remaining $15m of Armenian debt to Russia is to be paid back in two years by selling electricity within Armenia generated by the Armenian NPP. The Armenian NPP The Armenian NPP�also known as Medzamor�is located near the Turkish border and 28 kilometres west of the Armenia�s capital, Yerevan. It has two first-generation VVER-440/270 reactors�seismically improved versions of the VVER-440/230s�that were put into operation in 1976 and 1979. In October of 1982 the Armenian NPP suffered a serious explosion in the generator of the first reactor unit. The powerhouse hall was burned to the ground. The plant was built in a seismically active area, but supposedly designed to withstand earthquakes measuring as high as nine points on the Richter Scale. This premise was tested in December of 1988 during the disastrous earthquake near the Armenian city of Spitak, which measured seven to eight points on the Richter Scale. Even though engineers claimed it could withstand such jolts, the plant nonetheless was shut down and partially discharged of its fuel early in 1989. Fear of future earthquakes and potential harm to the plant, rather than any apparent damage suffered during the 1988 earthquake, motivated the shutdown. But in 1995 the plant was restarted because of Armenia�s severe energy shortage. Russian-Armenian Nuclear Ties Renewed Economic cooperation between Armenia and Russia restarted the plant. In January 1995, Russia�s State Duma ratified an agreement to extend a credit line to Armenia to resurrect the Armenian NPP. The credit line was earmarked for Russian technical expertise, fuel and equipment. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development helped finance the reactivating of the plant in 1995�but on the strict condition that the plant would be shut down for good by 2004. The sternest advocate of the plant closure is Armenia�s neighbour, Azerbaijan. A spokesman for Azerbaijan�s president, Novruz Mamedov, was recently quoted by Arminfo news agency as saying that the plant�s equipment is outdated and its future use poses a threat to the whole region. In an interview with Bellona Web, Antonia Wenisch of Vienna�s environmental Oekologie Institut said that the Armenian NPP and the Bulgarian Kozlodui NPP are the two most dangerous nuclear power plants for the European region�s environment. In a recent report, Wenisch said her institute gave both plants a danger level of 13, on a scale where 15 presents the worst possible danger. But Yevgeny Velikhov, the president of the famed Russian nuclear research centre, the Kurchatov Institute, said, according to the web site Nuclear.Ru�which serves as a mouthpiece for the Russian nuclear industry�that the Armenian NPP can be reconstructed to work safely in a short period of time. Gagik Markosyan, director of the Armenian NPP, said in an interview with the Armenian Business Express newspaper that the plant can continue to operate until 2017, and the planned closure is not due to �a technical problem, but a political one.� Armenia�s Reactors Based on Aging Russian Designs In Russia, reactors similar to the Armenian ones are used at the Kola and Novovoronezh NPPs. When money for safety of these plants was allocated from the G-8 Nuclear Safety Account�which preceded the famous billion-dollar pledges at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit�Russia promised to perform necessary safety upgrades and subsequently shut down some of the plants� reactor units when they reached the end of their predicted work cycles. For Novovoronezh that meant reactor bloc No.3 was to close in 2001, and its bloc No.4 in 2002. The Kola NPP�s bloc No.1 was slated to shut down in 2003. However, Russia�s Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, has since reneged on that promise to the G-8 and said that all of these reactors will continue to churn out power for another 10 to 15 years each. But the situation is even worse with Russia�s Leningrad NPP�s bloc No.1, a Chernobyl style RBMK-1000�located a mere 80 kilometres west of St. Petersburg�s 5 million residents�which will complete its predicted 30-year term of service this year. However, Minatom has suggested extending its term of service for another 15 years as well. Accordingly, all of these aging reactors are currently in operation. Europe�s Position On June 4th, a European Commission, or EC, spokesman, Hugues Mingarelli, said in Yerevan that the European Union will give �100m ($117m) to Armenia if it closes its nuclear power plant. Mingarelli is the head of the EC�s External Relations Directorate for Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics. Mingarelli was quoted by Armenpress news agency as suggesting that importing natural gas from Iran could compensate for the loss of energy that would be caused by the closure of the Armenian NPP. Yet he said that no agreement has yet been reached on EU funding to build an Iran-Armenia pipeline to transport the gas. But even the pipeline might not provide enough energy. According to the French firm Sofreco, Armenia�s need for gas imports over the next 20 years is predicted to increase four times�independent of the reactor shutdown�and the country will need annual shipments of 5.6 billion cubic meters of gas, reported the Turkmenistan.Ru news web site. However, Sofreco said, if the Armenian NPP is shut down, the country will need 6.2 billion cubic meters of gas. Today the country only uses 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year, buying it from Russia�s Itera group of companies, which costs its budget $55 per 1000 cubic meters. At the same time, Armenia plans to sell electricity to Iran, and that, coupled with the possible oil pipeline, brings the Armenian government into closer political contact with�and possible dependence on�Tehran�s controversial regime. Yerevan and Tehran have signed a contract to lay a $10m power line so that Armenia can export electricity to Iran. According to the agreements between the two governments, the line should be finished by the end of 2003, but Armenian officials say it will be ready ahead of schedule, in September. The cost of building the line was covered by Iran, and Iran will reimburse this sum by exporting $10m worth of electricity to Iran free of charge. Isidro Lopez-Arcos, principal administrator for the EC�s Directorate General of External Relations, told Bellona Web in an interview on Thursday that the closure of the Armenian NPP is a topic �being discussed between the EU and the Armenian government, and the plant will be closed as soon as there will be reliable [energy] sources to compensate for the plant.� �There are a lot of considerations, and we consider the Iranian gas pipeline as one of the possible sources, but it should be first studied and discussed with the Armenian government,� said Lopez-Arcos. The EU has been lobbying Armenia to close the nuclear power station by 2004, but according to Lopez-Arcos, it is now impossible to fix an exact date for the plant�s shutdown. Though Lopez-Arcos did not refer to the situation with Russia�s UES, it could be that Russia�s zeal to collect its debt from the Armenian NPP, as well as sell its energy, is tripping up the deadlines. In spite of the EU appeals, the Armenian government plans to extend the operation of the plant for another 10 years, the power plant�s director Markosyan was quoted by the Armenian Business Express newspaper as saying. According to Markosyan, the plant is theoretically capable of producing up to 40 percent of the country�s electricity supply. According to Armenian officials, the plant cannot be shut down until an alternative energy source has been found. Lopez-Arcos said that preliminary studies of alternative energy sources for Armenia are now being conducted by subcontractors for the EC, which are funded through the TACIS programme. Lopez-Arcos noted, however, that the work of the two subcontractors�the Italian company Societ� Gestione Impianti Nucleari, or SOGIN, and the Scandinavian firm Carl Bro�are still �as yet in a draft state.� Lopez-Arcos told Bellona Web that when the studies are completed their results will be discussed between the EU and the Armenian government. Return to Menu E. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Norway to Help Russia Dispose of Nuclear Submarines An agreement between Russia and Norway on the use of nuclear submarines located on the Kola peninsular was signed on June 12. According to Norwegian news agency NTB Norway is offering to help Russia 'get rid' of 50 submarines, 40 of which contain nuclear fuel. The agreement to use and treat the radioactive waste and nuclear fuel from the submarines is part of another agreement between Norway and the ship-building wharf Nerpaon the Kola peninsular and the wharf Star at Severodvinsk. The agreement will mark the continuation of cooperation between Russia and Norway in the area of radiation and ecology, which began in 1998. Norway will invest about USD 17.3 million in treating nuclear waste in the North-West Federal District of Russia this year. Return to Menu F. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. The First Step to Trust On June 1 fifteen years ago the Soviet Union and the USA signed the treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF treaty). It was the first practical step towards building up mutual trust. In the three subsequent years, the Soviet Union and the USA eliminated two classes of nuclear-capable missiles that threatened not only each other but also third countries. It was an even of historical dimension. The INF treaty liquidated a nuclear arsenal with a larger aggregate yield than the yield of all nuclear weapons humankind had used since their creation. The bulk of that arsenal (though it amounted to barely 5% of the aggregate number of nuclear warheads) was deployed in Europe. The flight time of those missiles was so small that the very possibility of their use greatly destabilized the situation for Moscow and many European capitals. Soviet missiles deployed in the European part of the country could reach the remotest parts of the continent, including Iceland and Spain. American missiles deployed in West Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium could reach Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Gorky (Nizhni Novgorod) and Baku. No wonder that they seriously affected the Soviet and American relations with their respective neighbors and allies. The INF treaty removed that very real threat from Soviet borders and paved the way to the reduction of not only nuclear but also conventional arms. In all, the two states liquidated nearly 2,500 ballistic and cruise missiles. The last Soviet intermediate-range missile RSD-10 was exploded at the Kapustin Yar range on May 12, 1991, and the last US Pershing-2 missile was eliminated on May 6, 1991. Moscow liquidated 1,752 missiles (including 845 that had not been deployed) and Washington eliminated 859 missiles (including 283 non-deployed ones). The liquidated Soviet intermediate-range missiles (with the range of 1,000 to 5,500 km) included RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20 Saber, according to Western classification), R-12 Dvina (SS-4 Sandal) and R-14 Chusovaya (SS-5 Skean) ballistic missiles and RK-55 Granat (SSC-4 Slingshot) cruise missile. The liquidated shorter-range missiles (with the range of 500 to 1,000 km) included the OTR-22 Temp-S (SS-12 Scaleboard) and OTR-23 Oka (SS-23 Spider) missiles. The USA liquidated Pershing-2 and BGM-109G intermediate-range missiles and Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles. The Russian military believe something strange happened in the case of the RK-55 and OTR-23 Soviet missiles. The RK-55 had been tested but was not deployed by the day when the INF treaty was signed; yet it was included in it as a special case. The story of the OTR-23 Oka is totally incredible. It did not fit the parameters of the treaty because it had a range of only 400 km. Created by a talented designer Sergei Nepobedimy, it incorporated the latest achievements of Soviet technology. It hit targets without fail, was invisible to the potential adversary's radars because it used stealth technology, and evaded electronic warfare systems. It could float and could be easily delivered by transport aircraft. The Americans wanted us to eliminate it and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze ordered the Oka to be incorporated in the treaty contrary to the firm objections of the Soviet General Staff. The implementation of the INF treaty cost the Soviet Union and Russia dearly. The utilization of intermediate-range missiles topped 30 million non-denominated roubles and a lot of money was spent on 250 inspections of US facilities where intermediate- and shorter-range missiles were produced and deployed. Soviet inspectors became a permanent fixture at the factory in Magna, Utah, while the Americans kept a permanent team at our factory in Votkinsk, Udmurtia in northeast Russia. Mutual inspections lasted ten years. In my opinion, we did not squander money. Both the USA and the Soviet Union became convinced in each other's honesty and that conviction is vital for confidence, then and now. Russians and Americans drew on each other's experience, learning above all to talk, to come to agreements, to respect the partner and to work openly. The INF treaty allowed us to exchange data about missiles, for the first time in the history of bilateral relations, and to publish it in the press. By the data I mean the tactical-technical characteristics of ballistic missiles, the factories where they were produced, their deployment sites, testing ranges, warehouses, the composition and strength of combat crews that service the missiles, and their training centers. There were 117 such facilities in Russia, including Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Postavy, Malorita and Karmelava. The Americans had 32 facilities, including in Maryland, Utah, Colorado and Alabama. Those positive trends were developed in the CFE treaty, START-1 and START-2 treaties and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SOR treaty), signed by the presidents of Russia and the USA in May 2002 and enforced on June 1, 2003. In the past 15 years the world has firmly moved away from confrontation to cooperation between the planet's largest countries. I am not naive or optimistic. I know that there is a long and winding road to lasting peace and cooperation. But we made the first step to it 15 years ago. Return to Menu G. Missile Defense 1. Russia, US to Conduct Joint Missile Defense Exercises Russia and the U.S. are planning to conduct joint theatre missile defence exercises in Russia in early 2004, Colonel General Yury Baluyevsky, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian General Staff, said on Tuesday. "We have offered to conduct bilateral exercises with the Americans to test theatre missile defence [TMD] systems, in which NATO countries will be observers," Baluyevsky said. "This exercise is not connected with the use of air and missile defence systems and resources. Its purpose is to practice computer simulation with the involvement of specialists," Baluyevsky said. In response to a question as to whether personnel of the S-300 missile defence systems will be involved in the exercise, the general said, "I prefer not to comment on this issue now as it has not been raised in this manner by the participants in the exercise. By agreement with the U.S., the exercise will not be tied to any particular situation or any particular region. Its participants will practice missile defence against a hypothetical enemy," Baluyevsky said. "The exercise will test the compatibility of the Russian and U.S. missile defence systems and will also provide practice for solving administrative problems," he said. The exercise "was planned during Russian-U.S. bilateral contacts. Experts are currently in the process of determining the subject of this exercise, its goals, objectives and what is to be practiced," Baluyevsky said. Speaking about the U.S. proposal to conduct a Russian-NATO command post missile defence exercise in the U.S. in late 2003, Baluyevsky said, "This proposal is currently being discussed by the Russia-NATO working group on missile defence." Return to Menu 2. Russia, US to Hold Missile Defense Exercise Russia plans to host a joint missile defense exercise with the United States next year, a senior Russian military official said Tuesday. Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, said the maneuvers are scheduled for early next year at an unspecified location in Russia, the Interfax-Military News Agency reported. The exercise will involve computer simulation rather than firing actual weapons, Baluyevsky said. "The exercise will test the compatibility of the Russian and U.S. missile defense systems and will also provide practice for solving administrative problems," he said. According to Baluyevsky, the maneuvers would deal with so-called theater missile defense, which is intended to fend off attacks by short- and medium-range missiles, and not intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia proposed inviting NATO member nations to observe the exercise. "By agreement with the United States, the exercise won't be tied to any particular situation or any particular region," Baluyevsky was quoted as saying. "Its participants will practice missile defense against a hypothetical enemy." Baluyevsky said that Russian experts were also considering a U.S. proposal to hold a Russian-NATO command post missile defense exercise in the United States later next year. Russia had strongly opposed U.S. plans to build nationwide defenses against ballistic missiles, but President Vladimir Putin reacted calmly to Washington's withdrawal last year from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy such a shield, saying the move was a mistake but not a threat to Russia. U.S. officials have tried to soothe Russian concerns about American plans for a missile shield by talking about prospects for cooperation on anti-missile systems. Joint missile defense programs also figured high on the agenda of the Russia-NATO Council. Baluyevsky's announcement comes at a time when Moscow and Washington are working to mend ties damaged by their disagreements over the war in Iraq. Return to Menu H. Official Statements 1. Transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov Remarks at Joint Press Conference Following Talks with Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja, Helsinki, June 10, 2003 (excerpted) [�] Question: Mr. Minister, is Russia planning to take a more active part in resolving the Korean peninsula problem? Foreign Minister Ivanov: The position of Russia with regard to the Korean peninsula is well known: we favor its nuclear-free status, as well as the solution of all arising questions through a political dialogue, which Russia has helped and will continue to help realize in the future. We welcomed the start of the negotiations in Beijing with the participation of the representatives of North Korea, the United States and China. We regard negotiations as the solely correct path for reaching agreements which would take into account the interests of all the parties. Russia will be giving all the necessary assistance to this dialogue. If the parties deem it necessary that Russia take a more active part directly in this or that format of negotiations then we shall be ready for this. Return to Menu 2. Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Remarks Following Talks with Indian Minister of External Affairs Jashwant Sinha (excerpted) [�] Question: What is the attitude of India and Russia to the discussion of the nuclear program of Iran? Answer: We await the report in the IAEA on this question, based on which it will be possible to draw appropriate conclusions. At the same time, Russia's principled stand is well known - we are against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, first of all, naturally, nuclear. This applies to any countries, including Iran. We are developing cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field, but this cooperation is exclusively peaceful and is being effected under IAEA control. Russia hopes that Iran will sign an additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which will make it possible to extend inspections of this organization to all the nuclear facilities in Iran and thus dispel the concerns that may be there regarding nuclear programs in the country. [�] Return to Menu I. Links of Interest 1. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
|
|
|
© 2007 Partnership for Global Security. All rights reserved. Privacy Statement.