5/21/12 Home / Projects / Globalizing Threat Reduction Project www PGS Printer Friendly Page   Summary of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: A Progress Report on 10 + 10 Over 10 Wednesday, October 9, 2002 Michael Roston Analyst The following summary is drawn from RANSAC's observation of the October 9, 2002 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the 10 plus 10 over 10 plan. The summary represents RANSAC's impression of the testimony and discussion, and these notes should not be attributed as an official transcript of events. Electronic copies of some of the witnesses' prepared statements can be found online at: http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hrg021009a.html and http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/14243.htm. Senators Attending: Senator Joseph Biden (D - DE), Committee Chair; Senator Richard Lugar (R - IN), Ranking Member; Senator Bill Nelson (D - FL) Witnesses: Panel One The Honorable John R. Bolton Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs US Department of State Panel Two The Honorable John S. Wolf Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation US Department of State Ms. Lisa Bronson Deputy Under Secretary for Technology Security and Counter-Proliferation US Department of Defense The Honorable Linton Brooks Acting Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration US Department of Energy Panel Three Mr. Kenneth N. Luongo Executive Director The Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Ms. Laura S. H. Holgate Vice President for Russia/NIS Programs Nuclear Threat Initiative Opening Statements Senator Biden called the hearing to order by expressing his hope that the 10 plus 10 over 10 (10+10-10) concept could create the possibility of expanding beyond Russia the activities that will be carried out within the Group of Eight's (G-8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Materials (Global Partnership). Although it is unclear if 10+10-10 will encourage greater spending by the US, he hoped that it would at very least add leverage to the US position that its allies should contribute more resources. Comparing the threats of Iraq using weapons of mass destruction and Russia losing hold of its WMD, he expressed his opinion that the latter was a more clear and present danger. With only $7 billion devoted to assistance by the US so far, Senator Biden stated that more help needed to be provided by the US and its allies. In the Senator's view, the major issue in need of resolution was the establishment of a finalized framework agreement to ensure that the assistance provided by G-8 states was properly managed. He also asked several additional questions: How will the G-8 implement the agreement? How will current programs in Russia be affected by the new assistance? How can more funding be leveraged for nonproliferation activities? Will debt-for-nonproliferation swaps be contemplated as a primary means of funding? How will the activities of various G-8 countries be coordinated? How will progress be benchmarked? Senator Lugar followed up this statement by agreeing that the root of the Iraq threat is the acquisition by Saddam Hussein of WMD and related materials, and that it was just one proliferation problem among many. While terrorism was a vague threat in 1991, he argued that it now had become a truly concrete and real concern. While Russia is a key source for material that would magnify the terrorist threat, Lugar argued that WMD sources in other states needed to be considered as well. To tackle this global problem, a global coalition would be needed. The Senator argued that 10+10-10 could accomplish a great deal by doubling funding, but that its success was in no way assured because of the difficulty in persuading allied states to create more obligations in their budget during years when a lack of fiscal flexibility is the rule. Although the recent meeting of G-8 senior officials in Ottawa re-affirming the commitment to 10+10-10 heartened Lugar, he believed that greater US leadership is required. Additionally, Russia had to overcome bureaucratic obstacles to help implement the agreement. Without a Russian commitment to an umbrella agreement covering all 10+10-10 activities, successful coordination of the G-8 program would be difficult. Panel One John Bolton started his statement by identifying recent progress in re-shaping the US-Russia strategic relationship. He identified the peaceable US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions as examples of significant progress. At this point, Senator Biden broke in and sought to reassure Bolton that the current delays in the ratification of the Moscow Treaty had nothing to do with opposition to the treaty within the Senate, and resulted only from other legislative agenda items obstructing its passage. He expressed his hope that it would be successfully ratified before this session of the Congress ended, and if not, during the lame duck session to follow the November Congressional elections. Bolton added that the Russian Duma would most likely conclude their consideration of the treaty in October or November, and he believed that this would be a major step forward in the relationship between the two states. Bolton next discussed a pair of proliferation concerns involving Russia. First, he argued that controlling the flow of weapons and materials of mass destruction to states of concern like Iran was an important task, and that high-level negotiations between the US and Russia on this matter were ongoing. As a second issue, Bolton discussed ongoing efforts through Nunn-Lugar funding to control Russia's existing WMD stocks. The Bush administration's extensive review of the program gave a very positive assessment to the previous decade of work, resulting in the request of additional funding beyond the level of the previous fiscal year. Although there are many threats were still in need of responses, Bolton stated that not enough resources were available, and that 10+10-10 could make up for the deficit. It remained to be seen how G-8 allies would fulfill their $10 billion commitment. He praised the Canadian government for advancing this concept strongly as the G-8 president, and looked forward to a similar level of commitment from France as it assumes the G-8 presidency this coming year. Bolton also noted the importance of getting non-G-8 countries to commit to the initiative, and he added that engaging Scandinavian countries and their various environmental and security interests in Russia would be especially important. While the announcement of the Global Partnership was a major step forward, Bolton added that work needed to be done in two areas. First, a significant commitment of resources by Russia to securing WMD would be required. Because of the US interest in this outcome, the concept of debt-for-nonproliferation swaps was being strongly highlighted. He praised the Committee for supporting this effort by authorizing the State Department to negotiate a Nonproliferation Investment Agreement with Russia that could advance a debt swap. Because of the skepticism of some G-8 partners to this approach, strong US leadership would be required. Bolton's second matter of concern was the completion of a new umbrella agreement for nonproliferation activities to replace a recently lapsed agreement. It was important for Putin's government to assure ratification in the Duma without the attachment of any crippling amendments to the new umbrella framework. Without such an agreement, G-8 partners would not commit resources to the initiative. As an example, he referred to the case of Japan's inability to inspect the submarine dismantlement work it had paid for, and that it would not contribute more resources until access and transparency issues were resolved. Biden began his line of questioning by asking for an explanation of the operational mechanisms that existed to implement 10+10-10. Bolton responded that each state will run its own programs and that no new multilateral mechanism would be established. With differing interests and bureaucracies, it was best to let each state conduct its own assistance programs. He believed that many US programs and procedures would serve as important models, and that the regular gatherings of senior G-8 officials would help to prevent duplication and overlap. Biden next inquired if a state could establish its own tax and liability procedures for programs and projects in the Global Partnership. Bolton responded that the G-8 agreement has a bare minimum of formal guidelines so that states could go to their legislatures and make appropriate requests within their own legal system. He believed that it was hard to imagine any state making significant omissions to the formulation of cooperation agreements with Russia. The Senator then argued that it was important to have benchmarks, and that he wanted to know how they would be established. Bolton hoped that a common reporting mechanism could be designed in time for the French-hosted G-8 Summit in 2003. Senator Biden asked if the Congress could expect a request for Nunn-Lugar to be increased beyond the current $1 billion level. The Under Secretary responded that over the next decade, the $1 billion amount would continue, and that the US wanted to see more equitable burden-sharing on the agenda with its allies, especially given the significant difference between the $7 billion in US funding over the past decade when compared with the $1 billion provided by other G-8 states. It was important to first get to the level of other states contributing $10 billion, and he was concerned that if the US gave more funding over the next decade, it would be difficult to convince allied states to contribute their share. He also argued that it was important to ensure that Russia could absorb funding beyond the $20 billion level over the next decade. Senator Lugar began the next round of questioning by underscoring the need for progress on the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction site. He argued that everyone in the government, including the President, seemed to be concerned that this program was not moving forward. He identified Congressmen Hunter and Weldon in the House Armed Services Committee as the barriers to the project, and urged the administration to weigh in heavily to move Russian chemical weapon destruction forward. Lugar also requested information from the State Department on how varying commitments of funding would be stretched out over the coming decade of Global Partnership activities. He hoped that an opportunity could be found to advance agenda items that the US has so far been unable to pursue. He referred to the example of the equipment provided by the US that can only be used for the dismantlement of 24 strategic nuclear submarines because of a lack of authority for the Defense Department to engage in non-strategic weapons dismantlement activities. With general-purpose submarines in Russia also posing a major threat, he hoped that 10+10-10 could get Japan and the Scandinavian states more heavily engaged in related activities. After this request, Lugar asked Bolton if it was possible to identify the commitments other G-8 states had so far made to the Global Partnership. He responded that several of the states had not yet made any public commitments, and that there was concern over the amounts of funding so far announced by several states given the size of their economies. He did note, however, that differing priorities could already be identified, for instance that Germany would probably be unwilling to support MOX as an option for plutonium disposition, although this might be preferred by the United States. Senator Lugar then noted that he would seek follow-up hearings to track the progress of G-8 activities. Bolton agreed with him that it was very important because G-8 successes can be important incubators for new ideas. Lugar then referred to the recent successful removal of highly enriched uranium from the Vinca research reactor in Serbia, and noted that 24 more sites worldwide had been identified that pose a similar threat. Unfortunately, the US lacks authority to apply Nunn-Lugar funds to states like Pakistan where other proliferation problems exist. He urged the State Department to work on overcoming resistance to the idea. He also asked the State Department to closely examine the actual effectiveness of existing restrictions on Nunn-Lugar, and whether or not many of them should be removed in order to help the administration combat terrorism more successfully. Bolton agreed with the Senator's analysis. Senator Biden followed up these questions by asking Bolton to identify the financial commitment expected of Russia in 10+10-10. He responded that no quantitative assessment existed, and that the most important thing was a commitment to establishing the local infrastructure to make these projects possible. He also argued that it was important that Russia ensure that assistance be spent effectively in order to avoid situations like the recent case of the unused US-funded liquid rocket fuel destruction facility. Bolton added that reciprocal funding was not expected by the administration. The ratification of the umbrella agreement was also an expectation on Russia. Biden next stated for the record that if he retains the chairmanship of the committee, he planned to make nonproliferation activities a committee priority, and that he hoped to have hearings on related matters on a monthly basis during the next Congress so as to highlight the importance of this agenda in protecting security. Panel Two John Wolf of the State Department began his testimony by identifying the agreement at Kananaskis as an important set of objectives for the pursuit of international security that go well beyond their fundraising importance. Because they have applicability beyond Russia, they will serve as important principles to prevent commerce in WMD. Wolf discussed the State Department's contribution to this progress through a variety of existing programs. He identified the State Department's commitment to the International Science and Technology Center in Russia, the chemical and biological engagement program, as well as the extension of the Soviet Scientists Act as important means of reducing the threat of the transfer of Russia's knowledge of various WMD. Wolf also emphasized several anti-smuggling programs of the State Department in securing Russia's WMD at the borders with detection equipment while also strengthening its export control regulations. Finally, he identified the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund as a means of rapid, flexible response to WMD threats, and identified Project Vinca and the supply of radiation detection equipment to Turkey's border guards as recent successes in this program. He concluded his statement by agreeing that resolving transparency and access issues were very important to nonproliferation success in Russia, and that the State Department was working hard to gain access to still off-limits biological weapons sites, particularly Kirov-200 to which Senator Lugar was denied access on a recent trip to Russia. The US was also seeking information from Russia on its multi-vaccine resistant viruses. Lisa Bronson opened her testimony by referring to the role the Defense Department had played in improving Russia's ability to account for, transport and store its materials. She hoped the Global Partnership could significantly expand these successes. In working with G-8 allies to smooth over obstacles to additional funding, she hoped the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement with Russia would serve as an important template for the negotiation of future agreements. By sharing existing procedures with other states, she hoped the Defense Department could contribute to global security. Bronson added that the Defense Department continued to be concerned that the Russian government was not being entirely forthright in its commitment to existing treaties banning certain WMD, and for this reason, more stringent guidelines had been established by the administration for collaborative research dangerous pathogens. She hoped to be able to share these guidelines with other G-8 states. Additionally, she referred to concerns that Russia was not providing full disclosure on its chemical weapons program, despite the significant investment already made in construction of the pilot destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, an investment totaling $229 million so far, in addition to $126 million requested for Fiscal Year 2003. Because it would take a long time to gather all of the information regarding Russia's chemical weapons program, she argued that a waiver of Congressional conditions was required to meet national security goals. She also underscored the importance of Europe's contribution to this site, including $4 million from Canada, $18 million from the Untied Kingdom, $7 million from Italy, $1.3 million from Germany, and $1.8 million from other EU states including the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. She concluded by noting that the Defense Department can share large amounts of information with Global Partnership allies, including details on previous and existing defense conversion activities, "rules of thumb," and necessary steps to successfully complete projects in Russia. Linton Brooks of the National Nuclear Security Administration next stated that the Global Partnership was an important priority of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, as recently underscored in a speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference. He hoped the Energy Department's Nunn-Lugar activities would advance over the next decade, and emphasized that significant work remains to be completed, especially with large stocks of fissile material poorly guarded and three nuclear reactors still producing plutonium in Siberia. He saw progress in the effort to convert the nuclear research reactor in Uzbekistan, but he was still concerned with the challenge of securing its weapons grade uranium. Brooks identified the disposition of Russia's 34 metric tons of plutonium as a major Energy Department priority, in addition to final decommissioning of a plutonium breeder reactor in Kazakhstan, as well as the properly re-directing Russia's scientific knowledge on WMD to peaceful ends. Finally, he hoped the efforts to return nuclear research reactor fuel to Russia from other states, and also to secure radiological sources, would be successful. Brooks called for a realistic assessment of Global Partnership efforts. To be realistic, Russian roadblocks to implementation needed to be overcome. He pointed to the Energy Department's experience with these problems, including tax and liability restrictions preventing a more rapid downblending of highly enriched uranium, and lack of access within Russia's closed cities and serial nuclear production facilities. If Russia did not work seriously at resolving these and related access and transparency problems, he was concerned that the Global Partnership could not succeed. Senator Biden initiated the questioning of the panel by asking Amb. Brooks to discuss the location and security status of Russia's 34 metric tons of excess plutonium. He responded that it could be found throughout the Minatom complex. Discussing broader Russian stocks of fissile material, including weapons grade uranium, Brooks explained that basic upgrades had been completed on 80 to 90% of the material, and that he hoped that comprehensive upgrades would be completed throughout Russia by 2008, three years ahead of the original schedule due to the current goodwill between the Energy Department and Minatom. Biden then analogized the government effort to secure WMD in Russia to the large bureaucracy that emerged around the war on drugs in the United States. As the US began to engage other states both as partners and targets for preventing trafficking in WMD, he hoped that the administration would finally spell out its priorities in written form, something it had not done. He expressed concern that there was a major disconnect between management of the activities and the goals they sought to accomplish. The Senator then asked for details on the Energy Department's current goals and priorities. Brooks answered that the security of fissile materials is the priority of the Department of Energy, and that it was most important to cease the production of new materials, especially through the successful shutdown of the plutonium production reactors in Siberia. Beyond this goal, he hoped to consolidate fissile materials in fewer sites that would be comprehensively secured. Brooks also explained that the ability of Russia to absorb more funding in this area would be a major challenge, and that for fissile material security, G-8 support may not entirely be necessary. He also noted that the HEU Purchase Agreement was another priority, in addition to the return of research reactor fuel to Russia, which would require significant diplomatic and technical effort. Looking to interactions with other states, Brooks referred to the engagement of Japan in nuclear fuel cycle reform, and that rather than providing funding, best practices would be shared. He summarized by noting that the near-term priority is to protect materials that could be used in weapons, and the longer-term priority was to decrease the amount of material overall. Biden responded to Brooks' statement by noting that by laying out priorities, specific impediments could be more readily overcome, and that members of Congress could do a more effective job of calculating actual financial need than the administration. Amb. Wolf responded to this point by stating that the difficulty with articulating some priorities is their evolutionary nature. In the post-9/11 context, many new problems have been defined, and some issues like the security of biological and radiological materials are virtually unbounded. He hoped that efforts by the US government, the IAEA, and private groups to define the nature of various problems would be helpful. Biden agreed that the major issues may change based upon the methods of attack that terrorists appear to be pursuing. He also sought to make clear that by making a request for more details on US priorities, he was not seeking accountability as much as to understand the state of thinking occurring within various government agencies. He hoped the committee could gauge its ability to better assist the accomplishment of the threat reduction agenda. Bronson responded by stating the administration had spelled out some general priorities in its review of the threat reduction agenda, and that shifts in thinking were visible in the funding increases for chemical weapons destruction and border security. Senator Lugar argued in response that despite the administration's request for more chemical weapons funding, the President had taken too little action to clear the hurdles that had emerged in the appropriations process. Lugar also agreed with Senator Biden that the Congress could add a great deal to the articulation of threat reduction goals and priorities. Biden then explained that planners within the various agencies frequently have their perspectives limited by the amounts of funding they expect to receive, and that by adding more funding, Congress can enhance the articulation of those goals. Senator Lugar agreed with this sentiment and reminded the witnesses that the first President Bush was unsure that the pursuit of threat reduction assistance in Russia was a path he wanted to pursue. Panel Three Kenneth Luongo of the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council began his testimony by arguing that despite the many difficult circumstances faced by overall US-Russia relations in the past decade, the threat reduction agenda had accomplished a great deal in securing Russia's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, dismantling and securing various parts of the infrastructures that supported them, and finding peacetime employment for tens of thousands of Soviet weapons scientists. He argued, however, that despite this good news, many problems persisted in implementing certain programs successfully, as exemplified by the continuing lack of knowledge about the true scope of the Soviet biological weapons complex. The Global Partnership provided important principles for advancing the agenda further, but a look at existing funding commitments by other G-8 partners and the EU demonstrated that $5 billion was still missing from the $10 billion that was supposed to be made available. Luongo was also concerned with the loopholes that existed in the agreement, which may allow for the counting of unspent contributions made prior to the agreement toward the total commitment. Considering debt swaps as an alternative source that could make up for the lagging commitment of funds, Luongo worried that the attitudes of various G-8 states on this front might not match up given expressed policy positions on debt reduction prior to the emergence of the concept of a debt-for-nonproliferation swap. He cited the potential lack of support for debt swaps by Germany and Japan, the possible support of Italy and France, and the unknown positions of the United Kingdom and Canada. He also referred to the possibility that Russia itself may be concerned that a debt swap might raise inflation and undermine its credit rating. Luongo concluded this point by arguing that the utilization of this potential mechanism for the funding of threat reduction must be carefully considered. Luongo then argued that funding priorities under 10+10-10 must be better evaluated. He referred to the lack of firm commitment to reducing the possibility of brain drain by finding peacetime work for former Soviet scientists. With downsizing such a high priority, more and more scientists may become dislocated, and existing re-employment programs have not solved all the problems. While the G-8 is concentrating significant resources on fissile material disposition, with the EU possibly committing $1 billion to plutonium disposition alone, Luongo suggested that funding needed to be distributed more evenly to other programs that also reduced proliferation threats. In conclusion, Luongo asked the committee to consider five questions in its review of 10+10-10. First, are the projects that have been identified for support those that are most urgently in need? Second, will the initiative be successfully coordinated, and more importantly will it fill in for efforts where the US is not currently active enough? Third, what steps will Russia make to ensure that this initiative moves forward? Fourth, will other G-8 states really find $10 billion to commit to the initiative? Finally, will the strength of US leadership for threat reduction persist throughout the decade during which this program will go forward? Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative next discussed the enormous opportunities that could be created with 10+10-10. She argued that with the $20 billion that could be brought to bear on securing WMD in Russia and the former Soviet Union, objectives could be achieved that as a whole will be greater than the sum of their parts. She called for a comprehensive strategic approach to implementation of the agreement that would consider the special capabilities and concerns of the individual G-8 partners. Holgate advocated thirteen steps that could be taken within the G-8 framework to advance nonproliferation and threat reduction goals: a pooling of funds for projects, including debt-for-nonproliferation swaps; accounting for and properly securing Russia's sub-strategic nuclear weaponry; "adopting" a closed city and providing it with more comprehensive support, potentially starting with Sarov; strengthening Russia's border controls against traffic in WMD; dividing the labor on fissile materials security by focusing the US on military sources and Europe on civilian materials; completing a global cleanout of fissile materials located outside of Russian and American borders; successfully converting Soviet-designed research reactors to use low enriched uranium fuel and securing the highly enriched stocks currently in use; accelerating the blend down of HEU to LEU fuel; contemplating the purchase of plutonium in a similar fashion to the HEU Purchase agreement to ensure its security; strengthening the chemical weapons destruction facility construction process by truly multilateralizing it; engaging Europe's biotechnology sector more fully in securing Russia's biological weapons sector; enhancing European and Japanese involvement in the dismantling of general purpose Soviet submarines; finding ways to apply non-security assistance to security issues. Ms. Holgate then moved on to discuss the legal impediments to 10+10-10, especially the many certification requirements that still get attached to threat reduction assistance. She praised the Committee for its work in trying to move past these restrictions, and hoped that various contracting requirements and visa restrictions could be overcome. She called on Russia to consider its own role in this process, especially its need to modernize its legal and regulatory infrastructure to facilitate threat reduction activities. Next, she argued that the dialogue group of the G-8 that concentrates on 10+10-10 should be very busy, and that she hoped they would release year-end Presidential reports from each G-8 member state about its activities in implementing the Global Partnership. Most important, Holgate argued, was the design of an explicit plan to engage non-G-8 states in the Global Partnership. In conclusion, she warned of a discussion she had with Zinovyy Pak, Director of the Russian Munitions Agency, who explained how the possibility of G-8 funding was making some officials within the Russian government argue that their agencies did not need to contribute to the chemical weapons destruction activities of his office. With this attitude present, she warned that the Russian government was paying too much attention to international planning for threat reduction, and not creating its own priorities. Heading off this attitude would be important for G-8 leaders who sought to make the Global Partnership agenda move forward. Senator Lugar began his questions by expressing his belief that a good faith effort exists in Russia to implement the Global Partnership, as was evident in the Duma's significantly increased funding for chemical weapons destruction. He agreed that too little attention was being placed on securing WMD knowledge in Russia's scientific field, and referred to his experience with ISTC work in Kirov that had directed offensive skills toward defensive purposes by employing former bioweapons scientists in the design of a response to an anthrax outbreak. He also referred to the work at the St. Petersburg Institute of Highly Pure Preparations to design prophylaxis to a terrorist anthrax attack. In Senator Lugar's estimation, a transition of Soviet WMD knowledge to peaceful purposes was possible, but he wanted to know how existing problems could be overcome. Luongo responded that each complex has its own unique problems, but that across all of them, there was the possibility that scientific skills could be put to good work, even if this work did not have an inherent market value. Enormous liabilities in Russia make it difficult to invest in projects that can have commercially-realizable benefits, but a middle ground was possible, similar to the one the Senator had experienced in Kirov in which scientific skills were put to work on real world problems. Lugar appreciated this sentiment, and added that Russia's scientists can go anywhere, but many will choose to stay at their current locations if it is possible to find alternative employment. Lugar then asked Holgate to comment on the state of Russia's biological weapons infrastructure and what could be done to secure its considerable knowledge of this form of WMD. She responded that many bio-defense activities have important, non-defense related spillovers, especially when the improvements in public health systems and basic understandings of the human immune system are contemplated. The value added from bio-security activities was truer in this context than it has been so far in the nuclear weapons field. Holgate also suggested that Europe's contribution to bio-defense in Russia could be more substantial as its governments have significant influence over indigenous biotechnology firms than is present in the US. Focusing on US work specifically, she argued that President Bush had agreed with President Putin during the November summit to advance cooperative bio-defense work, and that this agreement needed more implementation. Luongo agreed with this point, and added that smaller amounts of money could have tremendous impacts in the scientific field where significant urgency persists. Senator Lugar next discussed the prioritization of economic outcomes in President Putin's thinking for Russia, and especially how persuasive he finds any idea that leads to the creation of more jobs. He sought to learn more about Russia's action on debt for nonproliferation, especially potential opposition to it, as he imagined that there would be total support for it. Luongo responded that in certain Russian policy-circles, most visible in the Ministry of Finance, there were concerns that it might not be the right thing for Russia's economy, and that there may be a preference to swap debt for investments in things other than nonproliferation. In any event, he noted that no official statement on the subject had emerged, and that ambiguity so far was the rule. Lugar responded that if some opposition in Russia did exist to a debt-for-nonproliferation swap, the focus on promoting the idea needed to be sharpened. He still perceived the possibility of an economic decline to be serious, and hoped that the optimism about oil prices sustaining Russia's economic transition would be true. With this remark, Senator Lugar concluded the hearing.

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