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Summary of ISTC Project 1689p: Detection Of Signatures Of Undeclared Nuclear-Weapon Activities Through Environmental Monitoring

Summary of ISTC Project 1689p
Detection Of Signatures Of Undeclared Nuclear-Weapon Activities Through Environmental Monitoring

(Period of Performance: from 1 May 2000 to 31 December 2000, for 8 months)

Alexander Victorovich Smirnov
Project Manager,
RFNC-VNIITF named after Acad. E.I. Zababakhin

This work was performed under ISTC Project and supported financially through the Partner by the Alton Jones and John Merck Funds, USA

January 2001

ISTC Project 1689p

DETECTION OF SIGNATURES OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR-WEAPON ACTIVITIES THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

(Period of Performance: from 1 May 2000 to 31 December 2000, for 8 months)

First Deputy Director of RFNC-VNIITF named after Acad. E.I. Zababakhin

R.I. Voznyuk
Project Manager, Deputy Head of Center for Systems Research and Development of RFNC-VNIITF named after Acad. E.I. Zababakhin

A.V. Smirnov

RFNC-VNIITF* named after Acad. E.I. Zababakhin, RF Minatom

Verification approaches, methods, and technologies for nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime, which are predominantly based on the application of environmental monitoring, are reviewed in the Project.

In the course of the Project implementation the new IAEA safeguards system was analyzed and general review of up-to-date verification approaches and technologies for nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime, including remote monitoring technologies for the environmental objects was made.

Substantiation of theoretical basis of monitoring technique is given in the Final Report under the Project, as well as the review of the results obtained in the field experiment conducted within the framework of monitoring activities in 1995-1996.

Keywords: non-proliferation, monitoring, undeclared nuclear-weapon activity, explosion experiments, sampling, analysis of samples.

* 456770, Ulitsa Vasilyeva 13, Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk Region, Russia
Phone: (351-72) 326-25, Fax: +7 (351-72) 320-77
E-mail: bkv@vniitf.ch70.chel.su

The work has been accomplished by the following institutes and collaborators

Participated Institute:

Russian Federal Nuclear Center - Institute of Technical Physics named after Acad. E.I. Zababakhin (ZRFNC-VNIITF)

456770, Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70), Chelyabinsk Region,
Ulitsa Vasilyeva 13, Russia
Phone: (351-72) 326-25,
Fax: +7 (351-72) 320-77
E-mail: bkv@vniitf.ch70.chel.su

Foreign Partner:

Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC)

H-102, Engineering Quadrangle, Princeton University, Princeton, New-Jersey, USA
Phone: (609) 258-5190
Fax: (609) 258-3661
E-mail: kluongo@princeton.edu

1. Summary of the Project

1.1. Possible Clandestine Activities

One of the proposed techniques for the detection of clandestine nuclear activities related to the production of nuclear weapons, is environmental sampling, or environmental monitoring. In the wide sense of the term it includes the collecting of different kinds of samples from laboratories, factories and other kinds of buildings and the environment outside buildings, and the subsequent analysis of these samples. The signatures sought for are directly related to the specific process sought for. Such are uranium with isotopes, actinides, fission products and possibly chemicals needed for chemical processing.

Basically, different experts review processes associated with uranium mining and the related chemical processing, uranium enrichment and the related chemical processing. For plutonium-based activities they are looking for nuclear reactor operation and fuel reprocessing. Such types of activities as transportation of fissile materials, nuclear weapons production and testing are practically out of consideration. Apparently, this is due to traditional line in IAEA activities dealing with verification of nuclear material diversion, as well as the absence of practical experience in technologies related to the creation of a specific nuclear warhead.

Infrastructure can provide signatures of clandestine activities. A clandestine system set up to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) must have many components, including uranium mines, milting, (usually) conversion to UF6, enrichment, and conversion to metal. Each of these cannot normally be built on a small scale, so that there would be several large facilities that would be difficult to hide. The larger and more industrially developed countries could hide such facilities better than the less developed countries.

Plutonium production systems would usually require all of the above stated plus reactor fuel fabrication, moderator production, reactor facility and fuel reprocessing. Again, these are not small facilities, and are not easily hidden.

From the experience we know that for the reasons of safety and security the nuclear weapon countries have placed production facilities in remote locations. However, these facilities need power, transportation and (usually) water. The facilities and their utilities are generally easily observed in satellite photography.

1.2. On Strengthening Safeguards Regime through Verification of Non-Nuclear Technologies for Nuclear Weapon Development

The analysis of approaches to and verification technologies of nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime allows the following conclusions to be made:

Effective and timely detection of undeclared nuclear activity is a complicated, laborious, and costly effort, requiring a serious scientific and experimental study to be performed. To date, it has not been resolved up to the end;
Currently available and proposed verification approaches and techniques are based, generally, not on the detection and providing evidence of undeclared activities, but on verification technologies applied to the already detected objects, i.e. facilities connected, as a rule, with nuclear material production and reprocessing or its storehouses;
In order to resolve the problem of undeclared activity verification it is necessary to apply a system approach, associated with acquisition and further analysis of information covering the entire stages of nuclear weapon creation, beginning with training required specialists, creation of the needed infrastructure, export control of technologies and special equipment, proliferation of information, creation processes and experimental processing technologies for nuclear warheads.

Earlier established safeguards system did not cover many technological processes related to nuclear weapon development. It was oriented only to one stage in the development process - purchase of nuclear components, which is not essentially to be the first. And if one succeeds to secretly pursue it, then further activities of potential designer of nuclear weapon could actually continue beyond any control.

In addition to that, strengthening of safeguards regime is also possible at the expense of non-nuclear technologies, which are necessary for nuclear weapon development. In spite of the undoubted importance of strengthening nuclear material verification, there is a long-felt need to expand safeguards regime through verification of non-nuclear technologies applied for nuclear weapon development. It seems necessary to involve new mechanisms of nuclear weapon non-proliferation deterrence, and they can be find in the realm of special non-nuclear technologies for nuclear weapons.

The experience gained during the development of nuclear munitions, displays that the availability of the required quantity of special nuclear material (plutonium, uranium-233 or highly enriched uranium-235) is not yet sufficient for creating nuclear weapon on the basis of technologies applied for the development of conventional weapons. To attain this goal, a large scope of special research needs to be performed; unique equipment and technologies should be utilized.

Preliminary results of the research display the following technologies can be referred to those ones:

Special hydrodynamic explosion tests;
Development and production of powerful explosives;
Fabrication of large-size parts made of explosives;
Neutron measurements;
Production of special non-nuclear materials;
Development of special neutron sources; and etc.

1.3. Theoretical Basis of Environmental Monitoring Technique Applied for Detecting Signatures of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Activities

1.3.1. Content of Monitoring Technique

The system of environmental monitoring includes a number of procedures and technologies, which should enable obtaining the convincing evidence of undeclared nuclear weapon activities.

On the whole these procedures and technologies can be subdivided into three relatively independent, but interrelated components:

1.3.2. Probable Indicators of Non-Nuclear Explosion Experiments as Prerequisites for Working Out Monitoring Procedure

The development of nuclear explosive device is known to require fissile materials (FM) above all. But availability of FM is insufficient for nuclear weapon (NW) development. The systems are also required, which enable to quickly bring together and in many cases compress a certain FM mass, so that the system with FM and certain encirclement (a reflector) becomes supercritical, i.e. capable to produce fission chain reaction.

The development of "bringing-together" systems, which reliably ensure specified parameters, requires preliminary study of these systems with the application of simulating materials (simulators) instead of FM. Data on simulators and FM compressibility are also needed.

Various high explosive materials (HE) serve as a source of energy for those systems, which utilize the principle of FM compression (implosion).

As a rule, experimental hydrodynamic testing of nuclear explosive devices is done in the open areas of the remote test-sites. General peculiarity of this testing is relatively large number of explosions within the limited region resulting in the contamination of working areas and adjacent territory by specific materials.

High pressure and temperature characteristics of explosive events, large gradients of these values, high velocity of loading cause various aggregation states, complicated physical and chemical processes, fragmentation and crushing of elements and materials in an experimental device. Dimensions of particles formed under those conditions vary from macro fragments of centimeter size up to fine-dispersed particles and micron-range aerosols.

Investigation results indicate that particles of explosion origin are a composite material and contain considerably greater amount of elements, if compared with background particles. Greater content of silicon and iron is a specific feature of background particles.

Investigation results illustrated that reliable identification of explosion products is possible by morphological indicators of separate particles. These indicators are shape and surface character of particles. Particles of products resulting from non-nuclear explosion of implosive nuclear warhead are characterized by:

smooth surface or moiré surface with metallic glitter;
spherical or close to spherical shape with 0.6-50 mm diameter;
formation of 15-25 mm conglomerations out of particles having spherical shape with the diameter of the order ranging from 0.00 up to 0.0 fractions of mm;
considerably higher, if compared with the background (twice as much and even more), content of uranium, materials-simulators and chemical elements constituting nuclear devices.

The following types of analyses can be used to detect indicators of those experiments for further development of methods and procedure of sample analysis:

analysis of background characteristics of a locality;
element, isotopic and chemical analysis of samples;
analysis of morphological signatures of particles having explosive origin.

1.4. Monitoring Results in Field Experiment

1.4.1. Results of Analyses on Evaluation of Specific Elements Concentrations in the Environmental Objects Samples

For experimental check of the possibility to detect indications of undeclared nuclear weapon activities the following procedure of environmental objects (EO) monitoring was proposed (Fig. 1).

Sampling was performed in 8 bearings of a line within the radii 2.5; 5.0; 7.5; and 10 km from the center of the test site at the adjacent territory.

Comparison of uranium concentrations in the samples with environmental background parameters indicates maximal fourfold excess of uranium in the samples.

Figure 1. Block Diagram of Monitoring Procedure for Environmental Objects (EO)

Comparison of analysis results with background parameters of environmental samples indicates approximately two times excess of lead content in soil in several points, and in vegetation - approximately 1.3 times excess.

Beryllium and tungsten concentrations were also measured. But in regard to these elements it is required to improve background parameters.

In March 1996 in the vicinity of experimental test site several snow samples were taken with the aim to study transport processes for aerosol explosion products and elaborate techniques of particle extraction from the environmental objects samples.

In this connection it is necessary to emphasize two circumstances. Firstly, aerosol particles fall-out during winter months occurred on the practically clean spreading surface - snow, and this fact permitted to hope for the application of relatively simple methods of particle extraction. Besides, the results of previous experiments during many years did not affect the particle fall-out that allowed having an outcome in the "pure" form within six winter months. Secondly, the detection of background anomalies due to the results of analysis of environmental object samples occurred under conditions of relatively small number of experiments and small amount of specific elements released into atmosphere during the period under review.

Due to the above stated circumstances - small number of experiments and clean spreading surface - one can suppose that environmental contamination connected with explosion testing during winter period shall in its quantitative parameters correspond to contamination resulted from similar experiments at the test site to be conducted by a state proceeding to the development of its own nuclear explosive devices. This enabled to examine the monitoring methodology in case of limited number of experiments conducted.

Sampling occurred within the radii from 0.02 km up to 7 km from the center of test site on the adjacent territory.

Total of 29 snow samples were taken.

Analysis of uranium and lead concentration distributions over the territory of experimental test site and around it displayed:

1. Concentration of lead distribution over the territory is in complete correspondence with climate characteristic of area under examination in winter period. In winter the predominant wind direction is west and south-west. Within the territory of experimental test site the values of lead concentrations are increased from south-east direction toward north-east, north and north-east directions.

Considerable increase in lead concentrations can be observed at the distance of 5-7 km from the center of test site along the line north-west - north - north-east - east.

Such pattern of distribution of lead concentrations can be explained presumably by the fact that the principal fall-out of aerosol particles from the explosion cloud occurs at the distance of about 5-7 km from the explosion epicenter.

By virtue of the fact that the lead has low boiling point, presumably, its major part evaporates and then condensation of lead aerosol vapor from the explosion cloud occurs at the specified distances.

2. Distribution of uranium concentrations within the experimental test site territory has not any noticeable regularity in an explicit form. This can be explained by the fact that the considerable part of uranium, as compared with lead, is broken down in explosion into small and large fragments, which scatter into different directions from the epicenter of explosion within the area of several tens of meters.

Nevertheless, the averaged character of uranium distribution in the locality shows the tendency identified for lead. It is especially notable for points 1-8 locating along the perimeter of experimental test-site at the distances of 5-7 km (Fig. 5.2). As for lead, the uranium concentration increases from the South to the North and from the West to the East, that corresponds to the season wind distribution.

3. Values of uranium and lead concentrations in the vicinity of the experimental test site are greater by several fold than background values of these elements.

By this the fact of conducting special explosive experiments has been proved once more.

1.4.2. Determination of Uranium Isotopic Composition

Measurement of uranium isotopic composition was performed by mass-spectrometric technique based on spatial separation of a beam of positive ions, moving in transverse uniform magnetic field, into ion packages with different mass-to-charge ration.

Measurements were done with mass-spectrometer of MI-1201 type with application of triple-filament source of ions. As an evaporator material the tungsten tapes were used, and also an ionizer made of rhenium.

Ion flux recording was done by means of electrometric technique with follow-on recording of mass-spectrum by the electronic chart recorder KSP-4.

Because of uranium low content in the samples, they were previously concentrated.

Calculation of uranium isotopic concentration (in %) was performed by mass-spectrograms.

Comparison of analyses results with natural uranium isotopic composition indicated presence of man-caused uranium in the several samples that was proved by lowered, up to 1,5 times, content of U235.

1.4.3. Morphological Analysis

The main focus of particle morphological analysis was working through the techniques of particle extraction from the environmental samples.

Realistically evaluating difficulties that could be encountered in searching particles of micron sizes in the environmental samples, the decision was made to conduct investigations in two directions simultaneously:

Elaboration of particle examination techniques and study of their (particles) properties using a special material, which comprises finely dispersed powder prepared under special explosion loading conditions;
Elaboration of particle extraction directly from the environmental samples.

This approach held out a hope of reducing time needed to work through morphological analysis techniques and conduct search of particles in the environmental samples not in hit-and-miss fashion, but taking into account the results of investigation into real particle properties.To isolate concentrates (U, W, Pb, Be) in the form of micro particles from the explosion product samples without changing their state, suspended matter generation in water (fractionation) and treatment by surface-active agents were employed.Morphological analysis of particles indicated:

samples and products of their treatment by water and surface-active liquids consist of the powder, which involves particles of different size and shape (elongated, round, with sharp angles);
the largest particles - 0.5-0.7 mm, medium-small particles - £ 100 mm, quite distinguishable particles £ 5 mm;
small particles (tens and hundreds of mm) constitute conglomerates of even more superfine particles, in which, as a rule, U, Fe, and Al are detected. To identify distribution zones of these elements separately seems not feasible (i.e. there is an alloy), their content at the surface of a particle is different as recorded. This is inherent both with rather large conglomerates (~ 40-60 mm), and small ones (5-15 mm);
particles of sizes less than 1-2 mm have, as a rule, a round regular shape, particles with sizes more than 5 mm have the irregular shape - in the form of cubes, petalous formations, shapeless lumps.

The results of morphological analysis of particles conform to each other and indicate the man-caused character of their origin.

1.4.4. Element Analysis of Aerosol Products

Element analysis was performed with the help of a spectrograph STE-1 with arc initiation of spectra (destructive method) and micro roentgen-spectral electron-probing analyzer JXA-5? (non-destructive method).

Results of spectrogram decoding showed that the samples analyzed are identical to each other in quality composition and content of elements detected. Uranium is the base of samples. Among extrinsic elements with concentration above 1 % of mass, boron, aluminum, iron, beryllium, magnum, silicon, copper, and carbon were identified.

The obtained results indicated joint presence of widespread structural materials - uranium, iron, and aluminum, along with other elements of interest (Be, Pb, B) in the objects under study.

Uranium, iron, aluminum, silicon, copper, and also lead and tin (approximate series in decreasing order) were detected by means of electron-probing analyzer. In one particle similar to a fragment of size ~ 0.6'0.7 mm, the uranium content was detected at the level up to 95 %, iron - ~ 1.5 % and localized silicon impurities.

Conclusion

1. The results of study on the development of environmental monitoring methodology to be applied for the detection of undeclared nuclear weapon activities allowed the following:

Identify monitoring technique composition.
Detect potential indications of non-nuclear explosion tests.
Determine the approach to creation of simulation models for material dispersion processes at explosion tests, atmospheric transport and fall-out of aerosols and particles onto the surface.
Compile recommendations on sampling technology and procedures, sample analysis techniques and the required equipment.

2. Practical evaluation of methodology performed on the basis of the results obtained during examination of a territory adjacent to RFNC-VNIITF experimental test-site, proved the correctness of principles, methods, and technological procedures laid in its foundation and also its structure as a whole.

3. It is expedient to develop monitoring methodology in two major thrusts:

Simulation of dispersion processes, atmospheric transport and fall-out of particles onto the surface under explosion tests related to undeclared nuclear weapon activities.
Elaboration of sampling technique, methods of selection and analysis of aerosol products taken from the environmental object samples to detect undeclared nuclear weapon activities.

4. List of Publications

1. Detection of Signatures of Undeclared Nuclear-Weapon Activities through Environmental Monitoring. Final Technical Report under the Project.

2. Application of Environmental Monitoring for Detection of Signatures of Undeclared Nuclear-Weapon Activities. Article for the journal Science and Global Security.

3. Preliminary Results and Status of Work under the ISTC Projects. Paper presented at the RANSAC Meeting, Moscow, October 3-5, 2000.

The deliverables were submitted to the Partner and to the ISTC in compliance with the Technical Schedule of the Project activities.

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