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International Initiatives to International Nuclear Security Initiatives in Russia
International Initiatives to International Nuclear Security Initiatives in Russia

J. Raphael Della Ratta
Eighth International Nuclear Materials Policy Forum
Washington, DC
September 27, 2001


While the U.S. views its nuclear cooperative efforts in Russia as a security matter, other nations have established programs in Russian and the Former Soviet Union that focus more on the environmental impact of Russia's nuclear materials and its deteriorating nuclear establishment. Despite the different motivations for working with Russia, there has been some overlap between U.S. and other foreign projects that have proven beneficial to both sides' goals. I'd like to provide an overview of on-going international initiatives with Russia that focus on safeguarding nuclear materials and engaging nuclear experts in peaceful projects.

G-8 Activities

Many of the recent G-8 summits have specifically focused on nuclear issues including: nuclear reactor safety, radioactive environmental dangers, and the threat of nuclear proliferation from the FSU. Beyond making financial commitments to these programs, G-8 countries are also exploring ways to assist Russia in the eventual disposition of its excess weapons plutonium.

Nuclear Reactor Safety
During the Munich Summit in 1992, the G-7 established a multilateral program for financing nuclear safety improvements for countries in Central Europe and the FSU, and in 1993 proposed that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) establish the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) to receive contributions from donor countries for the financing of short-term operational and safety improvements of civilian reactors, specifically the VVER 440/230 and RBMK-type reactors.

NSA played a critical role in officially decommissioning the Chernobyl site in December 2000. In addition to the NSA, the EBRD also administers the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF). This program was established after the 1997 Denver Summit, during which the G-7, European Union, and Ukraine agreed to establish a multilateral funding mechanism to assist Ukraine transform the existing Chernobyl sarcophagus over the destroyed Unit 4 into a stable and environmentally safe system. The objective of the program is to stabilize the existing sarcophagus and to build a confinement facility around it to isolate its radioactive materials from damaging the surrounding environment and water supplies. Stabilization is expected by 2003, while completion of the confinement is anticipated in 2006.

Nuclear Smuggling
During the 1996 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in Moscow, the G-8 initiated the "Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material." The G-8 made the following pledges:

  • Share and promptly disseminate information on nuclear theft and smuggling incidents on a regular basis;
  • Exchange information on significant incidents in this area, especially if sensitive material is involved, and establish appropriate national points of contact for this purpose;
  • Foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among national intelligence, customs, and law enforcement agencies and cooperation to ensure prompt investigation and successful prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking;
  • Exchange experience and assistance to ensure safe and effective nuclear material storage, protection, control and accounting;
  • Maintain effective national systems of export licensing and control, which are important to deter and prevent illicit trafficking;
  • Establish training requirements pertaining to detection of concealed nuclear material, radiation protection, safe handling and transportation of nuclear material and radiation protection, for law enforcement agencies (customs, police) in accordance with their respective tasks and closely coordinate relevant training activities in this area;
  • Aid the exchange of scientific information and data to permit the identification of the origin, history, and route of seized illicit nuclear material;
  • Support efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) not intended for use in meeting defense.
To date, the program's progress has been slow in that is has focused mostly on developing information exchange mechanisms, expanding the number of countries involved, and a series of conferences and development activities related to nuclear forensics. Most of the international efforts to exchange information and consult on possible responses in these areas are now being coordinated by the IAEA.

Plutonium Disposition
Also during the 1996 Summit, the G-8 began to identify possible means of international cooperation to address the management and disposal of plutonium no longer required for defense purposes. Since 1996, G-8 countries have been examining the mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel pathway and/or immobilizing plutonium. France, Germany, Canada, and Japan have all been involved in the investigation of MOX fuel fabrication in Russia.

Now that both Russia and the United States have signed an agreement to dispose 68 metric tons (34 tons each) of excess weapons-grade plutonium no longer needed for defense purposes, plans are just now starting to move forward. Beyond the studies, however, limited funding has been provided.

European Union Activities

The European Union has also focused its efforts largely on nuclear safety issues in Russia.

Nuclear Safety
Including the funds given by EU countries of the G-8 to aid in decommissioning Chernobyl, the EU, through TACIS, has over the period of 1991-1999 committed roughly $640 million to international efforts to improve FSU nuclear safety. A total number of 650 projects have been financed, 450 projects are ongoing and another 200 are in the pipeline. In addition to Chernobyl, other examples of EU efforts include:

  • Enabling continuous on-site assistance at 14 civilian reactor sites in the FSU. The support has centered on the level of design safety, operating and surveillance conditions and the organization of operational safety.
  • Strengthening independent nuclear regulatory authorities and the necessary legal framework. Although the quality and performance of the regulatory authorities varies from one country to another and further work is still needed, the safety culture is being improved in the FSU through more formal and regular dialogue between plant operators and regulatory authorities.
  • Supplying technical assistance in support of possible Euratom loan financing for the safety upgrades of nuclear power plants in final stage of completion (Khmelnitsky and Rovno in Ukraine and Kalinin in Russia).
  • Providing a wide variety of modern safety equipment to Soviet-era reactors including: simulators for all VVER 440 units and to the fast breeder reactor in Beloyarsk; a condenser cleaning system to the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant (NPP); non-destructive testing equipment to several plants; steam generator level control system to the South Ukraine NPP; fire protecting coating to Zaporozhe and to Rovno NPP, pressurizer and steam generator safety valves to Medzmaor NPP.
  • Providing $18.5 million in support of the effort to decommission the Lepse nuclear fuel storage vessel.
The EU plans to continue its nuclear safety program in the FSU well into the next decade.

The Northern Fleet's Lepse Vessel
Beyond reactor safety, the EU has also become involved in securing the Lepse fuel storage vessel, a program that was initiated by Norway. Between 1962 and 1981, the Lepse was used as a service ship at the nuclear icebreaker base in waters in Northwest Russia. Since then, the Lepse has been used as floating storage for spent nuclear fuel from the reactors of nuclear icebreakers. The 624 spent fuel assemblies onboard the Lepse today are under highly unsatisfactory conditions; the fuel has become partially jammed in the holding tubes and now difficult to remove.

What started as a Norwegian initiative to decommission the Lepse has now become an EU project because of the sheer size of the problem. The EU established an international advisory committee to handle the environmental threat posed by the Lepse. The EU expert group appropriated $18.5 million for a technical solution to the Lepse problem. Funding was provided by the EU's TACIS program. Currently, the Lepse is docked, and progress towards decommissioning the vessel has moved slowly. Last year, France and Russia signed a long-awaited liability accord, removing most barriers for the work on decommissioning the Lepse. This liability agreement covers the supply of French equipment for the Russian nuclear industry, including the robotics to remove the damaged spent nuclear fuel stored onboard the run-down storage vessel.

The European Nuclear Cities Initiative

In December 1999, Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a program called the "European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI)." This program is envisioned as a complement to the U.S.-Russian "Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)" in its effort to facilitate economic development and downsizing in the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Like NCI, ENCI will address ways to eliminate the economic strain on key facilities in the Russian nuclear complex, thus eliminating a source of potential leakage of fissile materials and knowledgeable scientists to countries posing a proliferation risk.

After several meetings with the European Union (EU) Committee on Nonproliferation (CONOP), the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed a general framework for European-Russian cooperative efforts in the areas of nonproliferation, environmental cleanup, and energy efficiency. The Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV), an international, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization for scientific and cultural cooperation, has been working with the Italian government, designing projects. The ENCI concept is based on a demand-side approach to meet industry and market needs within Europe---and possibly even local Russian demands.

European financing for closed cities will likely take two forms:

  1. EC funding, by re-orienting current contributions made through the TACIS program and the ISTC program in the closed nuclear cities. Requests could be made for specific closed cities projects that could be financed by these institutions.
  2. The EC could create a separate program, funded on a bilateral basis between individual European countries and Russia, using existing scientific and technological agreements. Under the INTAS program, there is some cost-sharing by Russian entities, so that projects would not be wholly subsidized by European countries.
In order to coordinate the European objectives with the ongoing U.S.-Russian programs and non-governmental activities, the ENCI International Working Group has been established, with membership open to NGOs, government agencies, private companies, academic institutions, and philanthropic foundations. The IWG will focus on the root causes of proliferation concern: chronic financial problems in the closed cities, and significant numbers of excess workers. The IWG will work to identify funding mechanisms that will assist in conversion and restructuring of the complex. Such a diverse membership would create new sources of funding, and new project ideas. The IWG could also provide a central forum for information exchange and coordination of international activities. The first meeting of the IWG meeting is planned for November.

Activities of the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada

In addition to the roughly $36 million the United Kingdom has contributed to the Nuclear Safety Account, a new effort was launched in late 2000, in which the UK government pledged up to $120 million over the next three years for nuclear problems in Russia and the FSU. This budget will cover work in Northwest Russia to decommission Russian nuclear submarines, the UK commitment to plutonium disposition, security, material accountancy and physical protection projects, commitment to the international Chernobyl shelter fund and projects to assist diversity and business development in the closed nuclear cities. Concerning the decommissioned submarines, both sides hope to begin work soon on the construction of a UK-funded interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility in the Murmansk region, costing up to $7.5 million. Discussions about other projects are ongoing, pending the establishment of a legal framework for nuclear cooperation between the UK and Russia.

Norway
Since the days before Soviet dissolution, Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway, have been concerned about dumping of nuclear waste in northwest Russia in the Barents and Kara Sea region. Additional concerns have focused on Russia's many retired and deteriorating nuclear reactor-powered vessels, some of which are still fully fueled, and pose a proliferation threat. In 1994, after conducting a series of studies in search of solutions, Norway developed a "Plan of Action" to address concerns of an aging Russian nuclear fleet in the region. The Plan of Action has four priority areas: 1) safety measures at nuclear facilities; 2) spent fuel management and radioactive waste issues; 3) radioactive pollution in the Barents and Kara Seas; and 4) arms-related environmental hazards.

Plan of Action
As of January 2000, Norway has undertaken 113 projects in accordance to the Plan of Action, spending approximately $36.6 million. Most projects are bilateral efforts with Russia; others have grown into multilateral efforts involving the European Union, such as the decommissioning of the Lepse.

Construction and operation of four special railroad cars for the transport of spent nuclear fuel. Norway provided $3.1 million to build four TK-VG-18-type railway cars to ship maritime spent fuel from the Northern and Pacific fleets to the Mayak plant for reprocessing. All four cars were completed in March 2000. Before Norway had undertaken the project, Russia had only four such railway cars. The lack of specialized railway cars caused a backup of spent-fuel at Mayak and, in turn, slowed the entire dismantlement process. While the project was successful in the sense that the intended physical product was provided, there were disagreements between the Norwegian project manager and the Russian main contractor that ultimately delayed completion.

Modernizing the treatment facility for liquid radioactive waste at Atomflot (Murmansk).
The liquid waste processing facility at Atomflot is capable of processing 1,200 cubic meters of radioactive waste annually. The facility's poor condition prompted a trilateral project (USA, Norway, Russia), called the Murmansk Initiative, to upgrade the existing facility. Launched in 1994, the upgrade is nearly completed. When upgraded, the facility will have the capacity to take on 5,000 cubic meters of low-active waste annually. Norway contributed $2.2 million for the project.

Planning, construction and operation of a special ship for the transport of spent nuclear fuel. Russia needs a specialized vessel for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned nuclear submarines in remote locations in Northwestern Russia to transfer terminals in Murmansk and the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. The ship must be equipped with independent propulsion machinery, a double hull, and other safety equipment, in order to transport spent fuel in containers that are too heavy to be transported by road. The project has been allotted 3,300,000 NOK (roughly $352,500). Originally, both sides planned to build a new vessel, but in 1998, the Russians argued that refurbishing an old vessel, the Amur, would be a less expensive solution. The Norwegians opposed refitting the Amur, an old and polluted vessel, because the cost difference between building a new ship and overhauling an old one was negligible. Further, the Norwegians concluded the ship would be unable to fulfill the tasks required of the specialized vessel. After years of debate over expenses, Minatom agreed in early to the construction of the new vessel. Presently, both sides are in negotiations to determine a timeframe and project plans. The firm Moss Maritime is responsible for the project on Norway's side; the main participants on the Russian side are Minatom and a coordinating body for a few Russian shipyards, called Morskoye Korablestroyeniye (Maritime Shipbuilding).

Modernization and operation of a facility for temporary storage of liquid radioactive waste at Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk. This project entailed upgrading two existing tanks for liquid low-level radioactive waste storage at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk. The project also consisted of modernizing piping systems and control equipment on site. The project, which began in May 1998, was completed in August 1999, costing $4.3 million.

Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Initiative
In addition to its bilateral relationship with Russia, Norway is also involved in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Initiative (AMEC), which includes the U.S., Russian, and Norwegian defense establishments. Established in 1996, AMEC focuses on environmental hazards associated with military activities in the Arctic. To a great extent, AMEC initially complemented the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which, among other things, is assisting in the dismantlement of Russian strategic submarines. The three militaries work together on specific environmental issues associated with the removal and storage of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines being decommissioned and dismantled in Northwest Russia. This spent fuel, if not properly managed, could release significant concentrations of radioactivity into the sensitive Arctic environment and ecosystems. Additionally, this nuclear fuel material poses a serious security issue. In total, Norway planned to provide $1,351,000, while the U.S. planned to commit $4,783.00 and Russia was estimated to provide $2,009,000.

Canada
Bilateral relations between Canada and Russia on nuclear issues were established in 1989 when they signed a nuclear cooperative agreement. In June 1992, both countries launched a three-year, $30 million program called the Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative (CNSI). The main purpose of CNSI was to enhance the short-term safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power stations through technical assistance and safety and regulatory training. Canada established the Nuclear Safety and Engineering Program in which nuclear experts from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) work directly with Russian personnel on RBMK nuclear plant management and safety procedures at a handful of Soviet-designed plants. In addition to CNSI, the Canadian government administers an internship program for high-level officials of Russian regulatory agencies to study nuclear safety issues at its Atomic Energy Control Board. Canada has also started receiving shipments of MOX nuclear fuel under the Parallex Project, which will provide technical information on the performance of Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors to facilitate the disposition of excess U.S. and Russian weapons plutonium.

The Russian Nuclear Complex Conversion Consortium

From a non-governmental perspective, RANSAC's strategy for the closed nuclear cities is to create multiple paths that can facilitate the downsizing and redirection of the scientific expertise within the complex. To this end, RANSAC last year received funding to establish the Russian Nuclear Complex Conversion Consortium. The Consortium has as its goal to create new opportunities between the scientists within the cities and western organizations that seeking to apply the scientists' expertise to specific needs. The Consortium focuses its efforts in three broad areas: nonproliferation research and analysis; business and economic training; environmental management and energy technology research and development.

Currently the consortium has more than a dozen members:

  • The Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
  • The Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia
  • Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions
  • Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
  • Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT)
  • Technical Research Corporation/Technical Research Institute (TRC/TRI)
  • Technology and Systems Inc.
  • Technical Management Company
  • Landau Network-Centro Volta
  • Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University
  • The Analytical Center for Nonproliferation, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)
  • The Harvard Project on Managing the Atom
  • Environmental Defense (formerly known as the Environmental Defense Fund)
  • PNNL Center for Global Security
Progress in the Nonproliferation Center Sector
RANSAC, in cooperation with consortium member Center for Energy and Environmental Studies (CEES) at Princeton University, has worked intensively with four Russian institutes to create nonproliferation analytical centers---two of which are in the closed cities of Sarov and Snezhinsk, the other two are in open cities: Obninsk and Moscow. These analytical nonproliferation centers are designed to employ weapons scientists and improve Russia's contribution to addressing international proliferation dangers. Foundations have provided $280,000 in funding for the centers; DoE has provided $300,000 in FY2000 for the Sarov center and an additional $300,000 in FY2001; $139,000 in FY2000 DoE funding for the Snezhinsk center was recently withdrawn when the contract with the institute lapsed.

Many of the initial research projects taken on by the centers have been completed---the reports on these projects are available on the RANSAC web site. We're currently working to promote these reports, and find avenues for their publication or expansion. Throughout the fall of 2000 and into 2001, as the centers' initial projects were being completed and final reports were being delivered, the Consortium began the process of identifying new proposals and possible western NGO collaborators for additional projects.

Progress in the Business Development Sector
In July 2000, Consortium member Moscow Institute for Physics and Technology was awarded a $915,000 grant from a U.S. foundation to establish a business training school. This school, which is expected to become affiliated with a U.S. business school, is designed to bring scientists from Russia's regions to Moscow for training in business planning, proposal development, and marketing; the school administration also hopes to train scientists in the closed cities in modern business practices. Currently, the business school is seeking an additional $200,000 in funding to support business management education for closed cities personnel.

The consortium has sought to further enhance the appeal of this school to the U.S. government by proposing the school act as a "conversion laboratory." Under this proposal, the "laboratory" would simultaneously develop conversion strategies specific to a particular closed city facility and train its managers for the implementation of those strategies. Such an integrated approach would result in a bottom-up plan that addresses conversion needs in a site-specific, strategic manner. When their coursework is complete, the scientists/managers would be able to return to their city with projects specifically designed to address the unique aspects of that city's situation. However, there has been limited interest from the U.S. government and, as a result, from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy in supporting this initiative. We are continuing to pursue this idea.

Environmental Opportunities
In recent months the consortium has been promoting a concept wherein scientists from the various institutes in the closed cities organize themselves into Consulting Groups. This concept is particularly focused on energy and environmental activities, though it could be applied to any number of other sectors. A large number of successful consulting firms in the West support themselves by conducting research for private firms and government agencies---these Russian groups could do the same. The consulting group concept can maximize closed city talent and create a scientific core that is more attractive to potential customers.

There may be opportunities to create similar consulting groups in the medical and basic science fields as well, and the consortium is looking at the possibility of developing other niche consulting groups. While this concept is, for now, focused on western customers for Russian expertise, it is anticipated that the research conducted and technologies developed will ultimately be able to benefit Russia, once the country is in a financial position to pay for such services.



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