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RANSAC Nuclear News, September 5, 2003 Compiled By: RANSAC Staff A. Submarine Dismantlement/K-159 Accident
 A. Submarine Dismantlement/K-159 Accident 1. Radiation Situation at K-159 Disaster Site doesn't Exceed Background Radiation Levels The radiation situation in the vicinity of the K-159 nuclear-powered submarine's icy grave doesn't exceed background-radiation levels, Victor Kutsenko in charge of the Russian Nature Conservation Ministry's environmental-safety department told journalists today. The sub's reactors are not spewing out any radiation whatsoever; nor do we predict such radiation leaks in the future, Kutsenko went on to say. Sensors relay radiation-situation data every hour on the hour; moreover, the Askro system is also being used to assess the regional environmental situation. We are doing our best to ensure regional environmental safety round the clock, Kutsenko went on to say. He reminded his audience that the Nature Conservation Ministry and the Emergencies Ministry had established a special group for regularly monitoring the Barents Sea radiation situation near the K-159 disaster site. Nuclear fuel was unloaded from the sub prior to its last voyage; the sub was to have been scrapped in the foreseeable future, Kutsenko stressed. In his opinion, the nuclear reactor presents just about the only hazard; still that reactor was shut down, before the sub was towed out to sea, he noted. It's impossible to salvage the sub at this stage because of bad weather, Kutsenko said. The sub will be raised whenever possible and dismantled next year, Kutsenko noted in conclusion. We are controlling everything, he assured reporters. Return to Menu 2. SNAFU Navy�s Codeword Relatives of the Kursk crew were the first to call the St. Petersburg veteran submariners club: "Has the navy done nothing to get its act together in the three years since our boys were killed?" Capt. 1st Rank Igor Kurdin (Ret.), chairman of the club, also recalled August 2000, when he started a collection for the Kursk submarinersТ families. This time around they had to send to Severomorsk the father of Sr.Lt. Maxim Tsibulsky, the only survivor. "All of us took the tragedy close to heart. Especially since no one had expected it to strike from that quarter," Kurdin explained to this reporter. He believes that in the old days such a disaster in the process of a decommissioned submarine being towed to the scrap yard would have been altogether impossible. Project 627A submarines, like K-159s, have been dismantled at Gremlikha since the 1970s. The technology has been fine tuned down to minute details. First of all, Operation 1 was carried out - that is to say, nuclear fuel was unloaded and a special substance was pumped into the reactor cooling circuit, which prevented reactor runaway; all electric cables were cut out while reactor-related manual mechanisms were removed. Then, at a special floating dock, the so-called conversion operation was conducted: All external openings, including the conning tower, were welded shut. Most importantly, however, in the past, a subs canisters were filled with a special foam plastic-like buoyant substance. From then on a sub could be towed without a crew - and without mishap. It could not sink under any circumstances. In recent years, however, owing to financial constraints, the Navy started looking for ways of cutting costs. So the K-159 was hooked to four huge iron pontoons. As a matter of fact, the Russian Navy does not have any organic special transportation pontoons (according to Kurdin, pontoons for the Kursk submarine were manufactured especially for the lifting operation). It is not entirely clear what function was assigned to the K-159 crew, comprised of six commissioned officers, two NCOs, and two contract servicemen. A towing operation is usually manned by conscript servicemen. Furthermore, had everything been done in compliance with established procedure, the sub would have only needed a towing crew if the towing hawser had snapped. All the same, none of the sailors were supposed to go inside while at the time of the disaster only three of the 10 men were on the upper deck. According to an officer at the Leningrad naval base, investigators are also bound to have some questions as to the equipment of the participants in the operation. The towing and sub crews were supposed to have two, including one backup, communication channels and should have responded immediately when pontoons were ripped off the sub. In addition to life rafts inflating automatically upon contact with the water (one of them in fact saved Maxim Tsibulskys life), the seamen were supposed to wear not just life jackets but special wet suits and be equipped with a warm-up system, radio and light beacons, and a flare gun. A person in such a suit can stay in the water not 45 minutes (maximum time with the temperature of 10 degrees centigrade), but several hours. Professionals have only one reasonable explanation as to why most of the crew was below deck: night time, a battering storm, and a gale force wind. When a sub sinks, an open conning tower turns into a water pipe. It is impossible to swim against the current. The seven sailors had no chance. On the question of whether to raise the sub, there is a consensus in St. Petersburg: It must be raised no matter what. "Are the newly killed any worse than the 117 sailors who died aboard the Kursk?" Igor Kurdin asks rhetorically. "Of course, 238 meters is a substantial depth, but please dont forget that the reactor core is on the sea bed while the region around Kildin Island is an area of intensive shipping and commercial fishing. At the same time we will see whether, after the Kursk accident, our navy has put in place a special rescue service or nothing much has changed during these three years, and we will once again have to hire a foreign company for the operation." Return to Menu 3. Special Ship to Monitor Radiological Situation on Russian Submarine Death Site In the next few days a hydrographic ship will come to monitor the radiological situation in the area where the Russian K-159 submarine has sunk, a high official from the Russian Natural Resources Ministry Ivan Glumov said on Thursday. Monitoring will be carried out by his ministry. Until the submarine is raised, samples will be taken monthly, or more often in case the readings change. So far, the radiological situation in the sunken sub area is not alarming, he said. Monitoring results will be timely brought home to the public, he has promised. Coincidentally with ecological monitoring ministerial specialists will make engineering assessment of the soil under the sunken submarine in order to prepare calculations for raising it. In the meantime, search for the bodies of the dead submariners continues in the Barents Sea. Two rescue vessels and helicopters are involved. The K-159 submarine went to the bottom in the small hours of August 30 as it was transported for utilisation. Only one of the ten submariners on its board survived. Return to Menu 4. Sub crew died on the order of the command The Main Military Prosecutor�s Office, investigating into the sinking of the K-159 nuclear-powered submarine, charged Captain Sergey Zhemchuzhnov, deputy commander of the submarine division of the Ostrovnoy Garrison, with breaking navigation rules (Article 352 of the Russian Criminal Code). He was captain of the vessel that was towing the decommissioned nuclear submarine when it sank in the Barents Sea last week. The Kommersant newspaper comments on the catastrophe. Investigators established that one hour before the tragedy, Sergey Lappa, commander of the K-159�s docking team, asked that the submarine be towed aground to prevent it from sinking, as water filled its stern compartments. However, his request was ignored, and the crew were told to �fight for the viability of the vessel�, which ruined them. Meanwhile, a team of 25 investigators, including the experts of the Main Military Prosecutor�s Office and the Prosecutor�s Office of the Northern Fleet, continues its work in the Murmansk region. According to a source close to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, a storm in the Barents Sea and loose pontoons that kept the vessel from sinking, did not play the decisive role in the sinking of the submarine. In his opinion, the K-159 sank because its hull was leaky, and water filled the stern compartments of the submarine. According to Sergey Lappa, water leaked to the stern part of the K-159 through stern shaft seals. Most probably, they sprang a leak during the towing of the submarine. However, the crew did not notice the leak immediately: there were few people on board, and leakage indicators were not powered. The crew first established that the vessel was at a high-pitch angle, using the trim indicator, and after that they checked the ninth compartment and saw water there. �As far as I know, the K-159 crew tried to fight to keep the vessel afloat. First, sailors tried to batten down a partition door between the ninth and eighth compartments. But this did not help, because the partition leaked, and water started leaking to the eighth compartment. After that, the crew tried to create an air cushion in the eighth compartment that would stop the water. But there was not enough high pressure air in the compartment. When it became clear that the crew would not manage to stop the water, Sergey Lappa called the tow ship and suggested that the submarine be towed aground near Kildin Island,� the source said. After that, some more pontoons could be attached to the vessel, and it could be towed to the town of Polyarnoye. �However, as the submarine was not sinking, this proposal was rejected. The crew was told to continue efforts to keep the vessel viable and wait for rescuers, who were on their way to Kildin Island,� he added. The crew had to implement this order. According to the source, the K-159 was in such a technical state that, with two stern compartments filled with water, it would eventually nose up and go under water in a matter of minutes. �Apparently, this is what happened to the K-159,� the source said. Return to Menu 5. Sunk Sub Raises Questions The sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in August 2001 was a serious blow to the morale of the Russian navy. The Kursk was one of the newest and most powerful nuclear attack subs, officially listed as "unsinkable" and designed to withstand a direct hit by a U.S. conventional torpedo. Its sinking, as a result of the crew being unable to deal effectively with a faulty unarmed training torpedo during a firing drill, was not taken lightly by the military or the nation. The K-159 nuclear attack sub that went down last week (also in the Barents Sea, as with the Kursk) was a rusty old shell of a submarine built in the early 1960s and decommissioned in the 1980s. During its years of service, the K-159 had a reputation as a poorly built "experimental" boat that was not fully seaworthy. Since the 1980s the K-159 had been moored at a Soviet submarine base, Gremikha, on the Kola Peninsula. Throughout those years, compressed air was constantly pumped into the sub's hull to keep it from sinking inside port. The fact that the K-159 went down as it was towed from Gremikha to the Murmansk area to be finally scrapped is not as embarrassing an event for the navy as the loss of the Kursk. It was also clear from the start that no U.S. or British subs could possibly have been involved in the K-159 accident. Maybe this explains why this time the disaster was reported the day it happened. But the Russian tradition of misreporting unpleasant facts has not been fully abandoned, and what exactly happened with the K-159 is still not clear. At first, the supreme naval command in Moscow told journalists that the K-159 went down at 4 a.m. on Aug. 30 and was lying at a depth of 170 meters. A day later, the Northern Fleet command reported that at 2:20 a.m. the crew of 10 on board was ordered to abandon ship and that it went down at 3 a.m. There were further reports that the K-159 may have sunk at 2 a.m. or even earlier. The wreck was actually found on the seabed at a depth of 238 meters. Chief of the naval press service Igor Dygalo told reporters that the K-159 went down in a storm that severed the cables of the four large pontoons that helped keep the sub buoyant. But weather records show that there was no "storm" in the area that night. Another old sub was reportedly towed from Gremikha at the same time as the K-159 and made the journey without mishaps. The crew of the ship that was towing the K-159 and the one that was towing the other sub apparently did nothing to save the men from the K-159. Or at least the authorities do not report that they did anything. Sources in the navy told reporters that rescue helicopters were immediately sent to save the seamen, but did not find them. This story sounds unlikely, since Russian naval helicopters do not fly or perform rescue operations during nighttime. The crew of the K-159 included four captains and other officers. It's a mystery why a rusty hulk of a ship that had no power or working mechanisms needed such a high-ranking crew. The men on the K-159 worked at the Gremikha nuclear sub graveyard. They were skilled at keeping old subs afloat inside port. Their open sea experience, however, may have been inadequate. Only three men apparently managed to go overboard before the K-159 went under. Two of them died of exposure because help came late. (The men seem to have spent several hours at sea, but the navy does not say precisely how long.) Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has blamed the disaster on "lightheartedness" and the national bravado of naval officers. Bad discipline, low morale and the increasingly inadequate professional training of military personnel are indeed a grave problem that has led to a number of accidents with heavy loss of life in recent years. Ivanov's favored method of dealing with this kind of trouble is -- in line with Russian tradition -- to pile public insults on his subordinates and to arbitrarily dismiss low and middle-ranking officials. This in turn makes morale drop even further without addressing the root cause -- low pay and the low prestige of service. Tens of thousands of officers resign from military service each year. Those that stay in the ranks are totally disgruntled due to insufficient pay and miserable service conditions. Most officers do not give a damn whether they are dismissed from service with honor or not at the end of the day: It does not affect one's employment prospects or social status. Return to Menu 6. Submarine sinking was not caused by loss of air-tightness - Defense Ministry The K-159 nuclear submarine sank in the Barents Sea on August 30 because the pontoons keeping it afloat tore off, the press service of the Russian Defense Ministry told Interfax on Wednesday evening. "The assumption on the part of the media that the submarine sinking was caused by a lack of air-tightness is not true. Even if there had been a leak in the submarine hull, K-159 would have been kept afloat by the four pontoons," a spokesman stressed. "Therefore, all the claims that the main reason for the sinking was loss of air-tightness are groundless," he said. "These are findings of the preliminary study conducted along the ministry lines. The official causes of the sinking will be announced by the office of the Main Military Prosecutor," the spokesman said. The submarine sank in the early hours of August 30 in the Barents Sea on its way to Polyarny where it was supposed to be scrapped. There were 10 crewmembers aboard. One of them was rescued and the bodies of two others were retrieved from the water. Seven remain missing but the navy command believes all of them perished. Return to Menu 7. Norway Complicit in Same Unsafe Towing Practices That Sank the K-159 Though Norway is doing much to improve the ecological situation in Northwest Russia by dismantling two submarines, the country's money was spent on the same unsafe sub transportation methods that sank the K-159. Russia has recently been pledged a windfall of approximately $200m in international funding for nuclear remediation projects in Russia�s Northwest, with countries such as Norway, Great Britain, and France either donating to multinational funds for Russian nuclear cleanup or by contracting directly with Russia to dismantle its derelict retired submarines. But, as last weekend�s sinking of the K-159 during transport from the Gremikha naval base to a dismantling point at the Polyarny naval shipyard shows, none of these huge international donations will have their intended impact on nuclear safety unless these donor nations conduct their own independent risk assessments of each project they donate money for. �What happens is that investors are basically contributing to catastrophes and accidents like this,� said Alexander Nikitin, chairman of the Bellona Foundation�s St. Petersburg branch and a renowned environmentalist. �This accident illustrates [such negligence]. It also shows that this kind of incident can happen not only in towing, but also in dismantlement, defuelling, construction [financed by donor countries]. They give funds without thinking, just taking the Russians at their word.� The transportation of the K-159, which sank in 240 metres of murky and frigid water in the Barents Sea five kilometres northwest of Kildin Island, in the early morning hours of Saturday�killing nine of the 10 crew members who were inexplicably aboard the submarine�was not funded by western donors. But the towing of two Victor class submarines�a practice that was in the aftermath of the K-159 tragedy suspended indefinitely by the Russian Ministry of Defence�from the Gremikha base to dismantlement points at the Zvyozdochka, near the Arkhangelsk region city of Severodvinsk, and Nerpa, a few kilometres west of the Polyarny on the Kola Peninsula�was funded by the Norwegian government. It was good fortune for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the two submarines�which, according to Norwegian Ambassador Torbj�rn Norendal, were in good enough shape to be towed without the standard aid of pontoons�arrived at their destinations safely. Had there been any mishaps�the risks of which are innumerable in any submarine towing operation�Norway would be the country to have borne the specific blame for financing the submarines� sinking. Put simply, it was not bad luck that sank the K-159�but it was good luck that got the Norwegian-financed Victor class submarines towing operations through. The Scale of the Problem Of the 191 retired nuclear submarines in Russia, 115 are located at the Northern Fleet bases and shipyards. Of those, around 70 still have spent fuel, or SNF, on board. Approximately a mere 40 have been fully dismantled. SNF from more than 100 reactors is in storage at onshore bases and in nuclear service ships in Northwest Russia, and some 130 reactor cores are still on board retired submarines. The United States, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, or CTR, has focused over the past 12 years of the programme�s existence on the dismantlement of newer strategic submarines that used to pose a threat to US national security. While this is a laudable and necessary effort to rid Northern Fleet shipyards of dangerous and contaminating vessels, US congressional limitations to strategic subs has orphaned the older, more corroded non-strategic submarines which pose the lion�s share of environmental and non-proliferation risks. These submarines must be taken out of the water and dismantled as soon as possible. Donors Must Monitor Dismantlement Procedures More Closely Retired rusting hulks of submarines like the K-159 are indeed an urgency. But it is equally important to ensure that donor nations exercise greater control over the dismantling projects that their funding grants for nuclear remediation in Russia facilitate. Western donors cannot simply give financial support without reviewing each stage of the process they are funding�for example the process of dismantling a nuclear submarine. Otherwise, funding coming into Russia for nuclear radiation safety projects may have the opposite effect. Donor countries must insist on reviewing the projects they are funding from the point of view of the hazards they could cause. Whether this lack of project oversight comes from the donors� naivete or their unwillingness to delve into Russia�s infamous bureaucracy, such neglect can have dramatic effects. According to Nikitin, if international donors pay for operations that lead to such consequences as the K-159 sinking, then it would be better if they didn�t give any money at all. �They shouldn�t give money without assessment or consultations or getting expert analysis from all sides�just because they were asked for money by the government or the navy,� said Nikitin, a former naval captain first class. �Before they contribute, they have to count the opinions of the recipients, their own and of a third expert and independent party.� Norway, for instance, was basically trapped when it paid for the dismantlement�and particularly the dangerous towing�of the vessels, because it had not properly investigated the contract from the point of view of safe submarine destruction procedures. The money was simply transferred to the concerned shipyards that hire various contractors to carry out various aspects of the work�something that Ambassador Norendal pointed out was a Russian matter. Without any safeguards enforced by donor nations themselves�to take matters to the opposite extreme�it may indeed be safer not to give any money to Russia at all and let the subs rot where they float. In the case of the K-159, for instance, it would have been safer for both Norway and Russia if it had just been left at Gremikha. Now, lying at a depth of 240 meters, with a cold reactor that will not withstand the incredible water pressure for long, and whose control rods�which prevent the reactor from restarting a chain reaction�are in unknown condition, it is yet another incident of radioactive contamination waiting to happen. Granted, this accident is completely on Russia�s conscience, but donor nations run the same risks by not partaking in supervision. As a result of a 2002 government audit of Norway�s nuclear remediation commitments in Russia that said Oslo was failing to complete its projects in time, Bellona was invited to present a paper to the Norwegian Parliament's Control and Constitutional Committee. The Bellona paper described ways of optimising nuclear safety and security projects with the Russian Federation. These recommendations were forwarded by the committee to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Among other things, the list demanded that the Foreign Ministry conduct a risk assessment of each nuclear remediation project Norway finances in Russia. However, such assessments, including the case of the Victor submarine dismantlement project, have never been carried out. Other Countries' Efforts Lead to Unsafe Results Norway is not the only country having problem maintaining safety oversight in nuclear cleanup projects in Russia. There are other examples wherein western countries have spent money on such projects when the results amounted to nil because they failed to carry out safety and feasibility evaluations before signing the checks. For instance, a group of western donors were commissioned to build a liquid radioactive waste processing facility at the civilian nuclear icebreaker base in Murmansk, belonging to the Russian nuclear icebreaker operator Atomflot. The project was started five years ago, but because of severe and costly design flaws, when the facility will open is anyone�s guess. Another instance was CTR�s attempts at core conversions in the plutonium reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. The project would have converted Russia�s three remaining weapons-grade plutonium producing reactors�which also provide heat and electricity to the communities in which they stand�into less hazardous civilian reactors. But years and several million dollars after the project began, it became apparent that it was unsafe and unfeasible on many different levels. The programme was then turned over to the US Department of Energy, which was given the task of simply decommissioning the reactors, and building fossil fuel plants to make up for the heat and electricity deficits that will come with the reactors� shutdown. The plan will eradicate from Russian stockpiles the annual addition of 1,500 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium these reactors are collectively producing every year for no apparent use. But feasibility and safety studies carried out prior to the core conversion fiasco would have saved millions of dollars and spared tonnes of terrorist-luring weapons-grade plutonium�which is stored on site in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk�from being produced. The Bellona Foundation will be filing a new paper with a reiteration of its demands to the Norwegian Control and Constitutional Committee. Meanwhile, Bellona�s Russian offices are studying possibilities of bringing legal action against the Russian authorities that have been authorising the towing of the Russian Navy�s submarines in such an unsafe manner. Return to Menu 8. Russia Denies Lost Sub Poses Environmental Threat Russia's Atomic Power Ministry, known by the Russian acronym Minatom, insists that a nuclear submarine that sank on Saturday is not an environmental hazard. "The measures taken when reactors were stopped fully guarantee nuclear safety and absolutely exclude any possibility of a spontaneous chain reaction," the ministry said in a statement issued on Sept. 2. The K-159 submarine sank in the Barents Sea off the Kola Peninsula on Aug.30 when steel cables strapping it to pontoons snapped in rough waters. The decommissioned nuclear submarine, in service between 1963 and 1988, was being towed from the Gremikha base to a scrapyard in Polyarny, where its reactors were to be removed and dismantled. Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said towing procedures had been violated and he ordered a temporary halt to the towing of decommissioned subs. Three of the submarine's crewmembers were found, but only one of them survived. The bodies of the remaining seven sailors apparently are still inside the sunken submarine. Russian officials said the submarine's two nuclear reactors were shut down when it was decommissioned in 1989, and they said there was no spike in radiation levels in the waters around the sunken sub. The Russian emergency ministry says it has started checking the sites where other nuclear submarines have been sunk. The checks are being carried out in the western part of the Kara Sea, deputy emergency minister Mikhail Faleyev told journalists. This is the area where a K-27 nuclear submarine and one reactor from a K-254 were disposed of in early 1980s. The disposal method involved sinking the sub and the reactor. Russia faces immense challenges in dealing with its post-Soviet nuclear legacy, notably rusting nuclear submarines. In 2002, Minatom announced that the Russian navy had decommissioned a total of 189 nuclear submarines, but 126 were still waiting to be scrapped. Russia's Far Eastern regions face particularly serious nuclear waste problems. The Pacific Fleet's 75 decommissioned nuclear submarines reportedly are still stranded in harbors, and 45 of them are waiting for nuclear fuel to be unloaded from their reactors. The greatest source of danger has been reported from the submarine PM-32, located in a Kamchatka harbor. It is being used as a provisional storage facility for spent nuclear fuel from other submarines. Last fall, Minatom officials conceded that the Pacific Fleet's three decommissioned nuclear submarines are so dangerous that nuclear fuel cannot be unloaded from their reactors. Now a sarcophagus is being built for two of these subs in Razboinik Bay at an estimated cost of $18 million. In March 2002, Russian media alleged that a decommissioned nuclear submarine had sunk in Krasheninnikov Bay on Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia's Far East. Russian naval officials dismissed claims of a nuclear incident in Krasheninnikov Bay, although they conceded that such incidents had taken place back in 1997 and 1999. Russia's North also faces the challenge of dealing with decommissioned nuclear submarines. Last fall Minatom conceded that the rusting hulls of 39 nuclear vessels pose the greatest danger to the Arctic environment. In 2002, spent nuclear fuel reportedly was unloaded from 20 nuclear submarines, while 17 were completely dismantled. Since 1994, a total of 29 trainloads of nuclear waste have been brought from storage facilities in Andreyev Guba on the Kola Peninsula to the Mayak reprocessing facility near Chelyabinsk in the Urals. Waste from some 100 naval reactors is being temporarily stored in Andreyev Guba. All the waste is due to be removed from the Kola region by 2007. The Barents Sea is the area where Russia's Kursk nuclear submarine sank in August 2000, killing all 118 aboard. The Kursk was raised in October 2001 in a large-scale international operation. Russian naval officials said the K-159 also would be retrieved, but not earlier than 2004 and without the assistance of foreign companies. Return to Menu B. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Yamal nuclear icebreaker installed physical protection system The physical protection system to prevent an unauthorized access on board has been installed on Yamal icebreaker, which is currently under trustee management by Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC). This was reported by RIA Novosti referred to MSC press-service. Previously similar systems were installed on Arktika icebreaker and Sevmorput lighter ship. The physical protection systems are installed on nuclear ships in accordance with the RF Governmental decree of March 7, 1997 �On Approval of the Rules of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities� as well as on the basis of intergovernmental agreements between Russia, Norway, Sweden and the Great Britain. JSC Eskort-Center is the general contractor for installing the system on Yamal. The nuclear icebreaker crew has adjusted the standard physical protection system to the ship environs. The Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate, Norway Radiation Protection Authority and the UK Department of Trade and Industry provided for technical advice when the system was deployed on board. In total nearly US$ 1.5 million were allocated by the foreign partners to equip Arktika and Yamal. At present MSC negotiates the further cooperation to improve operational safety of the nuclear fleet including the installation of physical protection systems at ships of Russia�s nuclear civil marine fleet. Return to Menu C. Russia-Iran 1. Iranian Visit Postponed An Iranian parliamentary delegation that was expected to meet with the Nuclear Power Ministry has postponed a visit that was to begin Tuesday, Russian and Iranian officials said. Iranian lawmaker Elaheh Koulaee, a member of Iran's national security and foreign policy committee, said the trip was put off because Dmitry Rogozin, the head of the State Duma foreign affairs committee who had invited the group, was making an unexpected trip abroad and could not host them at this time. The postponement had nothing to do with nuclear issues or politics, she said. Return to Menu 2. Russia ready to sell air defense systems to Iran Russia could start supplying advanced air defense systems to Iran, Rajab Safarov, General Director of the Russian Center for Contemporary Iranian Studies, told the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun. According to Mr. Safarov, the sensational proposal was voiced by late Lev Rokhlin, during a meeting with Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, within the framework of the visit to Iran by the State Duma�s official delegation in February 1997. Rajab Safarov was also a member of this delegation, as the Deputy Defense Minister. According to the newspaper, General Rokhlin suggested that, having launched military satellites, Iran would be able not only to monitor all movements inside the country, on its borders and in the region, but also to ensure its security using various air and missile defense systems. �As Iran decided to build an atomic power station, it is necessary to protect it from multiple enemies. For its part, Russia is ready to provide the most advanced air defense system,� General Rokhlin said. According to Mr. Safarov, Iran�s leadership showed great interest in this proposal and requested information about the price and technical specifications of the air defense system. According to the Russian side, the system would cost about $3-4bn, and it would take at least 3 years to build. The Iranian delegation said it needed to discuss this issue with the country�s leadership. However, there was no official request from Iran. Meanwhile, the Russian delegation headed by professor Zhores Alferov, Nobel Prize winner and member of the State Duma, will head for Teheran on September 19, 2003. It is expected that the visit will last about five days. Perhaps, the issue of the air defense system will also be discussed at the talks. At the same time, a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is scheduled for September 8, 2003 in Vienna. International experts will discuss Iran�s nuclear programs. Having allowed a leak of information about its secret talks with Iran, Russia raises its stake in the talks with the United States. After the war in Iraq, anti-American sentiment is growing all around the world. In this situation, Russian air and missile defense systems are becoming more popular. Return to Menu D. Russia-North Korea 1. Conflicting Reports On NK Talks There was an element of mystery at the six-nation negotiations on the DPRKs nuclear program that ended last Friday in Beijing. Oddly enough, diplomats from different countries who took part in the three-day conference read each others comments differently. Reporters covering the meeting produced conflicting reports while citing "reliable" and "informed" sources. Thus, Russian experts are convinced that Pyongyang has no nuclear weapons although it could acquire relevant technology as a result of research. At the very worst, Moscow admits, North Korea could have some "nuclear device" that cannot be called a weapon in the full sense of the word. By contrast, U.S. intelligence services believe that the Kim Jong Il regime already has at least one nuclear bomb or warhead as well as delivery vehicles. What North Korean representatives themselves said about the DPRKs nuclear program is shrouded in mystery. According to one Russian source, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il said that his country "has no nuclear weapons nor the intention to develop them." Later on RF Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov expanded on the statement, revealing that his North Korean counterpart said "the DPRK is interested in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and does not aspire to nuclear status." The Americans, however, heard something entirely different. According to AP citing a U.S. administration official who asked that his name not be disclosed, DPRK representatives told their negotiating partners about Pyongyangs intention to officially declare that it had nuclear weapons and was going to test them. He said Kim Jong Il also notified U.S., Chinese, Russian, South Korean, and Japanese officials that Pyongyang had nuclear delivery vehicles. It seems that this is not a matter of listening comprehension problems that different countries may have, but a matter of position. Russia and China, which in effect acted as one, are not interested to see the situation near their border aggravate. Likewise South Korea does not want any complications: A first strike by North Koreans on Seoul could kill up to 300,000 people. Japan also sides with the "moderates." On the other hand, the Washington and Pyongyang delegations predictably adopted opposite positions. The DPRK only envisions resolution of the nuclear problem through consistent concessions on the part of the United States, the DPRK Foreign Ministry said. Pyongyang demanded the signing of a non-aggression pact, establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the DPRK, economic cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and provision of light-water reactors to meet North Koreas energy needs. In response, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly urged North Koreans to liquidate their nuclear program in an irreversible and verifiable way as a prerequisite to discussing a normalization of bilateral relations. Furthermore, once the DPRK has scaled down its nuclear program, the United States intends to raise the question of stopping production and export of missiles, reducing conventional weapons, and observance of human rights. Only once these problems have been addressed is Washington prepar ed to open discussions on the normalization of relations. Pyongyang took these conditions as a demand of complete disarmament without any guarantees on the U.S. part. "This shows that Washington has no intention either of normalizing relations or of revising its hostile policy toward the DPRK," the North Korean Foreign Ministry stressed. "Well have to strengthen our nuclear forces to protect our sovereignty," the DPRK foreign policy department threatened. The last day of negotiations proved the most difficult. At a certain point some media outlets filed flash reports saying that the North Korean representative had apparently walked out of the conference hall, terminating the negotiations. Later on, however, a Russian diplomat said that was not the case and that "everything passed as planned." The tortuous negotiations were over although no final document was adopted. Still, according to the Chinese hosts, agreement was reached to continue the dialogue, possibly in two months, again in Beijing. Russia is committed to working hard to settle Pyongyangs nuclear problem, Alexander Losyukov said before flying back to Moscow. "No one expects a dramatic breakthrough in the North Korean situation," he told reporters. "There will be plenty of long, tedious work, but there is no other way out. The alternative is confrontation and use of force, which is unacceptable to anyone," the diplomat stressed. Return to Menu E. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. What Role for the Armed Forces? If anyone doubted that change is afoot in Russian military policy, the major training exercises that concluded in the Far East last week, dubbed Vostok 2003, provided some convincing evidence. The Defense Ministry brass emphasized the unprecedented scale of the exercises: more than 70,000 soldiers along with dozens of warships and aircraft. But to my mind, the real change was geographical. For the second year running, Russia conducted training exercises in an area where it faces a real threat to its national security. In 2002, Russia held training exercises in the Caspian Sea after negotiations on dividing up the resource-rich sea floor broke down. The exercises sent a clear signal to all of the Caspian nations that Russia was prepared to defend its stake in the region's rich oil fields. This year's massive exercises in the Far East got under way on the eve of a six-nation summit devoted to the North Korean nuclear threat. So long as Kim Jong Il carries on blackmailing the entire world community, the possibility of armed conflict in this densely populated region cannot be ruled out. Though the organizers of the exercises wouldn't say so publicly, their main goal was to prepare for a possible military conflict on the Korean peninsula. Yet only one-fourth of the exercises were strictly military in nature, as noted by President Vladimir Putin's envoy to the Far East, Konstantin Pulikovsky. The rest consisted of training for humanitarian missions, such as a series of joint exercises for responding to natural disasters and other emergency situations that involved the armed forces and special units from the Interior Ministry and Emergency Situations Ministry, among others. At the same time, local authorities were instructed in how to cope with a sudden influx of refugees. According to participants in the exercises, the Russian Far East could absorb some 100,000 refugees. Even the strictly military exercises, such as a tactical deployment of paratroopers to block a terrorist incursion into Russian territory, fit easily into the list of possible situations that could arise as a result of war in Korea. The participation of Japanese and South Korean warships and a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in the exercises makes their foreign policy implications more than clear. The comparison between Vostok 2003 and another major series of military training exercises, Zapad 1999, is heartening. Four years ago, the armed forces were still preparing to repel a massive airborne assault followed by a prolonged land war against NATO forces. Although Vostok 2003 signals a shift in military planning toward realistic training aimed at dealing with real threats, it also revealed a basic and very serious contradiction at the heart of Russian military policy. Russia's most advanced and powerful weapons are no longer suited to the country's real defense needs. Long-range bombers are designed primarily to strike targets on enemy territory with nuclear weapons. Cruisers and destroyers are designed to take on aircraft carrier battle groups. This placed the organizers of Vostok 2003 in a quandary. On the one hand, it would have been unthinkable to conduct Russia's largest training exercises in 15 years without including its more powerful and effective weapons. On the other hand, these weapons are obviously designed for global war against a specific opponent, not for use in regional conflicts. Going after smugglers with cruise missiles makes about as much sense as duck hunting with a Howitzer. The only time when strategic bombers didn't seem out of place during Vostok 2003 was when Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov flew in on one from central Russia. When you look at Russia's defense situation rationally, it becomes clear that some of our most imposing weapons systems are simply not all that useful. They are expensive to maintain, and their mere presence can spark confrontation. After all, simulated strategic missile attacks on the United States, which were conducted from 1999 to 2002, only heighten suspicion about Russia's real intentions. The Kremlin must decide where its priorities lie. Even if the price of oil remains at today's high levels, Russia will not be able to match Soviet-era production across the full range of weapons. Judging by navy chief Admiral Viktor Kuroyedov's recent remarks, the hard choices have not yet been made. Kuroyedov told reporters that Russia needs a navy capable of policing the country's coastline as well as carrying out missions around the globe. In this regard it's worth remembering that a squadron of Russian warships recently conducted joint exercises in the Indian Ocean with the Indian navy. Only God and a few Russian admirals can imagine a scenario in which the Russian and Indian navies would need to join forces. Among the more off-the-wall explanations for the maneuvers was that Russian marines were preparing a lightning strike to seize Iraqi oil fields out from under the Americans' noses. Russia's leaders have to decide what the primary function of the armed forces will be in the future. In the absence of a real threat of global war, the armed forces could be revamped to eliminate regional threats to national security and to wage war on terrorism. In that case, scarce funds for weapons procurement would be better spent on modernizing the country's aging helicopter fleet than on multimission nuclear submarines. Or the Kremlin could decide that the armed forces are more important as a symbol of Russia's superpower status. In that case, we should carry on spending millions on strategic bombers and mammoth warships capable of projecting Russian military might and transporting the defense minister around the world. Return to Menu F. International Nuclear Business 1. Russia Ready to Supply All Types of Nuclear Reactors Tt World Market Russia is ready to supply all types of nuclear reactors to the world market, a source in the Nuclear Power Industry Ministry told RIA Novosti on Friday. "We can offer a wide range of prolonged-fuel-cycle reactors from small /50 megawatts/ to large /1,000 megawatts/," the source said. They are iceboat-type reactors and what is called "nuclear batteries" to last for 10 years, he added. Russia is also ready to supply power units for the desalination and production of drinking water in developing countries. Russia is an active participant in the international project for innovation reactors and fuel cycles under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This project is aimed at developing new power-producing technologies on the basis of an acceptable type of nuclear reactor. According to the source, the first stage of this programme has been crowned with the development of methods for the assessment of future nuclear reactors. "We propose to check up these criteria on the existing technologies", he added. Return to Menu 2. Should Russia share nuke secrets with Saudis? Saudi Arabia hopes to get access to Russian technologies. In return, the Saudis will offer Russia large investments and lucrative contracts Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud arrived in Moscow for an official visit on Tuesday. In Moscow, he held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, Energy Minister Igor Yusufov and Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov. During the Russian-Saudi talks, the situation in the Middle East and Iraq was discussed, as well as cooperation in the fight against terrorism. However, on the top of the agenda was the deepening of economic cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia. Saudi�s interest in Russia is determined by two factors. Riyadh wants to get access to Russian nuclear technologies. For their part, Saudi businessmen, who started withdrawing capital from the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks, want to invest in the Russian economy. But Russian authorities are only ready to give a green light to closer cooperation between the two countries if Riyadh agrees to curtail the activities of Islamic �charity� funds in Russia. According to Russian intelligence services, these organizations are in fact involved in subversive activities, they contribute to the spread of Islamic extremism and finance Chechen terrorists. This is the first visit to Russia by such a high ranking Saudi leader in the history of bilateral relations, which have been not as good as they might be. Diplomatic relations between Moscow and Riyadh were established in 1926. However, in 1938, the Russian mission in Jidda was recalled. According to an official note of the USSR�s Foreign Ministry, the diplomats were withdrawn from Saudi Arabia �because there were no prospects for improving the Soviet-Saudi ties�. Moscow was particularly irritated that Saudi Arabia, with which the USSR was holding talks on oil concessions, gave the first such concession to the United States. After the Second World War, Riyadh became one of Washington�s main allies in the region. The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia were completely spoiled in the early 1980s, after the Saudis started sponsoring Afghan mujahideen, fighting against the Soviet Army. In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia unofficially backed Chechen separatists. Meanwhile, Riyadh�s ties with Washington were spoiled following the September 11 attacks, as most terrorists involved in those unprecedented acts of terror, were Saudi nationals, and one of them received large sums of money from the bank accounts of the wife of the Saudi Ambassador in the US. Analysts close to the White House started speaking about the possibility of a military operation against Saudi Arabia. For their part, Saudi businessmen quickly responded to the threat and started withdrawing capital from America. Saudi investments in the US economy is estimated at $200bn. �The Saudis came to Russia to agree on a re-direction of part of the American money from the US to Russia,� said Alexander Sobyanin, head of strategic planning at the Border Cooperation Association. �The Saudis are, in the first place, interested in gaining access to Russian nuclear technologies,� he said. �Back in the mid-1990s, the Saudis asked Mr. Chernomyrdin�s government to give Saudi Arabia access to nuclear technologies. However, at that time, we were sensible enough to refuse them,� Mr. Sobyanin added. This time, the Saudis decided not to act rashly and prepare the ground for talks in advance. Preparation for the visit of Prince Abdullah, the kingdom�s de facto ruler, to Moscow lasted one year. Talks were held not only at the level of the Foreign Ministry and the Russian government, but also at the level of Russia�s Chamber of Trade and Commerce. The Saudis offer Russia the establishment of cooperation in a number of industries. A source close to the talks said the suggested cooperation included joint projects in the sphere of pipeline transportation, telecommunications, the development of urban infrastructure, the reconstruction of airports and the construction of a railroad from Riyadh to Mecca. According to the source, the Saudi delegation at the talks was headed by sheikh Abdurrahman al-Jeraisy, president of the Council of Saudi Arabia�s Chamber of Commerce. The source said the implementation of these joint projects was connected with �Russia�s desire to cooperate in the scientific and technological sphere�. Meanwhile, experts say that, to develop relations with Saudi Arabia, it is necessary that Riyadh stop support and sponsorship of Islamic extremism in Russia. �Saudi Arabia is a main sponsor and organizer of terrorism,� Alexander Khramchikhin, expert at the Institute for Strategic and Military Analysis, told RBC Daily. According to an employee of one of the former Soviet secret services, �Saudi Islamic charity funds spread radical Islam and support terrorists, in other words, they are involved in subversive activities�. �It is necessary to immediately close all funds and immediately take them out of the country,� Mr. Khramchikhin said. �Saudi Arabia�s leadership is perfectly aware of the activities of the �charity� funds and their ties with Chechen terrorists,� he added. However, the possibility that Saudi Arabia will stop supporting Islamic funds, is very small. Return to Menu 3. UM to use Russian nuclear supplies to study new approach to tumors Cancer researchers at the University of Maryland announced yesterday that they will soon be using radioactive material from Russia's nuclear stockpile to study a new approach to tumors. The radioactive isotope, called actinium, is in scarce supply in the United States. Scientists at the university are getting the material in several shipments as part of a federally funded partnership with Russian oncologists and scientists, the American Russian Cancer Alliance. The exotic isotope is appealing to researchers because its rays are powerful but go a shorter distance than other isotopes' rays. It has been studied with blood-borne cancers such as leukemia, but scientists at the University of Maryland School of Pharmacy and School of Medicine are working on it with solid tumors. They have developed an approach to directly deliver the isotope to tumors and kill the blood vessels that feed them. "If these studies go well and we need more of this material, the Russians will be able to supply us with much more material than is available in the United States," said Dr. Bruce Line, director of nuclear medicine at the University of Maryland Medical Center. Researchers are also interested in other agents the Russians produce, Line noted, such as isotopes used for other therapies and tests. Return to Menu G. Nuclear Safety 1. Search for Nuclear Waste to Begin in Karsk Sea A unique research expedition is about be carried out in the Karsk Sea where scientists will search for signs of nuclear waste. 200 containers of radioactive waste were deposited here in the sixties and seventies. According to Oleg Stepanets, head of the expedition, he and his colleagues must find out how well sealed the containers are and whether or not they pose any kind of threat. The scientists have all the necessary equipment onboard the ship including a German echo-sounder which will allow them to film the seabed at any depth. The containers will be visible even if they are covered by sediment at a depth of 11 thousand metres. The ship set off yesterday and the expedition is expected to take about a month. Extremely high levels of arsenic were discovered in the central part of the White Sea in August 2003 while scientists were searching for chemical weapons deposited during the Second World War. The exact cause will be identified by carrying out laboratory research. According to unofficial sources, after the war the northern shipping fleet deposited unused gas bombs containing mustard gas in the area near the White Sea, the Barents Sea and the Karsk Sea. The sailors involved in the mission agreed to keep it a secret for decades to come. Return to Menu H. Official Statements 1. DHS Advisory to Security Personnel, No Change in Threat Level (excerpted) The following Advisory was issued to security personnel by the Department of Homeland Security this afternoon. Protective Measures included in the original document have been removed for security reasons. TITLE: Maintaining Awareness Regarding Al-Qaeda's Potential Threats to the Homeland ATTN: Federal Departments and Agencies, Homeland Security Advisors, First Responders and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers [�] Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Threats As far as we are aware Al-Qaeda to date has not executed a successful terrorist attack using any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials. However, the acquisition, production, or theft of these materials and subsequent dissemination is a top Al-Qaeda objective. We believe it continues to research more advanced CBRN operations, including production of pathogenic organisms and toxins, as well as, high impact dissemination methods such as contamination of water and food, and aerosolization of an agent in enclosed densely populated space. (Protective Measures) [�] Return to Menu I. Links of Interest 1. Fact Sheet - Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles Return to Menu 2. USEC CEO: World Events Support Nuclear Power's Revival Return to Menu 3. Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Return to Menu 4. Iran�s Nuclear Program Return to Menu 5. Liability Concerns Jeopardize Renewal of Nonproliferation Programs With Russia Return to Menu 6. CTR Scorecard Return to Menu 7. Export Controls: Fighting Proliferation and Building Confidence Return to Menu 8. American Access to Russian Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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