Report from the Summit of Eight on the Strategy of Global Integration for Peace - June 21, 1997
Report from the Summit of Eight on the Strategy of Global Integration for Peace
June 21, 1997
Denver Summit of Eight
We are committed to a strategy of global integration aimed atfosteringinternational peace and prosperity. To that end, we have continued tobuild on the decisions we have already taken and agreed to broaden ourcommon efforts. Since our last meeting in Lyon, we have strengthened our cooperation on nonproliferation, anti-personnel landmines. transnational crime, counterterrorism, and UN reform. This Progress Report highlightsour achievements in these areas and decisions for further joint action. Wewill continue to discuss these issues over the course of the coming yearand review them again in Birmingham. In keeping with our strong commitment to advance international peace and security, we discussed a full range ofpolitical situations which both complemented and supplemented discussionsby the Heads of the Eight.'
Nonproliferation
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking
We commend the work of the Non-Proliferation Experts Group to fulfill the mandate granted to it at Moscow and Lyon to implement the "Program forPreventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material," agreedto at the April 1996 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in Moscow.
We encourage the undertaking of more enhanced information-sharingand cooperation among our law enforcement, intelligence, and customsservices in the fight against illicit nuclear trafficking, conductedwhenever possible on the basis of already-existing agreements, treaties,and arrangements, as provided for in the advisory "Framework for EnhancedCooperation and Information-Sharing" proposed by Russia and agreed to bythe NPEG at its May 12-13, 1997, meeting.
We endorse the agreement of our nonproliferation experts to establish specific tasks and a means of communication for the "Points of Contact"system called for by the Program, and the corresponding Terms of Referenceand provisional format for the exchange of information on significantillicit nuclear trafficking incidents.
To broaden the scope and effectiveness of our efforts to combat illicit nuclear trafficking, we continue to encourage expandedparticipation in the Program. To this end, we have asked the United States, as current Chair of the Eight, to continue its contacts, initiatedby France, with potential future participants. In order to maintainoverall direction of the Program after participation in it has been expanded. We agreed that the chair should seek to organize periodic meetings of new participants under the auspices of the Eight to discussProgram activities and exchange views on illicit nuclear trafficking. Wewelcome the intention of the United States to organize the first suchmeeting in November 1997 to be held in Vienna.
We welcome the progress made in international efforts to develop nuclear forensics capabilities, under the auspices of the IAEA, as well asthrough the meetings held by the International Technical Working Group(ITWG).
Plutonium Management
We welcome the conclusions of the group of experts, convened pursuant to the April 1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security to examineoptions and identify possible development of international cooperation forthe safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Our experts concluded that the mosttimely and technically viable option is the consumption of plutonium asmixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in nuclear reactors, and as a complementary option,the immobilization of plutonium in glass or ceramic form mixed with high-level radioactive waste. The experts also concluded that interim storage will be required, whatever longer-term management options are selected. These conclusions were also endorsed by the Non-ProliferationExperts Group last November in Paris.
Such an approach to the management of surplus weapons plutonium wouldserve the international community's nonproliferation objectives and wouldmake an important practical contribution to nuclear arms reduction. Thenon-proliferation objective should be given priority in the planning andimplementation of cooperation programs. Due consideration should also begiven to technical, economic, financial, environmental and other relevant factors.
International cooperation will accelerate efforts to address the management of surplus weapons plutonium. We therefore welcome theannouncement by France, Germany, and Russia of their plans, which are opento additional states, to build a demonstration-scale MOX fuel fabricationfacility in Russia. In this regard, we welcome efforts by Canada andRussia, in collaboration with France and Germany, to investigate thefeasibility of producing CANDU MOX fuel. The United States and Russia arealso planning cooperation in the area of converting weapons components tomaterials suitable for disposition, in coordination with otherinternational efforts. Participation in these and other related initiatives is being considered by others among us.
We reiterate the importance of ensuring transparency in the managementof plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes.Implementation of all options should include appropriate internationalverification as soon as it is practicable to do so and stringent standardsof material protection, control, and accountancy, with the objective of building confidence that surplus weapons plutonium will not again be usedfor nuclear explosives or diverted to unlawful purposes. In this context,we welcome the progress reported in the work in Vienna on the elaborationof the "Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium." We also welcome the progress reported by the United States and Russia on their efforts withthe IAEA to agree on measures to submit to IAEA verification weaponsfissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes.
In order to sustain and build upon the momentum generated by these initiatives, developed in the wake of the Moscow Summit, theNon-Proliferation Experts Group should begin discussion of possiblearrangements for coordinating and implementing plutonium managementefforts. The Non-Proliferation Experts Group should submit a report to theHeads by next year's Summit in Birmingham.
