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RANSAC Nuclear News, September 30, 2003 Compiled By: RANSAC Staff A. Nuclear Cities Initiative
 A. Nuclear Cities Initiative 1. Russian bomb makers to have idle hands - U.S. cancels program designed to send scientists into alternate fields As the Bush administration touts its success in securing Russia's gargantuan nuclear weapons complex, it also has chosen not to renew the only U.S. program aimed at turning Russian nuclear weapons scientists and factories to nondefense work. Administration officials complain that the $20 million-a-year Nuclear Cities Initiative didn't give enough protection to U.S. firms against liability for premeditated acts. U.S. Energy Department and Russian Minatom officials recently agreed that 69 projects will run until their completion, employing weapons workers at making artificial limbs, oil and gas instruments and medical imaging machines for sale abroad, in lieu of putting their weapons skills on the black market. But the U.S. decision to let the program expire last week means no new projects will be started. And the administration let a companion program to research disposal of excess U.S. and Russian plutonium to expire in July. "What they allowed to happen is (let) a dispute between lawyers derail a national security program," said Jon Wolfsthal, a former DOE nonproliferation official who negotiated the agreement during the Clinton administration. "It's like letting the engine drop out of your car because you didn't want to pay the price the mechanic was going to charge for a quart of oil," said Wolfsthal, now deputy director of nonproliferation programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It's very short-sighted." "It strikes me as overkill," said Kenneth Luongo, executive director of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. "It's not clear to me the approach was well thought out, and at the same time you're risking the ability to deal with Russian weapons brain drain." At a Moscow meeting two weeks ago, Russian officials were mystified that their American counterparts were willing to kill a five-year-old program over a seemingly technical issue. Why, the Russians asked, is it so important to indemnify Americans against intentionally injuring or killing Russians? "It complicates the work with Russia. But the Department of Energy is hunting for work-arounds," said Bill Dunlop, head of proliferation prevention at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. "I'm fairly confident that a work-around can be found." The reason for the Energy Department's decision lies partly in the Russian judicial system, which would hear lawsuits against U.S. firms engaged in disposing of plutonium or finding new work for Russian scientists. U.S. officials have complained privately that the system is capricious and could rule that all manner of acts are "premeditated." "The U.S. government and U.S. contractors do not have high confidence in the Russian courts. The suspicion is that if we allow an exception (for premeditated acts), that exception will be used," said Laura S.H. Holgate, vice president for Russia/Newly Independent State programs at the Nuclear Threat Institute, a nonprofit founded by former Sen. Sam Nunn and CNN founder Ted Turner. In 2001, Pentagon officials targeted the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the plutonium-disposal research for cuts, but both survived a National Security Council review. Some experts suspect administration officials let the programs expire rather than face a budget fight in Congress, where both programs have enthusiastic boosters. "Given that the Russian government has plans to close a number of facilities in the near future and the concern that a terrorist organization or rogue nation would actively recruit these scientists," said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Alamo, "it only makes sense to continue with the very program that helps them transition into peaceful, alternative careers." Administration officials see the cancellation of the two programs as mounting diplomatic pressure on the Russian Duma to ratify a larger, older collection of Defense Department programs for dismantling Russian weaponry. Those programs have full liability protections for U.S. industry. "This is not some sort of cheap political trick. This is serious," said Henry Sokolski, head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. "If they can't resolve it, they can't proceed. It would put U.S. taxpayers in a tremendous bind." But experts are hopeful the nuclear cities program will be renewed and soon, before a new round of budget cuts and layoffs hits the world's largest nuclear weapons program. "Desperate people might be driven to do desperate things, such as sell weapons materials or their skills to terrorists," said the Nuclear Threat Institute's Holgate. "You don't have to be an altruist to say these are people that you don't want desperate and hungry." One offshoot of the Nuclear Cities Initiative won't be touched by the cancellation. Livermore and other U.S. nuclear cities still enjoy deep ties with their once-secret sister cities in Russia. Former Livermore mayor Cathie Brown hosted four young leaders from Znezinsk last weekend and soon will fly to a larger U.S-Russian gathering in Wisconsin, where she'll practice her Russian. Canceling the nuclear cities program is "a big mistake," Brown said. "But the relationships are still there. We're all still very much involved." Return to Menu B. Research Reactor Fuel Return 1. Letter to the Editor: Nuclear Proliferation and Romania A Sept. 22 news story reported that "Russia took back control of 30 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from an insecure Soviet-era nuclear reactor facility in Romania." But safety standards at Romania's nuclear reactor facility have always been high and the storage of fuel has always been secure. Romania has been promoting a proactive approach regarding conversion for more than a decade. Further, Romania has been consistent in its efforts toward global nonproliferation, in keeping with its engagement in the war against terrorism. The press release issued by the U.S. Energy Department after the shipment is clear: "Romanian authorities stored the fuel in a secure location until it could be securely repatriated. The secretary said the Romanian government has demonstrated leadership in the fight against global terrorism." Return to Menu 2. Stray Uranium, Corralled While the United States is rightly concerned about nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists, it's having a hard time keeping a lot of it secure. About 130 research reactors in 40 countries use highly enriched uranium (HEU), the simplest material from which to make a bomb. Most don't have enough HEU to build one, but about 24 do - and experts say many of those reactors are disturbingly insecure. So far, the Bush administration - not the first to confront the problem - has succeeded in removing HEU from two insecure sites. It worked with Russia, Romania, and the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove 30 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from an insecure Romanian reactor in mid-September. The US paid for flying the material to Russia, its source, where it will be converted to a form that cannot make bombs. The transfer was the second in which the US and Russia have cooperated: Last year, they removed 100 pounds of HEU from an insecure institute in the former Yugoslavia. While both these moves are cause for celebration, and the world is much safer because of them, there's a long way to go. At this rate, the last batch of HEU won't be secured until about 2025. That's too long to wait. Several obstacles block faster action. Some governments and facilities don't want to part with the uranium. For its part, Russia has yet to approve an umbrella agreement to receive the fuel from Soviet-built reactors in other countries - meaning each removal must be negotiated separately. To speed up the securing of this dangerous material, the US must consolidate its various programs to address the danger. Most important, it must increase the incentives - that usually means money - for insecure research facilities to shut down, convert to lower-grade fuel, or surrender US-supplied HEU. Bills to create a five-year program to obtain and neutralize insecure HEU are moving through both houses of Congress. Lawmakers should enact them before leaving town this fall. Meanwhile, President Bush called in his UN speech last week for member states to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to implement controls on the export of sensitive materials. And he announced that 11 nations are preparing to search planes, ships, trains, and trucks carrying suspect cargo, and to seize shipments that raise proliferation concerns - an action taken with an eye on North Korea. Now the world's wealthiest nations must make a political and financial commitment to follow through. Return to Menu 3. Lab officials facilitate uranium shipment Oak Ridge National Laboratory workers recently helped facilitate shipment of highly enriched uranium from Romania to the Russian Federation for down-blending. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham on Monday announced that on Sunday 14 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin HEU were returned from Romania to the Russian Federation under the U.S. Department of Energy funded Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Initiative. The HEU was airlifted from Bucharest, Romania to Russia where it will be down-blended and used for nuclear power plant fuel fabrication. Oak Ridge National Laboratory employees who support the National Nuclear Security Administration's Nuclear Nonproliferation programs took part in planning for the shipment, according to Steven Wyatt, DOE Oak Ridge Operations spokesman. Planning that occurred prior to the shipment included site surveys, verification of the material, and planning for packaging, said Wyatt. The highly enriched nuclear fuel assemblies were originally supplied to Romania by the former Soviet Union for the Russian-designed 2 MW research reactor, located close to the Romanian capital, Bucharest. The reactor was shutdown in December 1997, and is being decommissioned. The fresh nuclear fuel was loaded in 8 fresh fuel transportation canisters provided by the Russian Federation. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspectors and U.S. DOE technical experts monitored the process of loading the fuel in the canisters. An IL-76 Russian cargo plane was used to complete the air shipment of the HEU fuel from Romania. The shipment of fresh research reactor fuel from Romania to Russia was part of a U.S.-led cooperative international effort to reduce, and if possible eliminate, the use in and storage of highly enriched uranium in civil nuclear activities. In 1996, DOE established the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, under which the United States accepts specified types of spent and unused fresh fuel containing U.S.-supplied uranium for management and disposition in the United States, on condition that operators agree to convert their reactors to low-enriched uranium as soon as practicable. This project with Romania represents the first step of a similar program that DOE has created jointly with Russia and the IAEA to return Russian-supplied HEU research reactor fuel for long-term management and disposition. The IAEA has played an instrumental role in arranging the shipment from Romania. Return to Menu C. Submarine Dismantlement 1. Rusty and Radioactive On Aug. 30, the K-159, a Russian November-class nuclear submarine, sank during bad weather in the Barents Sea, taking with it nine sailors. The K-159, which had been decommissioned by the Russian Navy in 1989, broke loose as it was being towed to the Nerpa dismantling site near Murmansk. Unfortunately, the K-159 accident is symptomatic of a larger malaise plaguing the Russian Navy. More than 30 of Russia's first-generation nuclear submarines are deteriorating, with the most typical problems including hull leaks and the failure of safety systems. Submarine conditions are only part of the problem, however. None of the 192 submarines that Russia has decommissioned have been completely dismantled; Russia lacks places to put the vessels' spent fuel and irradiated scrap. As a temporary measure, more than 80 nuclear reactor compartments are encased in storage containers at sea that have to be inspected and repaired periodically so they stay afloat. Furthermore, at least 40 decommissioned nuclear vessels of other kinds are anchored off Russian bases, while two submarines with nuclear reactors that were damaged in accidents and require special treatment are still docked at a base near Vladivostok, in the Sea of Japan. In addition, there are only rudimentary environmental radiation-monitoring systems in the Russian regions that deal with the dismantling of nuclear submarines or the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. This burdensome nuclear legacy of the cold war poses a potential threat not only to Russia but also to its neighbors. The K-159 accident was, unfortunately, not the first such accident involving a decommissioned Russian nuclear sub; a similar mishap occurred in 1997 off the Kamchatka Peninsula, thankfully without the loss of life. This time, however, there were significant casualties, and the submarine went down in an area of active navigation and commercial fishing. By itself, the sinking of the K-159 is not likely to cause an environmental disaster. Though its reactors contain spent fuel, the protective barriers and safety features of the submarine should prevent the escape of any measurable amount of radioactivity. But this accident is a clear signal to Russia and the international community to hasten the dismantling program and ensure the security of the Russian Navy. The potential is great for a disaster far worse than that of the K-159: many of the deteriorating submarines have high radioactivity levels, yet are hundreds of miles from a dismantling site. In recent years, Russia has undertaken a major effort, financed by the United States and other countries, to expedite the decommissioning of naval vessels and to secure radioactive materiel. Yet there is not enough manpower and resources to do so at the required pace. Without further involvement by the international community, efforts to eliminate the dangers of the maritime cold war legacy may take a long time. And while there is significant international cooperation in this area � including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program, which is financed by the United States and Norway � the scope of these efforts has yet to match the magnitude of the problem. The sinking of the K-159 is one more call for joint efforts to solve problems that remain from the cold war. Eliminating threats from nuclear and radioactive materials should be a priority for both Russia and the international community � one made all the more urgent because of the intensifying activities of terrorists and their quest for weapons of mass destruction. Ashot Sarkissov is a retired vice admiral in the Russian Navy. This article was translated by Ilya Feliciano from the Russian. Return to Menu 2. Dates of recovering wrecked Russian sub unknown Date at which the wrecked Russian nuclear submarine K-159 will be recovered from the depths of the Barents Sea is not known yet, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, the chief commander of the Russian Navy, said here Sunday. "It's pretty problematic to specify any dates until we choose the final version of the recovery operation," Adm. Kuroyedov said. "No doubt, the submarine will be hoisted from the sea one day - we simply have no right to leave that dangerous object on the sea floor," he indicated. Regular monitoring of radiation levels in the disaster area shows that the radiation background there is within standard parameters, Adm. Kuroyedov said. He also said experts had selected four projects of recovery out of the 13 projects, offered by Russian military and civilian organization, and their scrutiny was underway. "I can tell you for sure a Russian recovery project will be chosen, but a use of foreign assistance in it is not ruled out in later phases," Adm. Kuroyedov said. The submarine sank on August 30 while being towed for utilization to a ship-repair yard in the town of Polyarny. It had a crew of ten people aboard. Only one sailer survived. Return to Menu 3. Sunken sub will be retrieved - Russian Navy commander The decommissioned Russian submarine K-159, which sank in the Barents Sea while being towed in late August, will definitely be retrieved, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov has said. "The sunken submarine will definitely be raised. We will not leave a nuclear object on the seafloor, despite the fact that its current condition does not pose any kind of threat and our special services did not find any evidence of radioactive pollution," Kuroyedov said speaking in Kaliningrad on Sunday, following a ceremony of the Russian frigate Nadezhda's departure for a round-the-world trip. "It is somewhat early to talk about the dates, methods, and participants for the raising operation," Kuroyedov said. "All these issues are being actively examined. The possibility and necessity of involving foreign companies is being considered as well," he said. "We have selected 4 out of the 13 proposed projects for raising the vessel which were devised by both military and civilian specialists. In the near future, the most suitable project will be determined and its organization will be started," the admiral said. The K-159 sank three miles northwest of the Kildin Island on August 30 and is currently located at a depth of 170 meters. There were 10 people onboard the sub. One of them was rescued, two bodies were retrieved, and the remaining seven are still considered missing. The sub's nuclear reactor had been brought to safe condition and its ammunition had been unloaded prior to the sinking. Return to Menu D. Russia-Iran 1. Whom Does the Iranian Nuclear Program Threaten? Washington is demanding that Russia stop all nuclear cooperation with Iran, that it renounce a contract for the construction of the Bushehr NPP (Nuclear Power Plant), and that it freeze all other facilities and programs within the framework of the Iranian nuclear power industry. The United States claims that such programs can help Iran, which ranks among the Moslem world's largest countries, and which allegedly supports international terrorism, to develop its own nuclear weapons. However, any convincing evidence to the effect that Teheran supports terrorist organizations is lacking. Nonetheless, Russia is also concerned over the Iranian nuclear program. You see, Iran boasts an initial potential for developing nuclear weapons. Among other things, uranium deposits are located in its Jazd province; nonetheless, such relatively poor deposits contain only 50 grams of uranium per every 100 kg of uranium ore. Moreover, these deposits, which can't ensure full-fledged NPP operation, will be depleted quickly enough several years from now. However, they will provide enough uranium for making several nuclear warheads. A uranium-separation factory is currently being constructed in Erdekan city; plans are in place to commission this enterprise in 2005. An Isfahan-based uranium-concentrate enterprise can be commissioned anytime now. (By the way, uranium concentrate resembles some kind of a yellow powder - Ed.) Iran is to start building a uranium-conversion factory, and a pilot uranium-enrichment facility, 150 km from Isfahan can be commissioned in the near future. The Isfahan nuclear center boasts several labs, which turn out fuel for water-cooled and water-moderated (VVER) reactors. Moreover, Iran is now completing an enterprise, which will be producing fuel-assembly cases. Iran has made considerable headway in developing a closed-loop fuel cycle. This implies the nuclear power industry alone. IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) experts estimate that Iran will be able to turn out its own NPP fuel by the year 2006. Most nuclear experts know perfectly well that Iranian uranium deposits can provide only about 33 percent of all uranium for operating one VVER-1000 power unit. Meanwhile the projected gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment factory won't produce enough fuel for even one VVER reactor, let alone seven reactors, due to be constructed by Iran in Bushehr some 18 years from now. So, why is Iran moving to create a closed-loop nuclear fuel cycle, if its nuclear power industry lacks such fuel? One should also keep in mind that, if produced, such fuel would cost some 200-400 percent more than foreign nuclear fuel. There can be several answers to this question. Iran wants to acquire hi-tech equipment and technologies, without creating commercial uranium-production, as well as uranium-conversion and fuel-production facilities. First of all, Teheran needs this stuff in order to bargain with the United States, North Korean style. To cut a long story short, Iran might renounce construction of uranium-enrichment facilities in exchange for a possible US decision to lift unilateral economic sanctions. Second, Teheran's nuclear program aims to acquire a technical potential for developing nuclear weapons some time from now. Teheran's international commitments present no obstacle whatsoever because Iran can produce highly enriched uranium, as well as weapon-grade plutonium, stockpiling them at separate enterprises under IAEA supervision. At the same time, Iran can acquire the required technical and material potential for developing nuclear weapons in just a few months, as soon as it stockpiles enough weapon-grade nuclear materials. Meanwhile the relevant political decision for using these reserves for military purposes can be made, in case, Iranian-US relations deteriorate still further, and if the US Administration starts preparing to overthrow the incumbent Teheran regime. In a nutshell, one can talk about a veritable national-security insurance policy, which would tally with international law. Still it goes without saying that this scenario won't benefit Russia, as well as the entire international community. What can be done in order to prevent these negative developments? First of all, we must convince Teheran to sign the additional IAEA protocol, as the IAEA expands its cooperation with member-countries. The Iranian position is as follows: Two objectives should be accomplished at one go. First of all, the level of trust between specific countries and the IAEA should be enhanced; in other words, IAEA countries should make their nuclear programs more transparent. Second, the IAEA should facilitate the development of national nuclear programs. Teheran believes that the IAEA should balance between its technical-control functions and sectoral-aid functions. In addition, Teheran is demanding guarantees as regards non-discriminatory IAEA operations. In its opinion, the additional IAEA protocol should be signed by Teheran, as well as other countries, which are not covered by large-scale IAEA guarantees. The list of such countries includes Israel, first and foremost. Naturally enough, this requirement won't be fulfilled in the foreseeable future, to say the least. Russia voices a consistent and principled position on this issue. Moscow keeps saying time and again that Teheran should ink the afore-said additional protocol. This was stated by a Russian delegate at the 47-th session of the IAEA general conference. Iran doesn't refuse to do this; on the other hand, Iran wants to find out all about possible benefits. However, the IAEA hasn't yet provided its final answer. Neither Russia, nor the United States want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Consequently, we must expand cooperation in those specific areas where our interests coincide. Moscow provides Washington with confidential information, which is leaked to the US press and even spearheaded against Russia and its interests in some cases. As I see it, Russia should continue to link subsequent nuclear cooperation between Moscow and Teheran with the signing of the additional IAEA protocol by the Iranian leadership. Moscow should also demand that Teheran pledge to return spent nuclear fuel. Iranian leaders, who have repeatedly made this promise, should ink this document to date. Russia should not moth-ball construction of light-water power units, if Iran abides by such wishes. The thing is that VVER-1000 reactors can't be used to develop nuclear weapons. Meanwhile the projected Bushehr NPP would yield an impressive economic effect. One Bushehr power unit costs $1 billion; moreover, about 300 Russian enterprises employing more than 20,000 workers, engineers and technicians are involved in this program. It would be ridiculous to lose this lucrative contract. The US side promises to compensate Russian losses; however, such promises may never be fulfilled, as has been the case more than once. Among other things, Washington had insistently asked Ukraine not to deliver its turbines for the Iranian NPP. Well, Kiev did comply, nonetheless receiving no compensation in return. At the same time, we should attach priority to control over export operations on the part of those particular Russian enterprises, which offer sensitive goods and services (in the context of the non-proliferation regime), as well as R&D centers, which possess nuclear and missile secrets. Mind you, Iran has repeatedly tried to learn about those secrets in violation of the law. The Russian foreign-policy concept perceives Iran as one of this country's leading Moslem-world partners. Partner-like relations between Moscow and Teheran would largely solve the problems of radical Islamic movements in the Caucasus (where Teheran consistently supports the Kremlin's position). Russia, which has 20 million Moslems, considers Iran's support for its anti-terrorist policies in Chechnya as something highly important because Iran boasts substantial influence in the Islamic world. President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation addresses this issue in a pragmatic manner. There are certain specifics, which imply the need for heeding the international community's security concerns, Putin believes. Russia, which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and which is also a G-8 member, should pay attention to such concerns; however, it should not forget about its national interests either, Putin added. Return to Menu 2. US expects Russia to end Iran nuclear cooperation if IAEA demands not met The United States said Monday it expected Russia to halt construction of Iran's first nuclear power plant should the Islamic state fail to prove by October 31 that it is not secretly developing atomic weapons. The US ambassador to Moscow said President George W. Bush and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin did not specifically touch on Russia's decision to push on with Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant project during their weekend Camp David talks. But Ambassador Alexander Vershbow said that Bush had made it clear he expected Russia to cease Bushehr's development project should Iran fail to cooperate with the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia and the United States "continue to have difference of views on this issue but this (Bushehr) was not the focus of this discussion," Vershbow told reporters. He stressed that Bush's discussion with Putin on Iran was "very positive ... because both the United States and Russia have reservations about Iran's nuclear ambitions." During a joint press conference with Putin on Saturday, Bush evaded a question on whether the Russian leader had given him a direct assurance if Russia intended to halt nuclear cooperation with Tehran. Although the project is worth some 800 million dollars (around 700 million euros) to Russia, the US official said Washington expected Moscow to end all cooperation with Tehran should it fail to meet the IAEA's October 31 deadline. "It is our expectation that if Iran fails to comply (with IAEA resolutions), than the Russian side does the right thing in regards to Bushehr," Vershbow said. A senior official at the atomic energy ministry told AFP in early September that Russia would stop its nuclear programs with Iran "immediately" if the Islamic state was found to be in violation of IAEA norms. Iran declared Monday that it would not accept any restrictions on its bid to generate nuclear power and rejected international demands for tougher safeguards on its nuclear power program amid suspicions that it was merely a cover for nuclear weapons development. Return to Menu 3. Russia Won't End Accord With Iran to Build Reactor President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said today that he would send "a clear but respectful signal to Iran" that it must comply with international inspections of its suspected nuclear weapons program. But he told President Bush that Russia would go forward with its plans to help Iran build a nuclear reactor. Mr. Putin's statement this morning that he would not terminate Russia's $800 million commercial nuclear contract with Iran came as a brief, and almost cryptic, aside in response to a question at a news conference with Mr. Bush at the presidential retreat at Camp David. Eager to portray themselves as close partners in a fight against terrorism and proliferation, neither leader dwelled on their differences over support for Iran's nuclear program. They said they had warm and detailed discussions on other topics, including Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan and the twin nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea. But Russia's help to Iran in its main nuclear reactor project has been a continuing source of tension between the two countries. That is true even though Russia has joined in setting an Oct. 31 deadline for Iran to open itself completely to international inspectors, who have found worrisome traces of highly enriched uranium at two sites in the country. Mr. Putin's statement indicated that after two years of discussions, Mr. Bush has been unable to persuade his Russian counterpart that Russia's support of an ostensibly civilian nuclear energy program could speed Iran's ability to gain the raw material for weapons. His remarks also suggested broader differences in how they will approach the problem of proliferation. Asked about the issue today, Mr. Putin said simply, "As to the joint work, we are ready to pursue it." He gave no details, and immediately moved into a discussion of Iraq. Mr. Bush played down any differences, telling reporters, referring to the International Atomic Energy Agency: "You heard the president say that the I.A.E.A. process must go forward. We firmly agree. I found this part of our discussions to be very satisfactory." A senior administration official said after the meeting that Mr. Bush had not pressed too hard on the reactor sale in recent months because "it is nearly completed." But the official said that Mr. Bush believed that if Iran defied the atomic energy agency, "you'll see a lot of countries reconsidering their cooperation," and that Russia might not deliver the last, crucial pieces of technology. "There was no commitment," the official said. "We'll have to see." The meeting was intended to reinforce a relationship that began well after Mr. Bush's election, but has run into sharp differences � first over Mr. Bush's decision to withdraw from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, then over Iraq and Iran. "This visit comes at the confluence of two streams," one of Mr. Bush's senior advisers said on Friday. "Iraq and other current issues, and our effort to take a relationship that is pretty good and pretty broad and to deepen it." The two men insisted today that they had done so, and aides pointed to an accord on military-to-military relationships. But at the same time, Mr. Putin kept his distance from Mr. Bush on several issues. He said he would not decide what help Russia would provide in the occupation of Iraq until a new resolution passes the United Nations, where there is an effort to press Mr. Bush to turn over more authority to the Iraqi Governing Council and to the United Nations than he has been willing to do. "We have differences over Iraq, in terms of practical ways how to resolve this problem, but we had understanding on the essence of the problem," Mr. Putin said. But he said that relations were good and that problems would be solved "without excessive emotions or ambitions," apparently a reference to the highly charged meetings between American and Soviet leaders during the cold war. In another example of their different approaches, Mr. Putin pressed Mr. Bush to offer North Korea a guarantee of its security in exchange for its agreement to re-enter the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, which is racing forward at a pace matched only by Iran's. "Russia believes ensuring the nuclear nonproliferation regime should be accompanied by North Korea receiving guarantees in the sphere of security," Mr. Putin said. He was referring to North Korean demands for what it calls a "nonaggression pact" with the United States. Mr. Bush has rejected entering such a pact, though he has repeatedly stated publicly that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. While they sounded friendly � Mr. Bush referred to Mr. Putin as Vladimir and gave his highest compliment, "Good job," for how he handled himself at the news conference � the two men did not share the easy laughs they had in Crawford, Tex., last year. That may have been a reflection of the more formal environment of a news conference. Yet at every turn, Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin said they shared the same goals: assuring that unconventional weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists, that neither Iran nor North Korea develops nuclear weapons, and that democracy flourishes in Iraq. They cast their differences as tactical, and Mr. Bush said they shared what he termed "a trustworthy relationship." "Plus, I like him, he's a good fellow to spend quality time with," Mr. Bush said. But growing American concern about Russia's brutal military action in Chechnya led Mr. Bush to raise the issue, delicately, in his prepared statement today, saying that while "terrorists must be opposed wherever they spread chaos and destruction, including Chechnya," a "lasting solution" would require "respect for human rights and a political settlement that leads to free and fair elections." Mr. Putin did not discuss Chechnya in public today. Mr. Bush seemed eager to portray Mr. Putin as a general supporter of America's approach to Iraq, especially after Russia sided with France and Germany in opposing the invasion of the country. Mr. Putin muted any criticism today. Instead, he said progress was being made on carrying out the biggest single success in the relationship so far: the Treaty of Moscow, which calls for sharp reductions in both nations' nuclear arsenals. A Russian reporter seemed less worried about America's nuclear power than about its visa power, saying Russian reporters were interviewed at the American Embassy before being allowed to accompany Mr. Putin. "Can I be assured that my question will not lead to a denial of visa for me, personally?" the reporter asked. "No!" Mr. Bush said, laughing. "Nyet!" he added, laughing harder. Return to Menu E. Russia-North Korea 1. Tilted to the Middle East At the end of their two-day meeting in Camp David last week, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin urged both Iran and North Korea to abandon their suspected nuclear weapons programs. But we doubt that the joint call will have any practical effect in finding a solution to the problem. Disagreement was apparent between the two leaders, who both sent delegates to the multilateral talks on the North Korean nuclear question. While Putin said that in exchange for North Korea's promise to dismantle its nuclear program, the United States should give the communist country a guarantee of its security, Bush was unwilling to make that concession. There were few signs of efforts to resolve this very significant difference, and the two leaders only repeated the common position of demanding that the North end its nuclear weapons scheme "completely, verifiably and irrevocably." Hearing such hollow words from Camp David, Pyongyang leaders must have found little to lose sleep over. In the first place, measuring Iran and North Korea by the same standard concerning their nuclear programs ignores reality. Both happened to be classified as part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq in Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, but in terms of the imminence and magnitude of the threat they represent, North Korea is in no way comparable with Iran, considering the former's advanced means of delivery, not to mention its huge conventional arsenal. Russia's nuclear assistance to Iran, including an $800 million contract to build a power plant, causes particular concern for Washington, and the International Atomic Energy Agency said last week that it had found evidence that Iran is enriching uranium. Yet Bush should see the difference between the troubles in the Middle East and Northeast Asia and act accordingly, not be misguided by wholesale definitions. As for Russia, we urge it to come out of its historical patron's mentality toward North Korea. Having hatched the communist regime in Pyongyang after World War II and provided all necessary preparations for the Korean War, and more recently having supplied the reactors with which the North started its nuclear development program, Russia should be more actively engaged in defusing the tension on the peninsula. No longer a superpower, with its territory shrunk by half and national income reduced by two-thirds in a little over a decade, Russia should seek to play a constructive role for its neighbors and gain the trust of the international community. Moscow, having a high stake in a peaceful and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, should explore the best way to achieve it rather than being obsessed with maintaining its sphere of influence, seemingly in competition with Beijing. The Bush-Putin meeting last week must have significantly increased antiterrorism cooperation between the two countries, especially with warm personal ties on the top level. But it was unfortunate that the summit was tilted to the Middle East and failed to illustrate the two countries' readiness to tackle the problems in this region with equal commitment. Return to Menu F. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Lack of Defence Spending Leads to Tragedies Why do Russian planes and helicopters crash and submarines sink? There have been a series of tragedies in the past few weeks. First two Mi-24 combat helicopters crashed while landing during tactical exercises in the Far East and the Pacific Fleet, killing eight officers. Then a K-159 nuclear submarine sank off Kildin Island in the Barents Sea while en route to be scrapped, leaving nine submariners dead. And lastly, a heavy strategic Tu-160 bomber, called the White Swan in Russia and Blackjack in the West, crashed outside Saratov while making a flight after one of its four engines had been replaced. The latter was the most symbolic accident, as one could blame the crashes of the two helicopters and the sinking of the submarine on the human factor. But the crash of the Tu-160 encouraged the Russian military to start speaking about the need to review state attitudes to financing defence. The investigation of the Tu-160 catastrophe is not over yet, but it is clear that the crew was not to blame, if only because it was one of the best. Lt.-Col. Yuri Deineko, deputy regiment commander for flight training and the pilot of the unlucky plane, flew the supporting aircraft of the bomber on which Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov went to the Russian Far East in early September. The crew of the Tu-160 managed the virtually impossible, when they flew the dying plane as far away as possible from Europe's largest underground gas storage, which holds 8 million cubic metres of methane. If the Tu had crashed over it, the consequences of the environmental disaster would have been unimaginable. Unlike the helicopter crashes and the K-159 sinking, Sergei Ivanov did not hurry to publicise his verdict on the reason of the Tu-160 crash. But whatever conclusions are made on that and the other catastrophes, it is clear that the root cause of these tragic developments in the Russian armed forces is the systematic crisis that cannot be overcome by sackings and court hearings alone. Anatoly Kvochur, Hero of Russia and merited test pilot, had the following to say about the Tu-160 crash: "When planes remain on land for years and then flight training gathers momentum (as is the case now), we should not expect miracles, as some thing has remained unused for too long, other things rusted, and still others malfunction. Aviation is a complicated mechanism where any element can lead to a catastrophe. We first built the planes, then wrote rules, and then we started breaking them. What can one expect from equipment in this situation?" The statistics quoted by Lt.-Gen. Sergei Solntsev, head of the flight safety service of the Russian Air Force, are truly appalling: with the norm of annual minimal flight time being 150-200 hours, the real average figures in the armed forces are only 15-20 hours. Lt.-Col. Yuri Deineko, Major Oleg Fedosenko, Capt. Sergei Sukhorukov and Capt. Grigory Kolchin - the crew of the crashed Tu-160 and the best crew of the 22nd Guards Aviation Division of Heavy Bombers - had only 30 hours of training flight time this year and 50 hours last year. Everyone knows why our pilots spend so little time flying. There is not enough fuel. The 2003 defence budget allocated 2.2 billion roubles less on combat training (including aircraft flights, ship cruises, and the driving of tanks and other combat vehicles) than is needed. In fact, the allocations suffice for only 30-40% of the requisite volume of training, in particular barely enough for 25-35 hours of fight training and just 50km of practical driving for vehicle drivers (the norm being 450km). According to the defence ministry conclusions on the 2004 draft budget, which has been forwarded to the State Duma, the shortage of funds for fuel and lubricants in the army and navy will not be solved next year. Allocations will suffice only to increase the flight training to 32-35 hours per pilot and 16-20 days of sea training per ship (the minimum being 40 days). Moreover, with such a crisis in funding, the first to seize the chance to train are majors and lieutenant colonels, who have some flight experience already under their belts, says Sergei Solntsev. As for the young lieutenants, who did not have enough flight training in their military schools, they are frequently not allowed to fly at all. Unless we do something now, we will soon have no pilots to fly our aircraft. The trouble is that aviation is short not only of fuel and lubricants but also of spares and repair and maintenance funds. The statistics of air crashes with casualties in Russia and the USA is approximately the same, one tragedy per 20,000-22,000 hours of flight time. But experts say that such crashes, which are often a result of the human factor for other countries' armed forces, are a technical regularity in Russia. Return to Menu G. Nuclear Industry 1. Moscow, Ljubljana to Sign Protocol on Nuclear Fuel Deliveries to Slovenia Following the talks with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, his Slovenian counterpart Anton Rop told reporters Tuesday that Moscow and Ljubljana planned to sign a protocol on nuclear deliveries to Slovenia. The Slovenian parliament has ratified a protocol on inventorying agreements between the USSR and Slovenia. "This is a basis for holding talks and concluding a protocol on nuclear fuel deliveries," said Rop. The Slovenian prime minister is certain that this document will mean economic benefits for both countries as no intermediaries will be involved. Return to Menu 2. Russia to invest $14.5 mln in Kazakh uranium mine Russia will provide $14.5 million for the construction of the Zarechnoye uranium mine in Kazakhstan, due to begin in 2004. The mine is due to go on stream by the end of 2005, when it should attain projected capacity of 500 tonnes of yellowcake, a spokesman for Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan's national nuclear concern, said. Kazatomprom owns 45% of a joint venture with Russia and Kyrgyzstan that will develop the mine, which is in southern Kazakhstan. Return to Menu 3. Tianwan nuclear plant project runs according to schedule -official. The works on building the Tianwan nuclear power plant in China, assisted by Russia, France and German, run according to schedule, on the whole, Deputy Russian Atomic Energy Minister Valery Govorukhin said on Tuesday. The first tentative run of the 1st reactor's main circuit is planned for November, while the loading of fuel into the reactor is due in April 2004, said Govorukhin who recently visited the construction site. At present, the construction of the first unit proceeds, on the whole, in line with the schedule of the contract signed between Russia's Atomstroiexport and China's Jiangsu nuclear energy company in 1997, he told Itar-Tass. More than 3,000 people are involved in the construction of the first two units at the Tianwan plant, including 800 specialists from Russia. According to Govorukhin, the reactor will be connected to China's power grid on May 30, 2004, and commissioned in December 2004. Commenting on supplies of fresh nuclear fuel for the Tianwan plant, an official from Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry emphasized that the TVEL company will supply the fuel for the initial and two subsequent loadings of the plant's reactors. In the future, the fuel for VVER-1000 reactors will be produced in China, which bought a production license from Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry. The storage and handling of the spent fuel will be the responsibility of Chinese specialists; they have the necessary technology for it, the official said According to Govorukhin, the Chinese leadership praised the Russian-Chinese cooperation in building the Tianwan plant and expressed an opinion regarding a possibility of the construction of another two reactors, if the works on building the first two units were completed successfully and on time. Specialists from a number of countries regard the Tianwan plant the best in the world. Govorukhin said it was the most striking example of international cooperation in nuclear power generation. Russia is making the main contribution to the implementation of the project, supplying two VVER-1000 reactors, power generating equipment, turbines and generators, while the Franco-German firm Framatom ANP supplies monitoring and control equipment, Govorukhin said Return to Menu H. Official Documents 1. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharrazi A meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Kamal Kharrazi took place on September 29 in New York on the sidelines of the 58th UN General Assembly. The sides discussed a broad range of international problems, as well as the prospects for bilateral relations, including trade-and-economic ties. Special attention was devoted to questions of Iranian nuclear program transparency, in particular in light of the resolution adopted in this connection by the IAEA Board of Governors. Return to Menu 2. U.S. and Russia Take Major Steps Toward Shut Down of Last Three Weapons Reactors The United States and Russia have taken another major step toward closing down the last three remaining Russian reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium with the signing of two contracts for fossil-fuel power plants to be built and refurbished in Siberia. The two U.S. companies under contract, Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services, will carry out this work at the two sites, which will begin in Fiscal Year 2004. The companies have completed negotiations with Rosatomstroi, a Russian investment and construction company, for preliminary designs of projects to refurbish and construct fossil-fuel power plants in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. When the refurbishment and construction have been completed, operation of the plants will permit the shut down of the plutonium production reactors. This agreement represents another major step in the U.S.-Russia Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP) initiated by U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexandr Rumyantsev. "The administration places a high priority on successful nonproliferation programs, and elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia is an important step in our joint nonproliferation program," Secretary Abraham said. "Our two countries have made good progress towards nonproliferation goals, and we look forward to continuing our good work and progress through successful ventures like this." The three Russian reactors not only produce significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium daily, they also provide heat and electricity to several hundred thousand Russians in the traditionally closed cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. These reactors have deficiencies in the areas of design, equipment, and materials, and are considered to be among the highest risk reactors in the world. To ensure reactor safety, high priority safety upgrades are being expeditiously pursued with the help of the Department of Energy (DOE). At a ceremony in Vienna in March 2003, Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev signed the agreement that would reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction by stopping plutonium production at the last three Russian plutonium production reactors. In May 2003, Abraham and the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Yuri Ushakov, announced that $466 million was awarded to two U.S. companies to begin the shutdown work. Return to Menu 3. Interview on ABC's This Week With George Stephanopolous (excerpted) [�] MR. STEPHANOPOLOUS: There is also concern about weapons of mass destruction, as you know, in Iran. This week the International Atomic Energy Agency found for the second time, evidence of weapons grade uranium in Iran. And, yesterday, I spoke with the Foreign Minister of Iran, yesterday, in New York. And he said that Iran would be willing to accept full IAEA inspections, but they are not willing to give up their peaceful nuclear enrichment program. Is that enough for the United States? SECRETARY POWELL: We need Iran to adopt the additional protocol that they have been asked -- MR. STEPHANOPOLOUS: He said they would. SECRETARY POWELL: Well, then make it public and do it. But that, in and of itself, isn't enough. We have to have all questions, with respect to their nuclear weapons programs answered. A year ago, everybody thought the United States was being unreasonable by insisting that Iran be held to account for what it was doing. Even the Russians thought we were a bit unreasonable. And over the past year, the evidence that has come forward, that is now before the IAEA has made it clear to the world that there is something going on in Iran, with respect to nuclear weapons development. It goes beyond their nuclear power industry. The IAEA has now concluded this. Russia is now working with us. Russia -- MR. STEPHANOPOLOUS: They didn't say though they would stop helping Iran build their reactors. SECRETARY POWELL: We didn't ask them to stop building a nuclear reactor. What we have said to them is we have got to make sure that any reactor that is provided to them, the fuel cycle for that reactor, and how the material that might go into that reactor gets used and fed back into the overall nuclear fuel cycle system of the world, those questions have to be answered. [�] Return to Menu 4. Interview on CNN's Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer, by Judy Woodruff (excerpted) [�] MS. WOODRUFF: Very quickly, the President met this weekend with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Among other things, they talked about Iran. And afterwards, Mr. Putin said his government is -- they're going to respectfully suggest that the Iranians comply with international weapons inspections, but Russia is basically going to go ahead with its plan to help Iraq build a nuclear reactor. The Iranians are saying we're going to go ahead, even with uranium enrichment. Are you disappointed? SECRETARY POWELL: We never asked Russia to not build the plant at Bushehr. They are building a plant, and President Putin said he's going to go ahead with that plant. The issue is the fuel that goes into that plant and the fuel cycle that is created. Will we be able to control whatever fuel is going into that plant so that it does not become a source of nuclear weapons-grade material? What is different about the situation this year than, say, just a year ago, with respect to the Russians, is a year ago everybody thought America was overreacting. Everybody thought America was picking on the Iranians. But it turned out that we had it right. And over the past year, the evidence has become incontrovertible that the Iranians have been moving in the direction of producing a nuclear weapon. The Russians acknowledge it, the International Atomic Energy Commission acknowledges it. We will see at the end of October another report from the IAEA. And Iran now has to decide whether they are going to make known to the international community what they are doing. They need to sign an additional protocol. They need to answer all of the questions that have been raised to respect to their nuclear programs. And Russia has said -- MS. WOODRUFF: Right. SECRETARY POWELL: -- respectfully, as Putin says, we need to have these questions answered. But they are still going ahead with the plant, nor did the President tell him not to go ahead with the plant. [�] Return to Menu 5. Remarks Following Interview on This Week With George Stephanopolous (excerpted) [�] QUESTION: What's your reaction to President Putin saying yesterday that he will continue to help Iran build nuclear reactors? SECRETARY POWELL: I'm not surprised at all. We didn't think he wouldn't continue with the one reactor that has been sold to Iran. The question is how that reactor is used and how fuel is provided to the reactor, the fuel itself, that gives us the problem and gives the material (inaudible) nuclear weapons. We believe that Iran should sign the initial protocol that it has been asked sign, and take whatever other actions are appropriate to satisfy the international community that their nuclear power program -- (inaudible) nuclear power program is not a basis for developing a nuclear weapon. We are concerned about this. We expressed our concerns. At the beginning of this Administration, a lot of people sort of thought that we were overreacting. But in recent months, everybody has now come to the conclusion that something is going on inside of Iran. And that's why the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, took the action that it is taking and why Russia now is standing alongside the United States. As you heard our two presidents say yesterday, is concerned, and we have to put these questions to Iran and ask for answers. As President Putin said, ask in a respectful manner, but there are questions that must be answered. [�] Return to Menu 6. Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin held productive discussions at Camp David, Maryland, on September 26 and 27, 2003. Building on the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship of May 24, 2002, and other joint documents, they focused on practical ways to broaden and deepen cooperation and partnership between the United States and Russia, overcoming obstacles and fulfilling their shared vision of a new strategic relationship to deal with the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century. The Presidents discussed a broad range of bilateral and international issues, including counter-terrorism; preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the situations in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; strengthening the NATO-Russia relationship; progress in creating conditions to expand economic and commercial relations; cooperation in high technology, housing, and health; and people-to-people contacts, as well as other questions of mutual interest. The Presidents agreed on next steps in a number of areas to strengthen the existing U.S.-Russia partnership. They issued specific instructions to their respective governments identifying tasks to be undertaken by the appropriate agencies and specifying timelines for doing so, and they underscored their shared intention to monitor fulfillment of these tasks. In particular, they identified key areas where progress might be made in the near term, including, among other issues: implementing effectively the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Treaty of Moscow), and continuing efforts to increase transparency and build confidence on strategic issues; building cooperation between the American and Russian military establishments, as critical to joint efforts in areas such as counter-terrorism, missile defense, and peacekeeping; strengthening commercial and economic relations through further cooperation in enhancing global energy security, eliminating barriers to trade and investment, promoting high-technology cooperation, and protecting intellectual property rights; strengthening consultation and cooperation in dealing with regional problems; and deepening cooperation in the battle against HIV/AIDs, which will benefit the United States and Russia, and contribute to the global effort against this modern plague. The Presidents agreed to remain in close contact to ensure progress across the broad agenda that they have defined. Return to Menu 7. Remarks by the President and Russian President Putin in Press Availability (excerpted) PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you all for coming. I'm proud to welcome my friend, Vladimir Putin, to Camp David. President Putin has visited the White House, he's visited our ranch in Crawford, and now he visits Camp David. I'm honored to have him here, and I appreciate the great dialogue we've had last night and today. For decades, when the leaders of our two countries met, they talked mainly of missiles and warheads, because the only common ground we shared was the desire to avoid catastrophic conflict. In recent years, the United States and Russia have made great progress in building a new relationship. Today, our relationship is broad and it is strong. Russia and the United States are allies in the war on terror. Both of our nations have suffered at the hands of terrorists, and both of our governments are taking actions to stop them. No cause justifies terror. Terrorists must be opposed wherever they spread chaos and destruction, including Chechnya. A lasting solution to that conflict will require an end to terror, respect for human rights and a political settlement that leads to free and fair elections. President Putin and I talked about expanding our cooperation in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The President and I agree that America, Russia and the entire world will benefit from the advance of stability and freedom in these nations, because free and stable nations do not breed ideologies of murder or threaten people of other lands. I was encouraged that -- that it was clear that our governments will continue to work together on this very important matter, a matter of freedom and peace. The President and I also discussed ways to broaden Russian-American military cooperation. We're determined to improve our joint ability to fight terror, to keep peace in troubled regions and stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We strongly urge North Korea to completely, verifiably and irreversibly end its nuclear programs. We strongly urge Iran to comply fully with all of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We're seeking to intensify our missile defense cooperation, because both of our countries are threatened by outlaw regimes that could be armed with deadly weapons. We welcome the growing economic relationship between our two countries. We will continue to work together to expand cooperation in the energy sector. We recognize lower trade barriers and mutual investment will benefit both our nations. American and Russian officials are meeting more often and discussing broad range of issues. Old suspicions are giving way to new understanding and respect. Our goal is to bring the U.S.-Russian relationship to a new level of partnership. I respect President Putin's vision for Russia: a country at peace within its borders, with its neighbors, and with the world, a country in which democracy and freedom and rule of law thrive. Because of the President's vision and his desires, I'm confident that we'll have a strong relationship which will improve the lives of our fellow citizens, as well as help make the world more peaceful. Mr. President, welcome. PRESIDENT PUTIN: Thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to cordially thank the President of the United States of America, Mr. Bush, for his invitation. Our host has created, beginning yesterday, a very relaxed and tranquil atmosphere, conducive to having a calm and open, very frank talk on the major problems and on the broader picture of relations between Russia and the United States. Our talks today have once again confirmed that our relations are based on a clear vision and a clear understanding of special responsibility of Russia and the United States for ensuring international security and strengthening strategic stability. We have convinced -- we have proven once again that our partnership is not subject to political deal making. Despite all the difficulties that we have to overcome, the spirit and the basic principles of our relationship have remained the same: mutual confidence, openness, predictability and consideration and respect of interests of each other. We value very much the level of relationship that we have reached with the United States. According to already established tradition, President Bush and I have focused on specific issues. And fight against terrorism continues to be among priorities of our cooperation. I agree with the assessment that the President of the United States has just given. In this sphere, we act not only as strategic partners, but as allies. Our agencies are conducting an open and a professional dialogue on the entire range of questions in this sphere, including attempts by terrorist organizations to commit new terrorist acts and to gain access to weapons of mass destruction. We have also discussed today about the implementation of provisions of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. After the ratification of the treaty, its implementation, in our assessment, is going successfully. We intend to take this work under our control in the future, as well. Russia and the United States intend to pursue close cooperation for strengthening international regimes and non-proliferation mechanisms. We discussed in detail the situation around nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. In our -- it is our conviction that we shall give a clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity to continue and expand its cooperation with IAEA. As to the North Korean nuclear problem, I believe that the primary -- the priority now is to unblock the conflict situation around the Korean Peninsula to create a favorable climate, favorable atmosphere for a constructive dialogue. And Russia believes that ensuring nuclear non-proliferation regime should be accompanied by extending to North Korea guarantees in this sphere of security. We intend to continue our joint work with the United States in resolving this issue. I would like to stress separately the situation around Iraq. Our countries, just like the entire international community, have a common task: to ensure the speediest possible settlement and normalization of the situation in Europe. We want to see Iraq a free, democratic and united state. We believe that in solving the very difficult problems that the people of Iraq are -- that the people of Iraq are facing today, an important role shall be played by the Provisional Governing Council of Iraq, along with the special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. We also talked about the situation in the Middle East. And we believe that there is no reasonable alternative to consistent implementation of the road map. Significant attention during the negotiation was paid to Russian-American cooperation in trade and economic sphere. I would like to remind you that in the first six months of 2003, the volume of Russian-American mutual trade has increased more than by one-third. It's a good platform for future progress. There is also good grounds for future cooperation in energy sphere. We are also improving cooperation in the sphere of information and communication technologies and in the exploration of space. And in conclusion, I would like to draw the primary result of our negotiations. We have succeeded in reaching substantial progress on the way of forming the relations of real and mutually respectful partnership between Russia and the United States. I would like to thank President Bush for his constructive approach and for his interest in the discussion of all the questions, of all the issues that we have touched upon. This was a very useful meeting. PRESIDENT BUSH: Thanks. We'll take a couple of questions here, two per side. Q Yes, sir. You mentioned that you talked about Iran. Did you receive any specific commitments from President Putin that Russia would stop selling nuclear technology to Iran? And to Mr. Putin, did you -- are you ready to make any commitments now to contribute either troops or resources in Iraq? And, if not, what will -- what will help you to get there? PRESIDENT BUSH: We share a goal, and that is to make sure Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon, or a nuclear weapons program. We also understand that we need to work together to convince Iran to abandon any ambition she may have, ambitions toward the development of a nuclear weapon. What's important is we understand it's in our national interest that Iran doesn't develop a nuclear weapon. So the most important thing that came out of these meetings was a reaffirmation of our desire to work together to convince Iran to abandon her ambitions, as well as to work with other nations so that there is a common voice on this issue. You heard the President say that the IAEA process must go forward. We firmly agree. I found this part of our discussions to be very satisfactory, from the U.S. point of view. PRESIDENT PUTIN: We indeed paid much attention to this issue. I would like to reiterate that Russia has no desire and no plans to contribute in any way to the creation of weapons of mass destruction, either in Iran or in any other spot, region in the world. I would like to reiterate that we comply firmly with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because this course is in our national interest. As to the joint work, we are ready to proceed. As to our possible participation in the normalization of the -- in the settlement in Iraq, in the normalization of life in Iraq, Russia is interested in seeing it occurring as soon as possible. At the same time, we understand that this is a very complicated process that should be based on a solid legal and administrative base, and should go ahead stage by stage. The degree and the extent and level of Russia's participation in the restoration of Iraq will be determined after we know the parameters of the resolution -- of the new resolution on Iraq. [�] PRESIDENT PUTIN: Regarding declarative character of the relations between Russia and the United States. Where do, as we say in Russia, legs grow, where do some questions come from? This happens because people expect from us constantly some kind of revolutions. Now, just positive development in the relationship is no longer sufficient for them. I would like to point your attention that due to rapprochement between Russia and the United States we manage to establish and to create in the world, an atmosphere and trust -- of trust and strategic stability. This had very practical results, including in such sensitive areas as combatting terrorism. I have never said this in public, I'm going to do it today. When counterterrorist operation began in Afghanistan, we were approached by people, through several channels, we were approached by people who intended to fight against Americans in Afghanistan. And if by that time President Bush and I had not formed appropriate relationship, as we have, so no one knows what turn would the developments in Afghanistan had taken. You know what was Russia's position, and it helped, to a great extent, to achieve further results that we have achieved in Afghanistan, and was for a very good purpose. I have just said that in only six first months of this year, the volume of our mutual trade has increased by more than one-third. We are talking about Russia's balanced policy in the world energy sphere. We conduct a very high level energy dialogue with the United States, including at the very top level. And it's difficult to say what prices would be now -- how high prices for fuel in international energy markets would be now, if we had not had such dialogue. We continue to pursue cooperation in such sensitive areas as space. And it is, indeed, so that upon the results of today's meeting, we have compiled a checklist of different issues on which we have given instructions to specific agencies in our government. That is why our cooperation is not declarative, but extremely concrete and pragmatic. [�] Return to Menu 8. White House Press Briefing (excerpted) [�] Later today, the President looks forward to welcoming President Putin to Camp David. The President believes this is an opportunity to continue to focus on ways to broaden cooperation between the United States and Russia, as we work in partnership to address shared challenges. The two leaders tomorrow -- this evening and tomorrow will discuss a range of bilateral and international issues, including Iran, combatting terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the greater Middle East and Iraq reconstruction. [�] Q Scott, if I could ask you a little bit about President Putin's visit. Three times, by my count, the past meetings between President Bush and President Putin, the issue of the weapon shipments to Iran of nuclear technology have come up, starting first nearly two years ago. In each one of these, the response has been a variant of the same thing by the Russians: We're studying it and we'll let you know. It does not now look as if they have changed their policy despite new evidence, some of which you saw in the papers this morning, that the Iranians accelerated their program. At what point do we conclude that Russia is not actually a partner in halting the spread of nuclear technology to Iran? And what does this tell us about what you often celebrate as a great relationship between the two presidents? MR. McCLELLAN: There is a new a strategic relationship with Russia that the two presidents have worked to develop. We are partnering in a number of areas to address our shared challenges. I think when it comes to Iran, the President made it very clear that that would be one of the discussions we have with Russia during the meetings that will take place here soon. I don't want to jump ahead of the meetings. Obviously, that -- Q You've made that clear three times now and you're -- MR. McCLELLAN: I know. Obviously, there will be an opportunity for the two leaders to talk to you all in the media and take questions, and they'll have more -- then we can have more to talk about after this meeting occurs. But I think that you highlight a very important multilateral success in this administration: the international community is coming together, recognizing the seriousness of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. It's something that we have been talking about for quite a while, and now you have the rest of the international community recognizing it. You have the International and Atomic Energy Agency stepping up their efforts and setting a firm deadline for Iran to comply. So it's an issue that is very serious. It's an issue that the President will continue bringing up -- he brought it up with many of the world leaders he met with. And he looks forward to visiting with President Putin about it, as well. Q Scott, if I could just follow David's question. I mean, beyond the talk, is the administration prepared to offer any type of incentives for Russia to give up this deal? I mean, whether or not it's more information, more evidence or -- I mean, they stand to lose $800 million with this -- economic incentives? MR. McCLELLAN: I know we want to have the meeting here in this room, but let's let the two leaders have the meeting, let them discuss it and then we will have more to say about it after that. Q Mr. Putin has also said that there are western companies that are also involved in nuclear technology and the industry inside of Iran. Is there a double standard here? Is the administration's position that those companies should not be involved -- MR. McCLELLAN: The spread of weapons of mass destruction and WMD technology and related materials is one of the most dangerous threats we face in this 21st century. And that's why the President went to the -- well, that's why the President put forward the proliferation security initiative, where we're working closely with 11 nations to interdict shipments using the existing legal authorities. That's why he went to the United Nations and said, we need a new resolution to address the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technology. And so we're calling on all nations to step up their efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It's something that's very important to the safety and security of the world in the 21st century. [�] Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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