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RANSAC Nuclear News, August 18, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Cooperative Threat Reduction
 A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Attitude to Bioweapons Concerns Funds for Destruction of Chemical Weapons Russia's attitude of "denial" over concerns about biological weapons makes it more difficult to secure U.S. funds to destroy its massive chemical arsenal, which has been decreased by just one percent since Moscow vowed to get rid of it, a U.S. Senator at the forefront of efforts to reduce the threat from Russian mass destruction weapons said Friday. Of the 40,000 metric tons (44,000 tons) of chemical weapons Russia says it possesses, just 400 metric tons (440 tons) have been destroyed, said Sen. Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican and an initiator in 1991 of the Nunn-Lugar program to help the Soviet Union an its successor states destroy and safeguard weapons of mass destruction. The focus in efforts to destroy chemical weapons is a facility in the Ural Mountains city of Shchuchye, which Lugar said is one of seven sites in Russia where they are stored. Lugar said the facility, under construction since March, should be completed in mid-2005 if there are no delays. He said Russian officials told him that the chemical weapons stored at Shchuchye, which are mostly shells containing nerve gas, would not be fully neutralized before 2012 - the current target date for the destruction of Russia's entire chemical arsenal. At a summit in June 2002, Russia's partners in the Group of Eight pledged up to US$20 billion over 10 years to help Russia dispose of its nuclear, biological and chemical arsenals. Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said it appears likely the planned US$1 billion for the coming year will be included in the U.S. budget. But he said evasive behavior by Russian officials authorities over questions about biological weapons gives members of the U.S. Congress a reason to seek to block funds. While Russia has made clear declarations about its chemical and nuclear stockpiles, he said, "still there is a sense of denial" surrounding biological programs. "The denials with regard to the biological situation offer an avenue where opponents of spending Nunn-Lugar money can say 'See, still, we really don't know exactly,"' he said. The United States believes that Russia had four military biological facilities in the Soviet era, Lugar said. "Now conceivably, the general who visited with me yesterday may be correct that at all four of these there's not a single weapon at this moment. There may be pathogens in an icebox, we don't know what there is. The fact is, we don't know," he said. He cited problems he encountered on a visit last year, when a trip to one of the facilities was delayed when he was told his plane would not be allowed to land there. Eventually the flight was given clearance, but Lugar said he did not see the military personnel at the facility. Despite the difficulties, Lugar said it is counterproductive for U.S. lawmakers to demand full Russian compliance with all its commitments on weapons of mass destruction before allowing funding. "It is not useful to set up conditions in which there has to be 100 percent compliance before we do anything," he said. U.S. aid for construction of the Shchuchye facility was halted last year after Russia failed to meet commitments for aid established by Congress, but was resumed early this year after Congress allowed President George W. Bush to waive the requirements. The U.S. administration wants Congress to grant the president the permanent authority to annually waive Russian compliance requirements both for assistance for the Shchuchye facility and broader aid under the Nunn-Lugar program. Return to Menu 2. Russia's Refusal of U.S. Weapons Inspectors Threatens Destruction Program Russia's refusal to allow U.S. inspectors into its biological weapons sites is threatening the funding for the continued destruction of the huge Russian arsenal of chemical weapons, said Sen. Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Moscow's evasiveness and denials about its biological programs have led some members of Congress to question $1 billion in new funding for a decade-long effort known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The program has spent $6.4 billion since 1992 to help Russia safeguard and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction, from rusting nuclear submarines and poorly guarded warheads to deadly vials of anthrax and smallpox. Lugar, R-Ind., said the elimination of Russia's remaining chemical stockpile was "a monumental task which Russia cannot afford." "Russia's denials with regard to the biological situation offer an avenue where opponents of spending (this) money can say, `See, we still really don't know,' " Lugar said. "Some members of Congress say, `Is Russia complying - literally, to the dotted line - with all the arms-control treaties?' "But it's not useful to set up conditions in which there has to be 100 percent compliance before we do anything." Lugar said he met recently with President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to seek a presidential waiver that would snip the strings that some in Congress want to attach to the program's funds in the new U.S. budget. He said Friday he was optimistic that Bush would grant the waiver. The weapons-elimination program is informally known as Nunn-Lugar after its original co-sponsors - former Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia and Lugar. Lugar has been in Russia in recent days to meet with senior military leaders. He also was due to witness the destruction of several Soviet-era intercontinental ballistic missiles at a military facility in the city of Perm. Since 1992, the Nunn-Lugar program has overseen the destruction of 440 tons of chemical weapons in Russia - about 1 percent of Russia's total. More than 43,000 tons of nerve gas and blister agent remain in seven arsenals across the country. Amy Smithson, a biological and chemical weapons expert, has called these sites "the toxic archipelago." Most experts say the archipelago remains poorly guarded. Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., was alarmed at the lack of security when he visited a Russian site last year. In one laboratory, he said, the door to a refrigerator containing various animal poxes was secured only by a piece of string. Lugar said some biological- and chemical-weapon facilities have been converted to civilian uses since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. He visited one such factory where anthrax had once been produced. The very same vats, he said, are now being used to make "Green Mama" shampoo. The General Accounting Office reported to Congress in March, however, that 65 percent of Russia's nerve-agent stockpile is "unsecured" and that "a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion and pose a potential threat to U.S. national security interests." Lugar said a new chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuchye, Russia, is woefully behind schedule. He said making the deadline of 2012 for destroying the remaining chemical stockpile is "not going to happen." The GAO estimates "it could be another 40 years before Russia's stockpile would be completely destroyed." Smithson agreed that "significant tasks remain" for the Nunn-Lugar effort, but in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee in March she urged that funding for the Shchuchye facility be continued. "Once and for all," she said, "Congress and the executive branch should throw their full fiscal and political support behind the Shchuchye project so that the destruction of Russia's stocks of nerve agent can begin as soon as possible." Return to Menu 3. Lugar Focuses on Russian Disarmament Despite shortcomings in Russian cooperation on arms control, U.S. funding for the destruction of Soviet-era weaponry should proceed unimpeded, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said here Friday. "Our objective, and the Russian objective at the highest level, is to destroy weapons of mass destruction," Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) told a news conference. "It is not useful to set up conditions that there must be 100% compliance before we do anything." Out of 44,000 tons of chemical weapons that Moscow has acknowledged producing during Soviet times, only about 400 tons have been destroyed, Lugar said. And despite improved security at Russian arms depots, the risk of such weapons falling into terrorist hands is a significant threat, he added. Comparing Russia's situation concerning chemical weapons with Iraq's, Lugar said: "To the extent the Iraqis have destroyed everything they ever produced, that simply puts them well ahead of where Russia is. We still have 39,600 [metric] tons to go, at enormous expense that cannot be sustained by the economy of this country presently, and that is why we are involved in attempting to accelerate the process." Lugar is in Russia for talks with government officials about the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, under which the United States has spent about $7 billion to help destroy nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, bombers, submarines and other weapons in former Soviet states. The senator met Friday in Moscow with Munitions Agency Director Viktor Kholstov to discuss joint efforts to accelerate the elimination of chemical weapons. Today, Lugar is scheduled to fly to Perm, about 700 miles east of Moscow, to observe the U.S.-financed destruction of mobile SS-24 and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles that once threatened the United States. At his news conference, Lugar criticized members of Congress who have tried to attach conditions to U.S. funding of the weapons destruction program. He also complained that Russian officials played into those critics' hands by being less than forthcoming about what might be left over from the Soviet Union's biological weapons program. "Some members of Congress say, 'Is Russia complying, literally, to the dotted line, with all arms control treaties? There can't be cheating going on on the side while American taxpayer money is going in,' " Lugar said. "There is almost every year a dispute over whether Russia is complying with every aspect of this." He said another battle over conditions for funding �?" and the approval of waivers allowing the president to ignore those conditions �?" was likely next month. Lugar placed particular emphasis on a plant being built in the Siberian town of Shchuchye to destroy nearly 1.9 million chemical artillery shells stored there. Many are small enough to fit in a suitcase, he said. Just one of those shells can kill thousands of people, according to materials distributed at the news conference. U.S. funding has helped bring enormous improvements in security at Russian weapons depots, but major risks remain, Lugar added. The United States should "be active with Russian friends to destroy all of this so it cannot be appropriated by others, whether it be Chechens or Al Qaeda or whoever else might want to pick up a few," he said. Security at Shchuchye and many other sites is strong enough to protect the chemical weapons against "passersby or a few persons who are out for mischief," he said, but there is a potential risk from armed attack as long as the weapons exist. Lugar complained that Russian officials were still in denial over the Soviet Union's biological weapons program and what might remain from it. "I heard the phrase again yesterday in conversation: 'Sen. Lugar, you must understand, we do not have any biological weapons,' " he said. "The United States believes that there were four installations that are military bio-facilities," he said. "Now, conceivably, the general who visited with me yesterday may be correct that at all four of these, there is not a single weapon at this moment. There may be pathogens in an icebox. The fact is, we don't know." But there has been some progress even in this field, Lugar said. He recalled how a few years ago he visited a facility in Pokrov, near Moscow, that once was an anthrax research center. Old vats for producing the pathogen were being put to commercial use, he said: "People were making a product called Green Mama shampoo." Return to Menu 4. PART I: Delays, Politics, Underfunding Stymie Struggle Against Nuclear, Other Doomsday Arms EDITOR'S NOTE -- At their Millennium Summit three years ago, world leaders pledged to "strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction." This is the first in a three-part series taking stock of that effort at this critical moment, as the world awaits word of the truth about Iraq. THE global machinery for confronting the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- the machinery of treaties and sanctions, inspectors and detectors -- is sputtering and stalling, just as the dangers seem more real by the day. In Vienna, a U.N. agency struggles through its 19th year with a frozen budget as it works to keep nuclear bombs from spreading worldwide. In a neighboring glass tower beside the Danube, experts hired to detect secret nuclear tests close up shop over weekends. Their treaty is on hold. Plans to burn thousands of tons of fearsome chemical weapons, in the United States and Russia, have quietly slipped years into the future. The U.N. chemical inspector corps, meanwhile, is understaffed and politically handcuffed. As for biological arms, negotiators recently labored for seven years on an enforcement regime -- inspectors -- for the 1975 treaty banning germ weapons. But the United States has now shut down those talks. "There has been a disturbing gradual erosion of the established international norms on weapons of mass destruction," Kofi Annan, United Nations secretary-general, observed last February. Others put it less diplomatically. "The Bush administration has severe allergies to multilateral activities," said arms-control scholar Amy Smithson in Washington. That's because they often don't work, Bush administration officials contend. In a dangerous world, global treaties sometimes are just "words on a piece of paper" that have scant value, the U.S. undersecretary of state for international security said in an interview in Washington. "The international regime that tried to enforce restrictions on Iraq obviously didn't succeed," John R. Bolton said. "And so one has to wonder whether international regimes that find opposition in the form of states party to the agreement are ever going to work." What will work, President Bush contended last year, is the "path of action," the path that led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, to eliminate its alleged "WMD" -- weapons of mass destruction. But the last word on Iraq hasn't been heard. The U.S. weapons hunters deployed in Iraq insist they're making progress. But the failure thus far to find large stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons, or an active nuclear bomb program, suggests that arms control may have succeeded, contrary to Bolton's view, and that U.N. inspectors may actually have defused the Iraqi threat over the previous decade before being swept aside by the war. "Iraq is a major turning point in how to deal with WMD," noted chief U.N. disarmament researcher Patricia Lewis. If no major finds are made, it should boost the global credibility of arms control, including among Americans. The fear of WMD is, above all, felt in America, target of a catastrophic terror attack two years ago. The al-Qaida organization has shown an interest in using microbes as weapons, and advances in biotechnology may make it easier. Terrorists have already used chemical weapons, in 1995 in Tokyo's subway. But the fear focuses above all on nuclear bombs, wielded by terror groups or unfriendly states. "The desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge," CIA Director George Tenet told U.S. senators in February. Those desires are tracked, analyzed and, it is hoped, thwarted from quiet high-rise offices in the Vienna complex known as U.N. City, the riverside headquarters of the nuclear part of the machinery, the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA verifies global observance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under which 183 nations pledge not to pursue atomic arms in exchange for a commitment from five recognized nuclear weapons states to dismantle their arsenals someday. Complicating that picture, three nuclear weapons states remain outside the treaty -- India and Pakistan, which have declared their arsenals, and Israel, which has never admitted to having one. One member, North Korea, says it is building nuclear bombs and is withdrawing from the treaty. Washington says another, Iran, is secretly developing bomb technology. And tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the stuff of bombs, lie in Russia's poorly protected nuclear complex, a Soviet legacy. The more such technology and bomb material spread, the greater the risk they will fall into the hands of "nonstate actors," terrorists. To monitor activity and investigate claims, the IAEA has just 250 inspectors, little more than the number of engineers, scientists and other inspectors it fielded in 1985, when Washington forced a budget freeze, inflation-adjusted, on all U.N. agencies. The IAEA has long complained. "For $100 million a year" -- the outlay for verification work -- "the world wants assurances that 180-plus nations are not building nuclear weapons. That's equal to a few days' war in Kosovo," IAEA policy coordinator Tariq Rauf said in an interview. The U.S. government does make grants outside the budget, but that money cannot be used for personnel and is sometimes restricted to buying U.S.-made equipment. Now, after almost two decades, the treaty nations are expected in September to approve a $15 million increase, to a $260 million budget for 2004. Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei called that "long overdue," just a "first step in tackling the chronic underfunding of the IAEA." The IAEA's workload is expanding beyond its traditional tasks of ensuring no nuclear material is diverted to weapons work by verifying amounts at power plants and related sites. After the discovery of a secret bomb program in Iraq in 1991, a program later dismantled by the IAEA, the agency won broader powers, under an "Additional Protocol," to inspect a wider array of sites, from uranium mines on up the line, with short-notice inspections delving more deeply into nuclear plans and operations. Governments are slow in accepting the intrusive inspections on their soil, however. Some are drawing a political line. "Some are saying, `I'm not going to sign the Additional Protocol unless we see progress toward disarmament," Rauf said -- in other words, progress on the deal's other half, toward elimination of U.S., Russian and others' nuclear weapons. Many now want to see timetables, 33 years after the Nonproliferation Treaty came into force, and treaty nations three years ago laid out "13 Steps" toward disarmament. The fate of those "steps" shows the state of arms control today. Step No. 1 calls for putting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, a ban on testing that would make developing new nuclear weapons almost impossible. The United States led the negotiations converting a moratorium into a permanent treaty in 1996. A "CTBTO" -- a treaty organization -- was established at U.N. City in 1997, with a staff of 273. More than two-thirds of a global system of 321 land and underwater monitoring stations have been built or are under construction. Expert teams and computer banks filling two floors here analyze seismic and other data for signs of nuclear blasts. But in 1999 the U.S. Senate dealt arms controllers and President Clinton a sharp blow, rejecting the test-ban treaty. The Bush administration says it will not resubmit it for ratification. Without the United States, the treaty will die. "Even if there's a suspicious event now, we can't legally do anything about it," said the monitoring system director, Gerardo Suarez. The data center's plans for around-the-clock coverage have been shelved. The Bush administration also has abrogated the U.S.-Russian treaty banning anti-missile defenses, long championed by arms control advocates. And it is negotiating with Congress over developing new, small-scale nuclear weapons, and has laid out scenarios in which such bombs might be used against countries with no nuclear forces of their own. All run counter to the disarmament "steps." "We're saying to the rest of the world that nuclear weapons are not weapons of deterrence" -- that is, to hold, not use -- "but weapons of choice," Lawrence Scheinman, a top arms controller under Clinton, said in Washington. If the United States breaks out of its nuclear moratorium and tests a new weapon, it would shake Annan's "established norms" even more, possibly spurring other states to consider going nuclear. "The real bright line is testing," acknowledged the assistant U.S. secretary of state for arms control, Stephen G. Rademaker. "It's not something the United States would break out of lightly." The U.S. leadership, for its part, points to last year's Moscow treaty sharply reducing U.S. and Russian strategic missiles by 2012, as a good-faith step toward disarmament. Critics note, however, that the treaty delays previously anticipated cuts, and it is "reversible" since the Americans and Russians will put retired warheads aside, not destroy them. Washington officials point out that others sometimes stall nuclear initiatives. The United States backs a treaty to ban production of enriched uranium or plutonium for bombs, but China has blocked it at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva by tying it to a proposed pact to demilitarize outer space. The Americans balk at that one. Delays, obstacles and underfunding don't just trouble the nuclear arms-control machinery. The agency enforcing the ban on chemical weapons, under a 1997 treaty once held up as a model, is hobbled by international politics and weak finances, budget problems that one Bush administration official calls a "ticking time bomb." Return to Menu B. Chemical Weapons 1. Agency Sees Many Obstacles When they head out around the world with their cases of high-tech gear, their chemical suits, their global authority, the men and women from The Hague represent an agency viewed as a model for 21st century disarmament. But it's a flawed model whose problems run deep. The young agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, enforces the 1997 treaty banning a tool of war that horrified the world in the last century. The birth of the OPCW spelled progress at a time when arms control was making little progress elsewhere. But OPCW finances are weak. Its inspectors are checking less than 1 percent of potentially suspect chemical plants. The treaty timetable for Russia and America to destroy huge stocks of mustard gas, sarin and other deadly agents is slipping further into the future year by year. Even the U.N. experts' ability to pull surprise inspections is stalemated, by order of the U.S. Senate. And the gear they tote is also compromised: The spectrometers � chemical detectors � are "blinded," intentionally limited in what they can detect. The organization's former director general, Jose M. Bustani of Brazil, complained it was hobbled by "political agendas" and "unilateralism," mainly from Washington. The Bush administration accused him of mismanagement and engineered his ouster last year. Just last month, a U.N. tribunal ruled that he was wrongfully dismissed on "extremely vague" charges, and awarded him $57,000 in compensation. The U.S. undersecretary of state responsible maintains the move was necessary. "We were able to get good management installed at the OPCW and the organization is now proceeding ahead with its mission," John R. Bolton said in an interview in Washington. A year into his tenure, new OPCW chief Rogelio Pfirter of Argentina calls his agency "a good example of functionality." But Mr. Pfirter acknowledges fundamental weaknesses, too, the same as confronted Mr. Bustani. Another Bush administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of his sensitive position, called OPCW's financial straits "a ticking time bomb" that might "possibly break this organization." The Chemical Weapons Convention was the first treaty in history requiring elimination of an entire class of weapons under a timetable and under oversight of international inspectors. The vast majority of nations � 153 � are treaty members, but significant gaps exist, especially in the Middle East, where Israel, Egypt and other Arab states have failed to ratify it. From their headquarters, a striking, drum-shaped building in this staid European capital, OPCW specialists armed with long lists of controlled compounds keep watch on a world of complex chemicals that destroy skin on contact, blind or choke, paralyze and kill, substances that nations packed into artillery shells, bombs, rockets and land mines for generations. More than 200 chemists and other inspectors, of an OPCW staff of 500, crisscross the globe checking on weapon storage sites and chemical plants to verify that munitions are being destroyed and industrial products are not being diverted. A typical "dual-use" product is thiodiglycol, a chemical usable in felt-tip pen ink or to make mustard, a gas that burns skin, lungs and eyes. The treaty set a deadline of 2007 for the United States, Russia, India and South Korea � declared possessors � to destroy chemical weapons. At nine locations stretching from Johnston Atoll in the Pacific to Edgewood, Md., the U.S. Army held 31,280 tons of mustard and the nerve agents sarin and VX. The Army has incinerated or chemically neutralized about one-quarter of the stockpile, in a $24 billion program slowed by local disputes over safety and other delays. Washington may have to ask the OPCW for a deadline extension. But Moscow has encountered much worse problems, eliminating only 1 percent of its stockpile thus far, and has requested a five-year extension to 2012. For one thing, the U.S. Congress, demanding a better accounting of Moscow's program, froze hundreds of millions of aid dollars meant for a giant neutralization plant in southern Russia. Overseeing destruction takes up 80 percent of the inspectors' time, and Washington and Moscow are far in arrears reimbursing those costs. On top of that, one-third of the 2003 member assessments due last Jan. 1 are still outstanding, deepening the hole in a budget already considered paltry � $77 million this year � by arms-control specialists. "It's impossible to do the trick with that budget," Mr. Bustani, now Brazil's ambassador to Britain, said in an interview. New director Pfirter, like Mr. Bustani a career diplomat, pointed out a worsening problem of balance: An upcoming "bulge" in U.S. and Russian destruction activity will put still more stress on his inspectors, leaving the more than 5,000 declared industrial chemical plants worldwide almost untouched. "We're still inspecting too little," Mr. Pfirter said. "We're not even at 1 percent at the moment." Inspectors worry especially about small, versatile chemical plants in developing nations that could be quickly converted to military production. Aggressive inspection would meet resistance. India and Pakistan, for example, object to talk of inspecting plants other than those making the most dangerous substances. Other fundamental defects were built in at the OPCW's birth. The U.S. Senate, in ratifying the treaty, decreed that the president could reject an OPCW "challenge," or surprise, inspection on U.S. soil. That defied treaty language and put a chill on any attempt by governments to demand such inspections anywhere. The legislation also claimed to exempt U.S. chemicals from testing in foreign laboratories, an option inspectors consider crucial for independent analysis. "These exemptions deprive the inspectors of their two strongest tools. They're treaty-killing provisions," said arms-control scholar Amy Smithson at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. A third tool was "blinded." Not wanting to give inspectors free run of chemical industries, to identify any compound they found, governments insisted their spectrometer software indicate only whether a sample matches one on a limited database of the most dangerous chemicals. Thousands of other harmful, often novel compounds are not detected. "That really limited on-site analysis," said a former OPCW verification chief, Ron G. Manley of Britain. In Washington, Undersecretary Bolton said the OPCW's long-term effectiveness "remains to be seen." Of the Senate "exemptions," he said: "I don't think they're an obstacle. Nobody worries about them. I haven't heard it raised." One who worries is Patricia Lewis, director of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. "I don't think they [the United States] want to give any credibility to multilateral institutions that do the inspections," she said in an interview. Return to Menu C. Submarine Dismantlement 1. Zvezdochka Defense Shipyard Started Cutting a Multi-Purpose NS Under Russia-Norway Contracts Severodvinsk-based Zvezdochka defense shipyard has started disposing K-438 multi-purpose nuclear submarine. The work is done under the Russia-Norway contracts signed June 30. Reported to shipyard�s press-secretary Nadezhda Sherbinina via ITAR-TASS, presently they are cutting off the deck-house and dismantling the equipment. Ultimately, the N-sub will be cut into pieces in the launching dock. According to the press-secretary, Zvezdochka has started disposing the submarine without waiting for the Norway cash to reach the shipyard�s bank account. According to the two contracts totaling 10 million euros, Norway is to fund the disposition of two Russian multipurpose nuclear submarines: at Zvezdochka and Nerpa ship repair yard in Murmansk Region. Meanwhile, three more RF Northern NAVY nuclear submarines have arrived at Zvezdochka shipyard for cutting. So far the retired submarines are kept afloat waiting until the financing issue to cut them is settled. As Sherbinina noted, the nuclear submarines had been enlisted by the shipyard in the hope that the due finding will be shortly available for disposition of the Russian multi-purpose nuclear submarines under joint international programs. Return to Menu D. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. `Russia Ahead in Nuke Technology' Russia is ahead of the United States in the race to build a new generation of pinpoint bunker-busting nuclear weapons, a senior Russian nuclear official said. In an interview to mark the 50th anniversary of the first hydrogen bomb test in Russia the former Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, said Russia had maintained its lead over the U.S. in nuclear arms technology ever since the construction of the first thermonuclear bomb. The U.S. was the first to explode a thermonuclear device, but Russia stole a march by building the first hydrogen bomb. On August 12, 1953, Russia successfully tested a ready-to-use 7-ton thermonuclear bomb ten times more powerful than the atomic bomb the U.S. had dropped on Japan in 1945. By that time the Americans had only built a thermonuclear device that was the size of a three-storied building and weighed 65 tons. According to Dr. Mikhailov, Russia has never relinquished its nuclear lead since that time. "Whereas before 1953 we trailed the U.S. in the sphere of nuclear weapon technology, after 1953 � and to this day � they have been trailing us," he told the Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily. The focus of the nuclear arms race has shifted today from building more powerful bombs to the construction of smaller, but smarter devices. "The philosophy of thermonuclear weapons has changed today, and on the agenda is the development of high-precision and deep-penetration nuclear bombs," said Dr. Mikhailov, who is the research head of the Russian Federal Nuclear Centre in Sarov. The FNC is Russia's nodal research establishment for nuclear weapons programmes where all Russian nuclear bombs have been built. The FNC director, Dr. Radyi Ilkayev, confirmed that Russia was developing new nuclear arms despite a bad funding crunch in recent years. "The past 15 years have been tough for our nuclear centre, but we have never halted weapon programmes," he told the Itar-Tass news agency. The situation in the FNC has improved after Mr. Vladimir Putin was elected Russian President three years ago. "In the last two years the Centre has been getting government orders and hiring more staff," the FNC head said. During a visit to the Federal Nuclear Centre two weeks ago Mr. Putin said nuclear weapons "have been and remain the basis of Russia's security" and asserted that Russia "must and will remain a great nuclear power." Dr. Ilkayev said Russia's nuclear weapons were "safe, reliable and efficient," and did not require nuclear tests to verify their condition. "We can keep the country's nuclear arms arsenals in proper shape without conducting nuclear tests," he said. "We use computer, physical and mathematical simulation methods for this purpose." However, Dr. Mikhailov thinks that eventually nuclear tests will have to be resumed. "In the next 10 to 15 years we can move several steps forward without resorting to nuclear tests, but drawing on past experience and three-dimensional computer simulation. But sooner or later we will have to carry out a test, even though I am not sure it will necessarily be a powerful blast." Mr. Putin said two weeks ago that Russia would honour its self-imposed ban on nuclear testing only as long as other nuclear powers did not resume tests. Return to Menu 2. Maks-2003 Visitors to Get to Know How Russian Missile and Space Defence Operates Visitors of the Russian Space Forces pavilion at MAKS-2003 salon will be able to get to know how the Russian Space Forces operate and what the structure of the troops is, the press service of the Russian Space Forces reported. The press service stressed that the pavilion was fully ready to receive visitors and from August 19 when MAKS-2003 opens in Zhukovsky they will be able to see what many people think is secret. "In 2003 the Russian Space Forces registered all launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and controlled setting into earth-orbit over 40 foreign and Russian space vehicles," head of the staff of the Russian Space Forces Lieutenant-General Vladimir Popovkin said after examination of the pavilion. "In the first half of 2003 the Russian Space Forces warned about the presence of dangerous objects near the International Space Station more than 60 times," he said. The Russian Space Forces consist of early missile warning units, anti-missile defence units and space control units. Every unit has its own task. Special stands will tell visitors about it, the press service of the Russian Space Forces said. Return to Menu E. Russia-Iran 1. Iran Refutes Russian Media on Iranian Nuclear Ambitions Iran on Friday refuted allegations made by certain Russian media on the country's efforts to get access to nuclear weapons. The Iranian Embassy in the Russian Federation, in a statement, said some published reports in the Russian news media on the possibility of Iran's access to nuclear weapons are "baseless and unfounded.� "Iran does not seek nuclear weapons since the use of such weapons runs counter with the country's religious principles and strategic policy," the statement said. "Nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defense and military policy because the country's religious and moral principles would not permit the use of such weapons," the statement quoted President Mohammad Khatami as saying. Return to Menu 2. Treaty's `Fuel Cycle' Guarantee is Potential Road to Bomb The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has a "giant loophole" big enough to slip an atom bomb through, analysts say. Trying to close it would set off a giant political struggle. The treaty bars 183 nations without nuclear weapons from building them, but allows them to pursue civilian programs, including uranium-enrichment plants to produce fuel. That production, if intensified, can also yield richer fuel for nuclear bombs. The latest example is Iran, which acknowledged to the International Atomic Energy Agency in February that it was building a centrifuge plant to enrich uranium. The United States contends the plant will fuel a bomb program. Arms control advocates are growing more alarmed about this "fuel cycle" opening. "There is a giant loophole in the NPT that needs to be closed before other states try to use it," George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told a congressional committee in June. The world already has too many facilities to enrich uranium and to separate plutonium -- the other bomb fuel -- and "no additional states need acquire such capabilities that are inherently proliferation sensitive," Perkovich testified. The treaty is unlikely to be amended by its member states, however, since this political tradeoff -- between renouncing weapons and having open access to nuclear technology -- lies at the heart of the 1970 pact. Any effort to alter the treaty "will be detested among developing countries," said Patricia Lewis, director of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research. Instead, some say, nuclear supplier nations could agree among themselves to keep the technology out of new hands. Such exports, usually clandestine, have helped past bomb programs. China sold vital centrifuge magnets to Pakistan as it developed its bombs, for example, and West German engineering firms quietly helped Iraq in the 1980s with centrifuge designs and parts. In the 1990s, Russia signed an unannounced agreement with Iran for a centrifuge plant, but then backed out of the deal under U.S. pressure. It isn't known what foreign help Iran may have gotten on its new plant. Stopping the trade "is something that has to be taken very seriously," said arms control scholar Lawrence Scheinman in Washington. He said suppliers could decide to interpret "access to technology" to mean access outside the developing country -- that is, to fuel production facilities elsewhere. Russia, long keen to sell its nuclear technology, might be convinced of such a plan if guaranteed a big chunk of the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing business, he said. Return to Menu 3. Iran: No Nuclear Ambitions? Iran never strove to possess nuclear weapons, because the use of such weapons runs counter to the religious convictions and political strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, reads a statement released by the Iranian Foreign Ministry, which the Iranian embassy distributed in Moscow on Friday. In the past few days, some of the Russian media published unconfirmed reports about the possibility of Iran getting hold of nuclear weapons. "We deem it necessary to remind you that Tehran considered microbiological and chemical weapons as banned as early as Iraq's war against Iran of 1981-1988," the statement reads. "We are consistent in our opinion that weapons of mass destruction must be banned," the statement quotes Iran's spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as saying. On his part, Iranian President Mohammad Khattami has announced that "there is no place for nuclear weapons" in Iran's defence and military doctrine, because Iran's political structure "cannot afford the use of such weapons in accordance with its Islamic and moral principles." Return to Menu F. Russia-North Korea 1. Pacific Currents: Russia Tries to Wield Influence Over N. Korea As part of President Vladimir Putin's determination to keep Russia a major player, the Kremlin is emerging as a key force in trying to coax volatile North Korea to the negotiating table. Last week, Russian diplomats in Moscow met with envoys from both North and South Korea in an attempt to lay ground for the approaching six-way talks aimed at defusing the North's standoff with the United States over its nuclear program. Responding to persistent requests by the Bush administration that the Kremlin persuade North Korea to come to a settlement, Russian diplomats shuttled between South Korean envoys in one Russian Foreign Ministry building and North Korean envoys in another. Just how much influence Russia can exert over its secretive, Stalinist ally remains to be seen, analysts say. But the Kremlin -- reduced to a sideline role in the Middle East, a region in which it long had clout -- is eager to use the North Korea stalemate to show that it can still play a key diplomatic role. Diplomats who emerged from meetings Wednesday did not say whether they had made any progress in finding a compromise ahead of talks scheduled for Aug. 27 in Beijing that also involve the United States, China and Japan. The Russian Foreign Ministry would say only that the parley with the North Koreans had been held in a "sincere" atmosphere. In a separate statement, though, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said that Russia and China might offer North Korea security guarantees as part of an overall settlement "if guarantees established by the United States fail to meet North Korea's expectations to the full." Russia, which shares a 10-mile border with North Korea not far from the major Pacific port of Vladivostok, has repeatedly said that it wants a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The Kremlin believes that security guarantees for Pyongyang could solve the current crisis. History shows that the Soviet Union was responsible for the nuclear genie migrating to North Korea in the first place. The Soviets began training North Korean scientists in nuclear research in 1956 and built the North's Yongbyon nuclear plant nine years later. Today, however, the Russian government sees things differently. Any military action on the Korean peninsula that might involve nuclear weapons terrifies Moscow, since nuclear fallout in Russia's Far East would most likely cost hundreds of thousands of lives. "Russia is concerned about its own safety, the safety of its citizens," said Vadim Tkachenko, an analyst with the Russian Academy of Sciences' Center for Korean Studies. "We are interested in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, because that region is extremely combustible and will continue to be so for some time." The latest North Korean crisis erupted in October, when Pyongyang admitted to pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, reneging on a 1994 nuclear freeze. It then expelled international atomic energy monitors and withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea has since claimed to have reprocessed 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon, and Washington believes it has extracted enough weapons-grade plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs. Pyongyang says it will take a non-aggression pact with the United States to dissolve the 10-month dispute over its nuclear program. "As long as the U.S. insists on its hostile policy toward (North Korea), the latter will not abandon its nuclear deterrent force," the hard-line communist government reiterated Wednesday. Washington hopes Putin can use the rapport he has established with North Korea's reclusive ruler, Kim Jong Il, to persuade the North to back away from the confrontation. Earlier this year, the North Korean dictator approved the construction of a Russian Orthodox church in downtown Pyongyang -- a symbolic gesture analysts believe was aimed at pleasing Putin, a devout Christian. Putin is also the only world leader to have a direct phone access to Kim, said Alexander Pikayev, a Moscow expert at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Russia is the only country with which Pyongyang has good relations," Pikayev said. "That's something Russia can bring to the negotiating table." But good relations are about the only influence Moscow has over Pyongyang anymore, said Vadim Tkachenko, an analyst with the Russian Academy of Sciences' Center for Korean Study. The Soviet Union was once North Korea's main political and military backer and trading partner. But trade between Russia and North Korea has dropped from an annual $1.5 billion before the Soviet collapse in 1991 to about $115 million a year in the past few years -- a decline analysts blame mainly on Pyongyang's dire economic crisis and its unpaid debts to Russia, with which it no longer shares an ideology. China, which has displaced Russia as North Korea's main trade partner and interlocutor, now holds far greater sway over Pyongyang. Still, Russia sees new economic opportunities if the Korean peninsula can be stabilized. Return to Menu 2. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Discusses Korean Peninsula Situation With Japanese Ambassador Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov on Monday conducted consultations with Japanese Ambassador in Moscow Issei Nomura about the situation on the Korean peninsula in connection with the coming six-sided negotiations in Beijing. The information and press department of the Russian Foreign Ministry reported, both sides had expressed the hope to find an optimal solution to the existing problems to secure a nuclear-free status for the Korean peninsula, the security of the nations in the area concerned, and peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Russia and Japan have confirmed their intention to co-operate in achieving these aims. Return to Menu 3. China Backs Russia-Proposed N. Korea Security Guarantee China will basically support a Russian proposal for the six nations set to take part in upcoming talks on the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program to sign a written statement guaranteeing Pyongyang's security, diplomatic sources in Moscow said Friday. South Korea also has conveyed to Moscow it finds the proposal acceptable to a certain extent, but the North's response to the proposal is unclear, the sources said. Beijing has already thrown its support behind an earlier Russian proposal for the two nations and the United States to guarantee North Korea's security, and the latest information indicates China and Russia are in line with each other over the issue. As Russia prepares for the talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov met Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Monday, and on Tuesday met South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jae Sup and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kung Sok Ung. The six-nation talks involving North and South Korea, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan are slated for Aug. 27-29 in Beijing. Moscow is reportedly planning to make a proposal for the parties to draw up the security guarantee in the form of a written agreement or a joint declaration in return for Pyongyang's scrapping its nuclear weapons program, which all six nations or the six excluding Tokyo and Seoul will sign. Losyukov is expected to ask Japan to support the idea in a meeting next Monday in Moscow and make a similar request to the U.S., the sources said. Russia also made a proposal for the six countries to gather again in Moscow after the Beijing talks, and obtained informal consent from all the parties except Tokyo and Washington, they said. Return to Menu 4. Russia, NKorea Interested in Solving Nuclear Issue Russia and North Korea are interested more than any other side in solving the nuclear problem peacefully, Russia's ambassador to Pyongyang Andrei Karlov said. Karlov, who is visiting Pyongyang, said in an interview with Itar-Tass that the Russian-North Korean consultations in Moscow this week "went in a very benevolent tone". The Russian and North Korean sides "know full well that this problem must be solved". "North Korea is our Far Eastern neighbour. If something happens on the Korean Peninsula, for example an armed conflict, this will happen near our borders," the ambassador said. Russia "understands concerns of North Korea about the questions of its security". "As a country depository of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty, we believe that the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula must be preserved," Karlov said. Preparations are continuing for six-nation talks that are to be held in Beijing on August 27-29. "Russia has met practically with all participants of the Beijing meeting", he said. The ambassador said the sides "are trying to maximally understand with what some or another partner will come to the Beijing negotiating table". "There are no special problems that would have to be solved before the Beijing meeting," the diplomat said, adding that "consultations in most different formats will continue until the very last minute". Asked whether the signing of a four-party accord on security guarantees for North Korea was possible, Karlov said "Russia in its own time made a proposal of providing to North Korea the multilateral security guarantees; in particular it was proposed than the US, Russia and China provide the guarantees". "But I cannot say what the talk is concretely about in this particular case," Karlov said. Return to Menu 5. Russia May Hold Consultations on North Korea With U.S., Japan Russia may hold consultations with the United States and Japan next week as part of preparations for six-nation talks aimed to ease tension over North Koreas nuclear programs, the Interfax news agency reported. Citing an unnamed diplomatic source, Interfax said talks with U.S. officials could take place in Washington and that discussions with Japanese diplomats would likely be held in Moscow. The source said no final decision on the dates of the consultations or the level of officials involved had been made, the report said. The Russian Foreign Ministry often uses anonymous statements to Russian news agencies to make its positions known. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Losyukov has also said that consultations with U.S. and Japanese diplomats would be held, Interfax reported. On Wednesday, Russia held separate consultations with North and South Korean diplomats in Moscow to lay groundwork for the six-nation negotiations that are scheduled to begin in Beijing on Aug. 27. North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan are to take part in the Beijing talks in an effort to ease tension over U.S. allegations that Pyongyang is trying to develop nuclear weapons in violation of a 1994 agreement. Return to Menu G. Russia-Japan 1. Novovoronezh N-Plant Held Russia-Japan Safety Workshop Novovoronezh nuclear power plant (NPP) hosted the Russia-Japan workshop on NPP safety ensurance. As Nuclear.Ru was informed by Rosenergoatom�s press-center, the workshop was held August 12-16 in the frames of the Russian experts� training program. The Japanese side was represented by prof. Siichiro Inoue, Kanto Gakuin University; Masao Hamada, the deputy director general of Japan Atomic Power Company; Seichi Yoshimura, the senior researcher of the central power research institute; Masami Ikai, the deputy director for cooperation of Japan Electricity Information Center. The Russian side was represented by Rosenergoatom�s officials, experts from four Russian NPPs (Balakovo, Kalinin, Smolensk and Novovoronezh), Rosenergoatom�s research center, ONITs research center, and VNIIAES. The workshop participants discussed issues associating with prevention at NPPs of operational events caused by human errors; role of safety culture and its enhancement measures; methodologies to analyze the human factor impact to safe NPP operations, etc. The Russian experts familiarized their Japanese colleagues with practices of implementation of the safety culture principles at Rosenergoatom�s nuclear plants to improve safety and reliability of operation of the nuclear power units. On their part the Japanese specialists offered for study the materials on capabilities of the collective safety diagnostics and role of education in the process of implementing the �Human factor culture� at a nuclear plant. The workshop ended up with the tour to the existing Novovoronezh power units, the Plant�s Training Center and Don Interregional Office of Gosatomnadzor of Russia. Return to Menu 2. Russian Denuclearization is in Japan's Interest The Japanese media, which devoted so much time to reporting on the rift between the United States and Europe over Iraq and the North Korean nuclear development issue, virtually ignored an important development at this year's Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Evian, France: G-8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Global Partnership (GP) to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction adopted at the Kananaskis summit in Canada last year. The program calls for G-8 members to jointly tackle the disposal of Russia's weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Japan has offered to assist with Russia's denuclearization, in particular, the dismantling of its nuclear-powered submarines. On June 28, the two countries signed an agreement to start dismantling the first nuclear submarine. Some Japanese may ask why they have to spend a huge amount of their tax money to help dismantle the very Soviet nuclear weapons that threatened them during the Cold War. But promoting Russia's denuclearization is also in Japan's interest. Forty-one decommisioned nuclear submarines are sitting abandoned, without proper safety measures being taken, across the Sea of Japan in the Russian Far East. Some of them reportedly had accidents that caused radioactive leaks. Dismantling abandoned nuclear submarines without delay helps prevent contamination of the Sea of Japan with radioactive materials. It is also important from the viewpoint of preventing terrorists from getting hold of nuclear materials and for ensuring global security, including Japan's. Nuclear submarines are not the only thing on the GP's agenda. There is also the safe disposal of weapons-grade plutonium used in nuclear warheads, as outlined by the first Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty. If Russia's disposal of plutonium gets off the ground, it could also give impetus to the goal of reducing nuclear weapons on a global scale. Japan can also contribute to this process by providing funds and technical assistance. Traditionally, the Japanese government has promoted disarmament through such diplomatic channels as the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and treaty negotiations. In short, it has mostly concentrated on ``conference diplomacy.'' But international meetings and treaties are simply the first step in the disarmament process. We must not forget that only when the arms are abolished, in a verifiable way, and measures are taken to prevent them from being built again can the process be said to be completed. Promoting nuclear disarmament is a pillar of Japan's foreign policy. As such, involvement in Russia's denuclearization offers an ideal opportunity for Japan to participate in the disarmament process as a whole. Japan should positively involve itself in the ``implementation'' of disarmament in addition to ``conference diplomacy.'' Doing so enhances the credibility of Japan's nuclear disarmament diplomacy and serves as a major step for Japan to establish itself as a nation committed to contributing to peace. Also, from the standpoint of Japan-Russia bilateral relations, the denuclearization process is useful. By sharing military information, security is enhanced through building confidence in each other. Furthermore, the project will secure jobs for local residents and stimulate the economy of the Russian Far East. Currently, the $200 million Japan has pledged to the GP is the lowest among the G-8 countries. I think Japan should increase its share while proceeding with the dismantlement of nuclear submarines. Nuclear weapons are a negative legacy of the 20th century. No matter how difficult the process, making an effort to abolish them is a responsibility of not only the nuclear powers but also one that must be shared by our generation as a whole. When the disposal of weapons of mass destruction takes place in other countries in the future, Japan should have a hand in this as well. We must think positively about supporting Russia's denuclearization process as a perfect opportunity to establish Japan as a nation that contributes to peace. Japan needs to adopt such an affirmative diplomatic strategy. Return to Menu H. Official Statements 1. Statement by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov Regarding the Agreement to Hold Six-Sided Negotiations on the Korean Peninsula Russia welcomes the agreement to hold six-sided negotiations on the Korean Peninsula in Beijing at the end of August, with the participation of Russia, China, North Korea, the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. Holding negotiations and taking into account each other's concerns is the path that has always been favored by our country and that may open up prospects for stabilization on the Korean Peninsula. In this connection we note with satisfaction the constructive signals both from Washington and Pyongyang, including in connection with the six-sided negotiations. We hope this approach will be preserved at the negotiations in order to achieve mutually acceptable agreements. We welcome the important mediatory role of the People's Republic of China, and the active support for negotiations from the Republic of Korea and Japan. Moscow hopes that the upcoming negotiations, no matter how complex they may be, will lead to solutions that will help reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, and strengthen peace and security in the region as a whole. For its part, Russia will continue to contribute to the attainment of this goal. We think that the Korean Peninsula should be free of nuclear weapons. An important prerequisite for that is the guaranteed security of all countries in the region, and the creation of conditions for their normal economic and social development. Return to Menu I. Links of Interest 1. NRDC Nuclear Notebook - Nuclear Pursuits Return to Menu 2. The Department of Energy Strategic Plan - "Protecting National, Energy, and Economic Security with Advanced Science and Technology and Ensuring Environmental Cleanup" Return to Menu 3. Agenda for the Nation - Power and Cooperation: An American Foreign Policy for the Age of Global Politics Return to Menu 4. The New US Strategic Framework and Capabilities-based Planning: Application to Strategic Force Planning Return to Menu 5. Verification of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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