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RANSAC Nuclear News, August 1, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Plutonium Disposition
 A. Plutonium Disposition 1. Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition Allowed to Lapse by US In a long-anticipated act of inaction, the US Government let expire a 1998 US-Russian agreement on technical cooperation for plutonium disposition over concerns that the agreement did not provide sufficient liability protections for US officials and contractors involved in the project, the National Nuclear Safety Association, or NNSA, and Russia�s nuclear regulatory agency confirmed. As a result, all new plutonium disposition planning under the Clinton-Yeltsin era agreement�known as the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement�legally has to be halted. The agreement provided for scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and Russia on the development of methods by which to destroy surplus weapons-grade plutonium in each country. Both the US and Russia have agreed to each eliminate 34 tonnes�of the hundreds of tonnes both have in stockpile�of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in so called �parallel� progress. The method by which this plutonium will be destroyed is in the creation of a nuclear fuel called MOX, which is a mixture of weapons-grade plutonium oxide and uranium oxide. This fuel is to be burned in specially retrofitted conventional nuclear reactors, similar to Russia�s VVER-1000s, which will produce spent nuclear fuel of such high radioactivity that, according to MOX proponents, it will be impossible to extract the weapons-grade plutonium from it. The programme envisions billions of dollars worth of fuel fabrication plant construction and environmentally risky reactor retrofitting. It is Bellona�s opinion that, although safe methods of securing surplus weapons-grade plutonium must be found quickly, the MOX option is dangerous and ill-suited for this purpose. With the right technology, experts contend, weapons-grade plutonium in MOX spent fuel can, in fact, be extracted. Furthermore, because the MOX fuel includes uranium, burning MOX breeds even more plutonium than was in the fuel assemblies to begin with�undermining the very purpose of the enterprise. In Bellona�s opinion, adopting the MOX approach is irrational against a background of cheaper and safer options like immobilisation. �I cannot understand why the administration would let key aspects of the programme to get rid of so much weapons-grade plutonium lapse. Keeping fissile material out of the hands of terrorists seems a critical step in the war on terrorism,� Ellen Tauscher, a US House of Representatives Democrat from California, and a vocal proponent of maintaining threat reduction programmes, told the Global Security Newswire, or GSN last week. A US Department of State spokesman confirmed Monday that a provisional three-month extension had been given to the 1998 agreement, but that all new projects within this period would be �evaluated on a strict case-by-case basis.� The expiration follows the announcement last week by the US Department of Energy, or DOE, that another 1998 threat reduction measure, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, or NCI, agreement, will be allowed to expire in September unless Russia agrees to similar changes in liability provisions. The DOE-run NCI programme aims to retrain Russian nuclear weapons scientists for work in the commercial sphere. Tauscher and five other Democrats wrote the US President George Bush administration this week to protest the move, congressional officials said this week. The Plutonium Science and Technology agreement�signed by former US Vice President Al Gore and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin�covered MOX concept design, research and development, small pilot projects for fuel testing, equipment transfers, limited testing of lead-test assemblies, and international seminars. The 1998 agreement, did not, however, adopt the liability provisions of the �umbrella agreement� of the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, programme as it did not envision any actual construction, but only research. The umbrella agreement places nearly all liability for any accidents that take place during US-funded nuclear dismantlement and cleanup efforts in Russia on Moscow. This is a position that the US Department of State apparently will not compromise on, but that Russia finds untenable�especially given the May signing in Stockholm of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation, or MNEPR. The MNEPR agreement provides more latitude for Russia on liability issues when entering into bilateral nuclear disarmament and cleanup projects with other�particularly European�nations, and a spokesman at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, said Tuesday that the Russian side would prefer future liability agreements with the United States to be modelled on MNEPR�s liability policies. But this would be an unlikely concession from the United States: Although Washington is a signatory of the MNEPR agreement, it refused to sign MNEPR�s liability protocol, which, at the insistence of the US, had been separated from the main text of the agreement. According to the State Department spokesman, that position has not softened. In addition, according to a European Union official who is close to the plutonium disposition negotiations, and who requested his name not be mentioned in this article, there are some European nations that agree with the United States�though he did not name which ones, or whether they were signatories of the MNEPR accord�and think MNEPR liability guidelines are not stringent enough. In Europe, the MNEPR agreement was signed by Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, as well as the European Community, or EC, and the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom�all of which signed the MNEPR liability protocol. NNSA Says Impasse is �Short Term� Bryan Wilkes, a spokesman for the NNSA�which is participating in several exchanges with Russian nuclear regulators�said in a telephone interview from Washington that the liability problem was �a legal issue for the State Department to work out.� �We just want to proceed with our programmes, essentially, and we don�t want to get bogged down in these legal issues, but � the State Department is insisting on some legal changes on the liability issues,� Wilkes said. Wilkes said no new projects could be started under the 1998 technical agreement now that it has lapsed, but he noted that �there�s a lot that�s already in the pipeline that�s been planned. This will have no impact in the short term.� He added, however that �if [the disagreement over the liability terms of the 1998 agreement] becomes longer term, it could be a problem.� One Programme Allowed to Continue American and Russian officials, who had convened in Moscow this and last week under the aegis of the 1998 agreement to discuss regulatory issues for plutonium disposition plan, were said by one official to be in a �depressed mood� over the lapse of the agreement. �Few people showed up at the seminars and everyone is uncertain about their job security,� said the official. Only one programme has been allowed to continue operation after the lapse of the 1998 agreement without special State Department and US National Security Council, or NSC, approval, US officials and representatives of Russia�s nuclear regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, confirmed in interviews this week. This programme is a regulatory exchange project run by the DOE�s senior project manager for the GAN regulatory and licensing infrastructure development project, Sotirios Thomas, and Andrei Kislov, head of GAN�s 3rd Directorate, or fuel cycles division. This programme, according to Russian, European and American officials, which seeks to unite the experience of US nuclear regulators such as the NNSA and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, with Russian regulators to transform the ever marginalized GAN into a truly independent nuclear watchdog, goes beyond the scope of the plutonium disposition programme. The project is advancing US foreign policy as it relates to developing the licensing of nuclear activities in Russia, and is meant to help make GAN an expert regulatory agency free of state pressure�something the US Congress truly wants, said officials in conversations with Bellona Web in the weeks leading up to the lapse of the 1998 agreement. Working Around the 1998 Agreement Several US and European observers noted, however, that the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement, signed by former US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, may provide a map out of the current impasse over the 1998 agreement. The 2000 agreement�which does make reference to actual destruction of plutonium and contains provisions for facility construction�was vague on issues of liability and put off their resolution until a future date. That date, the Bush administration apparently decided, has arrived. "What the administration would like is to negotiate a liability provision for the 2000 plutonium disposition agreement that conforms to the CTR umbrella agreement," William Hoehn, Washington office director of the Russian American Nuclear Safety Advisory Council, or RANSAC�a Washington-based NGO that advises the Russian and US governments�said in a telephone interview this week. "That way, everything that needs to be done could be performed under the 2000 agreement, and the 1998 agreement would no longer be required." The European official agreed with Hoehn. �The 2000 agreement provides a political basis with which both sides can work,� the European official told Bellona Web. The CTR umbrella agreement, however, has never been ratified by Russia�s Parliament, the State Duma, but according to some reports, the US is hoping that the Duma may soon ratify the umbrella agreement. Although Hoehn noted that many Washington experts were enthusiastic about Duma ratification for the CTR liability structure, he said the issue may not be as high on the Russian Parliament�s �to do� list as some US specialists think. "Politically, [. . .] I am not sure, with parliamentary elections coming up in December, that ratifying the umbrella agreement is a high priority for the Duma right now," he said. "If they do manage to ratify it, it would be a major achievement." Whether or not the ratification comes, said the European official, �Russia and the United States have gone so far along the plutonium disposition path and exerted so much political pressure that I don�t think the whole programme will just disappear.� �They have a three-month extension in which to establish the needed legal principles,� he added. �I jut cannot see that this programme will come to an end.� Other factors that the European Union official noted which will buy some more negotiating time is the disparity between the US and Russian MOX programmes. Under the 2000 agreement, both countries are to proceed in parallel progress. But, said the European official, �the US work is far advanced and Russia is lagging far behind.� He noted, for instance, that Russia would require approximately $2 billion for its MOX fabrication plant that is slated to be built near the town of Tomsk in Central Siberia. So far, $800,000 has been collected in international donations, the official noted, and it is unknown how much more can be expected. The European official said, therefore, that even if all the liability structures were in place, Russia would face the dilemma of waiting until it has all the money it needs in the bank to start construction, or committing to the project with the money it does have�but then it may financially never be able to complete it. Nuke and Environmental Experts Register Opposition to MOX on Capitol Hill An open letter by a group of respected US nuclear and environmental experts sent to US Senator Pete Domeneci, who heads the Senate Appropriations Committee, confirmed the EU official�s analysis. Domenici will be responsible for whether a $402m appropriation to begin construction of the US MOX fabrication plant at the DOE�s Savannah River Site in the 2004 fiscal year will be granted. The experts, in their letter, urged him against it. Aside from US-side construction authorisation for the plant�which has yet to be granted by the NRC�as well as the DOE�s failure to accurately clarify the budget for the facility, the letter noted: *Technical and licensing plans for the Russian MOX programme are at a preliminary point and lag far behind the US programme, and thus will not be at a place where congressionally mandated �parallel� construction of MOX facilities in Russia can begin in the 2004 fiscal year; *Funding for the Russian MOX programme has not been secured from either the US or G-8 [Group of Eight] countries, with the most recent failure to secure sufficient funds coming at the G-8 summit which was held from June 1st to June 3rd in Evian, France; *No agreements with Russia have yet been reached concerning the critical issues of liability of Western vendors or �monitoring and inspection� to confirm Russia�s adherence to control and accounting of plutonium and inspection of facilities, as stipulated in the US-Russia plutonium disposition agreement of September 2000. Based on the United States� own cost analysis documentation of the MOX programme, the letter�which was posted on the Washington-based Nuclear Control Institute�s website at www.nci.org�went on to say that �it is quite clear that the Russian MOX programme is at a preliminary stage. In addition to lack of clarity about which reactors would be used for Russian MOX irradiation, whether one or two MOX facilities would be constructed has not been decided.� �Accordingly, the cost estimate for the Russian programme has increased dramatically from the 2001 estimate of $1.7 billion to a range of $2.1 to $2.7 billion, and the [cost analysis] document states that the estimates presented are �preliminary� and actual costs will �most likely� be greater than costs presented in the document,� the letter continued. DOE and NNSA insiders, in conversations with Bellona Web, said that the views expressed in the letter were widely shared within the corridors of their agencies. NCI Letter Urges Immobilisation Over MOX The letter also touched on the ongoing debate of MOX versus immobilisation�another way to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. One method of immobilisation involves melting plutonium oxide with high-level radioactive waste and specially fabricated sand, thus making glass bricks, and burying the bricks in a permanent repository. The other, called the �can-in-canister� approach, would compress weapons-grade plutonium into pucks and store them in canisters filled with molten glass containing high-level radioactive waste. These canisters would then likewise be placed in a permanent repository. �The DOE acknowledged in its 2002 plutonium disposition report to Congress that the cheapest disposition option for all 34 metric tonnes of surplus US plutonium was its immobilisation in high-level waste, yet the DOE prematurely ended development of this option in 2002,� read the letter. In 2002, the Bush administration abandoned any plutonium disposition agreements that would involve immobilisation altogether. The letter concluded that former US President Ronald Reagan�s Undersecretary of Defence had testified before the House Committee on International Relations in 2003 that the US-Russian MOX programme �could do great harm to non-proliferation� and that the programme �will encourage other expanding uses of plutonium,� which �could well mean the death knell for non-proliferation.� The letter was signed by NCI President Paul Levinthal, US Greenpeace�s top representative Tom Clements, Tom Cochran of the Natural Resources Defence Council, and 17 other nuclear and environmental experts. Pete Domenici�s office had no comment on the letter when reached on Tuesday. Return to Menu B. Chemical Weapons Disposal 1. Russia, US Discuss Funding for Russian Chemical Weapons Disposal Russian and U.S. officials discussed the possibility of Washington providing an additional US$60 million for a chemical weapons disposal facility in the Urals Mountains, Russian officials said. Officials from the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program said Washington might allocate an additional US$60 million for the plant at Shchuchye, a Russian Munitions Agency official told the Interfax news agency. Russia in 1997 committed itself to destroying its chemical weapons stockpile, which at 40,000 metric tons (44,000 tons) is the world's largest, within 10 years. However, the Kremlin says it lacks the funds to complete the program on time and has appealed for increased international donations and an extension of the target date until 2012. Washington has provided most of the funding for the Shchuchye site, one of the main disposal facilities. However, it has frozen some money due to concerns that Russia has not contributed enough or made elimination of chemical weapons a high enough priority. Return to Menu 2. Russia to Build Chemical Arms Disposal Facility in Volga Region Preparations for the construction of a large facility for recycling chemical arms will end in the town of Kambarka in Russia's internal Udmurt Republic [Central Russia] in 2003-2004, a source in the State Chemical Disarmament Commission told Interfax-Military News Agency on Wednesday [23 July]. "Preparations for the full-scale construction of the industrial zone for eliminating war gases will begin in Kambarka in 2003. Nearly R440m (14.5m dollars) will be allocated via the adjusted state defence order. The preparations will be wrapped up in 2003-2004, and then construction will be launched," the source noted. "After the preparations are wrapped up, the construction of the facility will begin in Kambarka. The facility includes the administration office, a set of detoxification modules, and stock recycling rooms. The fire station, handling facility, tetrachloride dimethyl storehouses, and other buildings are to be put in operation in 2004," he noted. Over R100m (3.3m dollars) will be allocated for building social infrastructure installations in Kambarka and nearby localities in 2003, the source went on. The funds will be spent on building two blocks of 60 apartments and rebuilding the boiler-house and gas networks, he said. Return to Menu C. Nuclear Smuggling 1. Kazakh Secret Services Seize 3 Trying to Sell Isotope of Plutonium Staffers of the National Security Committee detained two Kazakh citizens and a Russian national who tried to sell an isotope of plutonium-239 in Pavlodar. This isotope is applied in the firefighting signalling, the press service of the National Security Committee told Itar-Tass. "It cannot be used for producing weapons of mass destruction," committee staffers noted. Investigation that should ascertain the origin of the isotope is in progress. Under Kazakhstan's legislation free sale of radioactive substances is banned. Return to Menu D. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. Elimination of Soviet-Built Ballistic Missiles Continues Russia will continue to dismantle its aging Soviet-made ballistic missiles this year, a news agency reported Thursday. By year's end, Russia will eliminate 18 of its most powerful missiles, SS-18s, the Interfax-Military News Agency quoted an unidentified military official as saying. The silos will also be dismantled, the official said. The SS-18, capable of carrying 10 nuclear warheads to targets 11,000 kilometers (6835 miles) away, is the heaviest weapon in Russia's arsenal. The latest U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction agreement, signed in May 2002 by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, obligates both sides to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, by 2012. Russian officials say the treaty is advantageous to Russia because it allows it to choose which weapons to keep - unlike the now defunct START II treaty, which required the elimination of all SS-18s and other multiple-warhead land-based missiles that have formed the core of the nation's nuclear arsenals since Soviet times. The military has said it would keep some SS-18s and six-warhead SS-19 missiles in service for nearly two decades to come, postponing a costly effort to build a replacement. Meanwhile, Russian military officials revealed how many Soviet-built SS-19 missiles Russia purchased from neighboring Ukraine in a deal that has taken two years to complete. The Strategic Missile Forces said that 30 SS-19 missiles it has acquired from Ukraine could remain in service for as long as 30 years, replacing older missiles, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. The deal was an inexpensive way for Russia to boost its nuclear capability. Return to Menu 2. Russia Slates 12 More Missile Silos for Destruction Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) plan to eliminate 12 more silo launchers for RS-20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (Western designations SS-18 and Satan) before the end of the year, a Defence Ministry source told Interfax on Thursday. "Under the schedule of SMF reductions, six silo launchers for RS-20 missiles have been blown up. Another 12 launchers will be destroyed before the end of the year. As planned, three regiments equipped with missile systems whose service life has expired will be decommissioned in 2003," the source said. One regiment has three RS-20 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers. The elimination of silo launchers in the regiment based in Kartaly, in the Chelyabinsk region, has been completed. According to the source, the missiles and launchers are being destroyed in compliance with the Russian-US START-1 treaty. According to him, another missile regiment based in Kartaly is being withdrawn from combat duty. Its launchers are also subject to destruction.RS-20 missiles have been on combat duty from 18 to 23 years. The SMF has about 150 Satan missiles in its inventory. If its service life is extended, the R-36M-2 missile can stay on combat duty until 2010 or even longer. RS-20 missiles are also used in space programmes. According to open sources, the R-36M-2 heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (treaty designation RS-20, NATO designation Satan, US designation SS-18) runs on liquid fuel, can be fitted with several types of warheads and used against underprotected objects and area-type targets. In the latter case, the missile can be fitted with multiple warheads with individually homing payloads that ensure accurate hitting of multiple targets. The maximum range is 11,000 km. Under the START-1 treaty that took effect on December 5, 1994, Russia and the United States can have no more than 1,600 deployed nuclear missile carriers and no more than 6,000 nuclear munitions for them. The recent Russian-US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty provides for the reduction of the number of strategic nuclear munitions to 1,700-2,200 pieces per party by December 31, 2012. Return to Menu E. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Putin: Russia will Refrain from Nuclear Tests Only if Others do the Same President Vladimir Putin said Thursday that Russia would continue refraining from nuclear tests only on the condition that other nuclear powers do not conduct them. While Putin did not single out any country by name, his statement appeared to be a thinly veiled warning to the United States, which has declined to ratify a global nuclear test ban and kept the door open on a possible resumption of tests. "Russia has undertaken serious international legal obligations and hasn't conducted nuclear tests for many years," Putin said on a trip to Russia's top nuclear weapons center in the city of Sarov. "We are keeping and will keep the obligations we have undertaken, only on certain conditions, one of the most important of which is a similar attitude to these obligations by other nuclear powers," he said in remarks carried by the Russian television. The Soviet Union conducted its last nuclear test explosion in 1990, a year before its collapse, and Russia has maintained a moratorium on such tests since then. The United States suspended underground nuclear tests in 1992, although officials have not ruled out resuming them in the future. The U.S. administration has sought to reduce the time needed to restart such tests should that prove necessary to verify the readiness of U.S. nuclear arsenals. Moscow has strongly urged Washington to adhere to the moratorium, and urged the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The treaty will only become binding if all 44 countries that possess nuclear weapons or have nuclear power programs ratify it. Just over 30 such nations, including Britain, France and Russia, have ratified the 1996 accord that bans nuclear tests in any environment. The United States has not ratified it. Ivan Safranchuk, the head of Moscow's office of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based think-tank, said that Putin's statement was apparently aimed at encouraging Russian nuclear weapons experts who have fallen on hard times since the Soviet collapse. Safranchuk said that some Russian nuclear experts favored the resumption of tests to ensure the weapons' reliability. He said that the nation's nuclear industry has also long considered the possibility of building the low-yield "bunker buster" nuclear weapons of the kind the United States wants to develop. "Some experts believe that building such new weapons would require nuclear tests," he said in a telephone interview. Russian Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said at Thursday's meeting with Putin that about one quarter of researchers in the Sarov nuclear center had never taken part in real nuclear tests. The Sarov center has relied on computer modeling to replace tests, he said, according to the Interfax news agency. Return to Menu 2. Russian Nuclear Arsenal is Combat Ready At the Russian president's meeting with researchers of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center Aleksander Rumyantsev, Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev said "Russia's nuclear arsenal is combat ready, its most recent armaments are capable of overcoming different land-based systems. While talking about the center, the minister indicated that it was the country's strategic wealth. The center develops most modern types of armaments to ensure Russia's security, emphasized the minister. Rumyantsev indicated that the last nuclear tests in the country took place in 1990. Nuclear tests being banned, modelling plays an important role in maintaining nuclear parity in the world, he said. The center is therefore equipped with supercomputers and unique stands. In his turn, academician Viktor Mikhailov, the center's scientific director, said Atomic Energy Ministry experts had accumulated huge experience in ensuring safety of the most sophisticated technological systems. The academician stated that the center "is prepared, in addition to routine nuclear research activities, to ensure safety of technical systems in the gas, oil and petrochemical industries." Return to Menu F. Nuclear Cities 1. Putin Participates in Pilgrimage at Closed Russian City, Then Heads to Nuclear Center (Excerpted) President Vladimir Putin visited the closed city of Sarov on Thursday and paid homage to its unusual double history - home of one of the Russian Orthodox Church's most revered saints and heart of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program. [�] But while Putin's participation in an Orthodox pilgrimage symbolizes the changes ushered in by the collapse of Communism, the rows of metal barricades and gun-toting officers on the road into Sarov are a stark reminder that many Soviet habits have not been shed. The city 400 kilometers (250 miles) east of Moscow is still closed both to foreigners and to Russians without special permission. An Associated Press reporter traveling as part of Putin's press pool was turned back at the gates. "Not a single Sarov resident may come or go without permission - in essence, they are all state serfs," Russia's Kommersant newspaper wrote, referring to czarist-era peasants tied to their master's land. Under Communism, Sarov never appeared on official maps. The reason was the Avangard nuclear weapons plant. Andrei Sakharov, who later became a leading dissident, was once among the team of Sarov scientists developing the hydrogen bomb there. Today, the center's employees are among the highest-paid state workers in Russia, and secrecy persists. Meeting with workers at the center later Thursday, Putin said Russia "must and will remain a great nuclear power," the Interfax newspaper reported. He also said that Russia would continue refraining from nuclear tests only if other nuclear powers do the same, Interfax and the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. While Putin did not single out any country, his statement appeared to be a warning to the United States, which has declined to ratify a global nuclear test ban and kept the door open on a possible resumption of nuclear tests. [�] Putin's visit to Sarov also comes amid threats by the United States to not renew an initiative that aimed to retrain Russian scientists in an effort to keep them employed and prevent their know-how from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. Alexander Pikayev, a top nuclear analyst for the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow office, said that the program's end would significantly increase proliferation risks at the time when Russia's Nuclear Energy Ministry is planning massive layoffs. Putin sought to ease concerns, saying that "in any reorganization of the Nuclear ministry's structures, whatever changes occur, this whole complex will remain unified, integrated and able to work," Interfax reported. Return to Menu G. Missile Defense 1. Yuri Baluyevsky: The Danger is in Singular Launches An interview with Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, senior deputy chief of the general staff. Consultations on cooperation in the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defense are under way between Russia and the United States and between Russia and NATO. The subject of the talks, however, differs. Moscow discusses anti-ballistic missile defense system of a theater of operations with NATO and strategic anti-ballistic missile defense system with the United States... Question: Yuri Nikolayevich, when cooperation in the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defense is discussed, it will not hurt to understand first exactly what participants of the cooperation intend to defend themselves from. Cooperation stipulates existence of common threats. Russia has one approach to the problem, the United States another, Europe the third... Yuri Baluyevsky: That's right. It is because of this difference in approaches that we came to Europe with the suggestion to begin with evaluation of missile threats. It is clear after all that these threats will not be adequate to the ones existing in other regions of the world, say in the United States. Question: Do you think it all depends on the region or on the country in question? Yuri Baluyevsky: It does depend on the region too. Where may a threat to Europe originate from nowadays? From the "southern underbelly" where... Well, I won't identify countries by names, but the United States calls them rogue regimes. These countries strive for missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction. These are the countries where terrorist trends are particularly noticeable. That is why we told Europe, "Let us define the threats typical of Europe, and that will be the first part of our cooperation." We emphasized more than once that danger may lie in singular launches including terrorist ones. As for the United States, it assigns unquestionable priority to the threat posed by the so called rogue regimes. As a career officer and specialist, however, I view the threat posed, say, by North Korea far too inadequate technically. But all right, let the United States take the threat as seriously as it wants. But why would it modernize radars of the early warning system in Greenland and Great Britain, far from trajectories of the missiles launched by rogue regimes. It can only mean that theoreticians and strategists in Washington fear that there may be a threat posed by Russia too, say, the threat of unsanctioned launches. We can only guess that this is how this logic runs. At negotiations, we are always told that Russia and the United States are partners and even allies. Unfortunately, some actions and moves show that we are anything but. Question: And how does the joint study of the threats proceed? Are there any preliminary results you could comment on? Yuri Baluyevsky: The first time Russia voiced the idea of a European anti-ballistic missile defense system was in 1994. The defense minister of Russia returned to the initiative again at the meeting of the Russia - NATO Council in October 2000. The following February the idea was forwarded to NATO General Secretary George Robertson. The document suggested the algorithm - define the nature of the threats first and set up a joint mechanism of work on the European anti-ballistic missile defense system next. This mechanism has been set up. The working team within the framework of the Russia - NATO Council has performed perfectly. For example, it formed a glossary of definitions on the basis of what was previously agreed on at lengthy Russian-American negotiations... As for the threats, some progress has been made but I would not say that absolutely all threats have been analyzed. Question: And when do you expect it? Yuri Baluyevsky: The working group has until the end of 2004 to evaluate the threats and study compatibility of Russian and NATO means of anti-ballistic missile defense. Question: A few words on compatibility, if you do not mind. The Americans and we do have at least something to study compatibility of. What about Europe? Yuri Baluyevsky: There are problems here. We all know the American policy. Washington always strives to have its allies use American-manufactured key elements of armaments and military hardware. The same is true for the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defense. Some European countries use PAC systems (Patriot Advanced Capability) of different models - PAC-1, PAC-2, or PAC-3. All these systems are modifications of the American Patriot missile. These days, Washington suggests its own "umbrella" for all of Europe. It promoted the idea of a system known as THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense). Question: And is this what Russia proposes as well? Yuri Baluyevsky: Attempts of this sort are made. We know what the Americans understand under cooperation. American partners are never offered the latest technologies (even though they are demanded to come up with their latest ideas), manufacture is to be organized in the United States, and the financial burden is to be mostly carried by the allies in question. Question: Is the lack of progress at the talks ascribed to this state of affairs? Yuri Baluyevsky: There are other obstacles as well. Russia and the United States do not have an agreement on cooperation. Without it, the government of Russia cannot put the United States on the list of the countries military-technical cooperation is permitted with. This is a purely legal matter of course but even it has to be tackled first. Question: And what prevents the agreement? US Ambassador Alexander Vershbow suggested it ten days ago. Yuri Baluyevsky: I'd like to emphasize that there is a political foundation for our cooperation. It is specified by the Rome Declaration and by documents of the Russian-American summits as well. Moscow believes that cooperation should be long-term, mutually beneficial, and providing equal security to all participants. We will cooperate with the United States and NATO countries only on the basis of these principles. Return to Menu H. Nuclear Safety 1. Russia, U.S. Will Help Kyrgyzstan Repair Uranium Storage Facility Russian and the U.S. are planning to contribute about $560,000 to help repair a uranium storage facility in southern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz Emergency Situations Minister Satybaldy Chyrmashev told Interfax on Friday that the country's government and the U.S. Department of Energy will sign an intergovernmental agreement envisioning $400,000 for these purposes within the next few days. He noted that the Russian government has already pledged $160,000 to finance a feasibility study of the storage facility's repairs. "Nothing has been done over the past 15 years to make the facility less vulnerable to natural disasters, thus creating an actual threat to citizens' security," Chyrmashev noted. At the same time, the minister said that the promised funds are insufficient for the facility's full repair. "More than 30 Kyrgyz storage facilities, which hold uranium and radioactive wastes, need to be repaired. This effort requires about $30 million," he added. Return to Menu 2. Poor Financing of Nuclear Security Programme Arouses Concern The federal programme of nuclear and radiation security of Russia has been financed by the state to three-five percent of the planned amount, Deputy director of the Safe Nuclear Power Engineering Institute Igor Linge told a round -table meeting of physicists held in St. Petersburg on Thursday. Linge specified that since 2000, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has been a coordinator of the programme planned for a terms of six years. The funds planned to be allocated to the programme total more than 6.5 billion roubles, including two billion roubles intended for research, and 3.4 billion roubles - for investments, Linge told Itar-Tass. Return to Menu I. Russia-Iran 1. Russia to Carry on Civil Nuclear Contacts With Iran Iran's government does not intend to acquire nuclear arsenals, reassured Mehdi Safari, presidential envoy, as he met with Andrei Kokoshin of the Russian parliament a few days ago. Mr. Kokoshin leads the committee for CIS affairs and contacts with Russians abroad on the State Duma, lower house. He described the conference in a Novosti interview today. As Mr. Safari emphatically reassured, Iran is determined to closely comply with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and is willing to increase its nuclear programme transparency. If Teheran is good on its word, Moscow has every right to insist on Russia's right of partnership with Iran in civil nuclear research and industry. Meanwhile, if Iran and North Korea obtain nuclear arsenals, Russia will be badly endangered, warned the parliamentarian. Return to Menu J. Russia-North Korea 1. Nkorea Wants Russia to Participate in Nuclear Talks Pyongyang voiced support for Russia's participation in talks on settling problems in the Korean Peninsula. This position was expressed on Thursday by North Korean Ambassador to Russia Pak Ui Chun at a meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that "the ambassador reported on an instruction from his leadership that North Korea is in favour of holding six-party talks with Russia's participation on settling the difficult situation in the peninsula". According to the North Korean diplomat, Pyongyang "takes active efforts for their implementation". The Russian side "expressed satisfaction with Pyongyang' s constructive decision". Speaking on Thursday at a meeting with ambassadors of Asia-Pacific countries, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called for settling problems of the peninsula through "political and diplomatic methods". The aggravation of the situation in the area "is among the most serious threats for regional security". He voiced support for "recognising legitimate interests of security for all interested sides". Speaking on Thursday at the White House Rose Garden, U.S. President George Bush favoured settling the crisis through talks in a six-party format: with participation of the United States, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. According to the president, the best way of persuading North Korea to abandon further development of the military nuclear programme is to call other countries to shoulder responsibility for resolving the problem along with the U.S. Until now, Washington proposed a five-party format with participation of South Korea and Japan. However, this did not suit North Korea. As a result, China with agreement from the U.S., offered Pyongyang, late last week, a six-party version, involving Russia. This resulted in progress, and consultations plodded ahead to an understanding. According to a Tass dispatch from Washington, the U.S. took with enthusiasm numerous signals, showing North Korea' s agreement with its proposal on holding multilateral talks on settling problems in the Korean Peninsula. This was corroborated on Thursday by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher who said that news from Moscow definitely means that North Korea talks with Russia, and, consequently, the composition of participants in the talks will include six countries, he added. The spokesman explained that reports from Moscow are not the only signals on North Korea's agreement to a six-party format. According to Boucher, Washington has already received such confirmations, including from China, with whose mediation the U.S. tries to reach an understanding with North Korea on the start of the next round of talks. North Korea told the U.S. in October 2002 that it had secretly resumed the military nuclear programme. It also claimed that Pyongyang started production of plutonium out of worked-out fuel rods. Besides, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to a Tass report from Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, following the reception of information on North Korea's readiness to start multilateral talks on the nuclear crisis, started hammering out a comprehensive proposal on settling the problem with Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programmes. This question was discussed on Friday at a meeting between secretary of state of the Japanese Foreign Ministry Toshimitsu Motegi and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Bolton. They welcomed Pyongyang's agreement to a multilateral format of talks. It is probable that Washington, Tokyo and Seoul will hold separate consultations of high-ranking diplomats on concerting their views with respect to North Korea early in September before the multilateral talks which will be held in Beijing. Return to Menu 2. North Korean Ambassador Says North Korea Supports Multilateral Talks on Nuclear Threat North Korea's ambassador to Russia said on Thursday that his country supports multilateral talks, including Russia, to ease tensions surrounding Pyongyang's nuclear program, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. North Korea has previously said it would be willing to participate in multilateral talks on the condition it first has bilateral talks with the United States. Washington has insisted on talks involving a number of countries, including South Korea and Japan. Ambassador Pak Ui Chun met with Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov and said his leadership had instructed him to express North Korea's support for "six-sided talks with the participation of Russia on resolving the current complex situation on the Korean Peninsula," the ministry said in a statement. According to the statement, Chun said Pyongyang "was making active efforts toward their (the talks') realization." The wording of the Foreign Ministry statement suggested that no formal agreement on holding multilateral talks had been made yet. Russia is eager to raise its profile on the Korean peninsula, which is of strategic and economic importance, but it has played a secondary role in efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff. The Foreign Ministry statement expressed "satisfaction at this constructive decision by Pyongyang." According to the statement, Fedotov stressed "the importance of a political settlement of the existing problems through negotiations, on the basis of ensuring a nuclear free status on the peninsula and the safety of the states located on it." In Washington, a White House spokesman said the United States wants multilateral talks, including South Korea, Japan and Russia. "We welcome the multilateral approach," said spokesman Scott McClellan. "We remain in close contact with the Chinese, the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the Russians," McClellan said. "We hope North Korea is willing to agree to multilateral talks. It's important that we continue to move forward and that North Korea once and for all end its nuclear weapons program." North Korea has opposed multilateral talks, possibly because it fears the United States could marshal a united front against it in any negotiations. Also, North Korea likely prefers bilateral talks with Washington because it considers the United States to be the chief threat to its existence, and wants security guarantees from its No. 1 enemy. Still, South Korean officials have been upbeat about prospects for the imminent resumption of talks, and there have been persistent reports that talks could take place soon in a multilateral format. The statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry is the latest indication that North Korea may be moving toward a compromise. "The key now is to get South Korea and Japan, and ultimately Russia and others, a seat at the table," U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said in Seoul on Thursday. "Those with a direct stake in the outcome must be part of the process. On this point, we will not waver." In April, China hosted and participated in contentious talks involving the United States and North Korea. The three countries are close to finalizing a second round of talks in Beijing, and possibly for an expanded meeting including Japan, South Korea and perhaps Russia immediately afterward, sources close to U.S.-North Korean relations in Washington told Kyodo news on Wednesday. The nuclear dispute flared in October, when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted having a secret program to enrich uranium for building nuclear weapons in violation of international agreements. Return to Menu 3. Russia Expects N.Korea Talks to Start Soon Russia expects multilateral talks aimed at resolving a standoff over North Korea's nuclear ambitions to begin soon, Interfax news agency quoted a senior diplomat as saying on Friday. "We expect that such talks will start in the near future," Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov told Interfax in an interview. On Thursday, Fedotov met North Korea's ambassador to Moscow, who he said proposed six-way talks on the crisis. South Korea confirmed on Friday that North Korea had accepted multilateral talks and U.S. officials have said they could be held in Beijing in September. But an official start date has yet to be announced. Return to Menu 4. Would Russia Launch a Preemptive Strike Against North Korea? On 30 July, "Izvestiya" editorialized that "Russia's best response" to the unfolding crisis in North Korea could be to launch a preemptive strike against that country's nuclear facilities. The daily argued that if North Korea launched a nuclear strike against Seoul, radiation could easily spread within hours through Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais. The paper also reported that regional officials are holding meetings in Khabarovsk on civil defense and a possible emergency situation. The paper quoted a Vladivostok-based meteorologist as saying that radiation from Seoul could reach Vladivostok within two-three hours. An unidentified source within the Pacific Fleet told the paper that the cruiser "Varyag" is capable of carrying out a preemptive surgical strike, saying, "As soon as North Korea begins preparations to launch a rocket, we will know about it." As for the preemptive strike, the fleet source told the newspaper, "It would be better if the Americans did it themselves." Defense Ministry official Major General Vladimir Dvorkin noted that North Korea has not even tested a nuclear weapon and so it is premature to consider Pyongyang a nuclear threat. "Therefore, I completely exclude the possibility of Russia carrying out a preemptive strike," Dvorkin was quoted as saying. "But it cannot be ruled out that the United States will do so." Return to Menu 5. Russia's Ivanov Calls for Diplomatic Settling of Korean Problem Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has issued an appeal to the parties entangled in a conflict around the North Korean nuclear program to seek solutions to it by peaceful, political and diplomatic means. As he was meeting with ambassadors of Asian and Pacific countries in Moscow Wednesday, Ivanov said the deterioration on the Korean Peninsula was one of the greatest challenges to regional security. He reiterated at the same time that Russia advocates a full accounting of legitimate interests of all sides. Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov told Itar-Tass Russia believed in the benefits of solving the Korean problem on the basis of package proposals. The package could envision a nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula, strict compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear technologies control. Fedotov urged other countries to understand North Korea' s current humanitarian problems and provide the required amounts of aid. Return to Menu K. Russia-China 1. Jiangsu Nuclear Corporation (China) Shows Interest in Direct Cooperation With Russian Rosenergoatom July 28 Rosenergoatom Director General Oleg Saraev and Technical Director Nikolai Sorokin held negotiations with Jiangsu Nuclear Corporation Chairman of the Board Zhen Zhaobo. Reportedly to Rosenergoatom press-center, the meeting discussed prospects for direct bilateral cooperation in safe operation of Tianwan nuclear power plant (NPP). The Chinese delegation was familiarized with Rosenergoatom�s NPP Assistance Center capabilities in remote on-line interaction with NPP operators as regards communications, analysis of plant data, forecasting and monitoring. The Chinese experts valued high the Center�s capabilities, in particular the back-up communications lines over 10 channels, software and hardware, operation reliability, and thoroughly developed procedures. According to Zhen Zhaobo, the Jiangsu Nuclear Corporation is interested in establishing close relations with Rosenergoatom Concern, because in April 2004 it plans to achieve first criticality at its Tianwan-1 with the first power being achieved by June and commercial operation by the end of 2004. The similar activities are scheduled for Tianwan-2 in 2005. The fast pace of construction has conditioned the involvement of the Russian side to assist in operational matters. This is also due to high qualifications of the Russian specialists and to the fact that similar power units operated at Balakovo, Novovoronezh and Volgodonsk NPPs demonstrate high safety level and culture. The direct bilateral cooperation is to be pursued in assistance at the start-up and initial operation stages of Tianwan NPP by Rosenergoatom�s operators; training of the Chinese operators at the Russian nuclear plants (Balakovo and Novovoronezh); training of maintenance personnel at the Russian enterprises; operational experience exchanges between Rosenergoatom and Jiangsu Nuclear Corporation; technical consultations during operation of Tianwan NPP; Rosenergoatom�s assistance in scheduled maintenance of the plant. Zhen Zhaobo noted that China values high the vast experience of the Russian nuclear engineers and operators in construction and safe operation of VVER-1000 reactors which were built at Tianwan NPP. �Therefore, we believe that the Russian support and assistance are necessary for future normal operation of our new nuclear plant�, he said. According to Oleg Saraev, the cooperation between nuclear experts is very effective and useful especially when they operate the similar equipment. It is quite feasible to start cooperation in many of the said areas in nearest future. The negotiations noted that in some of them the contracting is possible before the umbrella cooperative agreement between the two nuclear power corporations is in place. Return to Menu L. Official Statements 1. Concluding Remarks by President Putin of Russia at a Meeting with Scientists of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod Region, July 31, 2003 Permit me to say a few words in conclusion. The first thing that springs to mind and that has just been mentioned here - as we were coming here one of your colleagues said: "All our work is for export." And so that the number of potential importers of your goods does not increase and no one is tempted to join this queue Russia must and will remain a great nuclear power. I must note that the general impression from visiting the center is very good and positive, both in terms of its content and in terms of the safety system at the facility and the state of the nuclear weapons complex of the country. The most important thing that impresses and leaves a very good impression is the level of developments, developments of the most modern technical and scientific character and, what is particularly important, in the relevant and very interesting modern areas. I would like to tell you that in any reorganizations, no matter how the structure of the Atomic Energy Ministry may change, this will remain a single complex. This is the main thing. I am not going to talk about any names or possible changes, but it is absolutely certain that the complex will remain an integral, workable and single entity. This is the first point I would like to make. Now I would like to react to some of the remarks made by the scientists. It is true that Russia has assumed some serious restrictive obligations of the international-legal character and has not carried out nuclear tests for many years. We will continue, on the one hand, to develop everything that is necessary for science and the applied part of your research to be properly supported, but we are mindful of the fact that we are complying and intend to comply in the future with our obligations on certain conditions, one of the key conditions being a similar attitude of other nuclear powers to the obligations they have assumed. I would like to stress this. There is another thing worth noting. Of course, I have jotted down the problem issues that you have raised today: I mean financing, organization, administrative issues and legal support. As we moved between the facilities we discussed these matters with the minister, among others. There is something to think about here. I promise you that corresponding work will be done. But what strikes one is that in spite of all the difficulties work is picking up. One evidence of this is changes in terms of personnel: during the last year and a half or two years the enrollment of young specialists into the sector, including the facilities of your institute has increased almost tenfold. That of course is a very good indicator which shows greater buoyancy of the economy and the industry. But part of the credit for this must go to the scientific and administrative management of your center for which I would like to thank you heartily. Thank you very much. Return to Menu 2. Speech at a Meeting With Scientists of the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre Dear colleagues and friends, I am very happy to have the opportunity to visit a centre which � without any exaggeration � has strategic importance for Russia. It would be appropriate to discuss today a number of problems that are important for safe and stable development of our nation. Above all, this concerns work on ensuring the reliability and stability of military systems. The quality of nuclear weaponry, which has been and remains the foundation of Russian security, should meet the highest requirements on universality of use, effectiveness and safety. Your institute is one of the largest centres of modern science in the world. It has a concentration of talent along with the knowledge of entire generations of great scientists. This powerful intellectual, industrial and scientific and technical capital should serve the country in full measure. We must strive for the maximum effective use of the potential of nuclear centres of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry to conduct a very wide spectrum of scientific-research and experimental-design work. Currently you are concentrating on improving complexes of nuclear weapons that are under development or which have been developed. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, your specialists have also actively cooperated with developers of non-nuclear types of weapons. And now we have had the opportunity to make sure of this. Colleagues told me about it. The developments are very interesting. And this work, of course, needs to be continued and developed in every way possible. Today the science intensive developments and projects in the institute, which were created on the basis of modern military technology, are also used in various branches of industry, and are capable of competing successfully on international markets. Therefore, it is necessary to make maximum use of the developments of your centre to manufacture products for the civilian population, to use the most modern nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. That is all that I wanted to say to begin with. Thank you for your attention. Let us now share opinions and proposals. Return to Menu 3. President Bush Discusses Top Priorities for the U.S. (excerpted) [...] Q I wanted to ask you about Iran, one of your other countries in the axis of evil. One of the things we learned from that march to war is that when you start warning countries, they better pay attention. Are we now in the early stages of a march to war in Iran? Or are they more like in the category of North Korea? THE PRESIDENT: No, I -- look, Hutch, I remember right after Iraq the first thing that happened out of -- out of some writers' pens was that, oh, no, they're getting ready to attack either Syria or Iran. You know, the march to war is just a campaign that's just going to march everywhere. I -- all options remain on the table. I believe that the best way to deal with the Iranians at this point in time is to convince others to join us in a clear declaration that the development of a nuclear weapon is not in their interests. I believe a free Iraq will affect the lives of Iranians. I want to thank the diaspora here in the United States, particularly in L.A. -- which reminds me, my last question is going to Ed. And -- so you can prepare for it, Ed. We've got a lot of our fellow citizens who are in e-mail contact, phone contact with people who live throughout Iran. And I want to thank them for that. Interestingly enough, there's a TV station that I think has been -- people have read about that is broadcast out of L.A. by one of our citizens. He's -- he or she has footed the bill. It's widely watched. The people of Iran are interested in freedom, and we stand by their side. We stand on the side of those who are desperate for freedom in Iran. We understand their frustrations in living in a society that is totalitarian in nature. And now is the time for the world to come together, Ron, to send a clear message. And so I spent time with Prime Minister Berlusconi on the ranch, and I talked to him about the need for the EU to send a very clear message, along with the United States. As you know -- some of you have been on the trips with me to Russia, and you remember me talking with my friend Vladimir Putin about the need to be mindful of the Iranians' desire to have nuclear weapon. We're making progress there. I really believe that we can solve this issue peacefully, but this is an issue that's going to require a concerted effort by nations around the world to work with the United States, particularly in Europe, to speak clearly to the Iranian administration. [�] Return to Menu M. Links of Interest 1. U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation in the Run-Up to the Next Bush-Putin Summit Meeting Return to Menu 2. Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments Return to Menu 3. The Long-Term Storage of Radioactive Waste: Safety and Sustainability http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/LTS-RW_web.pdf Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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