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RANSAC Nuclear News, September 11, 2003 Compiled By: RANSAC Staff A. Submarine Dismantlement/K-159 Accident
 A. Submarine Dismantlement/K-159 Accident 1. Norway says fish normal after Russian sub sinking Tests on fish from the Barents Sea have shown no sign of increased radioactivity since a Russian nuclear-powered submarine sank there at the end of August, Norway's atomic safety authority said on Thursday. The 40-year-old K-159 sank in a storm on August 30, killing nine servicemen, while being towed to a scrapyard. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority said that samples of Baltic Sea fish and water were routinely checked as part of Norway's general surveillance programme. "As part of this surveillance new fish and water tests have been taken since the sinking," it said in a statement. "So far measurements have shown normal values of radioactivity." Russia said after the accident that radiation levels were normal in the Barents Sea. The Norwegian authority said Russia's atomic energy ministry had told it that the submarine, lying at a depth of 240 metres (787 feet), holds about 800 kg (1,764 pounds) of spent nuclear fuel in its two reactors. "The U-boat is said to be in very bad condition with a lot of corrosion," the authority said. The authority said the Russian ministry had told it the submarine could not be raised until May 2004 at the earliest. The sinking of the K-159 evoked painful memories of the Kursk submarine tragedy in the same seas three years ago. Return to Menu 2. Russia may ask for foreign help to recover K-159 sub The operation to lift the sunken K-159 submarine will be held presumably in August-September 2004, the Russian Navy's commander-in-chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov told reporters. The Russian shipbuilding authority Rossudostroyeniye, Atomic Energy Ministry and Defense Ministry on Wednesday made a decision in principle to plan and prepare for the operation to recover the sunken submarine. Design bureau Malakhit under Vladimir Pialov has been appointed the head organization responsible. The K-159 recovery plan will be approved and equipment will begin to be prepared in January-March 2004. Kuroyedov said he had signed an order to appoint an expedition to lift the sunken submarine and prepare the fleet for the operation. He did not rule out other countries might be asked for assistance. "We are considering all possibilities. I do not rule out foreign specialists may be invited to help raise the submarine," he said. "The radiation situation in the area is normal. Instruments planted around the submarine confirm this. There is always the risk the radiation level may exceed the natural background, so we keep closely watching it. On the basis of what the submarine's designers and developers have been telling us we can say with certainty that the sunken submarine and its shut-down nuclear reactor is fraught with no immediate danger at this moment." Return to Menu 3. Sinking of K-159 Submarine Caused by Non-Fulfilment of Appropriate Regulations The cause of the sinking of the K-159 submarine was the non-fulfilment of the regulatory documents' requirements, said Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Vladimir Kuroyedov. "At twelve o'clock the command of the Northern Fleet received a weather forecast. The regulatory documents say that towage is not permitted in a moderate sea. But nobody reacted to the forecast. In the night of the tragedy it was a heavy sea," underscored the commander-in-chief at the news conference in Moscow. Moreover, under the regulatory documents, the speed of the towage must not top three knots. At the moment of the tragedy, however, the tugboat developed a speed of four and a half knots. The technical project could not stand such a violence with regard to it," added Vladimir Kuroyedov. At 1.20 a. m. on August 30, the headquarters of the Northern Fleet received a report from the tugboat that the stern pontoons had disappeared. This fact brought down to the stern of the boat, and the command was informed about it. At that moment the sea was moderate. For a whole hour the command of the fleet did not take any actions, though at 1.40 the commander of the fleet, Gennady Suchkov, was already at the command post," stated the commander-in-chief. He underscored that during this hour it was necessary to take a decision which could have saved the lives of the submariners. The commander-in-chief said that at 2.45-3.00 a. m. the submarine sank. Return to Menu 4. Russia to lift sunken sub without foreign help Russia will use its our resources to carry out the operation to lift the K-159 submarine next summer, Russian Navy Deputy Commander Mikhail Barskov declared at a news conference today. According to him, Russia has some experience in lifting nuclear-powered subs. He mentioned that technical proposals concerning this operation would be selected over the next few months. He specified that there was a considerable difference in the operations on lifting the Kursk submarine and the K-159. The latter weighs three times less than the Kursk, however the K-159 lies twice as deep as the Kursk sub. The nuclear-powered submarine K-159 sank on August 30 when it was towed for scrapping. There were 10 crewmembers on board the submarine. Only one of them survived. Return to Menu 5. Radiation Monitoring Ship to Go to Sub Wreck Site The "Gidrolog" hydrographic ship of the St. Petersburg-based Sevmorgeo research institute will start for the K-159 nuclear submarine wreck site within a few days - presumably, September 12 - for radiation monitoring. The ship is now engaged in the vicinity of the Shtockman gas condensate deposit, reports the natural resource board of the Murmansk Region, in Russia's northwest. Experts of the federal Ministry of Natural Resources, the Murmansk Institute of Maritime Biology, and Sevmorgeo will be on board the "Gidrolog" for independent monitoring. It envisages all-round background radiation gauging. If the radiation does not increase, the ship will visit the fatal site on three occasions - September and November 2003, and February 2004, to spend there a week each time. A Northern Fleet hydrographic vessel is monitoring the situation now. Fleet PR are reporting background radiation within the norm. The K-159 sank in the Barents Sea, three miles northwest of Kildin Island, in the small hours of August 30. Return to Menu 6. The K-159 Sinking: Worse Than the Kursk? A towed Russian sub claims nine lives but could present even greater radiation problems K-159, a rust bucket of a Russian nuclear submarine, was being towed to a navy scrap yard late last month when it sprang a leak and went down in the Barents Sea. Nine sailors lost their lives — a fraction of the 118 who died when another Russian submarine, the Kursk, exploded and sank three years ago. But this latest sub disaster could have more serious consequences. A high-level Russian official tells TIME that K-159 "presents a threat more menacing than that of the Kursk," a state-of-the-art submarine whose reactors were much less likely to leak radioactive material before the sub could be recovered. "There's no telling how [K-159] will hold up under water," this source says. The wreckage is under crushing pressure, 781 ft. down, and its hull is deeply corroded. Although its reactors ground to a halt 15 years ago, the spent nuclear fuel--1,760 lbs. of the stuff — was never unloaded. Adding to the worry, K-159 sank in the waters between Russia and Norway, an area crisscrossed by commercial shipping lanes and fishing boats. Norway's Fisheries Directorate says it is waiting for reports from Norwegian radiation authorities to assess whether the K-159 has leaked radioactive material. If the Kursk recovery is any guide, salvage operations won't be possible before May. The Russian Naval Command hasn't committed to a date but promises it will retrieve K-159 by next year — without foreign assistance. TIME's source is skeptical. The navy is short on funds. Three years after the Kursk disaster, it still hasn't bought the gear necessary for such an operation. The government, meanwhile, has allocated only $70 million for all nuclear clean-up and maintenance in Russia. It cost $150 million to recover the Kursk. Return to Menu B. Counterproliferation 1. Preventive Use of Force Justified Despite the fact that world's leading powers constantly monitor proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, hundreds of cases of violations and suspected violations of the non-proliferation regime are registered every year around the world. At present, more than 15 countries of the "third world" have at their disposal and develop ballistic missiles of various ranges. The number of such countries is constantly growing, and the most worrisome among them are those situated in unstable regions of the world: North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya and Egypt. For many of these countries, ballistic missiles are the instrument of waging wars, a solid addition to combat capabilities of conventional armed forces. Other countries consider ballistic missiles as a deterrent, as a status quo symbol or a means of blackmailing their neighbors. The proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles, capable of delivering WMD to designated targets, leads to changes in the strategic situation in the Middle East and in Asia, and threatens a growing number of locations in these regions. One of the most urgent threats is the close connection between missile-development programs and research in the sphere of WMD. All research work on the development of advanced ballistic missiles and the increase of their range conducted in "rogue" countries worries experts all around the world. The danger lies not just in the threat of preventive nuclear strikes on the territory of a neighboring country. After all, any dictator clearly realizes that as a result of immediate retaliation he would lose everything once and for all. In the mean time, for any dictator, possession of nuclear arsenal is the key factor ensuring the stability of his regime under external pressure. We should not exclude the possibility that the change of regime in Iraq through use of force might force similar regimes to expedite frantically their efforts to acquire WMD, primarily, nuclear weapons. All these facts require the world community to provide an adequate response to the threats posed by totalitarian regimes that seek nuclear weapons. The world community is also aware of the three inter-related challenges to global security: totalitarian regimes possessing or seeking WMD and their delivery systems, which provoke regional conflicts; a hardly contained proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems; and, finally, international terrorism. All these threats are coming from totalitarian regimes. The danger is increased significantly when such weapons end up in the hands of transnational terrorist organizations that rely on support of these regimes. Moreover, only the support of "rogue" regimes, where WMD labs, terrorist training camps, medical and R&R centers are located, makes these organizations stable structures. At the same time, terrorist organizations seeking acquisition of WMD are not subjects of international policy and cannot be influenced by purely political or diplomatic means. In such circumstances, the only way of destroying such organizations could be preventive use of force. I believe that the forms of such counteraction might vary and they should not be limited to full-scale military operations against "rogue" regimes. For example, in summer of 2002, before the beginning of the UN discussions on Iraqi issue, thirty influential independent U.S. analysts suggested an alternative way of destroying Iraqi WMD arsenal with the use of the so-called compulsory inspections. The plan provided for inspections conducted with support of air-transported mobile groups from the international contingent, at any facility and at any time, for as long as necessary. It also allowed disassembling or destroying any WMD facilities discovered in the course of inspections. Compulsory inspections also could have been conducted in other "rogue" countries in accordance with UN resolutions. They could have been supported by means of advanced instrumental reconnaissance and international forces deployed near the borders of totalitarian regimes. Later, such suggestions were voiced in Russia, by Mr. Yavlinski in particular. If such an alternative way had been adopted, we would have had a chance to disarm Iraq without conducting a full-scale military operation. However, nobody in Russia or the United States, which had already decided to invade Iraq without the UN resolution by that time, paid any attention to these suggestions. One of the preventive measures of G8 countries and the UN Security Council could be the legitimization of compulsory UN inspections supported by international forces of varied strength and entrusted with monitoring the adherence to the non-proliferation regime. The procedures for such inspections might be extended to include terrorist training camps and centers of international terrorism. It certainly seems to be the sound method of neutralizing possible violations of the international non-proliferation regime. Overall, we have to admit that it is impossible to stave off WMD threat coming from totalitarian regimes or international terrorism by purely defensive measures. Only preventive measures implying in certain cases the use of force can be effective. Instead of simply reacting on catastrophic outcome of terrorist actions, we need to develop a coordinated strategy aimed at compulsory disarmament, change of regimes, suppression of terrorist centers without violation of territorial integrity of countries that harbor them. For Russia, which does not have any other alternative but to pursue military-political and economic integration with the West, it would have been beneficial, indeed, to become one of the leaders of preventive counteraction to totalitarian regimes, instead of positioning itself sometimes too close to dictators, following the principle "he is a scoundrel, but at least he is on our side." Return to Menu 2. Russian diplomat says interception training may prolong nuclear crisis A senior Russian diplomat says joint naval exercises planned for this weekend off the Australian coast could set back efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. The exercises are the first for the 11-nation Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at future interceptions of ships suspected of carrying outlawed weapons and nuclear materials. Our reporter Karon Snowdon says the US-led training exercises involving Australia, Japan and France are officially not aimed at any one nation, but will intensify pressure on Pyongyang to end its nuclear program. A former diplomat to North Korea, Georgy Toloraya, now the Russian consul-general in Sydney says the exercises could increase tension ahead of new talks to resolve the nuclear standoff. "It certainly wouldn't help. And of course it wouldn't let North Koreans feel more secure and that could lead to more tension," he said. "It wouldn't help the diplomatic process, which I think now is more important than all other forms of activity." Return to Menu 3. Allies to help U.S. nip weapons U.S. officials say they plan an aggressive effort to sign up more countries in an effort to curtail nuclear, biological and chemical weapons sales by North Korea and other proliferators. The United States and 10 allies agreed last week in Paris to stage a series of land, sea and air exercises over the next six months, the first joint exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by President Bush in May. "We think it's important to go out as broadly as we can," a senior State Department official said, speaking to reporters yesterday on the condition his name not be used. "The more broadly, the more widely the circumstances of the PSI are known, we think, the greater the likelihood that we'll have the desired negative effect on proliferation," the official added. The Paris talks produced a set of principles for coordinating efforts to identify and intercept illegal arms shipments, and called for greater intelligence-sharing among the signatories. U.S. diplomats have been instructed to explain the PSI to governments around the globe. The State Department official said he expected all of NATO's 19 member nations to sign on eventually. While the PSI principles do not single out any country, U.S. officials have made no secret of their concerns about weapons sales by North Korea and Iran. North Korea has denounced the PSI program, saying any blockade would be seen as a "hostile" act. Several North Korean vessels found to be carrying weapons and other illicit contraband have been seized in recent months. China, a neighbor of North Korea and host of recent six-country talks seeking to ease the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, has expressed its own doubts about the "efficiency and legitimacy" of the antiproliferation initiative. China also has voiced concern that the joint exercises could upset the delicate diplomatic balance of the Korea talks, but the senior U.S. official said he believed the two could be pursued simultaneously. "To the extent that you can reduce North Korea's hard-currency earnings from proliferation and other illicit activities, you also have a negative impact on its nuclear weapons program," the official said. "We think we can and should pursue [this] simultaneously with the six-party talks in Beijing." Australian Foreign Affairs Deputy Secretary Paul O'Sullivan pressed for greater Chinese participation in the PSI during two days of talks in Beijing concluded yesterday. Russia has submitted written questions about the program to the State Department, but has not indicated whether it will consider participating. Return to Menu 4. US lobbies Russia and China on curbing WMD The US and its allies are lobbying China, Russia and South Korea to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, while simultaneously pursuing their joint negotiations to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear programme. A senior US official yesterday said that although the initiative, launched by President George W. Bush in May, was a response to a global challenge, the proliferation of weapons and related technology to and from North Korea remained a major concern. The PSI, which he described as "a loose association" numbering 11 countries, aims to increase seizures of suspect cargoes. "This is something we think we can and should pursue simultaneously with the six-party talks in Beijing," the official said, referring to negotiations that began last month involving the US, North and South Korea, China, Russia and Japan. North Korea is concerned that the new alliance is one step away from enforcing sanctions or a blockade which Pyongyang has warned would lead to war. But crucially for the success of the US-led effort over North Korea, China, Russia and South Korea have so far declined to sign up to the initiative. The US official said he had been in contact with the three countries. South Korea has indicated that PSI was consistent with its non-proliferation concerns and Russia has submitted a list of questions, the US official said. Paul O'Sullivan, Australia's deputy foreign secretary, went to Beijing on Monday to discuss China's concerns over PSI and maritime exercises to be held off Australia this weekend, involving Australia, the US, France and Japan. The US intends to lead an interdiction exercise in the Arabian Sea next January. Iran's nuclear and long-range missile programmes, which the US suspects may have been assisted by Pakistan and North Korea, are also under scrutiny. Concerns that North Korea would use the occasion of its national day celebrations yesterday to carry out its threat to test a nuclear device or declare itself a nuclear power proved unfounded. Thousands of soldiers and civilians paraded through the streets of Pyongyang but the celebrations were low-key. "It's good news North Korea has not done anything to provoke the US," said Woo Seong-ji, an analyst at Seoul's institute of foreign affairs and national security. "Pyongyang seems to be sending a message that demonstrates its commitment to diplomacy and dialogue." Even North Korea's rhetoric was subdued compared with past outbursts, though it did repeat a threat to continue developing nuclear weapons unless the US dropped "hostile" policies. "We should make no concession in defending the country's primary interests and fight imperialists to the end, even at the cost of our lives," said the Workers' party newspaper. The celebrations marked the anniversary of North Korea's establishment as an independent state in 1948. Return to Menu C. Nuclear Trafficking 1. Radioactive transport assault interception drill held in Sarov In Nizhni Novgorod Region the Sarov-2003 “paper battle” successfully ended on August 4 reportedly to the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy press-service. The drill was to master actions to terminate unauthorized access to a radioactive material packages transported by road and rail. The drill was commanded by the RF deputy minister of atomic energy Anatoli Kotelnikov with the headquarter commander Anatoli Abalov, the head of Minatom’s department for protection of information, nuclear materials and facilities. A large group of the US expert-observers headed by David Heiseneg, the head of the US Department’s of Energy division, also participated in the drill. Minatom’s report notes that considering the potential danger of radioactive material shipments in terms of probable terrorist acts Minatom of Russia with the US financial support implements an industry-wide automated nuclear material transport security system (ANMTS). The automated security system is to provide for protection and remote monitoring of special shipments as well as emergency notification on route. Presently, the security systems are being installed at railcars and trucks of the industry’s fleet used to transport radioactive materials with three industry’s enterprises carrying out trials of the ANMTS complex. Sarov-2003 drill results will be used for assessment of the implemented security measures, and for determining a level of preparedness of ministries, agencies, organizations and enterprises involved in the special shipment security. Return to Menu 2. Tabloids Cause Minor Nuclear Smuggling Panic in Scandinavia Norway awoke Friday morning to disturbing newspaper headlines and television reports that a major plan to smuggle 90 kilograms of radioactive waste—which may have included plutonium—into Finland in the trunk of a car driven by a Swedish national had been foiled by Russian border control agents. The reports had appeared in the Helsinki tabloid, Iltalehti, which were then duplicated in Stockholm’s sensationalist Svenska. By the time the reports reached Norway, Friday’s news was brimming with scenarios of possible plutonium smuggling corridors from the Kola Peninsula into Scandinavia, and information about an unnamed Swedish national who had attempted, via one of these apparent corridors, to transport a load of his own. Fortunately, say Russian, Finnish and Swedish officials, the reports were not only several weeks late, but highly exaggerated. Nonetheless, the news unsettled the pubic across Scandinavia, whose close proximity to Russia and Russia’s well-documented problems with securing fissile materials are cause for worldwide alarm. What the Papers Erroneously Reported According to the Norwegian daily VG newspaper published Friday, Russian police are busily investigating a case of radioactive smuggling that was brought to an end just 100 metres from the Finnish border by Russian customs’ radiation detectors. VG was quoting an article published by the Svenska, which said that the Swedish national driving the car loaded with radioactive waste was in Russian police custody. VG quoted Svenska further, adding that it was unknown when the arrest occurred, but that the Swedish national had been confirmed to be in custody of the Russians by the Finnish Police division in Salla, directly across the Russian-Finnish border. Iltalehti quoted Salla’s Police Chief Pentti Saira as saying “I don’t know what this material is, but according to our information, the material is radioactive.” Iltalehti insisted that the seized material contained plutonium, VG reported. But Iltalehti’s report and Svenska’s version of it began to fall apart when representatives for Russia’s Murmansk Regional Customs Division flatly contradicted much of what the papers reported. The Facts of the Case What was reported to be 90 kilograms of radioactive waste by the papers, said Murmansk’s Chief Customs Inspector Vitaly Popov in a telephone interview, turned out to be a car trunk full of 90 kilograms of assorted rocks and minerals that were emitting radiation levels strong enough to be picked up by radiation detectors at the border checkpoint. All of this occurred when the Swedish national left Russia a month ago. These rocks and minerals that the Swedish tourist had picked up while in the northern Kola Peninsula were confiscated, and he was sent on his way, said the chief customs inspector. “There was no arrest here,” Popov said. “There is an investigation of the materials underway, but there was no arrest. Customs officials delayed him for some 20 minutes, and then let him go.” Another customs spokesman in Murmansk, reached by telephone on Friday, said that the Swedish national had gathered the confiscated rocks and minerals in an area of no military or security significance to Russia, and he had done so with the aid of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “He was a rock collector, evidently,” said the spokesman. “That’s a hobby, not a crime.” According to a representative for the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, any number of minerals and rocks collected anywhere in northern Russia could contain some amount of radiation. “Everything contains a slight degree of radiation,” said the spokeswoman, who asked not to be identified because she was not specifically familiar with the case. “It could be that this man picked up something that contained natural uranium or another naturally occurring radioactive element, which would have registered on radiation detectors. Whatever it was, I am sure it could not be plutonium, which is not a naturally occurring element.” Diplomatic Reactions “All we know about the case is what we saw in Svenska newspaper,” said Consul Elizabeth Stan of Sweden’s Moscow embassy in a telephone interview. “We don’t know when it happened, or if it happened.” “The Russian authorities have not approached us about this matter at all,” she added. The Finnish Embassy in Moscow likewise had no information on the case other than what they had seen in Iltalehti. “At this point, anyone’s guess is as good as mine,” said a spokesman by telephone from Moscow. Finnish police in Salla—the border point to which the Swedish national was headed from the Murmansk region—denied both Svenska and Iltalehti’s reports that the Swedish national had been arrested by Russian authorities, adding further that they had never suggested that to any of the reporters who had called them for information. “We know there is an investigation underway about the materials, but other than that, we have no official information—all we know is what we saw in the paper,” said the officer, who asked not to be identified. At Russian customs, the spokesman said that the material taken from the vehicle is still under investigation and that if it is found to be radioactive, the Swedish national could face so-called administrative responsibility. “But the Swedish national is probably already home and bringing any administrative charges would be difficult,” said the spokesman. “In such a situation the case is likely closed.” As for Iltalehti and Svenska, who started the radioactive furore, both papers say they stick to their stories. Neither paper would comment on why they had reported the incident a month after it happened, where they got the information that plutonium was involved, and why they had reported that the Swedish national was in the custody of the Russian police. Return to Menu D. Strategic Arms Control 1. Arms Control Talks U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker was set to arrive in Moscow on Wednesday to discuss arms control and other security issues with top officials, the U.S. Embassy said. Rademaker will discuss "a full range of arms control subjects," including the implementation of a Russian-U.S. arms treaty that paves the way for dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons which came into effect in June, an embassy spokeswoman said. The Treaty of Moscow, signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in May 2002, requires each country to slash its nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, by 2012. Return to Menu E. Russia-Iran 1. Iran may be using lasers to harvest fuel for nukes - Nation could have dozens of weapons by decade's end As U.N. diplomats debate Iran's intent for 50,000 uranium-gas centrifuges, they also confront clues that Tehran could be exploring a more sophisticated path to nuclear-weapons materials that is more efficient and easier to conceal. International inspectors report that Iran's nuclear-energy scientists have produced uranium metal and are testing powerful green lasers -- potential steps toward an exotic means of harvesting weapons fuel that so far has been the exclusive province of developed nuclear nations. Unlike Iraq and its dozens of Calutrons, the old workhorses of electromagnetic separation invented by Berkeley physicist and Nobel laureate E.O. Lawrence, Iran is overwhelmingly banking on thousands of standard European-style centrifuges capable of fueling nuclear reactors or producing dozens of nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. Yet some U.S. and foreign intelligence analysts worry that Iran also is pursuing a more modern, compact source of bomb material. That source is AVLIS -- atomic vapor laser isotopic separation -- devised in the 1970s at Lawrence's namesake lab in Livermore. France, the United States and Russia spent billions perfecting laser separation in the 1980s and'90s, yet scientists never saw its commercialization due to a glut in enriched uranium left over from the Cold War. But an AVLIS factory in the Third World would offer an indigenous source of weapons-grade uranium while consuming so little real estate and electric power that it could be easily hidden from spy satellites. "This is a top-notch, high-tech, sophisticated approach and it's really dangerous," said former weapons inspector Victor Mizin, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "It's a very serious development." Evidence that Iran is pursuing an AVLIS program is hazy, however. Tehran denies any interest in laser enrichment or, for that matter, nuclear weapons. Yet the Clinton administration had to press aggressively to persuade Russia to cancel contracts in 2000 to supply AVLIS to Iran. "If it's shown that Iran really does have or is developing a substantial, working laser program, that would add a whole new dimension to the internal proliferation problem. But that's a big if," says Joseph Cirincione, head of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Weapons fuel expert David Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, also is skeptical. "I think it does show a very large commitment to the entire nuclear fuel cycle and things nuclear-related in general, but I don't think it shows they had a large commitment to laser enrichment for military or civilian uses," he said. The clues are still tantalizing, he said. Inspectors for the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency recently visited two sites identified by opponents of Tehran's Islamist government as related to uranium enrichment. One turned out to be an agricultural research facility. In the second, inside tall security fences, inspectors found scientists building and testing copper-vapor lasers. Iranian officials said the site was originally intended for laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy. But experts say copper-vapor lasers, while offering high-powered visible light, are largely useless for laser fusion, which generally uses invisible light beams. And Iran's scientists have their pick of cheaper, easier-to-use lasers for spectroscopy. In AVLIS, scientists vaporize metal uranium with an electron beam, then fire chemical dye lasers through the vapor to selectively excite atoms of uranium-235, scattered in a cloud of uranium-238. The U235 atoms take on a negative charge and accumulate at a positive electrode inside the separator chamber, later harvested as metal coins. In early forms of AVLIS, scientists used the bright green light of copper-vapor lasers to pump the chemical dye lasers. IAEA inspectors found that Iran also had produced hundreds of pounds of natural uranium metal. Iranian scientists said the metal was for shielding in its nuclear reactors, but inspectors found that it had an exceptionally high purity that was inconsistent with shielding. "There is a reason to wonder about the laser because the rationale for making the metal at the purity they're making it does raise questions," Albright said. "Iran knew it wasn't going to need metal at this purity, and so why make metal at this scale?" One possibility is for Iranian scientists to practice making weapons components. "The other answer is to feed a laser-enrichment program," Albright said. By far, weapons experts are more worried about Iran's centrifuges. Tehran plans to have 1,000 gas centrifuges operating in a pilot plant at Natanz by year's end. Inside the same security fences, workers are finishing two sprawling, underground complexes that would house more than 50,000 centrifuges, piped together in "cascades." Iran's leaders say these subterranean cascade halls, each enclosing almost eight acres, would supply fuel for nuclear reactors planned or under construction by Russian workers on Iran's coast. At full capacity, Iran's cascades could produce enough enriched uranium for at least 25 nuclear weapons a year sometime before 2010. All of these are more reliable sources of reactor fuel or bomb ingredients than AVLIS. "It looks like a backup plan in case the centrifuges don't work," Cirincione said. "So far, the centrifuges seem to be working very well for them." But suspicions about Iran's laser enrichment pursuits could lead the United States and allies to insist on Iran allowing more intrusive inspections. Return to Menu 2. Iranian Demand Holds Up Bushehr Tehran has made an unexpected and unacceptable demand that could derail Russian-Iranian cooperation on the Bushehr nuclear plant, a senior Nuclear Power Ministry official said Wednesday. To address concerns that Iran is secretly developing nuclear weapons, Russia has said it will freeze construction on the $1 billion plant and will refuse to supply fuel unless Iran agrees to return all of the spent fuel. Both sides in recent weeks have said that an agreement was close to being signed. On Wednesday, however, Deputy Nuclear Power Minister Valery Govorukhin said Iran is now demanding that Russia pay for the spent fuel, Itar-Tass reported. Usually it is the other way around; countries get paid for receiving and storing spent fuel, he said. Govorukhin chose to go public with Iran's demand as the board of directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna debated a U.S.-backed resolution that would find Iran in noncompliance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it has signed. The draft resolution -- put forward by the United States, Britain, France and Germany -- gives Iran until the end of October to prove that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. If Iran fails to meet the deadline, the IAEA would refer the issue to the Security Council, which would vote on whether to slap sanctions on Tehran. The IAEA board was expected to vote late Wednesday or Thursday, a spokeswoman said by telephone from Vienna. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is designed solely for generating electricity, but it has avoided signing an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that would allow for comprehensive IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities without notice. Govorukhin insisted the dispute was commercial and said both sides have agreed to start talks, Itar-Tass reported. Should Iran refuse to withdraw its demand, Russia would have to charge Iran a higher price to include the cost of buying it back, he said. Alexander Pikayev, a security expert with the Carnegie Moscow Center, said Iran might have concluded that it can produce fuel compatible with the Russian-made reactor itself -- and, thus, be deliberately making unrealistic demands in order to disrupt the deal altogether. If Iran used its own fuel in the power plant's reactors, it could then enrich the spent fuel to weapons-grade using one of the centrifuges that it possesses. The IAEA has recently said that its inspectors found residue of highly enriched uranium on gas centrifuges at a nuclear facility in Natanz, about 300 kilometers south of Tehran, during an inspection in February. Iran said it imported the centrifuges and that they were "contaminated" with enriched uranium by a previous owner. The decision to publicize Iran's demand during the IAEA debates may be an attempt to create international pressure on Iran to drop its demand and sign the agreement on the return of spent fuel, Pikayev and Ivan Safranchuk of the Center for Defense Information said. Moreover, Pikayev said, it may be a sign that Moscow has decided to end its lucrative nuclear cooperation with Tehran altogether because of its own security concerns. The Nuclear Power Ministry may have decided that it is time "to wash their hands" of Iran rather than continue cooperation with a country that avoids making its nuclear program fully transparent and draws constant fire from the United States, Pikayev said. Safranchuk, however, said he believes the ministry will complete the reactor unless Iran refuses to sign the fuel-return agreement. Earlier this month, the ministry said Iran had already reviewed a draft of the agreement and was ready to sign it. Officials said the agreement would be signed as soon as Russian government agencies finished reviewing it. Govorukhin himself said in late August that the ministry intended to sign it within a month. Ministry officials said Russia should complete construction of the first reactor at the Bushehr plant in 2005 but may send the first batch of nuclear fuel to Iran as soon as this year. During a visit to Moscow in July, Iranian atomic chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh said he hoped the agreement would be signed soon. "There are no vague points about the return of spent nuclear fuel," he said. Return to Menu 3. U.S. Allies Press Russia to Back Iran Nuke Deadline The United States and key allies worked through the night to get Russia and South Africa to back a U.N. nuclear resolution Thursday giving Tehran until Oct. 31 to prove it has no secret nuclear weapons program. Diplomats from France and Germany held closed-door talks with countries on the 35-nation board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to get them to support the toughly-worded draft offering Iran a last chance to show compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States says Tehran has violated the treaty to secretly develop atomic weapons. Iran, which denies the allegation, could face economic sanctions if reported to the U.N. Security Council for breach of its NPT obligations. Iran, an IAEA board member, has rejected the idea of any kind of deadline and threatened to "review" cooperation with the U.N. if its board comes down too hard on the Islamic republic. Diplomats told Reuters that the U.S.-backed resolution already had a majority of some 21 states who would support it. A vote had been expected Thursday, but might be postponed until Friday. They said Washington wanted a stronger majority, because if the board appeared split on the resolution, Iran would ignore any deadline or other demands in the text. "A divided board would give comfort to Iran," a Western diplomat told Reuters. FRANCE AND GERMANY WITH THE U.S. France and Germany assumed the task of trying to convince opponents on the board to back a deadline -- in high contrast to the role they played in the U.N. Security Council earlier this year, when Washington struggled in vain to win support for the Iraq war while France and Germany argued against it. Diplomats said that it was politically crucial to have Moscow, which has so far opposed giving Iran an ultimatum, behind any resolution passed by the board. France and Germany are also lobbying South Africa, which holds the rotating chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and is a former nuclear-weapons state that voluntarily disarmed under IAEA supervision. NAM countries occupy 15 seats on the IAEA board. South Africa has circulated a weaker draft proposal that imposes no deadline and does not call on Iran to stop enriching uranium. Diplomats said it was on these two points that Russia and South Africa were most unhappy with the U.S.-backed draft. Diplomats said that if South Africa were to support the deadline, many NAM states would probably back it. Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, told Reuters the decision of France and Germany to co-sponsor the resolution was clearly an attempt to ingratiate themselves with Washington and repair relations damaged by their opposition to the Iraq war. "They are now taking Iran as a scapegoat to bring themselves together," he said, rejecting the idea of a deadline. Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi warned the U.N. body's governing board against coming down too hard on the Islamic republic, which says its nuclear program is solely for the peaceful generation of electricity. "If the hawks gain ground and ignore our legitimate rights for peaceful nuclear activities, we will be forced to review the state of play and the current level of cooperation with the agency," he told the IRNA news agency in Tehran. Return to Menu 4. Russia calls on Iran to cooperate with UN nuclear watchdog Russia urged Iran on Wednesday to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) even as Tehran threatened to break off all contact with the UN nuclear watchdog before a key debate in Vienna. "The Russian side is convinced that all questions concerning Iran's nuclear program can and should be resolved trough (Iran's) cooperation with the IAEA," Interfax quoted chief foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko as saying. Yakovenko called for the negotiations to be "constructive and productive." His comments came shortly after Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi denounced the "arrogance" and "extremist posture" of certain countries over Iran's nuclear program and warned that Tehran might reconsider its cooperation with the UN's nuclear watchdog. The IAEA is set to consider at a meeting in Vienna on Wednesday an October 31 deadline for Iran to prove it is not secretly trying to develop atomic weapons. The United States accused Iran on Tuesday of being in breach of safeguards under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but supported a proposed "last chance" for Tehran to clear up questions about its atomic program. France, Germany and Britain jointly called on Iran to fully disclose its contested nuclear program by the end of October in a draft resolution submitted Tuesday to the 35-nation IAEA board. Russia's own involvement in Iran has troubled many nations. It is constructing the Islamic state's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr but insists the project can in no way help Tehran's nuclear weapons ambitions. Yet Moscow stresses it will not launch the reactor until Tehran agrees to return all spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr back to Russia. The signature of that separate protocol agreement has been delayed several times, with some analysts suggesting that Russia is delaying the project under pressure from the United States. Return to Menu 5. Russian Foreign Ministry: Iran to Settle its Nuclear Issues with IAEA The issue of Iran's nuclear programme should be settled in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency /IAEA/, official spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexander Yakovenko told RIA Novosti. "The Russian side is convinced that all the issues of the Iranian nuclear should and can be solved via this country's cooperation with the IAEA," the diplomat said. According to him, Moscow hopes this issue will be considered in this course at the session of the IAEA Council of Managers in Vienna. Return to Menu 6. Bushehr-1 cannot be started earlier 2005, Russian deputy minister says Judging from the current development the start-up of Bushehr-1 is possible not earlier than 2005, said to Nuclear.Ru Valeri Govorukhin, the state secretary and RF deputy minister of atomic energy who attended last week the meeting of Minatom’s of Russia delegation and the Ambassador of Iran to Moscow and the head of international relations department of the Organization of Atomic Energy of Iran. According to Govorukhin, the meeting “synchronized the clocks” regarding the main issues of Bushehr nuclear plant cooperation. “Regretfully, there is a large lag in the unit one construction, he said. “Problems are mainly to the fact that a new set of the lacking of equipment was not timely ordered instead of the equipment made Germans in the past”. He added that the technical work on the issue had been completed recently and the sides were working on the final time-schedule. “We have agreed to seek jointly for the reserves to expedite start-up somehow”, said Govorukhin. As of the supplement to the Bushehr INF (irradiated nuclear fuel) return protocol, the deputy minister said that legally everything is clear: both sides have corresponding authorities to sign it. But there is a commercial problem related to payments for this service. “The Iranian side has come up with an unusual position: the irradiated fuel is an Iranian property, therefore, Russia when taking it back must pay for it”, Govorukhin said. However, there are different practices in the world: the country, which sends its INF for storage and reprocessing, pays for this service a rather high price. Since the Iranian side has not changed its approach, the question arises to revise the fresh fuel supply contract terms and conditions or sign a new contract. “The matter is to settle the commercial side of the deal, the deputy minister explained. “In spite of the fact that the fuel return could occur in several years, negotiations should be conducted to completely solve all problems”. An agreement to conduct such negotiation has been reached. Now the sides are agreeing the dates, delegation members and venue – Moscow or Teheran where the next coordinating meeting is to be held in the late September. The fuel delivery date will be determined after all commercial documents of the deal are signed. “The fuel has been fabricated, accepted by the Iranian customer, sealed and kept in containers, i.e. at any moment it can be shipped to the prepared, certified temporary fresh fuel storage facility at the plant’s site equipped with all security systems”, Govorukhin said. He stressed that it is not the case of a deliberate delay as reported by the Iranian press. “It is a very serious issue in all respects including political, and we have fulfill all procedures established by the Russian and Iranian laws”, the deputy minister said. The Moscow’s negotiations also discussed the coming IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting. As before, the Russian side insistently recommended Iran to sign immediately and unconditionally the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards application agreement. The Iranian position remains unchanged: Teheran officially consented to start negotiations concerning the signing of protocol, but in turn it would like the countries having developed nuclear power to start fulfilling their commitments regarding technical assistance to Iran in peaceful uses of atomic energy. “Iran announced its readiness to accept foreign assistance in construction of nuclear power facilities, Govorukhin said. “So far, only Russia has presented feasibility studies for three options: completion of construction of Bushehr-2; “from the scratch” construction of the second power unit to the Russian design at Bushehr site; and construction of two nuclear power units at Akhvaz site. The feasibility study is a preliminary technical and economic justification along with some pricing considerations.” Return to Menu 7. Progress made in settling differences over Iran's nuclear program. Reports coming in from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters indicate positive shifts in the settlement of differences over the future of Iran's nuclear program and in the provision of reliable IAEA control over the entire process, an official at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy told Itar-Tass on Tuesday. He said the diplomatic sources in Vienna close to the IAEA circles had expressed confidence that Iran was ready to get down to talks with the IAEA and to sign a supplementary protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a result, the IAEA inspectors will have a chance to inspect Iran's nuclear facilities without a prior notice and to take soil, water and air probes. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy believes that Iran will be able to conduct constructive work with IAEA and to expand its nuclear energy cooperation with Russia if the two sides find a positive and mutually suitable solution. At the same time, the Ministry of Atomic Energy official told Itar-Tass that a decision to put off the date for signing a protocol on the return of Spent Nuclear Fuel from the nuclear power station in Bushere should not be linked to the discussion of Iran's nuclear program at the IAEA. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said before his departure for Hungary that the preparation and signing of the Russian-Iranian protocol on the return of Spent Nuclear Fuel from the nuclear power station in Bushere was a technical matter. He expressed the hope that the document would most likely be signed in Moscow soon. In the meantime, well-informed Moscow diplomatic sources noted in interviews with Itar-Tass that the "soft" draft of a resolution on Iran's nuclear program would most likely be passed in Vienna before the end of this week. That would impel the Iranian leaders to step up their decision on signing a protocol on safeguards with the IAEA. The same sources believe that the United States hasn' t enlisted the support of the majority of the 35 members of the IAEA Board of Governors required for the adoption of the initial "tough" version of the resolution, suggesting that the Iranian issue should be considered at the next session of the U.N. Security Council. Return to Menu 8. Russia under US pressure & fear of Iran's nuke reactor Russia appears to be dragging its feet over the construction of Iran's first nuclear reactor, partly due to US pressure but also out of its own safety concerns, analysts said. As Tehran's nuclear program fell under the international spotlight Monday in a debate in Vienna, Iran insisted that it has fully cooperated with the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and again denied it intended to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But it is Russia's involvement in Iran that has troubled many nations. And Moscow's contradictory statements over the Bushehr nuclear project have left some wondering if President Vladimir Putin is in full control of the situation. One of the main intrigues here is whether Russian officials pushing for the deal -- Russia is due to earn up to one billion dollars on the project -- will win over those who understand the diplomatic damage the Bushehr project may cause. Few, including Putin, are giving away clues. Russia's atomic energy minister was quoted as saying that a key agreement on Iran's return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia may be signed soon. But he gave no date for the signing, although other Russian officials had earlier said the protocol may be signed this month -- perhaps even during the IAEA talks now underway in Vienna. Close observers of the Bushehr negotiations said Russia was becoming genuinely concerned over Iran's apparent demands to keep the spent nuclear fuel for two years before it is returned here. Western nations worry the fuel can be reprocessed to make nuclear bombs -- although most analysts agree Tehran still lacks the technology to attack another nation with such a weapon if it was ever developed. "Iran wants to keep the fuel for at least two years in its own storage sites," said Anton Khlopkov of the PIR Center military research institute. "I think that Russia is delaying this not because of US pressure, but out of its own fears about the broader aspects of Iran's potential nuclear ambition." The analyst said any bomb made out of the spent fuel would be the size of "one or two rooms" -- and therefore impossible to launch on a missile. But he added for the time being "the United States has not made any financial offers to Russia that would give it reason to halt the project." Other analysts pointed to confusion within the Kremlin's own ranks ahead of December's parliamentary polls and March presidential elections. These involve debates not revolving around Iran but the very future of Russia's democracy and economic development. "There is no single center of power in Russia and there is fighting going on over various questions including Iran," said political and military analyst Andrei Piontkovsky. "There are people in the Kremlin that want to ally themselves with the United States and those who want to oppose it at all costs," he said. "Putin does not belong to either of these clans -- but he is stranded between them. Russia has no firm position concerning Iran because of internal struggles." Return to Menu 9. Russia, Iran to sign protocol on used nuclear fuel Russia and Iran will talks in Vienna in mid-September on the sending back to Russia of the used nuclear fuel from the Busher Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which is being built in Iran, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev said in an exclusive interview with Itar-Tass. He is going to attend a session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on September 15 to 19. According to his information, the drafting and the signing of a Russian-Iranian protocol on the return of used nuclear fuel "is a purely technical matter." Iran shares the opinion that it is necessary to sign the protocol, and the only thing left is to work out a procedure for it. "We should decide what changes should be made and in what contracts," Rumyantsev said. Previously it was believed that the protocol on sending used nuclear fuel back to Russia would be signed in the first half of September. The signing was postponed, however, because "it is not an easy thing to make changes and amendments to the existing contracts." Rumyantsev said that their ministry had officially informed Iranian officials of the work to be done in that sphere at the Russian-Iranian talks on the building of the Busher NPP in Moscow late last week. Rumyantsev did not make any forecasts about time limits for the signing of the protocol, but expressed hope that the signing would take place soon, most probably in Moscow. The Ministry of Atomic Energy believes that "the signing of the protocol on sending used nuclear fuel back to Russia, to be added to the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the building of the Busher NPP, is an indispensable condition for the beginning of deliveries of fresh nuclear fuel to the NPP." Russia builds NPPs abroad and, along with it, provides them with fuel, after which the used nuclear fuel is sent back for keeping and processing, which is in line with the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear technologies. The Busher NPP, for the building of which an agreement was signed in 1995, is to be put in operation in 2005. Initially, it will have the only power unit, whose value is about one billion dollars. The need for sending used nuclear fuel from Busher to Russia may arise in eight to ten years. Return to Menu 10. Close negotiations currently going on between Iran, IAEA: Asefi (excerpted) […] Commenting on Iran-Russia negotiations on return of spent fueld, he said there is no major problem between the two sides in this regard. Iran`s negotiations with its Russian partners still go on, he said expressing the hope that an agreement will be inked by the two countries. […] Return to Menu F. Russia-North Korea 1. Moscow & Seoul: Talks Concerning Korea Must Carry On Earlier in the day, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov had a meeting with South Korean Ambassador Jong Tae-ick on the latter's request. The sides discussed the results of the late August six-sided talks about Korea in Beijing, reported the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was stressed during the meeting that talks in Beijing had been an important part of the effort to pacify the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeastern Asia on the whole and that they had to be carried on. Losyukov and Jong Tae-ick also emphasized that it was necessary to work out a decision that would ensure nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula while paying heed to the legal interests of all parties involved, i.e. their concerns for safety and "normal conditions for social and economic development," the ministry reported. Return to Menu 2. Expert refutes reports that North Korea developed new missile Vladimir Dvorkin, senior adviser at the Russian Center of Political Studies, said on Tuesday that reports saying that North Korea was ready to accept ballistic missiles with a range of 4,000 kilometers into military service were groundless. "According to experience of the former Soviet Union and the United States, the creation of a missile of this kind must be preceded by a considerable cycle of flying tests. It should be taken into account that nearly half of the first ten launches end in accidents, which are perfectly recorded by space means," Dvorkin told Itar-Tass. Besides, Dvorkin is sure that North Korea doesn't have a sophisticated system of tracking down missile flights without which it is simply impossible to reveal and remove the causes of missile accidents as well as design and production faults. The Russian experts said that any report claiming that North Korea has developed a new missile is a bluff. Reports that North Korea has allegedly tested a new ballistic missile capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 4,000 kilometers have recently appeared in the South Korean daily "Chosun Ilbo". The new missile was expected to be demonstrated at a military parade that was held on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People's Democratic Republic in Pyongyang on Tuesday. However, no new missiles were put on view there. Return to Menu 3. Russia Backs Dialogue Between North and South Koreans - Russian Foreign Ministry Russia consistently backs up the dialogue between compatriots in the North and South Koreas, as well as their desire for a peaceful reunification, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said. This road "fully meets the Russian policy course towards the strengthening of peace and security on the peninsula and helps to eliminate obstacles emerging on this road," the Russian diplomat said at a Monday reception in the North Korean Embassy on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the foundation of North Korea. The Russian deputy foreign minister recalled that the Russian delegation at the recent six-party talks in Beijing on the North Korean nuclear issue stood on this position, seeking to ensure the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, the security of North Korea and other states. Return to Menu G. Nuclear Industry 1. Kasyanov Thinks High of Russian Companies' Chances to Participate in Hungary's Nuclear Power Industry Modernization Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov thinks high of the chances of Russian companies for participation in the modernization of Hungary's nuclear power industry. "If Hungary takes a decision to enlarge and update facilities in its nuclear power industry, Russian companies will stand a good chance of winning the tender," Kasyanov said at a meeting with Russian journalists on results of his visit to Hungary. On Tuesday an agreement was signed in Budapest. Under it, the Russian company TVEL will neutralize the effects of an accident which happened at the Hungarian nuclear power plant Paks. The sum of the contract is 4.5 million dollars. "The contract is targeted to rectify the mistakes made by the previous Hungarian government. Then, instead of inviting Russian specialists /Paks was built with the assistance of the Soviet Union/ they invited Western specialists and an accident happened. Now, I think, the Hungarian side will be more pragmatic and we have a good chance to be involved in the modernization," said Kasyanov. According to the Russian prime minister, Hungary will take a modernization decision before the end of this year. Return to Menu 2. Paks-2 event consequences elimination contract signed in Budapest In Budapest in the course of RF prime-minister Mikhail Kasianov’s visit the contract was signed concerning the work to eliminate consequences of the accident happened to Paks nuclear power plant unit two, RIA Novosti reports. The US$ 4.5 million contract awarded to the Russian Corporation TVEL came into force upon signing. The signing ceremony was attended by Mikhail Kasianov, Hungary’s prime-minister Peter Medgyessy, RF minister of atomic energy Alexander Rumyantsev, TVEL’s president Alexander Nyago, Paks plant management. “We think that the contract will be fulfilled in time and with high quality”, the Russian prime-minister said. The accident at Paks NPP occurred in April 2003 during fuel assembly washing in accordance with the technology and using the equipment supplied by Framatome ANP. The Hungarian side was provided with two technical proposals concerning elimination of the accident consequences: TVEL’s and Framatome ANP’s. TVEL’s proposal would cope with preparing the project and implementing recovery works within about eight months. The Russian company will develop, manufacture and deliver the equipment necessary for elimination of FA damage consequences and will develop work procedure to be jointly implemented by the Russian and Hungarian experts. The work is expected to end with removal of fuel assemblies and their fragments from the washing tank and their encasement in leaktight shrouds. Return to Menu 3. Russian, Hungarian companies sign nuclear power plant contract Russia's company TVEL and Hungary's PAKS have signed a contract for the reconstruction of the nuclear power plant PAKS. The two companies' directors, Alexander Nyago and Istvan Kocsiss, have signed the contact in Budapest in Tuesday. The worth of the deal is 4.5 million dollars. The Russian and Hungarian prime ministers, Mikhail Kasyanov and Peter Medgyssy attended the signing ceremony. "I am sure that the contract will be fulfilled timely and will allow Russian specialists to show a high quality of work," Kasyanov said. The PAKS nuclear power plant, which was built with assistance from Russian experts in the 1980s, went into a disrepair condition in April 2003 during an operation to flush fuel cassettes, in which technology and equipment of a German-French company was used. Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said that specialists of TVEL, a monopolist in Russia's nuclear fuel production sector, would work to restore fuel rods that the company once had delivered to the PAKS plant. The Russian and Hungarian prime ministers called the nuclear power plant construction one of promising lines of cooperation between the two countries. Return to Menu H. Nuclear Safety 1. Atomic Energy Ministry proclaims transparent information policy Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry is determined to honestly and openly inform the population and public organizations about everything that has been going on at nuclear power plants, enterprises and research institutions, Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valery Govorukhin told a news conference at the State Duma on Thursday. "Inaccurate information entails effects equivalent or exceeding those of ordinary terrorist attacks," he said. However, Govorukhin said there were certain levels of information that could not be disclosed to an unlimited range of users, because this might harm the national interests. A solution will have to be found to the problem of access to the necessary original data and the use of software and methodological support. The Atomic Energy Ministry has created a public ecological council. It includes representatives of the industry, science community and ecological organizations. "The council's advice will be published in the press and let known to the public without delay," Govorukhin said. Return to Menu 2. Russia Nuclear Power Ministry: Chernobyl Will Never Be Repeated The modern safety engineering methods in use at nuclear power stations rule out a repetition of catastrophes like in Chernobyl, Valery Govorukhin, Russian deputy minister of the nuclear power industry, told a press conference in the State Duma on Thursday. "Over the last 18 months, technical deviations at Russian nuclear power stations have never fallen below the first, lowest level of aberrations from the normal mode," he said. According to Govorukhin, today's nuclear power engineering "is very safe," ruling out major accidents. Radiation-related risks occupy the 20th place, he made a point. Social factors much more tell on people, Govorukhin continued. The worst health risk is road accidents, he stressed. In turn, Albert Vasilyev, director of the international center for ecological safety at the Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry, said that Russia has perfected methods for the utilisation of nuclear waste "not worse than in the West." The ministry "heavily invests in the development of such technologies," he said. Return to Menu I. Official Statements 1. September 11 Anniversary Statement A statement by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dick Lugar on the Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks. “After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States was forced to act to protect our citizens from a new type of international terrorist. Two oceans no longer serve as adequate protection. These terrorists did not seek a new political agenda, or redress of their concerns. They sought to inflict death and destruction on the United States and other peaceful nations. “The actions of the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq have reduced, I believe, the probability of another large-scale terrorist attack. However, terrorists still seek to harm Americans, and we must be ever vigilant to the threats that they pose, particularly if they are ever successful in acquiring weapons or materials of mass destruction. This is the work we do everyday in focusing on homeland security, the war on terror and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which is securing and eliminating the nuclear, chemical and biological threat from the stockpile of the former Soviet Union.” A report highlighting Senator Lugar’s most recent Nunn-Lugar oversight trip can be found at: http://lugar.senate.gov/nunn_lugar_program.html Return to Menu 2. Joint Communique Issued at Conclusion of Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Tashkent, September 5, 2003 (excerpted) […] The discussion of international issues proceeded from the viewpoint of the upcoming 58th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It was stressed that the transnational character of the challenges and threats of the period of globalization dictates the need for consistent consolidation of the international community by way of multilateral dialogue and collective actions. A coordinating role is to be played by the United Nations with its universal character and unique experience in the job of safeguarding international peace. The UN needs consistent adaptation to the evolving international realities on the understanding that reforms will enhance the efficiency of the UN and of its Security Council and will be based on clear and distinct criteria. The Ministers confirmed the importance of the speediest creation on a UN basis of a Global System of Counteraction Against Present-Day Threats and Challenges, incorporating multilateral cooperation mechanisms and combining measures of a political, economic and social character. The SCO could become an integral element of that system. The Ministers consider it an urgent task of the international community to strengthen the international legal base in the fight against terrorism, including the early adoption of a Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism and of a Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. […] Return to Menu 3. Answers to journalists’ questions after talks with Bulgarian President Georgy Pyrvanov (excerpted) […] Question: I have a question for both Presidents. Could you tell us in more detail about the plans of Russian energy companies for development of relations with Bulgarian partners – in gas, oil, electricity, and also about the increase in Russian investment? Could you also tell us in detail about the political situation in the Balkans? Vladimir Putin: We expect that interaction with Bulgaria in the economic sphere will not be restricted to problems of energy alone. And there is every reason to believe this. But, of course, issues of energy cooperation are among the most important in economic cooperation between Russia and Bulgaria. Here there are several directions of activity. The Bulgarian President just named them. The first is nuclear energy. The atomic energy station in Bulgaria, in Kozlodoe, was built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union. Now two blocs have stopped working, and the issue of starting them up again does not involve the third and fourth blocs, as far as we know there is currently discussion in Bulgaria on whether to stop them or not. I can tell you the economic reasons for Bulgaria as we envisage them. Our European partners, essentially, propose a new construction project which will cost Bulgaria $2 billion. It is also proposed to build energy facilities which Bulgaria will not need even in the most optimistic scenario for the country’s economy. The Russian partners propose to reconstruct the third and fourth blocs, and reconstruction of each of them will cost Bulgaria $150 million. So calculate the difference between 2 billion and 300 million. It is very large. This is the first point. Secondly, from the standpoint of safety and effectiveness, these proposals fully conform to international standards. And our specialists are working with the international energy community so that any concerns on this issue are removed. I just talked with the atomic energy minister, and he confirmed everything that I just told you. We are indeed prepared, as the President said, to also work on building new facilities. At the same time, I can tell you right now that the Russian proposals are half the cost, and are of the same level of quality as the proposals of our partners in the energy community. The final decision, of course, will always lie with the Bulgarians. […] Return to Menu 4. Remarks at The Elliott School of International Affairs (excerpted) […] We work hard to have the best relations with nations large and small, old and new. But it is important that we concentrate on those major powers, and especially on those with which we have had different and difficult relations over the years. Our relationship with Russia and China and India fall into this category. And just look at where we are now. Our relationship with Russia has been dramatically transformed -- for the better -- since that November evening in 1989. Americans and Russians no longer point growing arsenals of strategic missiles at one another. Indeed, thanks to President Bush and President Putin's leadership, we are now radically reducing our strategic weapons' arsenals. In Moscow, we have a committed partner in fighting terrorism and in combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction worldwide. U.S.-Russian commercial relations, too, have expanded, and will expand further to mutual benefit -- not least in the energy sector. The new relationship that is developing between Russia and NATO, too, has real substance. From sharing intelligence on terrorism to working together to deal with humanitarian crises and peacekeeping tasks, the NATO-Russia Council is operational and working -- something that would have been absolutely unthinkable just 15 or so short years ago. And that relationship with Russia can expand as far as our creativity and mutual effort will let it. We are closer than ever, with this new relationship with Russia and the other former republics of the Soviet Union, we are closer than ever to a Europe whole, free and at peace -- a Europe that definitely includes Russia, a Europe that will not in this century face the kinds of challenges that was faced in the century past. Perhaps most important, American and Russian political and economic philosophies are converging. Russia today is more democratic than not. It is also more a market economy than not. We should be patient as Russia develops its democratic institutions, and as the painful hangover of Soviet-era corruption is rooted out and the rule of law firmly established. We do not agree on everything. Earlier this year, we had hoped for a more supportive Russian attitude toward our Iraq policy. We still hope for more change in Russia's attitude toward the Iranian nuclear program. And we differ over aspects of Russian policy in Chechnya. But the relationship as a whole is no longer locked in knee-jerk antagonism. That's what is important. We now have the necessary level of trust required to solve even the most difficult issues that exist between us. […] Return to Menu J. Links of Interest 1. Bellona Investigation Reveals Radiation Levels Are Normal After K-159 Sinking—So Far Return to Menu 2. Missile Defense and Russia Return to Menu 3. Séances by Candlelight Return to Menu 4. The Nuclear Bee-Sting Theory Return to Menu 5. "Seacurity": Improving the Security of the Global Sea-Container Shipping System Return to Menu 6. Nuclear Reaction: Why Won't the IAEA Get Tough with Iran? Return to Menu 7. Gaining Support for Action on Iran's Nuclear Program Return to Menu 8. Nuclear Security – Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism Return to Menu 9. Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@ransac.org |
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