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The Nuclear Weapons Complex: Meeting the Conversion Challenge
A New Agenda for Action

To evaluate methods of the conversion of the nuclear complexes in Russia and the U.S., a meeting was held by RANSAC in Moscow on May 24-25, 1997 with representatives of five of Russia's key nuclear institutes and the Ministry of Atomic Energy on their conversion desires and needs. This proposal will outline the key issues that were raised during the deliberation and also put forth recommendations for near-term action.

I. The State of the Institutes: Presentations by their Representatives

All Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16)

A 20,000 employee facility with an annual budget of $130 million, Arzamas-16 has decided not to use large cutbacks in employment as a conversion technique to reduce the outflow of scientists who have specialized knowledge of military technologies. Instead, to create jobs, the institute has focused on expanded scientific research and industrial technology development; namely expanded use of existing nuclear reactors, the use of laser technologies, development of tritium targets for ITER, electromagnetic isotope separation.

Also possible is expanded activity related to the protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials, technology for emergency response to nuclear warhead accidents, restoration of radioactively contaminated areas, development of containers for fissile materials and spend nuclear fuel, the disposition of plutomium, and the disposal of high explosives.

All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk-70)

A weapons design laboratory with 15,000 employees and an annual budget of $100 million, Chelyabinsk-70 has focused its conversion efforts on the development and expanded use of advanced computers. Scientists at the laboratory have expertise and facilities to work in the areas of shock waves, detonations, turbulent mixing technology, testing (mechanical impact, vibration, climatic), and computational physics.

Chelyabinsk-70 has three proposals which have potential commercial application: superplastic forming, production of perforators for the oil industry, and the production of fiber optic technologies. Although these projects are in the laboratory's grasp, its leadership expressed frustration with the process of commercializing its technologies.

Mining and Chemical Combine (Krasnoyarsk-26)

A major plutonium production, processing and storage facility which employs 9,400 workers, Krasnoyarsk-26 currently has an annual budget of $30 million. Its conversion approach has three elements: conversion of the core of the two operating plutonium production plants and the ultimate replacement of these reactors, eventual shut down of the existing radiochemical plant when its reprocessing and waste processing missions are completed, and the creation of viable commercial products.

Promising areas of conversion activity include an original technology for the vitrification of plutonium sludge which can be used in the disposition of excess weapons plutonium, the production of super pure and semiconducting materials for the electonic industry, especially silicon.

Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7)

With 15,000 workers and a budget of $50 million a year, Tomsk-7 is a major plutonium production and uranium enrichment facility. Current plans of the facility involve the decommissioning and long-term storage of plutonium production reactors and the conversion and eventual shutting down of the radiochemical plant. A successful project of conversion is the blending down of highly-enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons under a U.S.-Russian agreement.

A number of potentially commercial technologies which Tomsk-7 has developed include plasma technologies to produce ultra-fine powders of metals for use in ceramics products, the creation of strong magnets, and the production iogenic salts for use in rechargeable batteries.

Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-65)

A primary plutonium processing and storage facility, Mayak employs 18,000 people and has an annual budget of $60 million. Current activities of the facility include the storage of highly-enriched uranium and spent nuclear fuel, as well as construction of a storage facility for spent fuel from naval nuclear reactors. The facility is also focused on constructing reactors to dispose of the plutonium that is declared excess.

Other conversion activities now underway are the production of isotopes, technologies for environmental clean-up, and possible cooperation with Chelyabinsk-70 on the production of fiber optic cable.

II. View of the Ministry of Atomic Energy

The Ministry is supportive of efforts to convert its nuclear weapons complex from complete dependency on federal funds and has generated a three point plan for how the transition from weapons to peaceful work should proceed:

• Potentially commercial development of fundamental and applied science
• Development of a new generation of civilian nuclear reactors, safety upgrades at existing reactors, and the construction of new power plants
• Commercial production of equipment for energy transmission, milk processing, and medical application

Funding will come from two sources: first, under the Law on Radiation Dangerous Facilities, 1.5 to 3% of facility revenues are to be directed to conversion activities; and second, revenue of exports of nuclear materials and equipment will also be directed to this end.

III. Problems to be addressed:

1. Access to Training: the people employed in the institutes are trained as scientists, and thus have little if any experience with the market economy
2. Access to Business and Information: the institutes need help with gaining access to business leaders and information on markets, since when left on their own, the institutes develop products without knowing whether the market needs them
3. Access to Facilities: the very limited access policy of the closed nuclear cities is a problem, making it difficult for potential investors to evaluate a product or production line
4. Organization and Planning: there is at present no central plan or strategy for how the conversion of these facilities would occur, outside of the three-pronged outline put forth by Minatom; neither Minatom nor any other governmental organization has given serious consideration to downsizing or consolidating the complexMinatom nor any other governmental organization has given serious consideration to downsizing or consolidating the complex
5. Nuclear Priorities: although nuclear power is an important long-term investment, in the next five to twenty years what will really be needed are technologies to assist the environmental restoration of contaminated sites; any conversion plan must be balanced between long-term objectives and short-term realities
6. Funding Difficulties and Priorities: there are industries in Russian which can utilize the products and technologies created at the nuclear laboratories; these collaborations should be encouraged to compensate for the little funding allocated to the institutes by the government
7. Regional Concerns: environmental authorities from several regions expressed a growing restiveness of the population that lives near highly contaminated nuclear sites

IV. Recommendations for Expaned Joint Cooperation

1. Improve Organization and Planning

·        all programs integrated under a unified plan, yet managed independently

·        a joint Russian-American board of overseers reporting to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission

·        the Russian government creating a cohesive strategy for the short, medium, and long-term transition of its complex

2. Expand Nuclear Security Cooperation

·        establishment of arms control and non-proliferation technical and analysis centers

·        additional collaboration on the issues related to the Helsinki agreement for the negotiation of a START III treaty and also for the highly technical and difficult issues surrounding the creation of a new regime for the transparency and irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process

·        enhanced security for plutonium in storage and during the disposition process

·        additional collaboration in the form of a comprehensive test ban treaty

3. Support Research and Development

·        the international community through the ISTC should seek to expand its project list beyond research in the nuclear area in order to maintain the core competency of basic science research in the Russian nuclear complex

·        the U.S. and Russia should re-negotiate and re-sign the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement to expand its current scope

·        the Agreement for Cooperation, authorizing the U.S. and Russia to cooperated on a broader set of nuclear technologies, must be approved by Congress

4. Encourage Environmental Restoration

·        creation of a throurough contamination assessment at the five institutes in the workshop

·        careful evaluation of proposed technologies which will immobilize liquid raioactive waste and waste in the soil

·        the small U.S. program exchanging information on cleanup methods and technologies should be expanded and the Russian government should make environmental restoration a top nuclear priority

5. Intensify Market Economy Training

·        the evaluation of the commercial potential of each institute

·        the creation of a commercialization incubator at one or more of the facilities, assisting with business plan development, market analysis, and idetification of potential partners and investors

·        recruitment of a new set of aggressive business employees with business, marketing, banking, and legal backgrounds

·        new business teams' participation in conferences with experts outside of Russia

6. Expand Non-Governmetal Interactions

·        The foundation of laboratory-laboratory interaction should be expanded to include joint projects with non-governmental entities; a current opportunity is to have a small number of universities take in a visiting scientist from the laboratories to expose Russian scientists to the larger U.S. independent analysis community

7. Improve Access to Information and Facilities

·        the policy of access to closed cities needs to be revamped in a way that respects the wishes of the population to be protected from crime, but also does not deter potential investors in laboratory technologies

·        a conference on the subject of the U.S. efforts to transform its nuclear complex should be convened, allowing an exchange of information about the difficulties the U.S. has had in downsizing its work force and commercializing its technologies

8. Utilize Indigenous Industries and Capabilities

·        facilitate interactions between Russian industries and the laboratories; currently the oil and gas industries

·        provide tax incentives for industries which invest in the ideas of the nuclear laboratories

·        ensure that there are no legal barriers to cooperation

·        devote a greater share of the income from the highly-enriched uranium agreement to the conversion of the nuclear complex

9. Address Regional Issues

·        any successful laboratory conversion activities should spin-off economic benefits for the local population

·        residents around the closed cities have an increased environmental awareness which needs to be factored into plans for conversion

10. Support Promising Commercial Products

·        Arzamas-16: oil well perforators, automated pipeline controls, environmental restoration technologies

·        Chelyabinsk-70: fiber optic cable, oil well perforators, superplastic forming

·        Krasnoyarsk-26: polycrystalline silicon plant, nuclear waste vitrification plant

·        Tomsk-7: ceramics production, iogenic salts for rechargeable batteries

·        Mayak: environmental restoration technologies, collaboration with Chelyabinsk-70 on fiber optics

V. Funding

Increased use of the HEU proceeds in Russia (5% of total income)	$20 million
Increase in U.S. cooperative security activities (beyond FY97 appropriated levels)	$30 million
Additional international funding for ISTC	$20 million
Percentage U.S. funding for waste clean-up (much less than 1% of total)	$30 million
Total	$100 million with $50 million from Russia and $50 million additional from the U.S.

VI. Measuring Success

• Report to every GCC
• Provide tangible products (fiber cable, perforator, etc.)
• Provide before and after pictures of technologies and factories
• Number of contacts made that resulted in something tangible
• Number of contracts for products
• Amound of new investment
• Number of people employed